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In 1962 the European Economic Community published a study on the instruments 
of monetary  policy in  the countries of the EEC.  This work has  been  widely used, 
both  by  the  EEC  and  national  monetary  authorities,  and  in  university,  banking 
and  financial  circles. 
The  Community,  which  at  that  time  had  just  passed  to  the  second  stage  of the 
transitional period,  entered the final  phase  on  1 January  1970. 
The experience gained during  the twelve years of the transitional  period,  the need 
for  increasing  integration  in  the  final  phase,  and  the  prospect  of economic  and 
monetary  union  decided  upon  at the Hague  Conference  in  December  1969,  high-
lighted  the  importance,  for  a satisfactory  development  of the Community,  of the 
coordination  of national  monetary  policies  and  the  harmonization  of the  instru-
t~ents employed. 
The  Monetary  Committee  therefore considered  it appropriate to  undertake a new 
study  of the  instruments  of monetary  policy  in  the Community  countries,  and a 
group  of experts was given  the task of examining, at a practical level, how instru-
ments could  be  harmonized. 
As in  1962,  the  Monetary  Committee,  which  entrusted  the  examination  of the 
means  of monetary  action  to  its alternate  members,  was  able  to  lean  heavily  on 
the  cooperation  of  the  Commission's  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Fi-
nancial  Affairs,  and  of national  monetary  authorities.  It would like  to  take  this 
opportunity  of thanking  them.  . 
The  technical  analyses  of  the  instruments  of  monetary  policy  in  each  country 
provided by the national authorities, and which are  the subject of Parts II to VII, 
were drawn up as  of 30 June  1971, and the statistical appendices as  of 31  Decem-
ber 1970.  Obviously  the many  measures  taken  by the member countries  since 30 
June  1971-notably  in  the  field  of external  financial  relations-have  not been 
included in  the analysis.  This  could not have  been  otherwise,  since  the events of 
the  summer of 1971  led the member countries'  monetary authorities to adopt ar-
rangements  which  were  bound to be exceptional,  some  of which  have since  been 
revoked,  and  which,  it is  to  be  hoped in  any  case,  will be  only  temporary.  The 
Monetary Committee  has  in mind besides to  update the study at intervals. 
The  chapters  about  the  different  member  countries  were  discussed  fully  in  the 
Group  of alternate  members of the Monetary Committee,  so  as  to allow  them  to 
be presented on comparable lines.  This contributed to a better mutual understand-
ing  of  the  respective  means  of  action  and  facilitated  the  formulation  of  the 
synopsis  contained  in  the  first  part  of the  study. 
It seemed  desirable  to  present  a  general  view  of the  range  and  development  of 
instruments of monetary policy from  two points of view, firstly  in the light of the 
experience  of the  member  countries  and  of the  progress  that  had  been  made  in 
monetary coordination and collaboration in  the Community, and secondly and more 
important with the prospect in mind of a gradual convergence of member countries' 
policies,  which  will  be  required  during  the  establishment  by  stages  of economic and  monetary  union.  The  first  part  thus  serves  as  both  an  introduction  and  a 
conclusion  to  the  study. 
Greater  emphasis  has  been  given  than  in  19627  to  a  comparison  of  instruments 
within  the  framework  of an  analysis  of the  institutional  and  structural  features 
of national financial systems. The method decided upon led the Committee to tackle 
problems  which  were in  many cases  only touched upon in the previous study. 
{{ Liquidity"7  seen  both  from  the point of view of the general liquidity of the eco-
nomy and  from  the more technical  angle  of the liquidity  of the  banking system, 
was  examined in terms of the various ways in which it is defined - in relation to 
monetary policy - of the different sources contributing to its creation7  of its struc-
ture  and  of its development  in  each  of the  member countries.  This  broader  ap-
proach  makes  it possible  to  produce  a  better overall  picture  of the  role  of the 
various  instruments  of monetary  policy. 
Another aspect  which,  although  sensitive,  could  not be  omitted from  the  field  of 
investigation  concerns  the  objectives  of  monetary  policy.  Although  official  docu-
ments,  and,  in  some  respects,  scientific  literature,  have  relatively  little to  say  on 
this  point,  it is  nevertheless  of basic  importance  for  those  countries aiming  at a 
common  monetary  policy  within  an  economic  and  monetary  union.  The analysis 
presented is a first  attempt to formulate  the general  objectives of monetary policy 
and  to  compare  the  objectives  actually  pursued  in  the  different  Community 
countries.  It  shows  the  road  which  has  to  be  covered  in  order  to  make  these 
ob;ectzves  mutually  compatible  and  to  harmonize  the  instruments  by  which  they 
can  be  attained. 
Comparzson  of the  instruments  used  by  the  member  countries  is  the last  point 
dealt  with  in  Part  One.  It  attempts,  as  objectively  as  possible,  to  bring  out 
the similarities and differences  which exit at present in  this field.  There is a large 
variety ·of instruments,  and  it seemed advisable  for  the sake of clarity,  to distin-
guish  between  those  which  have  a  general  effect  and  those  which  operate  in  a 
more  specific  way.  The  means  by  which  these  are  used  often  reveal  particular 
structural and institutional characteristics which will make their .gradual harmoniza-
tion  in  the  Community  framework  more  difficult.  This  harmonization  is  never-
theless  a  necessary  precondition  for  arriving at a monetary  policy  which  can  lead 
to the achievement of economic and monetary union. 
All those  who  have  worked  on  this  study have  tried  to  contribute  towards  this 
progress  in  a  Community  spirit.  They  hope  that,  in  addition  to  its  immediate 
practical  use,  it may be the starting-point  for  further  study and research,  both in 
circles  responsible  for  monetary  policy and  in  the academic  world. 
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OVERALL  VffiW  OF THE FRAMEWORK, 
THE OBJECTIVES  AND THE 
INSTRUMENTS  OF MONETARY POLICY 
IN THE EEC  COUNTRffiS CHAPTER  ONE 
INSTITUTIONAL AND  STRUCTURAL  ASPECTS  OF  THE 
NATIONAL  MONETARY  SYSTEMS 
Section I  - The institutions 
Para.  I:  The  Monetary  Authorities 
1.  Responsibilities in the matter of monetary policy are divided in the Community 
countries between the central bank, the government and other institutions in ways 
which differ  to a marked extent from one member country to another. 
As  regards the financial operations of the public authorities, especially of the central 
government,  and more particularly their consequences for  the creation of liquidity, 
the  means  of  action  at  the  disposal  of  the  central  banks  vary  from  country  to 
country, but are generally limited. The action of the central banks hinges  moreover 
on credit policy and on the monetary  effects  of movements  of funds  to and from 
foreign  countries.  As  to  the  control  of  banking,  which  does  not  amount  to  an 
instrument of monetary policy, this is  exercised by different organization according 
to  the country concerned. 
In certain countries, the action of the bank of issue in monetary matters is  closely 
tied  up  with  decisions  by  the  public  authorities,  who hold  the  responsibility  in 
the last  resort in  this  field;  in other countries the cet!tral bank occupies  a de jure 
or de facto  position \vhich leaves it great liberty of action. But the policy  applied 
is  ahvays  the  outcome  of  close  collaboration  between  government  and  central 
bank.  In other  respects,  other organizations  are  often  competent  in the  matter; 
these  are  more  numerous  and  their  associations  more  complex  in  certain  states 
than  in  others. 
The legal  provisions  governing the relations, often very complex, between govern-
ment,  central  bank  and  other  organizations,  moreover,  only  give  an  incomplete 
view  of  the  true  situation.  The  possibilities  offered  by  these  provisions  are  not 
ahvays  made use  of in fact  by the government, when they confer on it the power 
of  participating  in  the  elaboration  of  the  policy  of  the  central  bank  or  of  in-
tervening in that field;  and on the other hand a very  large measure  of autonomy 
by the central bank by no means excludes  the possibility that the government may 
require its own views to be taken into consideration. For this reason, in the present 
conduct of monetary policy,  the degree  and  methods  of collaboration between go-
vernment and central bank depend to a large  extent on the personalities involved. 
Furthermore,  coordination  between  the  various  organizations  responsible  is  the 
result  of  well-established  traditions  and  in many  cases  of  the  exercise  by certain 
personalities of responsibilities within several organizations that are legally distinct. 
As  monetary policy is  only one  of the ways,  though certainly an  essential one,  of 
controlling the economy, it is  right that the central bank, whatever the importance 
13 OVERALL  VIEW  - INSTITUTIONAL  AND  STRUCTURAL  ASPECTS 
of  its  role,  should  integrate its  policy  in  a  wider  whole,  or  at least  adapt  it to 
situations in which the simultaneous action of different organizations plays  a part. 
For  this  reason  the  coordination  of  policies  is  of  the  first  importance  and  is 
particularly  desirable  in  cases  of economic  difficulty.  In fact  the latter  could  not 
be  effectively  solved  if monetary .policy  were  not  incorporated  in  a  corpus  of 
coherent  economic  and  financial  measures. 
Germany 
2.  In Germany,  the  fields  of  action  of  the  government  and  the  central bank are 
clearly  demarcated.  The Bundesbank has  the primary  responsibility in the  matter 
of credit policy, and exercises it to a large extent autonomously vis-a-vis  the public 
authorities. As  far as  the policy regarding monetary relations with foreign countries 
is concerned, this comes primarily under the jurisdiction of the government; foreign 
exchange operations  are within the province of the Bundesbank. 
The coordination  of  the  policies  of  the  government  and  the  central  bank  results 
from  the  following  arrangements:  the  Bundesbank  is  required  to  advise  the  Fe-
deral  Government  and  to  provide  any  clarification  asked  for  concerning  any  es-
sential monetary question.  It must, in the field  in which it has  prerogatives of its 
own,  support  the  government's  economic  po,licy,  subject  only  to  the  express  re-
quirement  that  such  support must  be  compatible with its  task of  "protecting the 
currency". 
In fact,  the demarcation of powers between monetary authorities does  not prevent 
decisions  on monetary policy  from  being the subject of frequent  consultation, and 
they  are  arrived  at in general by agreement between the two parties. 
Coordination  is  organized  more  particularly  on  the  institutional  plane,  for  the 
Federal  Government  is  required  to invite  the Governor of the Bundesbank to its 
deliberations  on  monetary  matters.  Conversely,  the  members  of  the  Federal  Go-
vernment  can  participate  in  the  meetings  of  the  Central  Bank  Council (Zentral-
bankrat);  there  they  may  present proposals  and obtain  the  deferment of decisions 
for  up  to  two weeks.  • 
Finally, as  regards  the control of banking, the relative powers are exercised by the 
Federal Supervisory Office for Banks (Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir Kreditwesen) in close 
collaboration  with  the  Bundesbank. 
Netherlands 
3.  In the Netherlands,  as  in Germany,  the powers  of the Government and of the 
central bank are  in principle  separate.  Credit  policy  comes  within the province  of 
the N ederlandsche Bank;  if monetary relations with foreign countries form part of 
the  government's  responsibilities,  the  execution  of  policy  in  this  field  is  never-
theless  in  the  hands  of  the  Nederlandsche  Bank.  It is  certainly  laid  down  that 
the Minister of Finance  can  under certain conditions issue directives  to the Board 
of Management of the Bank, when he considers it necessary, to ensure coordination 
of monetary and financial  policy;  but this power has  not been exercised so far and 
is  to  be  considered  altogether  exceptional. 
Cooperation  between  the  Minister  of  Finance  and  the  central  bank  is  in  reality 
very  close.  Important decisions  are  only  taken  in fact  after consultation between 
them.  In  addition  regular  coordination  is  ensured  by  weekly  meetings  of  the 
Minister  of  Finance  and  the  Treasurer  General  with  the  Governor  of  the  Ne-
derlandsche  Bank.  It is  to  be  noted  that  the  general  coordination  of. economic 
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policy  is  effected  by  the  Council  of  Economic  Affairs  (  Raad  voor  Economische 
Aangelegenheden  - REA),  of which  the -Governor  of  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  is 
a  member. 
If the Nederlandsche  Bank  is  legally  invested  with very  extensive  powers  in the 
matter of  control  of  credit,  in fact  it acts  in  concert  with the organizations  re-
presenting  the banks  regarding  the measures it desires  to take (gentleman's agree-
ment). This is  an  essential characteristic of the exercise  of monetary policy in the 
Netherlands;  the  principle  is  also  enshrined  in the  law on  the  control  of credit, 
and its satisfactory application has  so  far absolved the Bank from taking unilateral 
decisions  which  would  then  have  had  to receive  the  approval  of the Minister of 
Finance. 
The control of banking is  also  exercised by  the central bank. 
Belgium 
4.  The  organization  of  monetary  power  in  Belgium  is  somewhat  different  from 
that in force in Germany and the Netherlands.  Responsibility for monetary policy, 
more  especially  as  regards  credit policy,  is  assumed by the National  Bank  of Bel-
gium  in conjunction  with  the  government.  The  latter,  together  with other  orga-
nizations,  are in possession however of certain powers of their own .  in the matter. 
of  monetary  policy.  Unity of action  is  ensured by  the manifold links  existing be-
tween the government and the National Bank, which are both represented moreover 
in  various  organizations  for  the  regulation  or  protection  of  financial  activity,  as 
well  as  in ·certain  public  credit institutions. 
This distribution of powers,  principally between the central bank and the govern-
ment,  is  reflected  moreover  in a  wider form  in the  Council  of Regency  (Conseil 
de  Regence)  of the  National  Bank  which  is  composed,  apart  from  the  Board  of 
Management  (comite  de  direction)  of  the  Bank,  of persons  proposed  respectively 
by  the  Minister  of  Finance,  the  organizations  representing  industry,  commerce, 
agriculture and labour, and the managing authorities of the financial institutions of 
public  interest. 
Four other legally distinct organizations play a role in monetary policy: 
- the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund  (Fonds  des  Rentes ),  managed  jointly  by  re-
presentatives  of the Minister  of  Finance  and  the National Bank, has  the task 
of  regulating  the  market  in government  securities  (at  short  and  long  term), 
and  the  money  market  at very  short term; 
- the  Institut de  Reescompte  et de  Garantie  (IRG) a  parastatal organization in 
which the National Bank is  represented, is  the principal rediscounting organiza-
tion of first  resort; 
- the Institut Belgo-Luxembourgeois du Change  (IBLC), of which the Governor 
and a member of the Board of Management of the National Bank are members, 
is  responsible  for  the  exchange  control  regulations  and  their  implementation; 
the  influence  it  exercises  in  the  :field  of  monetary  policy  is  principally  the 
result of the  measures  taken  to protect the  official  reserves; 
- the  Banking Commission,  which  includes  in  particular a  representative  of  the 
National  Bank,  is  entitled among  other things  to  apply  banking ratios  on the 
recommendation  of  the  National  Bank  or in  consultation  with  it;  it is  also 
·entrusted  \vith  the  control  of banking. 
France 
5.  In France  also  the  powers  in  the  monetary  sector  are  distributed  among  the 
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government, the Bank of France and other organizations (in which the government 
and the Bank are represented) which work in close cooperation. The government's 
powers  are  however  more important, in fact,  than in Belgium.  The government's 
predominance  arises  first  and  foremost  from  the organization  of  the institutions. 
The Treasury  plays  a particularly important role:  it directly or indirectly manages 
part of  the currency  and centralizes  the balances  of the public authorities.  By  its 
budgetary policy  it exercises  a  special  influence  over the development  of liquidity 
in  the  economy. 
As  in the case  of Belgium, no legal prescriptions lay down in a systematic manner 
the tasks that fall  to the Bank of France, but the Bank's statutes define  its credit 
operations,  and  particular  texts  prescribe  specified  responsibilities  together  with 
the  instruments  necessary  for  their  fulfilment.  This  is  the  case  in  particular  as 
regards  the management of the Exchange  Stabilization Fund which devolves  upon 
the Bank of France, in accordance  with general instructions given by the Minister 
of Finance.  The  powers  of the Bank of  France in monetary  matters  are  in  short 
very  extensive.  The day  to day  management  is  in principle conducted quite inde-
pendently;  in  practice  the  Minister  of  Finance  and  the  Governor  of  the  Bank 
consult  one  another  frequently  on all  important questions  concerning  the  Bank's 
field  of  activities.  The  coordination  is  reinforced  when  economic  difficulties  ne-
cessitate the adoption of a recovery programme. 
The managing  authorities  of the  Bank have  extensive powers  that go  beyond the 
field  of action proper of the Bank. The Governor is  vice-chairman  ex officio of the 
National  Credit  Council,  and  he  usually  presides  at its  meetings  in place  of  the 
Minister of Finance;  he also  presides over the Banking Control Commission (Com-
mission  de  Controle des  Banques) which  is  responsible  for  the supervising  of the 
banks.  . 
The  National Credit Council  is  invested  with powers  for  the regulation  of credit 
poHcy,  the execution of which is left to the Bank of France;  and it is  also required 
to consult the  public  authorities.  The very  close  liaison  between the government 
and the Bank comes out very plainly in the way in which the latter operates. The 
majority of its members  are appointed by various ministries from  among represen-
tatives of economic and social groups on the one hand, and of the public authorities 
and  organizations  on  the  other;  while  others  are  selected  from  among  represen-
tatives  of  the  banks. 
Italy 
6.  The Italian organization  is  different  from  that existing  in  the  other countries. 
The initiative and the supreme power in the field of monetary policy lie in principle 
with  the  government.  In  accordance  with  the  guiding  lines  laid  down  by  the 
Interministerial  Committee  for  Economic  Programming  (Comitato  Interministe-
riale  per  la  Programmazione  Economica  - CIPE), which  decides  on  the distribu-
tion  of  the flow  of  money  for  different  purposes  on lines  laid  down  annually  in 
the  national  economic  programme  the  Interministerial  Committee  for  Credit  and 
Saving (Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito e il Risparmio - CICR), formulates 
the monetary policy to be adopted in conformity with the general economic policy 
of  the government.  Such  unity of purpose certainly represents  an  original element 
within  the Community.  The Bank of Italy, which is  subject  to the control of the 
Minister for  the  Treasury, to some  extent performs functions  delegated to it, and 
is  obliged  to  observe  the  decrees  that  this  Minister,  after  consulting  the  Inter-
ministerial  Committee,  sees  fit  to issue. 
16 The  institutions 
The  government's  powers  to lay  down  general  guidelines  for  monetary  policy  do 
not prevent  the Bank of Italy from  filling  a  role  of great  importance. 
First  of all,  wide  discretionary powers have been  conferred on it for  the  applica-
tion to the banking system  of ministerial directives, and it enjoys  almost complete 
autonomy  as  regards  the way in which it controls  the banks.  More especially,  the 
Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Italy,  who  participates  as  of  right  in the  deliberations 
of  the  Interministerial  Committee  for  Credit  and  Saving  is  the  government's  ad-
viser  and  can  propose  to  the  Minister  for  the  Treasury  that changes  should  be 
made  by  decree  in  the  official  discount  rate.  He is  the  President  of  the  Admi-
nistrative Council of the Italian  Foreign Exchange Office (Uffi.cio  Italiano dei Cam-
hi)  an  institution which  enjoys  a  separate legal  existence from  the Bank of  Italy 
and which is  responsible for the control of foreign exchange operations, for ensur-
ing  that  the  foreign  exchange  regulations  introduced  are  observed,  and  for  the 
management  of the  foreign  exchange  reserves. 
Luxembourg 
7.  Luxembourg has  no central bank of its own. The role usually filled by such an 
institution is  performed either by the National Bank of Belgium, under the treaty 
inaugurating  the  Belgian-Luxembourg  Economic  Union,  or by  the  State  Savings 
Bank (Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat), the importance of which, judged by the volume 
of deposits  received,  is  far  greater  than  that of  the other banks  in the  country. 
It largely  plays  the  part of  a  state bank  and bankers'  bank. 
The government can play  an  important role  in monetary policy through the inter-
mediary  of  the  State  Savings  Bank  and  of  the Commissioner  for  the  Control  of 
Banks who in addition to the supervision of  the banks can  take measures  for  the 
regulation of the volume  of credit and bank liquidity. 
General characteristics compared 
8.  Having  reviewed  the  arrangements  in  the  various  countries  individually,  it is 
now possible to set out the principal resemblances  and differences  that distinguish 
them  as  regards  the organization of powers in the monetary sector. 
The  fields  of  action  of  the  government  and  the  central  bank  are  more  clearly 
demarcated in Germany and the Netherlands than elsewhere. In both those countries 
credit policy,  and  in Germany foreign  exchange  operations,  are  essentially  within 
the  province  of the central  bank. 
In the other countries the apportionment of responsibility for monetary matters is 
more  complex.  In Italy  the  government  enjoys  prerogatives  which  make  it pre-
eminent in principle  and which enable it to impose  its requirements and exercise 
its right to take decisions  in the last resort. Nevertheless, it is  dear that the Bank 
of Italy wields  considerable authority in the determination of monetary policy and 
in relation  to  the banking  system. 
In France and Belgium, the relative powers are distributed among a larger number 
of bodies,  whose  connections  moreover  are  very  close  on  the legal  and  personal 
plane.  One important difference  emerges,  however,  between these  two countries: 
in France  the organization  of monetary  power gives  a  clear  predominance  to the 
government, not only de facto but also de jure;  whereas in Belgium  the organiza-
tion  depends  on  a  very  delicate  balancing  of powers  brought  about  by  detailed 
legal provisions and regulations based on numerous and complex relations between 
the various  institutions  involved. 
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One feature is  common to all  the countries:  whatever form the demarcation of the 
respective fields  of action of the various monetary authorities takes, there is always 
a network of relations between them and the government permitting the coordina-
tion of the policies  for  the  orientation of  the  economy  adopted  by  the different 
authorities,  according  in each  case  to  the  particular forms  of  action  in use.  This 
collaboration is  secured in particular by  the participation of the representatives of 
one organization in the deliberations conducted by another. In this way, according 
to  the  country  concerned,  the issuing  authority is  represented in  the government 
when the latter is  dealing with matters concerning monetary policy, or the govern-
ment may  participate in the deliberations of the central bank. Similarly,  in certain 
countries  (Belgium,  France)  representatives  of the government  and  of  the central 
bank together  participate in  the  activities  of special  institutions.  The same  result 
is  achieved  by  the  allocation  to  the  governmental  authorities  of  more  or  less 
extensive powers relating to the appointment of the managing bodies of the central 
bank and other organizations. 
Para.  II:  The  monetary  and  financial  system 
9.  The overall  organization  of  the  monetary  and  financial  system  is  of  great  im-
portance in relation to the study of monetary policy.  It is  essential, in fact, having 
examined  the monetary authorities, to know to which institutions the instruments 
they  utilise  apply,  and  to  know  the  workings  of the  markets  in  which  various 
liquid or negotiable  assets  are  bought and  sold. 
It is by no means necessary to study all the institutions exhaustively at this point; 
they will only be  examined  to the extent necessary  to obtain a through grasp  of 
monetary  policy  and  of  the  instruments  it uses.  A  brief outline  of the workings 
of the money markets (and of their links with the financial markets) will complete 
the  picture  of the financial  structures  on which  monetary  policy  operates. 
Para.  II-1:  The  monetary  and  financial  institutions 
i)  General 
10.  The  structural  differences  between  the  member  countries  of  the  Community 
and the divergencies between the national concepts  on the subject, combined with 
the  complexity  of the  organization  in  the  matter,  make  it difficult  to establish  a 
line  of  demarcation  between  monetary  and  financial  institutions  that  would  be 
valid  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.1 
Criterion of classification into monetary and financial institutions 
If it is  sought to establish a distinction between these institutions the most useful 
criterion is  that of the nature of the commitments shown on the liabilities  side of 
their balance sheets. On this basis, the designation of monetary institutions is here 
taken  to  apply  to  the  institutions  (other  than  the  central  banking  authorities) 
whose  liabilities  consist  of  items  which  to  a  large  extent  have  the  character  of 
means  of  payment  or liquid funds. 
1 On  this  subject  it  should  be  noted  that  the  European  System  of  Integrated  Economic  Accounts  (SEC  - Systeme 
Europeen de  comptes  Economiques  Integres  published  by the Statistical  Office  for  the  European  Communities,  1970) 
gives  an  analysis  of  the  monetary  and  financial  institutions on  a  harmonized  basis  on  the Community  plane. 
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Difticulties of appUcation 
This  distinction  admittedly  raises  numerous  difficulties,  even if it is  applied in a 
flexible  manner.  Ideas on  the subject differ considerably in fact  from  one  country 
to another;  and the divergencies will be set out below.  Furthermore it is  difficult 
to  draw  a  clear  line  of demarcation  between  monetary  and :financial  institutions; 
in fact,  to  a  varying  extent  according  to the  country,  beside  organizations  of an 
essentially monetary nature, many others have a mixed structure; they take in both 
liquid funds (having more or less  the character of money) and savings. It has been 
decided  to  class  as  financial  institutions  for  these  purposes  the  establishments 
whose liabilities  consist  in  large  part of items  that do  not have  the character of 
money (or liquidity in the Netherlands). 
It is  precisely this difficulty of classification that results in Germany in the distinc-
tion  between  monetary  and  financial  institutions being  hardly  regarded  as  of any 
practical value, any more than the classifications made within the monetary organiz-
ations. The banking system  is  there considered in its entirety. This is  understand-
able  in  view  of  the  diversity  of  the  resources  and  operations  of  the  German 
organizations.  The same  reasons  limit the extent and rigidity of this distinction in 
other  countries,  in  the  Netherlands  notably.  That  country  nevertheless  considers 
the distinction necessary  in the application  of monetary policy. 
The  problems  of  terminology  are  numerous.  The  same  terms  (banks,  savings 
banks credit establishments, etc.) mask very different realities between one country 
and another. They are sometimes difficult to handle within the scope of the present 
work, although in current use elsewhere, in that they are applied to both monetary 
and  :financial  institutions. 
ii)  The  principal  institutions  and  their  characteristics  in  the  various  countries 
(see  Table  1) 
11.  In this  section  the  general  distinction  drawn  between  institutions  according 
to the nature of their liabilities  will be supplemented by a more  detailed analysis 
according  to  the  types  of  operation  effected.  This  analysis  will  bring  out  the 
differences  of  structure  and  concept  in  the  member  countries.  Some·  similarities 
in certain  fields  can  nevertheless be pointed out at  the outset. 
Postal Services 
12.  In all cases  the  Postal  Cheque  Services  are  state organizations  coming  under 
the  Postal  Administration  and  more  or  less  directly  under  the  Treasury.  They 
operate on the basis  that out of the deposits received from private customers funds 
are  provided  to the Treasury or the Post Office  (though in  the Netherlands only 
to a certain extent). They are considered as  monetary institutions, for  they handle 
the monetary resources  of  the public.  In all  the countries  there also  exist savings 
services  operating  through the intermediary  of the Post Office. 
Public and semi-public institutions 
13.  Furthermore, in all  cases,  though to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, there 
are  public  or  semi-public  monetary  and  financial  institutions.  In  the  monetary 
sector,  state  intervention  is  relatively  highly  developed  in  France  and  Italy.  As, 
regards  the  monetary  and :financial  system  as  a  whole,  the  parastatal  institutions 
play  an important role  in  all  cases.  They  are  governed  by different  statutes  from 
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TABLE  1 
Monetary  and  financial  institutions  entering  into  the  field  of application  of  monetary  policy,  Community  countries  1971 
(other  than  the Central  Bank  and  the Treasury) 
A. Monetary  Institut-
ions 
1.  General 
2.  Others 
Germany  (1) 
Credit  Institutions, 
including: 
- commercial banks, 
comprising 
• large  banks 
• regional  &  other 
commercial banks 
• "private" banks 
- savings banks 
- central  giro  insti-
tutions 
- credit cooperatives 
and  mutual  loan 
funds 
- central institutions 
of  credit  co opera-
tives and loan as-
sociations 
- Post Office  giro  & 
postal savings bank 
offices 
- Hire  purchase  fi-
nance houses 
France 
- deposit banks 
- merchant banks 
("banques  d'affai-
res") 
-long and medium-
term  credit  banks 
(2) 
- Establishments 
with  a  special  le-
gal  status, includ-
ing: 
• the  French  Bank 
for  Foreign  Trade 
• agricultural  credit 
institutions 
• mutual loans 
• loans  to  small  & 
medium-sized firms 
("credit populaire") 
-postal cheque serv-
ice 
Italy 
- Banks,  including 
• establishments con-
stituted under pub-
lic law 
• banks  of  national 
interest 
• ordinary credit 
banks 
• pqpular  co opera-
tive banks 
- Savings banks 
- Specialized  central 
institutions 
- postal  cheques  & 
Post  Office  banks 
(attached  to  the 
Cassa Depositi Pre-
stiti Section of the 
Treasury) 
Netherlands 
Banking  institutions 
including: 
- commercial  banks 
- rural  credit  banks 
-savings banks 
- postal  cheques  & 
giro  services 
Belgium 
..,...  deposit  banks 
- Institut  de  Rees-
compte  et de  Ga-
rantie  (partim)  (3) 
- Securities  Stabili-
zation Fund (Fonds 
des  Rentes) 
- Credit  Communal 
(partim) (3) 
-Postal  cheque  of-
fice 
Luxembourg 
- state savings banks 
-banking and sav-
ings institutions 
- credit establish-
ments  (specialized 
institutions for con-
sumer  credit) 
-Postal  cheque  of-
fice 
(1)  For Germany, analysis into monetary institutions and financial institutions is  not feasible in principle.  The diversity of the resources and activities of most of the institutions makes their classifica-
tion particularly hazardous.  ~ 
(2)  These banks  are included in the statistics among the monetary institutions in spite of the nonliquid character of their resources. 
(3)  The splitting of these two institutions into a  monetary part and a  financial  part  correspo~ds to a  concept inspired by other criteria than those of the classification on an institutional basis adopted 
in principle. N 
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TABLE 1  (continued) 
Germany  (1)  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg 
- I  I  I  I  I  I 
B. Financial  Institut-
tions  (4) 
1.  Private  institutions 
2.  Public  or.  semi-pub-
lic  institutions 
- building societies 
- private  mortgage 
credit banks 
-specialized private 
- financial  institut-
ions,  including: 
-hire  purchase  fi-
nance houses 
credit  institutions I - finance  companies 
- building  societies 
-public  real  estate 
credit  institutions 
-specialized  .public 
credit  institutions 
- real  estate  credit 
institutions 
-National Savings 
Institution  (Caisse 
Nationale  d'Epar-
gne) 
- savings  banks 
- Caisse  des  Depots 
et Consignations 
- specialized  credit 
institutions, includ-
ing: 
• Credit  National 
• Credit Fonder (real 
estate credit) 
• Caisse Nationale des 
Marches  de  l'Etat 
- specialized  credit 
institutions (of lit-
tle  importance  in 
the private sector) 
- Specialized  credit 
institutions 
- mortgage  credit 
banks 
-hire  purchase  fi-
nance  companies 
- State  postal  sav-
ings  bank 
..:.;.  Bank  for  Nether-
lands  Municipali-
ties  ("Bank  voor 
Nederlandse Geme-
enten")  (5) 
-hire purchase credit I  -financial  institut-
institutions  ions 
-private savings 
banks 
- mortgage  credit 
companies 
- Institut  de  Rees-
compte et de  Ga-
rantie (partim) 
- Caisse  Generale de 
Epargne et de Re-
traite (General Sav-
ings  &  Pension 
Fund) 
-Credit  communal 
(partim) 
- National  Institut-
ion  for  Credit  to 
Industry 
- Other  specialized 
credit  institutions 
(4)  Only the principal financial institutions that enter most directly into the field  of action of monetary policy are shown here.  Other organizations sometimes come into this field  of action, for example 
the insurance  companies and the social security institutions, particularly in the Netherlands. 
(5)  The Bank voor Nederlandse Gemeenten is  not an autonomous financial institution, but an extension of the local authorities. OVERALL  VIEW  - INSTITUTIONAL  AND  STRUCTURAL  ASPECTS 
country to country, but they have this in common, that they were created to serve 
the  general  interest  in  particular  fields;  this  is  particularly  true  of  the  savings 
banks and of the mortgage credit and industrial credit institutions. 
As  regards  the public  savings. banks, these receive  an  appreciable volume of funds 
in all cases.  The funds  are utilized  to  meet the requirements of ;all  sectors  of the 
economy,  except  in France.  In that country  the savings  banks  in fact channel  the 
major part of their resources  into the public or para-public sector or into economic 
sectors of a priority nature. 
After  these  general  remarks,  attention  can  be  directed  to  the  national  character-
istics  of  financial  organization. 
Germany 
14.  In Germany  all  the monetary and financial  institutions are regarded as  banks, 
with the exception  of  insurance companies  and  the social  security institutions.  In 
this country the universal type of bank predominates which can undertake all types 
of banking operations,  that is  to  say  accept  sight,  time and  savings  deposits  and 
long-term funds,  and grant credits  at short, medium and long term. 
This  universal  type  of  credit  institution  is  usually  classified  under  three  heads: 
joint-stock banks of various types; savings banks and central giro institutions (Giro-
zentralen) which effect all banking operations, but with a traditional preponderance 
of financing  at long  term;  and agricultural or commercial cooperative credit banks 
(Kreditgenossenschaften)  which  as  a  general  rule  exercise  their  activities  in  the 
local sphere (this is  also  true of the savings  hanks  and  the small "private" banks) 
and  which  receive  assistance  in  their  operations  from  the  central  institutions  to 
which  they  are  attached  (Zentralkassen). 
It should be pointed out that the  savings  banks (like the cooperative banks) have 
achieved  the  status  of  real  banks.  It is  for  this  reason  that  they  are  subject  in 
Germany, in  contrast to the position in the other countries in the Community, to 
the regulations  regarding  compulsory  reserves. 
Apart  from  the  banking  establishments  of a  universal  character,  there  are  other 
banks  which  have  come  to specialize  in the role  of financial  intermediaries.  This 
category  includes  in  particular  the  mortgage  credit  institutions,  the  public  real 
estate credit institutions, and certain specialized establishments (Kreditinstitute mit 
Sonderaufgaben). 
Luxembourg 
15.  The Luxembourg banks are  not subject to any legislative requirements regard-
ing  the  nature  of  their operations:  they  may  at  their  own  discretion  be  deposit 
banks,  merchant  banks,  or mixed  banks. 
In practice, in Luxembourg as  in Germany, the banks are for  the most part of the 
universal  type.  Although  many  of them have  specialized  in  international financial 
operations  or  in  industrial  or  mortgage  credit,  they  are  distinguished  more  by 
their legal  form  than by their particular activities. 
Netherlands 
16.  The main  body of  credit  institutions (Kredietinstellingen) in  the  Netherlands 
corresponds  in  essence  to  that  of the  credit  institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of Germany  in the sense  that it incorporates  a  variety  of  institutions  whose par-
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ticular powers are not always  specified and which,  in every case,  effect  operations 
not  specifically  prescribed for  them. 
The commercial  banks (Handelsbanken ),  the first  group  of credit institutions, are 
general or universal banks, for they can  perform, and in fact  do  perform all bank-
ing  operations. Another group  consists  of  the  rural  credit  banks, whose  activities 
are  very  similar  to  those  of  the commercial  banks. 
The  savings  banks  are  also  taking  on  the  same  shape  as  the  commercial  banks, 
with  the  exception  of  the  State  postal  savings  bank.  They  have  for  some  time 
been  of  importance  on  the  monetary  plane,  for  they  have  opened  for  private 
customers accounts  used in the same way  as  current accounts.  In consequence the 
authorities  have  brought them into the field  of application  of monetary  policy  in 
the  same  way  as  the  banks .1 
The whole of the institutions enumerated above constitute the category of registered 
credit  establishments  subject  to  the  control  provided  for  in  the  law  on banking 
institutions. 
Belgium 
17.  The banks in Belgium are deposit banks:  the banking legislation of 1935, given 
a 1nore flexible  shape in 196  7, in effect split up the mixed banks into holding com-
panies (societes de  portefeuille) and deposit banks. The latter may  not hold shares 
in  non-banking  commercial  companies  beyond  a  specified  period  necessary  for 
placing  them  with  the  public;  their  portfolio  of  bonds  in  private  companies  is 
correspondingly  small. 
The legal  concept  of  a  bank  is  thus  strictly  applicable  only  to banks  of  deposit 
defined  as  undertakings  habitually  receiving  deposits  of  funds  repayable  in  not 
more  than two years,  to the exclusion in  particular of private savings  banks. The 
banks are essentially concerned with short-term credit; for a dozen years they have 
been engaging more extensively in credit at medium and long term, as  the relative 
importance  of their time deposits  has  increased. 
The activities that have devolved elsewhere upon the merchant banks and the mort-
gage  credit banks are  exercised in Belgium by holding companies  or financial  com-
panies,  private  savings  banks  and mortgage credit companies,  as  well as  by para-
statal organisations. The Caisse  Generale d'Epargne et de Retraite, the only public 
savings  bank with branches  throughout  the  country,  has  considerably  centralised 
the  collection  of savings;  it  is  the  principal  institutional  investor  in  the  public 
sector. 
Reference  should  again  be  made  to  the  Institut  de  Reescompte  et  de  Garantie, 
which establishes by its operations a link of an original type between the National 
Bank and the money  market. This institution promotes the circulation of funds in 
the  market,  inter  alia  by  facilitating  by  its  rediscount  operations  access  by  the 
banks  to  the liquid funds  available;  and  on  the other hand it helps  to  replenish 
liquidity in the market by its refinancing operations at the National Bank. 
Italy 
18.  In principle,  the  Italian  banking  law  establishes  a  clear  distinction  between 
1 It will be seen,  however,  in the following  chapter that for  practical reasons  it has  not yet  been  possible. to include 
the  liquid part of  their liabilities  in the  statistics of liquidity. 
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credit institutions according  to the terms  of their operations.  This distinction has 
in  fact  been  established  by  reference  to  the  aggregate  of  their  resources,  the 
structure of which is  reflected in the use to which they are put, and should make 
it possible  to  trace  a  clear  line  of  demarcation  between  monetary  and  financial 
institutions. In practice, however, things are  not so  simple  and certain institutions 
receive at the same time liquid funds  and savings  deposits  and effect operations at 
short,  medium  and long  term. 
Under the general  designation  of  "credit institutions" it is  possible  to distinguish 
in  Italy  the  banking  establishments  ("aziende  di  credito":  banks  and  savings 
banks),  the  specialized  credit institutions  and  the insurance companies. 
The  two  latter  groups  consist  exclusively  of  financial  intermediaries  of  a  non-
monetary  nature. 
Among the banking establishments, the development of savings banks brings them 
closer  and closer  to the banks.  All  these  establishments  receive  liquid funds  and 
should therefore be classed ·as  monetary institutions. They perform a wide variety 
of operations, of which those concluded at short term, however, enjoy a clear pre-
dominance  at the banks;  as  for the savings banks, their loans still go for the most 
part  to  the  public  sector. 
There have  still  to be included  in the  banking  system . the four  "leading central 
institutions"  which lend their technical  and financial  assistance  to the institutions 
associated with them. They also perform a normal credit function, but this, except 
for  one of them, is  of limited importance. 
It is  to be noted that a  sizeable part of the capital of the specialized credit in,sti-
tutions at medium and long  term is  held by the "aziende di credito ", which rein-
forces  the  relationship  between  the  two  categories  of  institution. 
France 
19.  In France, a  particularly sharp distinction is  drawn between on the one hand 
the  banks and  "·establishments  with a  special  legal  status", handling  resources  of 
a  monetary  or  quasi-monetary  nature,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  specialized 
financial  institutions, whose resources come from savings or the banking system. 
The  deposit  banks,  the  merchant  banks  and  the  long  and  medium-term  credit 
banks  together  make  up  the  category  of  "registered"  banks  dependent  on  the 
authority  of  the  National  Credit Council.  The  diff.erence  between  deposit  banks 
and merchant banks  has  disappeared  as  regards  the term of  the deposits  and has 
diminished sharply as  regards  the nature of the uses  to which their funds  are put. 
On  the  other  hand,  since  1965  a  deep  and  complex  integration  movement  has 
been  developing,  together  with  agreements  to  work  together,  implying  among 
other things  overlapping  participations by banks  of different  types.  The long  and 
medium  term  credit  banks,  which  are  few  in  number,  are  at  present  the  only 
banks  that  have  not  been  authorized  to  accept  sight  deposits,  and  they  are  not 
strictly speaking  monetary institutions. In the French statistics, however,  they are 
included  in  the  category  of  banks. 
Also  to be classed  as  monetary  institutions are a certain number of special  status 
establishments  whose  resources  have  a  monetary  or  quasi-monetary  character 
(notably the  "popular" banks,  the  agricultural credit funds  and the mutual credit 
institutions). Their activities are very similar to those of the registered banks, but 
are  aimed  at special sectors.  In contrast to the banks they are not subject to the 
National  Credit  Council:  they  come  under  the  supervision  of  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  who  subjects  them  to  the  same  measures  of  monetary  policy  as  the 
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registered banks  when the decisions  of the Council or the Bank of France do not 
apply  directly  to  them. 
The whole of the monetary institutions in France (the "banking system" with the 
exception  of  the  postal  cheque  centres),  mainly  grant  short-term  credits,  but  a 
tendency has  arisen in recent years  towards an  increase  in medium and long-term 
credits.  The funds  of a  quasi-monetary  nature  that  those  institutions  handle  play 
for  their part an expanding role in relation to monetary resources. 
As  for  the financial  institutions, these  consist of  two quite distinct categories. 
The private financial  establishments  can  only  finance  their operations out of their 
own resources or those supplied to them by the banking system. They are therefore 
very  dependent  on  the  banks,  to  which  moreover  they  are  often  linked  legally. 
The role of financial  intermediaries  gathering in the public's savings  is  performed 
by public or semi-public institutions, among which should be mentioned the Caisse 
des  Depots et Consignations.  This  has  an  important role;  in particular it has  the 
task  of  managing  the  bulk  of  the funds  that  flow  into  the  savings  banks.  The 
latter have  only a lilnited discretion in the way  they employ the  funds, but their 
liberty  of action  in  this  respect  tends  to  increase  progressively. 
Degree of specialization in the various countries 
20.  From what has been said above it is clear that in practice specialization among 
the  monetary  institutions  and  the  various  categories  of  financial  institution  has 
gone furthest in France, even if in that country as  elsewhere there is  a movement 
towards  the  diversification  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  various  types  of 
institution  and  less  rigid  separation  between  the  categories.  Specialization  is  on 
the  other  hand  much  less  in  Germany  and  Luxembourg,  where  the  majority  of 
the institutions  accept  liquid and non-liquid funds  (to the point that it is  difficult 
to isolate the monetary institutions .  from  the financial  intermediaries)  and conduct 
a wide range of operations of a banking nature. The structures in the Netherlands, 
Belgium  and  Italy occupy  an  intermediate position in this respect. 
Para.  II-2:  The  money  and  financial  markets 
21.  The money market serves essentially to promote a better utilization of liquidity 
and  to  adjust  the  supply  and  demand  for  it.  The  market  can  be  provided  with 
fresh  funds  by  action  on  the  part of  the  central  bank. 
The money markets in the six countries display fairly  marked differences,  although 
the  situation  is  developing  in  every  case  in  the  direction  of  an  expansion  and 
diversification  of  the  markets  from  the point of  view  of  the number and variety 
of  the  participants,  of  the  operations  handled,  and  of  the  securities  which  are 
generally  used  to  support  them. 
In ·every  country  in  the  Community,  except  the  Netherlands,  the  money  market 
is  limited essentially  to  the banks.  A  wider  money  market open  to participation 
by enterprises, institutional investors  and the local authorities, and in which these 
institutions can replenish their liquidity, hardly exists except in the Netherlands. 
Thus  in  the  Netherlands  the  banks  and  the  exchange  brokers  are  flanked  as 
purchasers  of  open  market  securities  by  the  savings  organizations,  the  "funds" 1 
and  the  enterprises,  and  as  sellers  by  the local  authorities. 
1 The  "funds"  embrace  the  insurance  companies,  the  pension  funds  and  the  social  security  funds. 
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The  short-term  assets  negotiated  in  the  money  market  are  Treasury  bonds  and 
certificates  and short-term loans  (kasgeldleningen).  Important transactions  are  also 
effected in call-money  (with or without guarantee). The banks meet  their current 
requirements  for  liquid  funds  mainly  by  recourse  to  the  central  bank  and  the 
international  markets. 
In this  country,  where  the policy prevails  of the direct quantitative restriction of 
credit  and  where  the  authorities  thus  have  no  interest  in  acting  on  the  money 
market in order to control the volume of liquidity created through the banks (the 
use of funds in the market by the banks, in so far as  they are aimed at the private 
sector,  in fact  comes  within  the  scope  of  the  restriction  of  credits),  the  central 
bank is  nevertheless  concerned  to supervise  the  market  on the one hand for  the 
purpose of regulating the way it operates and on the other hand in order to influence 
the  rates  of interest.  The trend of interest rates  acts  in  fact  on  the  operation of 
direct  credit  between  enterprises  (near banking)  which,  in  certain  circumstances, 
can  assume  a  considerable volume in the country. 
22.  In Belgium,  the  money  market  includes  the  day-to-day  money  market,  the 
market in public certificates with a currency of up to one year, and  the market in 
bank  and  commercial  acceptances,  controlled  respectively  by  the  Securities  Sta-
bilization Fund, by this Fund and the National Bank, and by the Institut de Rees-
compte  et de  Garantie.  Access  to  the  market is  on the whole limited principally 
to the public and private monetary institutions, to the other public credit organiz-
ations,  to  private  non-banking  credit  organizations  and  to  certain  institutional 
investors.  The interdependence of the three parts of  the market results  from  the 
identity of the participants and the links connecting the controlling institutions. 
23.  Similarly  in  France  the  group  of participants  in  the  market  is  limited,  with 
minor  exceptions,  to  the  monetary  institutions  and  the  public  and  semi-public 
institutions, these last intervening  only  as  lenders;  the enterprises have no access 
to  the money  market.  The operations  handled  consist  almost  exclusively  of loans 
secured on public  and private effects  and  so only include to a limited extent firm 
transfers  of  financial  assets. 
24.  In Germany,  the enterprises have not been excluded from  the  money  market 
since  the  regulation  of  interest  rates  was  suspended,  but their  participation  has 
been relatively modest. In the same way  the money  market paper which the Bun-
desbank offers  not only to the banks, but which it has been offering for some time 
in  particular  to  the  public  institutions,  has  so  far  only  been  bought  by  other 
investors  to  a  very limited extent. 
25.  In Italy,  money  market  securities  are  also  bought by  other institutions  than 
banks.  The  control  of  the  money  market  by  regulation  of  the  sources  of  the 
monetary base,  combined with the management of  the  compulsory  reserves,  pro-
vides  the Bank  of  Italy with the means  of controlling  the whole  of the banking 
reserves  and  the  volume  of deposits.  Knowing  in  this  way  the  demand  for  the 
employment  of  bank  funds,  in  particular  the  part  devoted  to  the  granting  of 
credits,  the Bank of  Italy can  determine  the demand for  securities  by the banks. 
Links between the money  markets and the  financial  markets 
26.  Links  more or less  close  according  to the country exist between the monetary 
and  financial  markets,  whether  the  financial  market  takes  the  form  of  direct 
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relations  between  those  seeking  credit  and  investors  or the  form  of a  market  in 
the true sense  of the word. Such connections between the markets establish links 
between the rates formed  in each of them,  more particularly because a hardening 
occurring in one of them may prompt economic agents to turn to the other. 
These links  arise  in particular from  the fact  that the same institutions participate 
in both markets  and do business  for  preference in one or the other according  to 
the conditions  prevailing in  each.  The result can  be arbitrage in securities in one 
market  against  those  in the  other. 
27.  It is  only  in France  that a  relatively clear separation has existed between the 
two  markets  up  to  the present  time,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that the banks  hold 
little of their assets in the form of negotiable securities. Nevertheless, access to the 
money market by certain semi-public organizations holding large portfolios of long-
term  funds  establishes  a  measure  of  communication  between  the  two  markets. 
This connection has widened since  196  7,  at least as  regards  the formation of rates 
of interest,  when  the  collective  savings  institutions  (notably  the  insurance  com-
. panies)  were  authorized  to  participate  in  money  market  operations,  which  has 
enabled them to obtain the terms ruling in this market for the return on the funds 
that they  deposit in fact  at the banks. 
28.  In the Netherlands,  the relationship bet\veen the money and financial  markets, 
relatively  limited  in  extent,  does  not  result  from  the  employment  of  financial 
effects  in the  money  market  but from  the participation  of  savings  banks  and of 
"funds" in both markets at the same  time (although the "funds" operate princip-
ally  in the financial  market). 
The banks can certainly deal in short-term and long-term effects. The latter however 
have hardly been dealt  in  so far, for the system  of drawings by lot renders  their 
maturity  dates  uncertain  and  largely  deprives  them  of  their  quality  of  potential 
liquidity  .1 
29.  In Belgium  and Italy  and especially  in Germany,  the interdependence of the 
two markets is  very marked and the control exercised by the monetary authorities 
over the money  market influences  the financial  market. 
In Germany, besides short-term effects such as  Treasury bonds, Treasury certificates 
without  coupons  and  certain  rediscountable  effects,  the  Bundesbank  is  able  to 
influence  the money  market by transactions  in long-term securities.  On the other 
hand it will  be seen below that the action by the Bundesbank on bank liquidity 
may considerably effect  intervention by the banks in the financial  market. 
In  Italy  the  banks  have  increased  their  portfolios  of  long-term  securities  with 
the object  of supplying  resources  to the specialized credit institutions with which 
they have links. The possibility of employing certain long-term securities to consti-
tute  compulsory  reserves  has  only  served  to  strengthen  the  links  between  the 
financial  market  and  the  money  market. 
Connection between monetary policy and capital market 
Participation  by  the  banks  in  the financial  markets 
30.  The  expression  "financial  markets"  is  here  used  in  the limited  sense  of  the 
term and only relates  to the markets in securities. 
1 The  issue,  since  the  second  half  of  1%9,  of  medium-term  loans  repayable  on  a  prescribed  maturity  date  could 
change  this  situation  to  some  extent. 
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Monetary policy in each of the Community countries is  not influenced to the same 
extent by developments in the national financial  market, or vice  versa.  In fact,  in 
the different  countries,  the banks  do  not enjoy  by  statute or tradition  the  same 
liberty of  action  in the capital  market.  By  reason  of these  differences  the  degree 
of  autonomy  of  the banks  in  the  face  of  directives  by  the monetary  authorities, 
as  well  as  the effect  produced in  the financial  market by measures  of  a monetary 
nature, can be very  different.  Thus, if the banks  are  very  involved in the capital 
market,  the  adoption  by  the  central  bank of  a  policy  of  restriction  of  liquidity 
will have  the effect  to  a  greater or less  extent of slowing down purchases  by the 
banks, which will endeavour on the other hand to maintain their activities  in the 
matter of credits.  Monetary policy  can  then,  on  these  assumptions,  have  a  rapid 
and  marked  effect  on  the  financial  market. 
Financial markets and banks in the various countries 
31.  In Germany and Luxembourg the banks as  a whole adopt more generally than 
elsewhere  a  proper  policy  of  investment  in securities.  A  large  part of  the credit 
institutions there are in fact general banks in the sense that they can effect all sorts 
of operations  at short and long  term, including  the purchase of bonds. 
The banks  in  the Federal  Republic of Germany  are  hardly  subject  to  restrictions 
in  this  field.  They  have  often  intervened  to  an  amount  of  over  half  in national 
purchases  of bonds;  nevertheless  the volume  of  their purchases  has  proved  to be 
very  variable  from  one  period  to  another. 
The  effects  of  the banks'  strong influence  on  the financial  market  are  further  ac-
centuated  by  the  advisory  role  that  the  credit  institutions  perform,  as  in  all 
countries,  in  relation  to  the  savers  and  enterprises  whose  orders  they  execute  in 
the market, by  the modest intervention-in comparison with the situation in the 
Federal Republic's partner countries- of the insurance companies and the pension 
funds  in financial  transactions,  and  finally  by  the outstanding  part played  by  the 
German  banks  in  international capital  movements. 
In principal  the  situation  is  similar  in  the Netherlands:  portfolio  investment  by 
the banks is  authorized;  but in a period of quantitative limitation of credits it is 
only  allowed as  long as  the growth in their long-term  assets  does  not exceed  that 
in  their  long-term  liabilities.  The  savings  banks  also  effect  investments  of  some 
importance. Intermediaries as  they are for security transactions in the stock market, 
the  commercial  banks  also  constitute  a  new-issue  consortium  and  participate  in 
international  syndicates  for  placing  issues  of  securities. 
What has been said  above  relates  particularly to  the "public" capital  markets.  In 
fact,  in  the  Netherlands,  the  bulk  of  the  new  issues  (about  three  quarters)  are 
dealt  with  in  the  private  (" onderhandse")  market,  where  direct  transactions  are 
effected  between  the seekers  of capital and  institutional investors. 
Luxembourg forms  part  of  the  group  of  countries  in  which  the  monetary  insti-
tutions hardly  face  any  restictions  on their activities in the financial  market. 
Italy  occupies  an  intermediate  position  among  the  Community  countries.  The 
banks  and  savings  banks  are  forbidden  to  make  any  investments in  shares.  They 
make  the  investments  of  their  choice  in  fixed  interest  securities  and  are  large 
purchasers  of  bonds.  They  buy  securities  issued  or guaranteed  by  the  State  and 
bonds  of  specialized  credit  institutions  which  at  present  represent  an  important 
part of the securities  in  circulation.  It is  principally by the purchase  of bonds in 
specialized  institutions  that  the  "aziende  di  credito",  which  cannot  grant  credits 
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at  long  term,  intervene  to  a  considerable  extent  in  the  financing  of  private  in-
dustry. 
The Belgian  and French  banks also  act  as  intermediaries  between the public  and 
the  :financial  market.  By  the  services  that  they  render  to  issuers  in  the various 
sectors  of  the economy,  notably  in  the public sector  (although  to a lesser  extent 
in France),  by the public  offers  whereby  the loans  are  eventually  taken  up firm, 
they  both play  a  part in the capital  market.  It should be  noted that, if in both 
countries they  intervene in the placing of new issues,  their positions differ in the 
two countries as  regards  the amount they retain of the various  types of securities 
at long  term.  The French banks  retain little,  while  the Belgian  banks hold on to 
a  considerable  quantity  of  each  new issue. 
Generally speaking, the banks have less influence in the financial market in Belgium 
and France than elsewhere, but the authorities  in the two countries  are trying to 
promote by  appropriate  measures  a limited  ~extension of the  role  of the banks in 
this  field. 
Section II - Liquidity 
General  Introduction:  concepts 
32.  Monetary  policy  is  aimed  principally  at influencing  liquidity  in  the  economy, 
111ost  often by action affecting banking liquidity. 
Liquidity of the economy 
3 3.  When one speaks  of  the liquidity of the economy,  that is  to say  the liquidity 
of private individuals and enterprises, of the non-monetary financial  intermediaries 
and  the local  authorities,  one  is  referring  to  their  scope  for  acquiring  real  assets 
by means  of monetary  assets  and financial  assets  enjoying  a  high  degree  of con-
vertibility  into  money. 
Under current practice, all  the countries in the Community use  the word "liquid-
ity" in a relatively limited sense.  In principle the term covers assets which have a 
specific  nominal  value}  and  which  either represent claims  payable  on  demand  and 
directly  employable  in  the  markets  for  goods  and  services  (money)  or  are  con-
vertible  into  such  claims  without  material  delay  and  without  loss  (or  with  a 
negligible  risk  of  loss)  of capital  value  (if such  conversion  is  effected  without a 
reduction in purchasing power of the other economic agents).  It is  thus a question 
of assets  the variations  in which are capable of exercising  an influence  on national 
expenditure. 
The practical field  of application  of the concept  of  the liquidity of the economy, 
thus  understood,  varies  from  country  to country according  to the financial  struc-
tures  and  traditions  in each  of  them;  this  explains  why  the national  notions  re-
garding liquidity  are  not  always  in harmony.  It should  be noted that  the  assets 
taken  into  consideration  for  the  application  of  monetary  policy,  as  shown  in 
particular in the  statistics  utilized for  the  purposes  of monetary  analysis,  do  not 
always  embrace  all  the assets  easily  convertible into money. 
In Germany,  the expression  "liquidity" of the economy is  hardly used.  A distinc-
tion  is  made  there  between  the  money  volume  in  the  narrow  sense  (  Geldvolu-
men =  Ml) and  the  money  volume  in  the wider  sense  (Geld- und Quasigeldbe-
stande = M2);  the latter only includes  the  money  and  deposits  for  terms  of less 
than  4  years  of residents.  The  ~Netherlands and  Italy on the other hand include 
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a fairly wide range of assets  in the liquidity subject to monetary policy.  In France 
and  Belgium,  besides  the  money  and  quasi-monetary  liquidity  at  the  banks  (and 
in  addition at the Treasury in France)  which  constitute  the liquidity the counter-
parts of which are shown in the statistics, other short-term assets held by financial 
intermediaries  are  also  considered;  together  with  near-money  these  assets  make 
up what in France  is  called  liquid  savings. 
Bank liquidity 
34.  As  applied  to  the whole of the banking  sector,  the  term  "liquidity"  denotes 
the assets  of the banking sector in central bank money  (and in divisional currency 
issued  by  the  Treasury),  together  with the  assets  of  the  banks capable  of being 
converted  into  such  money  without  delay  or material  loss  of  capital  value.  The 
level  of  and  variations  in  their  available  liquidity  determine  the  possibilities  for 
expansion  of  the  banks'  operations  in  the  form  of  credits  and  investment  in 
securities. 
The expression  "bank liquidity", used without elaboration in this  general  portion 
of the work, denotes the whole of the liquid assets of the banks, whether blocked 
or free,  and whether they  are  in the nature of liquid cash  or potential liquidity.1 
Money base 
35.  The authorities can still bring hnmediate action to bear on the money base,  a 
complex aggregate including elements of liquidity in the economy and bank liquid-
ity. This concerns a point of view which, in the Community, has received particular 
attention in Italy, where it forms  the basis  of action  by  the monetary authorities 
(cf.  Point  62). 
The  money  base  is  formed  by  the  fiduciary  currency  circulation  and  any  other 
assets  immediately  convertible  into  fiduciary  currency  with  the  monetary  author-
ities. It is  held partly by  the monetary institutions, partly by the public. Action by 
the  issuing  authority  on bank liquidity thus  enables  it to  influence  the expansion 
of  credit  and  of  deposits. 
Para.  I:  Liquidity  of the  economy 
Para.  I-1:  Definition,  structure  and  evolution  of liquidity  in  the economy 
36.  In the present  section,  after  comparing  the  different  national  conceptions  of 
liquidity gleaned from  the  analyses  made  by the monetary authorities, an attempt 
will  be made  to trace  the global evolution  of liquidity in relation  to the national 
revenue  and  the changes  that have  occurred  over  a  period in  the composition of 
liquidity  in each  country. 
Primary liquidity 
i) Comparison  of national  concepts 
37.  All  the central banks  differentiate  between  various elements  of liquidity.  But 
1 For the different elements  constituting bank liquidity see Point 46. It should be noted  that in Italy the terminology 
is  different.  The term  "bank reserves"  refers  to the whole of the banks' liquid assets,  whether free  or blocked.  The 
term "bank liquidity"  denotes  only the portion of the reserves  that is immediately available. 
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the terminology they use varies.  Italy and the Netherlands distinguish primary and 
secondary  liquidity;  in  Belgium  the  terms  used  are  money  and  near-money,  but 
the  latter is  still  known  by  the  names  of  secondary  liquidity or short-term  non-
monetary financial  assets;  in  Germany  the volume  of  money  in the narrow sense 
denotes money, the volume of money in the wider sense includes money and near-
money;  in France  the distinction  is  drawn between money  and liquid savings,  of 
which  near-money  is  one  component.  On practical  grounds,  a  single  terminology 
will be used here, that of primary and secondary liquidity (see Table 2). 
As  regards primary liquidity all  the countries  include the fiduciary  currency circul-
ation and money of account:  the fiduciary  currency consisting of the notes issued 
by  the central bank, excluding  the cash  holdings  of the banks, and the divisional 
currency (and small coinage in Belgium) issued by the Treasury;  money of account 
consisting  of the sight deposits,  in the national currency, of  residents 1 other than 
the  banks  with  any  institution  that  creates  or manages  money.  As  is  shown in 
Table 2, the differences  between countries  are  relatively limited. In Belgium bank 
deposits  at one  month  are  included,  and  in  Germany  deposits  at less  than one 
month.  Primary  liquidity  only  includes  sight  deposits  at  the  savings  banks  in 
Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, where these institutions are true banks; elsewhere 
these deposits  are excluded from  the statistics of primary liquidity, either because 
they  do  not possess  the  true character of  means  of  payment (France) or because 
they have  this  character but practical considerations have not yet made it possible 
to adapt the statistics  to a recent development (Netherlands and Belgium).  · 
Secondary liquidity 
38.  As  regards  secondary  liquidity,  more  substantial  differences  are  to  be  noted 
between  the  Community  countries. 
Secondary  liquidity  is  usually  taken  to  include  the  following  elements:  time  de-
posits, savings  deposits, the foreign exchange deposits of residents in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg/ and short-term claims on the Treasury to the extent 
that  such  claims  are  held  by  the  non-banking  sector.  However,  in the  statistics 
relating  to the  formation  of liquidity  the  different  countries  do  not include  the 
whole of these assets. 
In this  respect  Germany  constitutes  a  somewhat special  case,  for  the statistics  in 
that  country  only  show  as  secondary  liquidity  (under  the  name  of near-money) 
deposits  for  terms  of less  than  4  years;  deposits  for  more  than  4  years  and  all 
savings  deposits  are  regarded  as  capital  formation,  that  is  to  say  as  elements 
increases  in  which  have  a  contracting  effect  on  liquidity.  In fact,  the  German 
monetary  authorities  consider  that  such  deposits  are  more  rarely  mobilized  than 
other  deposits  by  their holders.  The  short-term  claims  of the non-banking  sector 
on the public sector do not play an important part in  Germ~ny, these claims being 
almost exclusively held by the banks. 
For the  other countries,  the  following  plan can be given.  Representing  the main 
element  constituting  secondary  liquidity,  time  deposits  (for  over  one  month  in 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg)  are  always  included  in  secondary  liquidity,  whether 
they are  held  at the banks or at the Treasury  as  in France. 
; 
1 In Germany and Italy residents' deposits  in the national currency  and  in foreign  exchange are included;  in Germany 
the  sight deposits  of the public  authorities  at  the Bundesbank are  excluded.  Furthermore the global  French  statistics 
do  not  distinguish  between  deposits  of  residents  and  non-residents,  in  national  currency  and  in  foreign  exchange. 
2 See  the previous  note with regard  to France. 
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Saving deposits at the oonks and savings banks are regarded as  secondary liquidity. 
In the Netherlands, however, savings deposits at the banks are only included as  to 
a  small  part,  since  their velocity  of circulation  is  relatively  low.  The  situation is 
identical  as  regards  balances  at  the  savings  banks,  but for  practical  reasons  the 
corresponding fraction  has  not yet been included in the liquidity statistics. 
As  for  short-term  claims  on  the State (and the other public authorities),  these are 
included in  almost all  cases  in the  statistics  of liquidity formation,  but they only 
represent  an  important  V•)lume  in  the  Netherlands  and  France,  where  they  are 
widely  distributed among  the  public.  In the  Netherlands  this  applies  not only  to 
Treasury bonds, but also  to cash deposits with the local authorities and day-to-day 
loans  both to  the Treasury and  to  the local  authorities.  The monetary analysis  of 
the National Bank of Belgium does not treat short-term Treasury bonds as  liquidity 
items,  as  these do  not come  into the hands of the public. 
Liquidity ratio and its meaning 
ii)  Evolution  of the liquidity of the economy  and its composition in the member 
countries 
39.  The liquidity of the  economy  is  understood as  a  relative notion measured by 
a comparison between, on the one hand, the average amount of liquidity in absolute 
terms, and on the other hand an economic magnitude sufficiently  representative of 
the level  of incomes  and  transactions,  such  as  the national income.  Nevertheless, 
no  simple  criterion,  such  as  this  relationship,  will  serve  to  size  up perfectly the 
appropriate level of liquidity in the economy according to the objectives  aimed at. 
A  whole series  of factors  in fact  comes  into  the reckoning. 
Table  2 gives  an  overall idea of the evolution of liquidity and of its  components 
in  the  Member  States,  between  1960  and  1970.  The  lines  of  demarcation  be-
tween  the  assets  regarded  as  forming  part  of  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  are 
shown in the table at different levels according to the country. 
To  clarify  the  comparisons  between  countries,  two  points  should  be  made  in 
particular. In its analyses  of the volume .of money in the .wider sense ,'of  the term, 
the Bundesbank includes  monetary assets  and  time deposits for less  than 4  years. 
In France,  within  the  field  of  secondary  liquidity,  one  distinguishes  near-money 
and  the rest of the liquid or short-term savings  (that is  to say  deposits at savings 
banks  and  Treasury  bonds). 
Global  &  structural evolution 
40.  During  the  period  1960-1970,  the  total  volume  of  the  holdings  which  are 
actually  regarded  as  having  a liquid character  (line  G  in the table)  has  increased 
in all  cases  during the period more rapidly than the national income, except in the 
Netherlands where the liquidity ratio has  fallen  and in Belgium where it has  not 
changed.  · 
It is  to  be  noted,  moreover,  that  between  1960  and  1970  certain  changes  have 
occurred in the structure of liquidity.  Increases  in liquidity have  occurred mainly 
in secondary liquidity,  the items  of which appear in lines  C,  D, E  &  F.t.,  In fact, 
the relationship  between  primary liquidity  and  national  income  has  generally  re-
1 It will  be recalled  that  the  distinction  between  primary  liquidity  and  secondary  liquidity  is  not  made  in German 
monetary  analysis. 
32 TABLE  2 
Elements  constituting  primary  and  secondary  liqui<dity  in  the  economy  in  the  Member  States 
classified  according  to  the  institutions  that  issue  them  (1) 
Money-creating Institutions  Germany  France 
Central bank (2)  Notes & sight deposits  Notes & sight deposits 
- sight deposits  - sight deposits 
-time  deposits  for  - time deposits 
less  than  4  years  - bank-book deposits 
- certificates  of  de-
posit 
Banks and assimilated insti- - housing savings de-
tutions  posits 
- sight deposits  -savings  book  de· 
Savings banks (3)  (and savings  -time  deposits  for  posits 
at the Post Office)  less  than  4  years  - housing savings de-
posits 
- savings  certificates 
Postal cheques (or giro service)  - sight deposits  - sight deposits 
- divisional  currency  - divisional currency 
Treasury  - sight deposits 
- time deposits 
- Treasury bonds 
Local authorities 
(1)  Primary liquidity items are underlined. 
(2)  Excluding notes held by the banks. 
(3)  In Germany the savings banks are credit institutions like the banks. 
(4)  In certain cases, deposits for not more than 2  years or  1  year. 
Italy  Nether  lands  Belgium (5) 
Notes & sight deposits  Notes & sight deposits  Notes & sight deposits 
- sight deposits  - sight deposits  - sight deposits 
- time deposits  -time  deposits  for  - deposits at not more 
- savings deposits  less than 3 years (4)  than  1 month 
- foreign exchange de- - savings deposits (to  - deposits  at sight  & 
posits by residents  the extent they are  at  not  more  than  1 
liquid)  month at parastatal 
- foreign exchange de- institutions 
posits by residents  - deposits at not more 
- day-to-day loans  than 1  year 
- bank-book deposits 
- foreign exchange de-
posits by residents 
- sight deposits  - various deposits at 
- time deposits  not  more  than  1 
- savings deposits  year 
- Postal deposits 
- sight deposits  - sight deposits  - sight deposits 
- divisional currency  - divisional  currency  - divisional currency 
- sight deposits  - deposits  &  small coin 
- short-term Treasury  - short-term loans 
bills  - Treasury bonds 
- cash deposits 
- day-to-day loans 
-advances  on  cur-
rent accounts 
---
Luxembourg 
Notes & sight deposits 
- sight deposits (up to 
30  days) 
- time deposits 
- savings deposits 
- foreign exchange de-
posits by residents 
~- sight deposits (up to 
30  days) 
- savings deposits 
- foreign exchange de· 
posits by residents 
- sight deposits 
- di~isional currency 
(5)  The statistics published by the National Bank of Belgium m'linly concern the stock of money and qua>i-monetary liquidity, the latter being limited to time deposits and foreign  exchange deposits at 
\.N  the banks.  Sometimes, however, and this is  the case with that part of the present work which concerns Belgium, quasi-monetary liquidity is extended to take in holdings at savings institutions. 
\.N \.N 
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TABLE 3 
Primary  &  secondary  liquidity  (a) 
In milliards of national  monetary  units  (Italy:  1,000 milliards) 
Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg (i) 
1960  1970  1960  1970  1960  1970  1960  1970  1960  1970  1960  1970 
A.  Fiduciary  currency  circulation  20.8  36.9  39.5  75.9  2.4  6.5  5.1  10.0  126.8  190.7  5.9  7.1 
B.  Money of  account  33.7  71.3  55.3(h)  158.2(h)  4.9  24.3  6.2  16.0  6.6  11.8 
sight deposits  (b) 
deposits  at  sight  and  up  to  one  month 
93.6  227.8 
C.  Time &  foreign  exchange  deposits  (e)  65.1  9.6  79.9  (f)  (f)  3.3  7.8  19.1  89.6  6.4(g)  26.9(g) 
time deposits  • at the banks (c)  (d) 
(e)  94.7  • for 4  years &  more (in 
Germany) 
• at parastatal credit ins- 4.4  26.6 
titutions  (h)  (h)  (f)  (f)  0.2  1.0  7.2  11.4  (g)  (g)  foreign  exchange  deposits  19.4  33.7  0.2  1.4  1.1 
D.  Treasury bonds  and deposits at the Treasury  ... 
0.5  2.6 
E.  Claims  on  local  authorities 
F.  Savings  deposits &  holdings 
savings  deposits at the banks  1.4  30.9  7.7  21.2  01  0.7  15.6  76.0  9.3  16.5 
- liquid  {e)  208.7  0.9  4.6 
- non-liquid  (d)  (d) 
deposits  at the  savings  banks 
29.5  113.8  (d)  {d)  9.9  29.6  107.7  213.2  (d)  {d) 
G.  Total  of  the  items  considered  to  be  of  a 
liquid nature 
- in milliards of units (Italy in 1,000 mil-
liards of units)  ...  173.3  154.7  492.4  15.2  52.0  16.8  39.2  374.4  835.3  2.82  62.3 
- as a  percentage of the national income  ...  33.0  67.0  78.0  85.7  111.5  41.8  36.1  81.8  82.0  12.99  166.1 
(a) For each country,  everything is  considered  to be primary or secondary liquidity that appears in this table above the horizontal dividing lines.  The various items in the table  are presented in this 
way for practical reasons, to permit regrouping on roughly similar lines for  the different countries. 
(b) All countries: including postal cheque deposits and at central giro institutions. 
(c)  Germany:  deposits for less  than 4  years. 
(d)  Germany, Italy, Luxembourg: the savings banks form  part of the banking sector. 
(e)  Germany: in 1960 the total of time deposits and savings holdings was DM 72.4 mrd. 
(f)  Italy: the total of time, savings  and foreign  exchange deposits at the credit institutions and deposits at the Post Office  are included in savings at the banks. 
(g)  Luxembourg:  in time deposits  are included the sight and time foreign  exchange deposits of residents. 
(h)  France: foreign  exchange deposits are included in sight deposits. 
(i)  Luxembourg: estimates. 
Sourcer:  Monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Tables  1  &  2. 
Monthly statistics of the National Credit Council, Tables  1  &  4. 
Report on the Situation of the Country,  1970,  Table 60. 
Quarterly Report of the Nederlandsche Bank, Table 3-1. 
National Bank of Belgium Bulletin, in particular Tables XIII-2d,  XIV-5b,  XIV-6. 
Statistics furnished by the State Savings Bank in Luxembourg. Liquidity 
mained  constant  or has  declined.  The  only  exception  to  this  has  occurred  in the 
case  of  Italy,  where  the  relationship  has  increased  considerably  owing  to a very 
special factor:  sight deposits  are  largely used for  savings  because  under the inter-
bank agreement in force,  the  return on them is  greater  than  that on savings  de-
posits. 
The proportion between the fiduciary currency circulation and the national income, 
a  structural  factor  which  has  a  considerable  influence  on  the  banks'  needs  for 
liquid funds, has fallen particularly sharply in Belgium and France (the countries in 
which  this ratio was  the highest), and in the Netherlands. The proportion ranged 
in  1970  from  7% in  Germany  to  15% in Belgium. 
The biggest changes  in structure have occurred in France,  where secondary liquid-
ity,  notably  savings  bank deposits  and certificates,  as  well  as  bank  time  deposits 
and certificates of deposit, have assumed a relatively much greater importance than 
in the past. 
Para. 1-2:  Sources of creation of liquidity and their relative importance 
41.  The majority of the Member States prepare and publish periodically a monthly 
analysis  showing on the basis of the consolidated balance sheet of the credit insti-
tutions  (central  bank included)  on the one hand the  variations in the volume  of 
internal  liquidity,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  origins  and  counterparts  of  the 
variations.  As  has  been seen  above,  the definitions  of the notion of liquidity vary 
according to  the country.  Germany, for example, interprets it in a narrower sense 
than the. other countries;  similarly one finds  differences  in the delimitation of the 
counterparts.  Among  the  latter,  a  distinction  can  reasonably  be  made  between 
those  originating  inside  the  country  (comprising  credits  to the private sector  and 
credits  to the  public  sector)  and those  originating outside the country (balance  of 
operations  with  foreign  countries). 
42.  In all  the Member States  the granting  of credits to  the private sector usually 
heads  the  list  of  sources  of  creation  of liquidity.  In this  respect,  a  distinction 
should  be  made  between  short-term  credits  and  medium  and  long-term  credits. 
From the  point of view of the analysis  of the causes  of the creation of liquidity, 
medium  and long-term  credit  operations  are  included  in  some  countries, if some-
times  only  in  part;  in  others  it is  considered  that the  granting  by  the banks  of 
longer-term  assistance  merely  represents  a  transfer  of  savings  and  not a creation 
of money. 
43.  The creation of liquidity is similarly effected in favour  of the public authorities. 
The counterparts of such  liquidity also  appear in the monetary  analysis,  as  claims 
by the banking system on public authorities;  in certain countries (France  and  the 
Netherlands)  private  persons  and  enterprises  can  also  have  claims  on  public 
authorities. 
In Germany,  this  source  of creation  of liquidity  has  been  relatively  insignificant. 
In the Netherlands,  the recourse  of the central government  and the local  author-
ities  to  the  creation  of  liquidity  has  considerably  increased  in the  course  of  the 
1960s,  while  in France  the  policy  of  budgetary  restraint  has  made  it  possible, 
having  regard  to  the-economic  situation,  to reduce  sharply  (except in 1968-1969) 
recourse by the Treasury to monetary financing.  In Italy and Belgium recourse by 
the  public  authorities  to  monetary  financing  has  traditionally  been  fairly  con-
siderable. 
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44.  Finally,  the creation  of liquidity may be of foreign  origin.  One foreign source 
regarded as  a factor in changes in liquidity is the balance of payments with foreign 
countries,  defined  as  the net result of sales  and purchases  of foreign  exchange  by 
private persons, enterprises  and the State effected with the monetary institutions. 
The internal and foreign  causes  of the creation of liquidity cannot be put on the 
same  plane  to  the  extent that  the  internal  sources  of liquidity  are  more  directly 
under the control of the monetary  authorities  than changes  in liquidity emanating 
from  abroad,  which depend on the whole  body  of factors  which  affect  the  trend 
of the balance  of payments. 
If one examines  the contribution of the balance of payments with foreign countries 
to  the  growth  in  liquidity  in  the  economy,  it  appears  that  this  contribution 
fluctuates  considerably  from  one  period  to  another.  In  the  second  half  of  the 
1960s it was  very  substantial  in  Germany,  but negative  in France  owing  to the 
large deficits  in the balance of payments recorded in 1968 and' 1969. In the other 
countries  the  balance  of transactions  with foreign  countries for  the whole  of the 
period has constituted a relatively important source of creation of liquidity. 
The international flows  of capital not only directly replenish internal liquidity but, 
by the  expansion  of bank liquidity  that  they  bring if no  measures  are  taken  to 
counter it, they  may  also  prompt the banks  to  develop  their internal credit oper-
ations  and  thus indirectly promote an  additional  creation of liquidity. 
The analysis  of  the  various  sources  of  creation  of  liquidity  makes  it possible  to 
determine  the  origin  of  any  disequilibria  in  the  evolution  of  liquidity  in  the 
economy.  Certainly,  having  regard to the manifold interdependence of the various 
sources  of creation of liquidity,  one should refrain from  interpreting variations in 
one  counterpart  or  another  taken  in isolation.  Nevertheless,  the  analyses  of  the 
short-term variations  in the counterparts  have  proved very useful in assessing  the 
monetary situation with a view to determining  the direction that should be given 
to monetary policy  and  the choice  of instruments  to  be employed. 
Para II - Liquidity of the banking system 
Definition 
4 5.  Banking  liquidity has  been defined above  (see introduction  to the chapter on 
liquidity), as  being formed by the holdings in the banking system of central bank 
money (and divisional currency issued by the Treasury) and by bank assets capable 
of  being  converted  into  such  money  without  delay  or  material  loss  of  capital 
value. 
Their liquid holdings  enable the banks  to face  their cash  requirements in relation 
to their customers and the central bank. The margins at their disposal for recourse 
to the issuing authority constitute an essential element in this. 
Composition 
46.  Traditionally, bank liquidity is  classified  according  to  the availability more or 
less  immediate  of its  elements,  and  these  are  grouped  into  cash  (or  immediate) 
liquidity and potential liquidity. The need to  earn a return prompts  the banks to 
reduce  the former  to  the  utmost  in favour  of  holdings  that are  both liquid  and 
remunerative. 
The composition of cash  liquidity differs  little from  one  country  to another.  It is 
made  up of  the  holdings  of the banks  in cash  and on current (sight)  accounts  at 
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the central bank and in the postal cheque  system  and  at the Treasury.  The com-
position  of  potential  liquidity  varies  more  from  country  to country,  according  to 
the  financial  structure;  it is  also  connected  with  the  methods  of  credit  utilized. 
Generally speaking it comprises  the banks' holdings  that are capable of conversion 
into  central  bank  money.  The  detailed  composition  of  the  potential  liquidity  in 
each  country  is  set  out in Table  4. 
The  central  banks  can  immobilize  a  greater  or  lesser  part  of  the  banks'  assets 
possessing  a liquid character by manipulating their compulsory  reserves,  by which 
means it is  sought to act directly on the banks' liquidity with a view to influencing 
the distribution of credits and the creation of deposits that results.  This technique 
is  en1ployed  at present in Germany, France  and Italy. 
In  Germany,  the  Bundesbank  distinguishes  between  non-available  liquidity  (or 
minimum reserves)  and the  free  liquid  reserves of the banks. The free reserves of 
liquid funds  are composed of the following elements:  balances at the central bank 
in excess  of the amount of the minimum  reserves/  domestic  money  market secur-
ities,  short-term  investments  abroad,  re-discount  quotas  not  utilized;  from  this 
total,  advances  against  security  (Lombard loans)  are  deducted.  The  total of  these 
free  reserves  provides  the  basis  of possible  expansion  of banking  activities. 
The same  distinction is  made in France and  Italy, where it forms  the basis of the 
analysis  of bank liquidity,  but with variations  arising  from  the  characteristics  of 
monetary  policy  in  those  countries.  In France,  special  importance  is  attached  to 
the possibility of the banks' indebtedness, in respect of which a distinction is  made 
between assistance  at fixed  rates  and  variable  rates.  In Italy, the  liquidity of  the 
credit  institutions  consists  to  a  very  large  extent of the  margins  available  on ac-
counts  for  advances  against  securities.  On  the  other  hand,  specific  recourse  is 
not  had  to  this  distinction  in Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  were  the  monetary 
authorities  do  not  make  current  use  of  the  principal  instrument  aimed  at  the 
direct  contr~l of bank liquidity,  that is  to say  the manipulation of the compulsory 
reserves. 
It  should  be  noted  that  in  principle  the  compulsory  reserves  of  the  banks  on 
accounts at the central bank, where they exist, may not be drawn on. Nevertheless, 
except in Italy/ the banks are only required to maintain the stipulated :amount of 
the  reserves  as  a monthly average.  Consequently,  a portion of  the reserves can  be 
utilized to cover  temporary cash  requirements  and  serves  in fact  as  cash  liquidity. 
The banks' reserves in cash and on current account "available at the central bank'" 
(that is  to  say  in excess  of  the compulsory  reserves)  can  thus be kept at a  very 
low  level. 
Factors influencing bank liquidity 
47.  The  central  banks  highlight  certain  variables  that  they  consider  of  strategic 
importance.  In Germany  these  variables  are  the  "free  bank  reserves",  in France 
the  "central  bank  assistance  to  the  banks",  in  Italy  the  "monetary  base"  sub-
divided into the base  in the hands  of the public and the base held by  the  banks~ 
in the Netherlands the "expansion  or restriction  of the money market" (otherwise 
called the free  reserves of the banks  and central bank assistance);  in Belgium the 
1 Account  is  taken  of  the  average  of  these  balances  and  this  amount  calculated  according  to  a  certain  number  of 
reference  days. 
2  And  in Belgium,  when the system of compulsory reserves  was in force. 
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00  TABLE  4 
Composition  of the  potential  liquidity  of the  banks  (1) 
-Assets 
in the 
internal 
market 
-Claims 
on  for-
eign 
countries 
Germany 
Domestic money mar-
ket  securities  (less : 
"Lombard" loans); re-
discount  quotas  not 
utilized 
Short-term investments 
abroad: short-term 
claims on foreign banks 
excluding sight claims 
denominated in foreign 
currencies (regarded as 
working  capital);  for-
eign  bills  (including 
Treasury bills} at short 
term 
France 
Margins available aga-
inst the rediscount ce-
iling;  bills  eligible  for 
discount without a  ce-
iling;  other assets  eli-
gible on the open mar-
ket in virtue of  decis-
ions  by  the  Bank  of 
France 
Short  and  medium-
term effects mobilizable 
at the Bank of France; 
short-term investments 
abroad 
(1)  The terminology employed is that in use in each country. 
Italy 
Margins  available  on 
ordinary  advance  ac-
counts at the Bank of 
Italy;  bills  and  cur-
rent  accounts  repre-
senting  stocking 
Convertible foreign ex-
change  (sight  funds 
and short-term invest-
ments)  to  the  extent 
to which they are  ac-
cepted  for  conversion 
by  the  monetary  au-
thorities 
Netherlands 
Assets capable of being 
sold or pledged to the 
Nederlandsche  Bank; 
cash  deposits  granted 
to  the  State 
Net  balances  of  the 
banking system vis-a-
vis  foreign  countries 
Belgium 
Net day-to-day loans; 
commercial  bills  and 
acceptances rediscount-
able  at  the  National 
Bank;  certificates  of 
the  Treasury and the 
Securities Stabilization 
Fund  (less:  advances 
against  security  from 
the National Bank) 
Spot foreign  exchange 
position (  exluding par-
ticipations) 
Luxembourg 
Bank  balances  (  espe-
cially  holdings  with 
Belgian  banks);  secu-
rities receivable at short 
term; rediscountable ef-
fects; mobilizable pub-
lic  securities Liquidity 
monetary  analyses  (cf.  lower  down  Table  7  in  Part 6  concerning  Belgium)  cast 
light  on  the  "banks'  liquid  resources"  (equivalent  to  their  free  reserves),  and  a 
group  of  items  which  taken  together  correspond  to  the  notion  of  the  monetary 
base utilized more generally in other countries. 
The  causes  of variations  in bank liquidity are split up into: 
- factors of an economic or monetary order operating on the level of liquid assets 
of  the banks:  external  factors  or factors  connected  with the  market; 
- intervention by  the monetary authorities  with a view to modifying  the banks' 
powers of recourse to the central bank (to which should be added, to a variable 
extent  according  to  the  country,  those  which  aim  at  acting  on the  external 
position of the banks and the method of financing  the public sector). 
Extemal factors 
48.  External factors  are  generally  taken  to include the factors  connected with the 
developn1ent  of  the  market over which the policy  applied by the authorities only 
has  an  indirect  influence  or only  operates  after  a  certain  time-lag.  The principal 
factors  of this  type  are  of  three  kinds: 
- movements  of  fiduciary  currency  between  the  banks  and  the  public;1 
- payments  in favour  of or emanating  from  the public  sector; 
- the  balance  of  external  operations  by  the  non-monetary  sector  shown  in the 
balance  of  payments. 
Movements of fiduciary currency 
The volume  of  ban~ liquidity is  influenced in particular by the demand  for  notes 
and  coin  on  the  part  of  the  public,  which  depends  on  the  public's  payment 
habits  and  the trend  of disposable  incomes.  According  to whether the proportion 
of payments  normally  effected  in notes  and  coin  is  high  or low,  any  creation of 
money  by  the  banks  will  lead  to  a  more  or less  substantial  drain  on their  cash 
reserves. 
Payment  habits  only  change  slowly.  For structural and historical reasons  they are 
very  different  from  one  country  to  another,  and  in  consequence  the  proportion 
of notes  and  coin  in  the  total  money  supply  differs  likewise.  However,  seasonal 
and  adventitious  factors  influence  the  proportion  and  impose  particular  require-
ments  on  the  banks  in the  matter of  liquidity. 
The  trend  of  disposable  income  also  influences  the  demand  for  notes  and  coin, 
although the relationship is not proportionate (cf. next paragraph). Income normal-
ly  increases  each  year,  but very  irregularly  from  one  year  to  the next.  This is  a 
factor  making  for  fairly  sizeable  variations  in  the  requirements  of  bank  cash 
reserves. 
In fact,  it is  found  that if the  volume  of notes  and  coin  held by  the public  has 
increased  each  year  in absolute figures  in all  the countries (with rare exceptions), 
the proportion of fiduciary currency in the total money stock has declined steadily, 
thus  contributing  to  reducing  the  "flights"  of  liquidity  on  the  occasion  of  the 
creation  of  money. 
1 It  should  be  recalled  that  the  Bank  of  Italy  applies  its  actions  to  the  monetary  base  rather  than  to  banking 
liquidity.  The  movements  of  fiduciary  currency  between  the  banks  and  the  public  do  not  affect  the  volume  of  the 
monetary base overall. 
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Operations by the public authorities 
The  second  factor  which  affects  the  liquidity  of  the banks  is  the  movement  of 
receipts  and  expenditure  of  the  public  authorities.  The  creation  of  liquidity  in 
this  way  depends  generally  speaking  on  the  financial  policy  followed  and  the 
methods of financing  budget deficits  and allocating surpluses. 
The  effect  of  the financial  operations  of  the  public  authorities  on bank liquidity 
is  also  conditional  on the  rules  and  practices  in ·use  in the different  countries  as 
regards  the management  of  the  holdings  of  the public  sector  and  the  tapping by 
the Treasury of the financial  circuits. According  to whether the Treasury can deal 
freely  and directly  enough with the banks  and  the  public  or whether the central 
bank  intervenes  in  these  relations,  the  effects  of  the  operations  of  the  public 
authorities on bank liquidity  are  more  or less  direct  and more  or less  susceptible 
of being  influenced  by corrective  action by the  central bank.1 
In Italy, intervention by the monetary authorities is considered to have a particular 
influence on the potential effects  of this  source of liquidity. In the other countries 
it is  considered  that the means  of action of the issuing authority in this  field  are 
relatively  limited. 
Operations with foreign countries 
Movements in the reserves of the official  sector and the banks are a third external 
factor  affecting  variations  in bank  liquidity.  This  is  affected  by  the  sum  total  of 
the  operations  of  the  non-monetary  sector  with foreign  countries  as  reflected  in 
the  balance  of  payments.  It is  to  be  noted  that  in  so  far  as  the  elements  of 
liquidity in the hands  of the banks are located partly inside the country and partly 
abroad,  and  that  the  regulations  do  not prevent  the  credit  establishments  from 
transferring  them  from  one  centre  to another,  they do  so  without  affecting  their 
total liquidity;  this is  the case  for instance in Germany  and the Netherlands. On 
this point is must be pointed out that as  the definitions of bank liquidity vary from 
country  to  country  the  impact  of  movements  of funds  by  the  banks  is  not  the 
same  in  all  cases. 
Instruments for intervention by the authorities into bank liquidity 
49.  The monetary authorities seek to correct the effect of external factors on bank 
liquidity  by  deliberate  intervention  for  the purpose of influencing  the  volume  of 
liquidity  in  the  direction  desired.  For  this  purpose  they  make  use  of  various 
instruments.2 
The  principal  instrument  in  Germany  and  France,  that  of  compulsory  reserves, 
has  a  very  direct  quantitative  effect;  in normal  circumstances  this  instrument is 
particularly well  suited  to  a  monetary  policy  that  seeks  to promote internal  and 
external equilibrium by acting on bank liquidity, as  is  the case  in these countries. 
Other techniques  for  the control of liquidity  are  employed  in Germany  (changes 
in  rediscount  ceilings;  open  market  operations  by  the  Bundesbank  in short-term 
negotiable  securities  in  relation  to residents  other than the banks;  and operations 
in  long-term  securities)  and  in  France  (rediscount  ceilings;  minimum  levels  for 
t  See  below  the  chapters  concerning  each  country  for  detailed  descriptions  of  the  very  complex  relations  between 
public  authorities,  central  bank,  the  banks  and  the  public. 
2 For  a  detailed study of  these  instruments  see  below in the chapter  on the instruments of monetary  policy. 
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effects  representing rediscountable  medium-term credits;  changes in the conditions 
of  access  to  refinancing  at the  central  bank). 
The position in Italy  approaches  that of these  two countries but with important 
differences  of  detail.  The authorities  in that country exercise  on  the  one  hand  a 
quantitative  control of  the  money  base  (and  not only  of bank liquidity)  by cor-
rective  intervention  regarding  the  development  of  the  external  factors  conducive 
to the creation  of  this.  On  the  other  hand  the  manipulation  of  the compulsory 
reserves  is  intended  to  control  the  ratio  of  credit  and  deposits,  once  the  basic 
monetary volume and its distribution between the public and the credit institutions 
is  known. 
Belgium  now  employs,  with a  similar object,  rediscount  and  certification  ("visa") 
ceilings  and, ·occasionally, ceilings on the external debtor position of the banks. 
As  regards  the  Netherlands,  the  authorities  also  have  means  of influencing  bank 
liquidity:  compulsory  reserves,  open  market  operations  and  changes  in  the  pro-
visions  governing  refinancing  possibilities.  Nevertheless,  the  policy  has  been  to 
make only  occasional use of these instruments since action has  been applied direct 
to  the  liquidity  in  the economy. 
As  lending and borrowing abroad by the banks have  assumed growing importance 
in all countries, the monetary authorities have tried to act on this source of liquidity. 
To  this  end,  they  have  in  particular  the  possibility  of  imposing  on  the  banks 
limitations  on their external indebtedness  (regulation  of  their external position in 
all cases  except Germany) or of concluding with them (in all cases, but this power 
is  not used in practice in the BLED) forward foreign exchange (swap) operations, 
sometimes  with the  object in  particular of promoting  international movements  of 
capital  considered  desirable  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  exchange  reserves, 
sometimes  for  the  purpose  of acting  mainly  on internal  liquidity. 
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THE OBJECTIVES  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Para. I:  The general objectives and 'the relationship between methods of 
control of the economy 
50.  In all  the  countries,  the  general  objectives  allotted  to the authorities,  under 
one  formula  or another,  are  as  follows:  economic  growth  and  stability of prices, 
a  high level  of ·employment,  and  external  equilibrium of the economy. 
Certainly differences  appear in the way  these objectives are formulated and in the 
specific attitudes of the authorities in the face  of given situations; and in particular 
circumstances,  the  monetary  authorities, or one  of them,  may  assign  to certain ot 
these  objectives  a  higher  or lower order of  priority.  Particular attention has  thus 
often been paid  to  the  movement  of  prices  and  the balance  of  payments  during 
the  1960s  by  reason  of  the  tendency  to  disequilibrium  that has  often  developed 
in  these  fields. 
Regulation of the economy and assessing recourse 
to the various instruments of economic policy ( « policy-mix») 
In the  pursuit  of economic  objectives,  it is  necessary  to  combine  the use  of  the 
various  means  available,  of  which  the  principal  ones  in  the  short-term  economic 
field  are  monetary  policy  and  the policy  governing  public  finances.1  The efficient 
implementation of these policies  in conjunction calls  for close  coordination by the 
authorities  concerned  (essentially  the government  bodies  and  the  central bank) in 
combination  with  the  social  partners. 
If the value of a combination of the various means  of controlling the economy is 
generally  recognised,  it is  none  the  less  true  that the place  allotted  to  monetary 
policy  in  the  countries  of  the  Community  has  often  been  an  important  one, 
especially  as  regards  the  use  of  instruments  intended  to  operate  on  the  volume 
of  liquidity. 
Various  reasons  may  be cited for  giving  monetary  policy  a  particularly hnportant 
role  in practice,  notably  a  lack of flexibility  in budgetary  policy:  in cases  of  dif-
ficulty  in  the  correct  and  rapid  application  of  budget policy  the  authorities  will 
have  a tendency to accentuate recourse to the means  of action offered by monetary 
policy. 
1 The  line  of  demarcation  between  the  fields  of  application  of  monetary  policy  and  public  financial  policy  cannot 
be  drawn  in advance  in accordance  with universally  accepted  norms.  The principal  questions  in this  respect  concern 
the  financing  of budget balances  and  the management of the public debt.  It will be agreed  here  to give  to the term 
"monetary policy"  the restrictive  meaning  of credit policy  and  the  regulation  of monetary  and  financial. transactions 
with foreign  countries. 
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It is  fairly  generally  admitted  after all  that monetary policy is particularly useful 
when  employed  for  restrictive  purposes,  but that  where  it is  a  question  of sti-
mulating an  economy  judged to be too depressed the accent  must be placed more 
on budget  policy. 
Para. II: Elaboration of the objectives ·on the monetary plan: 
The global Uquidity of the economy 
51.  The  liquidity  of  the  economy  constitutes  the  principal  aggregate  on  which 
the action  taken by  the monetary authorities to assist  the realization of the global 
objectives  of economic  policy  bears. 
The choice  of means  put in train by such action must take account of the various 
elements of the structure of the economy concerned, the most important of which 
will  be  indicated  below. 
In addition,  the authorities  must  take  into consideration other,  more changeable, 
factors  which  result  from  the  economic  and  social  development  in each  country 
and  from  external  influences. 
In this connection, it should be noted in particular that the central banks, in order 
to influence  the trend of global liquidity in the manner desired, must take account 
of  the  incidence  of  the  operations  of  the  public  authorities  on  the  monetary 
situation.  Certainly  the  governments  themselves  pay  attention  to  the  monetary 
effects  of  the  volume  of public  expenditure  and  the  size  of  the  budget  outturn, 
having  regard  to the means  of financing  to which it is  possible  to  turn, but the 
margin for manoeuvre by the issuing authorities may  be reduced by the limitations 
resulting  from  these  factors. 
To attain in  the monetary field  the  objective  aimed  at  as  regards  the  regulation 
of liquidity in the  economy,  the central banks  must  therefore endeavour,  in col-
laboration  with the  other monetary  authorities,  to  reconcile  the various  financial 
effects  of the  application  of  the general  economic  policy  and take account  of the 
constraints imposed  by  the economic  and  social  situation. 
Faced with these factors,  the diversity of which can be very great, the authorities 
endeavour  to  provide  them  with  a  reference  basis  worked  out in more  or less 
detail according to the country, which enables them to assess in an orderly manner 
the modulations  they should adopt in their action.  The Netherlands and  Italy are 
the countries in which the reference basis  is  most elaborate.  Certain objectives  of 
monetary  policy  are  transmuted  in  those  countries  into  quantitative  terms  which 
are  the subject  of  publication. 
Para. III: The principal criteria for selecting the means of action 
52.  Although  the  objectives  of the  monetary  authorities  are  fairly  similar  in the 
various  countries,  the  approach  to  these  objectives,  the  variables  on which  it is 
sought  to  bring  the  action  to  bear,  and  the  instruments  used  to  influence  the 
liquidity of  the economy  directly  or indirectly  are  sometimes  very  different  from 
one  country  to  another,  and  depend  on  economic  and  financial  structures,  on 
institutional  characteristics  and  on  tradition. 
Among  the  factors  which  intervene  in  the  choise  of  the  orientation  and  the 
methods  of  monetary  policy,  certain  of  them  have  analogous,  although  varying, 
effects  in  the  various  countries  of the  Community;  others  present  fairly  marked 
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differences  according  to  the  country.  Among  these  factors  as  a  whole,  certain of 
them influence  the general orientation of monetary policy,  while others determine 
the choice of  instruments to which recourse  is  had. 
a)  Variations  in  openness  of economies 
53.  Considerable  differences  exist  between  the  Member  countries  as  regards  the 
degree  to  which  the economies  concerned are  open to foreign  countries,  and con-
sequently  as  regards  the  monetary  effects  of  relations  with  foreign  countries. 
Although  to a  varying  extent,  all  the countries  in the common  market  have  had 
in the last few  years  to face  problems  the effect  of which has  tended to increase 
with the increase  in the international mobility  of capital,  especially  at short term 
(see  under d.  below);  particularly  serious  difficulties  have  ensued in the attempts 
to  achieve  internal  and  external  equilibrium. 
b) Principles  observed  in  intervention  by  the  authorities 
54.  For reasons  of  tradition - a  reflection  of which is  found  in the institutional 
framework  and  in the  distribution  of powers  among  the  monetary  authorities-
the national authorities  attach to the principles  that inspire  their action a  weight 
that is  not the  same  for all  the countries  concerned.  In some  of  them preference 
is given to the market mechanisms;  in others, on the other hand, more importance 
may  be  attached  to  direct  intervention  that imposes  more  or  less  constraint  on 
the  authorities.  In  the  latter  case  a  predominant  part  is  played  by  the  direct 
relations  between central banks  and commercial banks in proportion to the whole 
range  of  market  relations. 
c)  Financial  behaviour  of enterprises  &  private  persons 
55.  It is  a question here of a whole set of attitudes of the public concerning the 
distribution of income between consumption and saving,  and as  regards  the latter 
of  preferences  for  amassing  money  and/  or certain  forms  of investment,  together 
with  the  habits  of  economic  agents  as  regards  the  forms  in  which  liquidity  is 
maintained (proportion of  money  of account  to the  total volume  of money),  and 
finally  of  the  stability  of  the  demand  for  money. 
These factors  are tied up with the degree of development of the financial channels. 
The differences of situation between countries on these points introduce an element 
of greater or lesser  uncertainty into the simultaneous pursuit of the objectives  of 
stability,  equilibrium  and  growth  and  can  be  at  the  root of  appreciable  shifts  in 
ratios  of  liquidity  in  the  economy  and  the  banks.  Considerable  differences  can 
consequently appear in the intensity of recourse of the economic sectors to internal 
or foreign  financing  and in the  dependence  of the banking system  on the various 
forms  of  refinancing  by  the  central  bank. 
It appears  that  the  monetary  authorities  are  in each  country  anxious  to improve 
the  possibilities  for  investors,  private  and  public,  to  finance  themselves  out  of 
savings.  In certain countries particular emphasis  is  laid on the fact  that monetary 
policy  should contribute as  a matter of priority to the realization of this  objective, 
subject  only  to  the  requirements  resulting  from  the  economic  situation.  This  is 
the case  in France,  Italy and Belgium. 
Particular  importance  is  attached  to  this  objective  when it is  estimated  that the 
flow  of  savings  is  not  sufficient.  The  monetary  authorities  then  take  steps  to 
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prevent excessive  recourse  by  the  enterprises  to bank assistance  from  compromis-
ing the objectives  in the matter of global liquidity in the economy,  and  to direct 
the  available  funds  to  the  desired  uses.  This  latter result can  be  achieved  either 
by a selective policy in the true sense of the term applied to bank credits and the 
refinancing  of banks,  or by  the  specific  employment  of instruments  the  range  of 
which  is  in principle  comprehensive  (compulsory  reserves  for  example). 
d) Degree  of liquidity  of the  banks 
56.  From  this  point  of  vie:w  the  differences  are  sharp  between  one  country  and 
another,  even  if the  most  frequent  situation is  the  indebtedness  of the  banks  to 
the issuing  authority.  It is  clear  in  particular  that the Dutch banks are  generally 
very  liquid  and  that  the  French  banks  are  permanently  obliged  to  resort  to 
financing  by  the central bank;  the  same  is  true of  the  banks  in Italy,  where the 
central bank can employ  effective  means  of guiding  the banks' use  of funds. 
These  widely  different  situations  necessarily  influence  the  general  trend  and  the 
methods  of  application  of  monetary  policy.  Thus,  confronted  by  a  very  liquid 
banking  system,  action  to  check  bank  liquidity  encounters  many  difficulties  and 
needs to be reinforced by more direct intervention as  regards the credits distributed 
(Netherlands). 
Whatever  may  be  the  relationship  of  cause  and  effect  between  the  degree .  of 
liquidity of the banks  and  the  results  of quantitative action on credits  a situation 
of  very  tight  liquidity  leaves  the  banks  heavily  dependent  on  the  central  bank 
and  means  that  any  action  by  the  issuing  authority  has  severe  effects  on prices 
and  volume  in the  money  market. 
It  should  be  added  that  a  very  important  phenomenon-which  poses  similar 
problems  in  all  the  Community  countries - made  its  appearance  with  the  intro-
duction of convertibility of the currencies, and has grown in importance constantly 
since  1958.  This  is  the  impetus  achieved  by  international  movements  of capital 
and  the  development  of  Euromarkets.  This  trend  has  appreciably  reduced  the 
relative  autonomy  of  the  various  countries  in  respect  of  the  monetary  impulse 
coming from abroad, notably in the matter of interest rates.  The monetary author-
ities  of all  the  member  States  are  therefore faced  with the  same  problem,  which 
is  to  maintain  control of the internal monetary  situation  affected  by international 
movements  of funds  both by the banks  and  the big enterprises. 
e)  Structures  of the  markets  and  the  banking  system 
57.  The  organization  of  the  money  and  financial  markets,  the  structures  of  the 
banking  system  and  the  degree  of  competition  prevailing  are  all  factors  capable 
of guiding the choice of monetary policy. Among many others, two factors  deserve 
attention in this  connection. 
When the  majority  of  banking  activity  is  concentrated among  a  small  number of 
big  banks,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  control  fairly  precisely  the  essentials  of  that 
activity.  Such  a  situation  is  characteristic  of  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  In  the 
latter country the control is  effected in a flexible  manner by personal contact and 
in  the  form  of  "gentlemen's  agreements". 
Another  aspect  of  the  problem,  the  diversification  of · their  activity,  very  pro-
nounced in Germany, gives  the different categories of institution plenty of flexibil-
ity and possibilities  of varied reactions  both to external impulses  and to interven-
tion  by  the  authorities.  In such  a  situation,  monetary  policy  pays  particular  at-
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tention  to  this  factor  and  attains  its  objectives  in a  more  indirect  manner  than 
in other cases. 
Para.  IV:  Points of application (or intermediate objectives) and ways of 
implementing monetary policy 
58.  The factors  that have  just been mentioned,  and others besides,  give monetary 
policy  in each  country  a characteristic  slant.  In fact,  differences  stand out in the 
general  concepts  concerning  the  methods  of  operation  of monetary  policy,  in the 
formulation  of  the  immediate objectives  (sometimes  taking  the form  of "variable 
targets"  expressed  in figures),  in the  precise  points  of  application  of  the  policy 
instruments, and in the estimates of the desired effects of the action taken. 
These  subjects  are  dealt  with in  the  present  section,  country  by  country,  while 
the  enumeration  of  the  principal  instruments  used  in  each  country  will  be  left 
until  the beginning  of  the  following  chapter. 
Germany 
59.  Monetary policy in Germany relies essentially on the orientation of the market 
mechanisms  by  the  central  bank rather than on direct controls. 
It operates  by  pressure  on  bank  liquidity  and  interest  rates  to  the  extent  that 
market  trends  do  not  move  them  spontaneously  in  the  desired  direction;  these 
two  factors  are  moreover  interconnected  and  exert  a  mutual  influence  on  one 
another. 
It should be noted that, if the liquidity of the banks is  the only  aggregate directly 
influenced by  the  Bundesbank,  the  latter does  not set  out to lay  down  a precise 
ratio  of  liquid  assets  as  a  norm;  it confines  itself  to  influencing  the  volume  of 
liquid  assets  and  the  disposition  of  the  banks  to  hold  liquid funds. 
The effects  of such  action on the liquidity of the economy and global  expenditure 
are  indirect and complex,  and  must be regarded in the light of their influence  on 
the  supply  of and  demand  for  credit.  As  regards  the  supply  of credit,  if  a  con-
traction in bank liquidity  is  postulated,  the first  effect will normally be to reduce 
purchases of long-term  securities by the banks, by reason of the close ties between 
monetary  and  financial  markets  in  Germany.  The  contraction  in  the  supply  of 
funds  and  the  rise  in interest  rates  in the  financial  market  will  have  the  result, 
more or less quickly, of reducing long-term credits for capital investment purposes. 
As  regards  medium  and  short-term  credits,  the  effects  may  be  slower.  Interest 
rates,  however,  will end up  feeling  the influence  of  the  trend  of  long-term  rates 
and  in this  way  a  tendency  will  develop  towards  a  decline  in  the  demand  for 
credit.  The  impact  of  the  rise  in the  rates  of interest will be minimal,  however, 
at the outset,  in a period of prosperity, on the demand for funds.  Only gradually 
will  the  difficulties  of obtaining credit,  the rise  in costs  and  the effect  of interest 
rates  on  these costs  change  the general business climate and the volume of credit 
distributed. 
It is  still  not  possible,  however,  on  the  basis  of  the  trend of credits  to  predict 
with any  certainty the movements in the volume of money  and in global demand, 
for it is  considered  that relations  are  not stable between these three elements and 
private  saving  is  capable  of  varying  appreciably. 
It is  therefore  difficult  for  n1onetary  policy  to  set  itself  ultimate  objectives  ex-
pressed in quantitative terms.  But its action on bank liquidity is  capable of finally 
achieving  the  desired  result,  especially  if  it is  combined with the  employment  of 
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other means of regulating the economy, more particularly with a view to guarding 
against  undesirable  economic  influences  from  abroad.  With  such  a  combination, 
the accent can be placed more on monetary policy when it is a question of checking 
excessive  economic  expansion  and  safeguarding  price  stability.  The  accent  would 
not be  so  heavily  placed  on  monetary  policy  when it is  a  question  of  reviving 
the  economy. 
France 
60.  In  France,  the  general  objective  is  to  reconcile  a  sufficiently  high  rate  of 
economic  development  with  stability  of  prices  and  exchange  rates.  This  double 
objective  raises  intricate  problems,  for  in  the face  of  the  considerable  needs  for 
financing  in  the  economy  it has  proved  difficult  to  maintain  a  thoroughly  satis-
factory  flow  of  savings.  Recourse  to  financing  from  monetary  sources  is  con-
sequently  very important,  and whatever the  trend of economic  activity,  monetary 
policy  tnust most  often be restrictive,  especially  with regard  to the expansion of 
credits. 
In  their  endeavours  to  master  the  creation  of  liquidity  in  the  economy,  the 
monetary  authorities  are  led  to  lay  down  quantitative  limits  for  the  increase  in 
the  volume  of money.  The latter is  to be understood  in  the wider sense  of  the 
term,  embracing  not  only  means  of  payment  but  also  to  a  certain  extent near-
money. 
The optimum rate of growth in the supply of money is  determined in relation to 
the trend of internal  production and of  the liquidity  requirements  of  the various 
categories  of  economic  agents.  The  assessment  of  the  liquidity  requirements  to 
be  satisfied  depends  on  the  public's  behaviour  as  regards  cash,  which determines 
the extent to which means of payment are amassed or restored to trade channels. 
Limits  to  the  growth  in the  volume  of  money  being  thus  laid  down  with some 
flexibility, particular norms are assigned to the accepted increases in bank assistance 
to  the  economy in relation  to the  other sources  of money  creation, that is  to say 
essentially to the position of the balance of payments and the Treasury. From this 
point  of  view,  budget  policy  and  monetary  policy  are  considered  to  be closely 
linked.  In this  respect,  the  neutrality  of  the  Treasury  operations  in  relation  to 
money  creation  constitutes  a  principle  which,  despite  temporary  difficulties  of 
application connected with the prevailing economic conditions, has  been respected 
for some years. 
The policy aimed at obtaining quantitative effects  on the liquidity of the economy 
is  applied principally by means  of action  on  bank liquidity (its development is  not 
given  quantitative  expression  as  it is  not  regarded  as  an  intermediate  objective 
but as  a means) and in case of need by the restriction  of credit, the most rigorous 
forn1  of action on the progress of banking assistance  to the economy. 
In addition, action in the field  of interest rates,  an essential instrument of govern-
ment policy,  also  assists  the attainment of specific  objectives.  These  are  aimed  at 
the  improvement  of  the  financial  and  savi!!gs  channels,  selective  orientation  of 
credits  and  the control of movements  of  short-term capital.  In the last few years, 
this  quest  has  assumed  great  importance. 
Belgium 
61.  To assist the realization of the general objectives of economic policy, particular-
ly  the  maintenance  of  internal  and  external  stability,  the  Belgian  authorities  act 
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on the flows  of expenditure and consequently of savings  and on the movement of 
funds  with foreign  countries. It is  within this field  that they make their contribu-
tion to the correct financing  of government expenditure, an element that influences 
the policy  followed  in the matter of rates. 
Operations  with foreign  countries  are  the subject of  special  attention.  As  regards 
current  operations,  the  impact  of  the  policy  adopted  can  only  be  indirect,  and 
therefore  limited.  As  regards  action  taken  on  movements  of capital,  it is  aimed 
not  only  at preserving  external equilibrium-notably  with the  help  of  a  special 
foreign  exchange  system-but  also  at  ensuring  that  these  movements  do  not 
conflict with the credit policy adopted for the public sector and the enterprises. 
It should also  be pointed out that beside the pursuit of general objectives separate 
action  is  taken  in individual  sectors,  when  the  need  arises  to  stimulate or check 
activity  in one  or another  of them. 
To attain  their  ultimate  objectives  the  authorities  show  themselves  to be flexible 
and pragmatic in the choice of their means of action and of intermediate objectives 
that  they  may  decide  on.  They  do  not adopt a preconceived theoretical plan and 
do  not regard as  constraints either the realization of a specified  rate of expansion 
of  the  quantity  of money,  nor  the  rigorous  adjustment  of  the  expansion  to  the 
anticipated trend of the national product, nor the maintenance of a predetermined 
degree  of liquidity. 
To  ensure  that  the  level  and  structure  of  the  commitments  and  claims  of  the 
various  economic  agents  evolve  in  the  manner  desired,  the  National  Bank  may 
act  in  two  ways:  either  indirectly  by influencing  the  rates  charged  to borrowers 
or the  liquidity  of  the  banks,  or directly  by  restriction  of credit.  The  National 
Bank  may  also  act  on  deposit  rates  to  influence  the  volume  of  savings  and  its 
distribution  between  real  investments  and  placings  of  various  types.  This  action 
on the  rates  modifies  the  conditions  and  consequently  the  volume  of credits;  it 
may  moreover be completed by  more  direct action  on the granting  of credits. 
Italy 
62.  If the  Bank  of  Italy  employs  a  very  elaborate  scheme  of  monetary  analysis 
it nevertheless  sets  its face  against  any a  priori attitude as  regards  the choice  and 
precise  delimitation of an intermediate financial  objective  (such as  the quantity of 
money).  It is  bent on preserving  the  possibility  of  recourse  to  numerous  means 
of attaining varied ends, more particularly as  regards  the activities of the banking 
sector. 
The  Italian authorities  are  concerned  not only  about  the  evolution  of  the liquid 
assets  in the economy  and their counterparts, but about the sum  total of financial 
assets,  liquid  and  non-liquid,  and  the  whole  of  the  finance  granted  to  foreign 
countries,  to  the Treasury and  to  the economy. 
To  control  the  liquid  assets  and  the  level  of  interest  rates,  monetary  policy  is 
applied to influencing the cost and the conditions of credit by acting on the volume 
and the channels  of creation  of the monetary base.  This is  composed  of the legal 
currency  and  short-term  financial  assets  created  by  the  monetary  authorities  and 
eligible without limit for constituting the compulsory reserves or freely convertible 
into  cash  at  the  Bank  of  Italy;  it is  held  in part by  the public,  in  part by the 
credit institutions. To the extent to  which there is  a  known  relationship between 
the  demand  for  the  monetary  base  on  the  part of  the  public  and  income,  it is 
possible  to  establish  the  portion  of  the  base  which  accrues  to  the  banks  and 
which,  after  constitution  of  the  compulsory  reserves,  modifies  their  means  of 
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action.  The central bank can  then control the possibilities  open to  the banks for 
increasing credit, as  well as  interest rates, according to the current level of demand 
for credits, thanks to its policy in the matter of refinancing.  1 
It is  thus  easy  to  see  the  great  importance  in  Italy  of  the control  of  the  bank 
reserves  by  the central bank.1  As  regards  the  refinancing  of  the banks,  the bank 
of Italy prefers  to  work on its volume rather than on the rates of interest applied 
to it.  The  effect  on short-term rates  of these  two -methods  of intervention is  for 
the rest considered the same:  in each case  the measl)res'' of restriction give  rise  to 
a  raising of  the rates of interest in the market.  --"'--
Generally  speaking,  the  control  of certain financial  aggregates  and  action  on the 
rates  are  considered  to  lend  material  support  to one  another  for  the  purpose  of 
control  of credits  and  liquidity. 
The  consideration  of  external  equilibrium  and  of the  medium-term  objectives  in 
the  matter  of  savings  and  investments  adds  a  further  dimension  to the problem 
of  monetary  equilibrium.  With regard  to the objectives  in the  matter of  savings, 
a  particular  feature  of  Italian  policy  is  the  accent  placed  on  the  desire  to  keep 
the long-term  rates  stable.  However,  the principles  of Italian monetary  policy  in 
this  matter and as  regards  a not frequent  recourse  to changes  in the  rate of dis-
count  are  liable  to  run up against  limits  by  reason  of  the trend of interest  rates 
abroad  and  movements  of  capital  resulting  from  considerable  margins  between 
rates  ruling  in Italy and abroad.  This explains  the activation of the discount rate 
instrument  in  1969-1970. 
Netherlands 
63.  Monetary policy in the Netherlands based on the control of credits put at the 
disposal  of the economy  is  conducted in accordance  with the following principles. 
Credit policy is shaped in the light of the trend it is desired to give to the evolution 
of the liquidity ratios, a concept understood in this country to indicate the volume 
of  liquidity  (primary  and  secondary)  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  national 
income. At the basis of this policy is  the idea that in the short run, in the absence 
of  exceptional  circumstances,  there  is  an equilibrium relationship between the in-
ternal liquidity  volume  and  the national  income;  changes  in this  relationship  set 
off  reactions  which  tend  to  restore  the  equilibrium  position.  Thus  a  restrictive 
policy for example, on the assumption that there is  a deficit in the current balance 
of payments,  will  aim  at  slowing  down  the  growth  of  expenditure  by  allowing 
free  play  to  the restrictive  effect  imputable to  the decline  in the reserves  and by 
making  the  creation of liquidity  of internal origin less  than the liquidity  require-
ments  corresponding  to  the  nominal  growth  in income.  The  necessary  flexibility 
in  the  system  is  assured  primarily  by  changes  in  the  velocity  of  circulation  of 
money; it can also  stem from other factors:  recourse by undertakings to the capital 
market  (this  must  be seen  in relation  to  what is  said  below on the  role  of  the 
Treasury), and possible international movements of funds. A supplementary flexibil-
ity factor  arises  from  the  possibility  the  banks  have  of overstepping  temporarily 
the norms  allotted to them in the matter of the expansion of credits, if  they are 
prepared to face  the  ensuing  penalties. 
Under the system of control of the global quantity of liquidity particular attention 
~---.,-'l8lill,  •.  if"'·-"' 
·1 With- regard  to terminology  in the  matter of bank liquidity and the particular case  of  Italy from  this  point of  view 
cf.  Points  32  and  55. 
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is  paid  to  the  creation  of  liquidity  of  internal  origin;  this  notion  is  comparable 
to  that of "domestic  credit expansion"  which has  been  utilised for  several  years 
by  the  IMF.  In addition  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  prefers,  as  has  been  seen,  to 
give  free  rein  to  the  monetary  effects  of  the  current  balance  of  payments.  As 
regards  the flows  of capital between the country and foreign countries it only has 
limited means  of action,  which  arise  from  special  instruments  of  control.  On the 
other hand,  if the activities  of  the public  authorities  are  of  major  importance  in 
the  matter,  the  control  of  their  monetary  behaviour  is  for  the  government  to 
handle:  the  principle  adopted  is  that  the  impact  of  Treasury  operations  on the 
monetary plane must be neutral, that is  to say  the Treasury must finance its deficits 
in  the  capital  market.  The  application  of  this  principle  has  its  limits,  however, 
when monetary policy is  applied in a restrictive sense;  in this case it  ~may be that 
the  enterprises  are  under  the necessity  of resorting  to  the  capital  market (which 
is  not subject  to  the credit ceilings)  and  the combination of public demand and a 
surplus  of  private  demand  in  this  market  could  drive  up  interest  rates  beyond 
what  is  considered  desirable  having  regard  to  the  possibilities  of  an  influx  of 
capital  from  abroad.  The  Treasury  could  then  be  moved  to  finance  itself  by 
monetary  means. 
The  main  emphasis  of  the  monetary  policy  of the central  bank thus falls  on  the 
private  demand  for  credits.  In the  event,  the  Dutch  policy  has  been  conducted 
over  the  last  few  years  in a  mainly  restrictive  direction,  given  the  existence  of 
frequent  heavy  strains  posing  a  threat to both internal and external equilibrium. 
To  limit  private  demand  for  bank  credits,  the  authorities  resort  in particular  to 
direct  quantitative  action  regarding  them.  This  method  had  been  chosen  at the 
beginning  of  the  1960s,  mainly  to  avoid  an  influx  of  foreign  exchange  to  the 
Nederlandsche Bank, influxes  to be  avoided because of the action  taken to reduce 
the  liquidity of the banks;  these  were at that time  able  in fact  to draw on large 
reserves  of liquidity abroad.  In 1968, intensive  consultations between the Neder-
landsche  Bank  and  the  banks  indicated  a  preference  for  the adoption  of  direct 
quantitative  action,  by  reason  in particular of  the  big  differences  noted between 
the  banks  as  regards  their  degree  of liquidity  and  because  of  the  extent of  the 
seasonal  and  adventitious  influences  emanating  from  the  public  finances,  the 
fiduciary  currency  circulation  and  transactions  with  foreign  countries. 
Luxembourg 
64.  Monetary  policy  in  Luxembourg  is  fairly  limited  in  scope,  in  view  of  the 
absence  of an  issuing authority proper in this country. The authorities accordingly 
adhere to methods which do not require the intervention of a central bank, notably 
the limitation of bank credits  adopted since  the beginning of  1970. 
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Introduction 
65.  The  present  chapter  sets  out  to review  the  techniques  for  the utilization  of 
instruments of monetary policy and to examine how their use is  combined. Having 
regard  to  the description  in the  previous  chapters  of  the institutional framework 
and the financial  structures of  the Community  countries, and of the general direc-
tion  of  the  policy  of  the  monetary  authorities,  this  description  will  enable  an 
appreciation  to be made  of the range  of these instruments  and will bring out the 
differences  and  similarities  of  their employment in the  different  countries. 
First an enumeration will be made, country by country, of the principal instruments 
used  to  influence  economic  activity  and  the  level  of liquidity.  This  will  help  to 
establish the role  of each  of  them in the  whole field  of monetary policy.  It goes 
without  saying  that  the  choice  of  the  methods  of  action  and  the  points  of ap-
plication  of  monetary  policy  (see  previous  chapter)  determines  to  a  large  extent 
the choice  of  the means  selected for  preference.  However,  the authorities  do  not 
limit  themselves  to  the  use  of  the  instruments  enumerated  below;  according  to 
circumstances  they  can  modify  or extend the range of their means  of action. 
Germany 
66.  The  Bundesbank  normally  uses  a  wide  range  of  instruments. 
- For  the  purpose  of  acting  on  bank  liquidity  the  most  important  and  most 
frequently  used  procedure  is  to  make  changes  in  the  minimum  reserve  coef-
ficients.  The  bank  of  issue  also  has  recourse  to  open  market  operations  in 
long-term  securities,  open  market operations  in short-term  securities  with  the 
non-banking  sector,  and  changes  in the re-discount quotas. 
- As  far  as  direct action  on  interest rates  is  concerned, the Bundesbank changes 
the discount rate, the rate for advances against securities, the rates for its open 
market operations,  and when circumstances  lead it to resort to  this  technique, 
the  rates  applied  by  it  to  forward  cover  in  the  foreign  exchange  markets 
(swaps). 
It should  be  noted  that  the  fixing  of rates  for  open  market operations  does  not 
imply  that  the  Bundesbank  undertakes  formally  to  deal  in  securities  with  the 
banks.  In  fact  it has  at  times  limited  transfers  of  money  market  securities  to 
effects  maturing  shortly  or has  even  stopped  such  sales  completely. 
France 
67.  In France  the permanent feature  of the policy  is  based on the action  applied 
to  bank  liquidity. 
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This action  may  be exercised by  the manipulation  of interest rates  (discount  rate, 
rate for  advances  and  the  rates  applied  to open n1arket  operations).  This  type  of 
action  is  still  of  great  importance  in  spite  of  the  increasing  use  made  of  other 
instruments.  Among  these,  compulsory  reserves  play  a  leading  part. 
Reference  must  also  be  made  to  quantitative  action  on bank  liquidity  effected, 
within  the  framework  of  a  classical  refinancing  policy,  by  rediscount  ceilings  in 
particular,  or in  the  form  of open  market operations  (the  latter  assumed  a  pre-
dominant  role  in  1971). 
When circumstances  require,  the  authorities  exercise  direct  action  on credit itself 
by  means  of  credit  ceilings,  which  are  regarded  as  instruments  of  last  resort.  It 
will  also  be noted that the selective  control  of credit remains,  in spite of certain 
relaxations,  a  traditional  feature  of  French  monetary  policy;  it  supplements  the 
general  monetary  policy. 
Belgium 
68.  In Belgium manipulation of discount rate  is  regarded as  exercising an effective 
influence  on  the  cost  of credit,  but much  less  on its volume,  which  depends  on 
bank liquidity  and  the elasticity  of demand for  credit. This  technique is  intended 
in  particular  for  the  control  of international  movements  of funds.  As  for  open 
market  operations,  these  have  a  limited importance.  The same  is  true in fact  of 
the  monetary  reserve  coefficient. 
Besides  these  traditional  methods  recourse  has  developed  to  the  rediscount  and 
certification ceiling, which operates effectively on the lending capacity of the banks. 
The  Belgian  monetary  authorities  also  have  the  possibility  of  fixing  ceilings  for 
credits.  They  consider  however  that use  of this  instrument must be  kept flexible 
and cannot be permanent. 
Finally,  regulation  of  the  foreign  positions  of  the  banks  and  of  the  return  on 
deposits and funds  placed in the money  market by foreigners  are used in Belgium 
for  the  purpose  of  controlling  international  movements  of capital  and  have  the 
effect,  often  sought  after,  of influencing  internal liquidity. 
Italy 
69.  In Italy,  since action to regulate  the money base is  principally directed at the 
volume (rather than the price) of refinancing of the banks at the central bank, the 
authorities  use  the  quantitative instruments of  limits  on  rediscount  and  advances 
4gainst  securities  in conjunction  with compulsory  reserves. 
On  the  other  hand,  discount  rate  has  a  very  restricted  use,  except  when  in 
1969-70 it was needed to bring the Italian rates  of interest in line with the rates 
ruling  abroad  so  as  to  limit  the  outflow  of  capital.  Similarly,  recourse  is  hardly 
ever  had  to  the  quantitative  control of  bank credits,  except for  the  recommend-
ations which the Bank of Italy may  make to the banks to this effect. 
Finally, the Italian authorities attach great importance to the regulation  of the net 
position  of the  banks  vis-a-vis  foreign  countries,  when  they  are  proposing  to  act 
on the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system. 
Netherlands 
70.  Until the end of 1971, the Nederlandsche Bank has resorted almost exclusively 
to quantitative instruments acting directly on  the volume of monetary resources in 
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the  economy.  This  confers  a  strategic  role  on credit  ceilings.  Moreover  it is  for-
bidden for  the banks  to maintain a debtor position with foreign countries (except 
for  a  small  free  margin)  and  the  private  sector  may  not,  subject  to certain  ex-
ceptions,  borrow abroad. 
The  Nederlandsche  Bank had until recently largely  renounced open  market oper-
ations in the domestic market and changes in discount rate were hardly more than 
an indication of the policy being followed;  on the other hand,  the Nederlandsche 
Bank was beginning to intervene in the forward foreign exchange market. 
Section I  .;  General  purpose instruments 
Para.  I:  Refinancing  policy 1 
Para.  I-1:  Introduction 
Scope of refinancing policy 
71.  Refinancing  policy  embraces  the various  forms  of direct  assistance  which the 
central bank can furnish  to the monetary institutions, either by buying from  them 
public or private effects  (rediscount in the strict sense of the term), or by granting 
advances  to them (advances  against securities or against  public or private short or 
medium-term effects ).2 
Whether it takes the form of management of interest rates or imposition of quan-
titative limits rediscount policy in the different countries of the Community varies 
in importance and effectiveness  according to the traditions and organization of the 
banking  system  and  the  practices  of  the central  bank. 
Structural conditions 
72.  In all  the  Community  countries  the  central  bank imposes  certain  conditions 
and  limits  on  the  assistance  it will  grant  to  the .  banks  by  way  of  rediscount  of 
bills and advances  against  securities. The relative importance of bank credit in the 
form  of  discounting  depends  to  a certain  extent  on  the  policy  adopted  by  the 
central bank itself to promote  or restrict certain forms  of credit,  and also  on the 
practices of the banks, notably on their disposition more or less marked to borrow 
at  the  central  bank. 
This  last-named  factor  depends  on  the  abundance  or  shortage  of  liquid  funds 
which  the  banks  receive  from  other sources  and  on the  distribution  of  liquidity 
in the economy  among  the institutions which manage  them (bank of issue, banks, 
specialized  credit  institutions,  and  the  Treasury);  these  two  factors  are  closely 
interwoven. Thus in the Netherlands and Belgium,  an  easy  cash position generally 
saves  the banking  sector  from  recourse  on a  large  scale  and  for  long  periods  to 
central bank assistance (in Belgium thanks in part to the rediscounting institutions 
of first  resort, notably the Institut de  Reescompte et de Garantie). 
On  the  other  hand,  in  France,  because  of  the  insufficiency  of  liquid  funds,  the 
banks  are  permanently involved with the  Bank of France  (at  a  fixed  rate or the 
1 The  term  "refinance"  is  used  here  to  denote  the  process  whereby  banks  obtain  funds  from  the  central  bank  by 
rediscounting  eligible  paper  or receiving  advances  against  eligible  collateral. 
2  For  simplicity's  sake,  the  term  "advances  against  securities''  will  be used. 
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rate  ruling  in  the  money  market).  Germany  and  Italy  occupy  an  intermediate 
position  in this  respect. 
Principal methods of refinancing 
7 3.  Calls  by  the banks on  the central bank principally take the. form in Germany 
and Belgium of rediscounts (see Table below). In these countries, advances against 
securities,  which  are  charged  a higher  rate  than  the  discount  rate,  are  rather the 
exception. The Bundesbank and  the National Bank of Belgium,  moreover, consider 
that advances  against  securities  should only  be granted if they serve  to overcome 
passing stringency.  In Italy on the other hand, despite  the relative importance of 
bank credits granted to the economy by discounts of commercial bills, the liquidity 
requirements  of  the  banks  are  only  secondarily  covered  by  rediscounts.  In fact 
the Italian banks prefer to resort to advances  against securities, the rate of interest 
for  which  is  normally  the  same  as  the  official  discount  rate.  In the Netherlands, 
to  the  extent  to  which  recourse  is  had  to  rediscounting  at  the  Nederlandsche 
Bank,  this  has  been  spread  fairly  equally  recently  over rediscounts  and  advances; 
the latter are,  as in Germany and Belgium, in principle very short term. In France, 
rediscounting,  of  predominant  importance  until  recent  times,  has  become  a  se-
condary  method  of  refinancing  for  the  banks.  These  are  now  obtaining  their 
requirements  of  liquid  funds  essentially  by  the  deposit  "en pension"  (i.e.  under 
an agreement  to buy them. back) at the Bank of France, at the money market rate, 
of public effects  and of the private bills which  were formerly presented for redis-
count. 
Para.  I-2:  Essential  technical  elements  of rediscounting 
Paper accepted 
7  4.  Rediscounts  provided  by  the  central  bank  for  the  banking  system  do  not 
always  apply  to  the  same  range  of effects  in all  the  Community  countries. 
Generally  speaking,  short-term  commercial  bills  are  accepted  in all  the countries. 
Besides  these  bills  there are  often bills  for  the financing  of stocks  of agricultural 
produce  and  certain  short-term  State  securities.  In the  Netherlands,  where  redis-
counting  is  very  little  used,  it mainly  concerns  Treasury  bills. 
Financial  paper  is  generally  accepted  for  rediscount  except  in Belgium  and  Ger-
many;  in  France  it is  only  accepted  if it has  previously  been  the  subject  of  a 
mobilization  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  central  bank. 
Rates 
75.  Besides  discount  rates,  certain  central  banks  quote  preferential  rates  (lower 
ones)  to  encourage  certain  economic  sectors  or operations  (in  France  and  Italy) 
and  higher  rates  to  discourage  excessive  recourse  by  the  banks  to  refinancing 
(Italy) or to make discounting certain bills more costly (France and Belgium). 
However,  in  practice,  neither  in  France  nor in Belgium  do  the  banks  resort  to 
refinancing  at a higher rate.  In Italy, the extent of this  technique is  considerable. 
As  the  Bank  of  Italy  follows  a  general  policy  of  stability  in  the  discount  rate 
(see  above),  it applies  an  increase  of  1·  5  points  for  rediscounts  above  specified 
ceilings,  when  it wishes  to  check  demands  for  refinancing  considered  excessive. 
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TABLE  5 
Bank  credits  &  refinancing  of the  banks  at  the Central  bank 
(situation  at  end  1970) 
(in  milliards  of national  monetary  units) 
Germany  France (c)  Italy  Nether- Belgium  lands 
1.  Credits  granted  (or  fi-
nanced)  by  the  banking 
system at short, medium 
&  long-term  (a)  481.2  262.2  27,683  37.9  518.0 
2.  Refinancing of the banks 
at the central bank 
- rediscount  16.3  30.3  664  0.2  0.4 
- advances  1.7  - 817  0.0  -
- total  18.0  30,3  1,481  0.2  0.4 
- pro mem. :  other forms 
of  refinancing  (b)  0.7  15.7  - 1.4  -
(a)  In Item (1) are included all the credits distributed at short, medium and long term, including the financing of export 
operations.  The securities portfolio is excluded except for short-term Treasury bonds. 
(b)  Germany and France: money market. 
(c)  Situation at 5  January 1971. 
Sources:  Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports, tables II.l &  111.5. 
France: National Credit Council, Monthly Reports, table III.A. 
Italy: Bank of Italy Bulletin, tables 3, 4,  26. 
Netherlands: Nederlandsche Bank Quarterly Report, tables 1.1  &  2.1. 
Belgium: National Bank of Belgium Bulletin, tables XIII.6 and  12. 
Rediscounting institutions of first resort 
76.  In  certain  countries,  rediscounting  institutions  of  first  resort  act  as  inter-
mediaries between the banking institutions  and  the central bank. Sometimes  these 
institutions  operate ·in  both the  money  market  and  the financial  market. 
It is  in  Belgium  and  France  that  these  institutions  play  the  biggest  part;  they 
have  much  less  importance  in Germany  and  the  Netherlands  and  none  at all  in 
Italy. 
In  Belgium  the  role  of  rediscounter  of first  resort,  filled  principally  by  public 
credit  institutions,  and  among  them  primarly  by  the  Institut  de  Reescompte  et 
de  Garantie,  covers  the whole field  of short-term  operations.  An idea  of the im-
portance  of  these  rediscounting  institutions  is  gleaned  from  the  fact  that  in 
1969-70,  according  to  the  statements at the  end of  each  quarter,  the Institut de 
Reescompte  et de  Garantie  alone  was  responsible  for  more  than  half  the ·  redis-
count  total  of  the  deposit  banks,  while  direct  rediscounts  by  the  banks  at  the 
National  Bank  were  much  lower and  in some  cases  minimal. 
In  France,  the  specialized  credit  institutions  play  a  more  limited  part  than  in 
Belgium;  their  role  concerns  the  rediscount  of effects  representing  medium-term 
credits  and  consists  above  all  in examining  the  records  prior  to  any  grant  of a 
mobilization agreement and in furnishing  their guarantee. 
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Para.  I-3:  Essential  technical  elements  of  advances  against  securities 
77.  The technical forms  for  advances  against securities at present employed in the 
Community  countries  are  advances  on  current  account  and  advances  for  fixed 
periods. 
Advances on current account 
Current  account  advances  consist  of  a  credit  opened  for  an  amount  equal  to  a 
certain  quota of state securities  or other securities  provided as  security,  at a rate 
of  interest  normally  equal  to  the  discount  rate in  Italy and  a  higher  rate in the 
other countries.1 
Advances for a  fixed period 
Advances  for  a  fixed  period-only  used  in  Italy-are  distinguished  from  ad-
vances  on current account  by  the  fact  that  they  are  drawn immediately  to  their 
full  amount  and by  the fixed  period laid down for  their  repayment (8,  15  or 22 
days).  This type of advance  is  usually  provided at a rate of interest equal to dis· 
count rate if  the facility is  required only once  in six  months;  on each  subsequent 
occasion  recourse  is  had  to  it, the  rate  increases  progressively by  0·5  points  to a 
maximum  increase  of  1·5  points.  Recourse  to advances  for  fixed  periods  in  Italy 
has  risen  in  the  past  to  amounts  comparable  to  those  for  advances  on  current 
account, but their relative importance declined sharply in  1970. 
Para.  I-4:  Discretionary powers of the central bank as  regards refinancing and the 
policy  of overall  and  selective  control 
Scope of discretionary powers 
78.  In practice  the exercise of powers by the central banks  is  obviously more ef-
fective if  the banking sector is obliged to resort to refinancing at the bank of issue. 
Thus  the  effective  exercise  of  their  powers  is  clearly  more  important  in France, 
Germany  and  Italy  than  in the  Netherlands.  In Belgium,  where  rediscounting  is 
principally  effected  through  the  Institut  de  Reescompte  et  de  Garantie,  central 
bank  action  also  extends  to the control of the operating conditions  of  that insti-
tution. 
The central banks are  invested in particular with fairly  wide discretionary powers 
as  regards  both  the  volume  of credit  that  they  decide  to extend  to  the  banking 
sector  and  the  conditions  they  impose  on  the  banks  for  access  to  it. In every 
country there exist minimum conditions which bills  must  satisfy if they  are  to be 
presented  for  rediscount  or lodged  as  security,  but in  the  various  countries  the 
central bank. has  greater or lesser powers of discretion in the matter of acceptance 
or refusal  of  applications  for  refinancing. 
Ways of exercising them 
The volume  of  refinancing  is  controlled  globally  by  means  of  rediscount  ceilings 
(and sometimes by ceilings on advances  against  securities) imposed individually on 
1  From  0.1  to  1 point  in the  Netherlands,  from  1  to  1.5  points  in Belgium,  from  1 to  2 points  in France,  and  from 
0.5  to  3  points  in  Germany. 
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the  banks.  It is  within  these  limits,  which  can  be  modified  at  the will  of  the 
authorities,  that the banks  have recourse  to refinancing.  These rediscount  ceilings 
constitute in France,  Germany  and Belgium  a  very  important  instrument  for  in-
fluencing  bank liquidity. 
Within these global limits, but very much more effectively  still beyond them, the 
central banks of other rediscount institutions can practise a selective policy for pro-
viding their assistance.  Recourse  to selective  control to supplement global control 
is  practised frequently  in a  desire  to mitigate certain  effects  of  global  control on 
specified  sectors  or  categories  of  operation. 
a)  Instruments of global  control 
79.  Global control is  effected  by prescribing  ceilings  for  rediscounts  or advances 
against  securities.  Its  effectiveness  depends  on three factors: 
- the level  at  which  the ceilings  are  set; 
- the  frequency  and  amount  of changes  therein; 
- the  abundance  of  cash  in the hands  of  the  banks. 
In Germany and Belgium the rediscount ceilings play an important part in monetary 
policy.  Their level is  adjusted according  to the requirements of credit policy.  It is 
to be noted  that in these  two countries  the  ceilings  can  be  temporarily  lowered 
by  an  amount  corresponding  to  part  of  the  liabilities  of  the  banks  to  other 
countries. 
In France  the level  of the  ceilings  is  relatively  low  and has  only  been  adjusted 
rarely. 
In Italy,  although  formally  distinct from  the ceilings,  there  exist limits  on redis-
count above which the banks pay a higher penal rate;  the sanie sort of limit exists 
for advances  against  securities  for a fixed  period, but not for advances  on current 
account. The increases in all the forms  of refinancing depend in fact .on the wishes 
of  the  Bank  of  Italy. 
In the Netherlands,  the  central bank has  never  set global limits  within which it 
agrees  to  finance  the  banking  sector. 
b) Instruments  of selective  control 
80.  The refinancing  techniques can be employed on a  selective basis.  In that case 
their incidence  may  only  be  of secondary  importance  from  the  point of view  of 
global  monetary  policy. 
Various  instruments  are  used  for  this  purpose:  selective  policy  regarding  the 
securities  eligible  for  presentation by  the banks,  acceptance  "outside the ceiling" 
by  the  central  bank  of  certain  types  of  paper  (France,  Germany,  Belgium)  or 
within  particular  ceilings  (Germany),  previous  rediscount  agreements  (Belgium, 
France)  and  preferential or increased  rates  (France,  Italy). 
In France  particularly  certain  type~ of effects  can be rediscounted  without being 
imputed to the ceilings.  Certain  selective  action is  also  effected  under  the system 
of  mobilization  agreements  which constitute  a  prior condition  for  refinancing  by 
the central bank by way  of rediscount under "en pension"  arrangements. 
Para.  I-5:  Connection  between  discount  rate,  rates  charged  by  the  banks  and 
money  market  rates 
At  the present time,  in all  the Community countries,  the fixing  of  rates  charged 
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to  borrowers  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the credit  institutions.  If no  automatic 
relationship  exists  between  central  bank discount  rates  and  the  rates  charged  by 
the  banks, it nevertheless  seems  that these  short-term  rates  settle down within a 
fairly  uniform  distance  of  the  official  discount  rate  (in  France,  the  practice  has 
arisen  of paying increasing  attention  to  the rate for  Bank of France assistance  in 
the  money  market),  above  it.  In Germany,  however,  since  the  liberalization  of 
rates in 1967 this margin has proved less stable. With the exception of the Nether-
lands  and  Belgium,  where  the  banking  sector,  as  has  been  seen,  is  fairly  in-
dependent of financial  support by the central bank, this de facto  link results from 
the  need  of  the  banks  to  resort  frequently  to  possibilities  of refinancing  at  their 
central  bank. 
As  regards  the banks'  short-term deposit rates,  these are  fixed  freely by the credit 
institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic  and  the  Netherlands.  In France,  Italy  and 
Belgium,  the  maximum  rates  payable  on  short-term  deposits  are  fixed  according 
to different procedures;  these are,  respectively, administrative arrangements/ agree-
ments  between  banks,  and  agreements  between banks  and  the  central  bank.2  As 
for sight deposits (as  distinct from  savings deposits), interest on them is forbidden 
in  France,  minimal  in  Germany  and  Belgium,  high  in  the  Netherlands  and  very 
high  in  Italy. 
Para.  I-6:  Incidence  of refinancing  policy 
Discount rate 
81.  As  regards  the  rate  of discount,  changes  in the rate are  regarded  as  a means 
of  more  or  less  rapidly  and  effectively  influencing  recourse  by  the  economy  to 
credit. Because  of the links that exist between the central bank discount rate and 
the  interest rates  that  the  banks  charge  their  customers,  this  rate in fact  largely 
determines  the  cost  of credit  and  changes  in the discount  rates  have  a like effect 
on  the banks'  deposit  rates.  Changes  in bank rate  consequently have  a  direct or 
indirect  influence  on  the  trend  of  rates  in  the financial  market. 
The impact of changes in the discount rate on the demand for credit varies consider-
ably  from  country  to  country,  and  consequently  from  one  given  situation  to  an-
other. Nevertheless,  generally speaking,  the central banks in the member countries 
consider that a change in the cardinal rate in the market,  that is  to say  in the dis-
count  rate  and  the  rate  for  advances  against  securities  (in  France,  to  a  certain 
extent,  since  1971,  in  the rate for  assistance  at variable  rates  by  the Bank),  is  a 
measure which normally exercises  an influence on recourse to credit. The incidence 
of variations in the interest rate depends largely  on the expectations of the entre-
preneurs,  subject  to  the  influence  of  the  decisions  taken  in  the  n1onetary  field. 
Banking  circles  and  enterprises  also  consider  with  some  justice  that a  change  in 
the  discount  rate  is  not  only  a  factor  affecting  the  cost  of liquid  funds  but also 
a  pointer  to  the  general  direction  of  monetary  policy  in  the  near  future.  The 
"warning"  aspect  and,  to  a  varying  extent,  the  "cost"  aspect  tend  to  have  re-
percussions  on  the decisions  by enterprises,  notably in the fields  of capital invest-
ment and stocks. 
1 Deposit  rates  are  nevertheless  free  in  France  for  deposits  to  an  amount  or  for  a  period  exceeding  a  specified 
minimum. 
7 In Belgium,  the  rate  for  "big  deposits"  for  fixed  periods  in free. 
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Refinancing as a  whole 
The effects of "refinancing" policy as  a whole, that is  to say  changes in the official 
rates  and  ceilings,  often  seem  to  be  fairly  limited  unless  the  policy  is  supple~ 
mented by  other measures  directly  affecting  the funds  available  to the banks. The 
principal additional element generally  used  to supplement refinancing policy  is  the 
adoption  of compulsory  reserves;  the  combination of  these  two  means  of  action, 
and  others  as  well,  improves  their  effectiveness. 
Policy of rates and international movements of funds 
82.  One  development  which  has  increased  in  importance  in  recent  years  affects 
the efficacy  of national policies  in the matter of refinancing,  and in fact the whole 
field  of  monetary  policy.  Since  the  return  to  currency  convertibility  and  since 
international payments and movements of capital were to a large extent liberalized, 
the  external  aspect  of refinancing  policy  has  assumed  greater  and greater import-
ance.  The central banks  are  now  more  obliged  than in the past  to  conduct  their 
monetary policy, and in particular their discount rate policy, in the light of develop~ 
ments  in  certain  foreign  money  markets  and  international  markets.  Recent  de~ 
velopments  show  in particular  that  the  central  banks  are  encountering great dif-
ficulty  in maintaining  the level of  interest rates they consider  suitable to the eco-
nomic  situation,  for  undesirable  movements  of capital  can  counteract  the  hoped 
for  effects  of  internal  monetary  policy. 
Para.  II:  Operations  in  the  money  market 
General 
83.  Independently of the means  of regulation at their disposal, central banks com-
bine  direct  refinancing  of  the  credit establishments  with operations in the money 
market  (which,  in  the  Community,  is  principally  an  inter-bank  market);  these 
operations influence  the degree of liquidity in the market and the rates of interest 
ruling in it. 
Generally  speaking,  these  central bank operations (open  market operation) consist 
technically in buying or selling, in receiving  or giving  "en pension", a wide range 
of securities:  public  or private effects,  mainly  short  term,  but also  in some  cases 
medium  or  long  term. 
In  the  Community,  open  market  operations  for  monetary  policy  purposes  are 
tnainly  effected  between  the  central  bank  and  the  banks,  perhaps  through  the 
intermediary  of specialized  houses.  The  Bundesbank  effects  transactions  in short-
term securities direct with public bodies, and since  May  1971  it has done  so  also 
with other non-banking  bodies. 
General objectives 
84.  The  effects  that  the  authorities  seek  to  produce  in the money  market  differ 
according  to  the  country  and  the  circumstances.  Their  main  object  may  be  to 
influence  either  the  interest  rates  ruling  in  the  market  or  the  volume  of  bank 
liquidity.1  In  this  respect  it will  be  seen  below  that  the  scope  of  open  market 
1 Besides  its use  within the ftamework  of general  monetary policy, open market policy may  be used  for  the technical 
regulation  of  the  market.  In  the  Netherlands,  until  1971,  it was  used  for  this  purpose  alone. 
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policy  differs  from  country to country  according  to  the market structures and  the 
possibilities open to the banks of converting short-term securities into central bank 
money;  in consequence,  the  quantitative  action  of the  authorities  in  the  market 
by means of short-term securities will affect  as  the case  may  be the global volume 
or the composition of bank liquidity. It should be noted, however, that the pursuit 
by a central bank of a  particular objective in the field  of interest rates limits  the 
possibilities for it to achieve a precise quantitative result in the matter of liquidity. 
85.  In Germany and the Netherlands,  to the extent that short-term money market 
securities can  be sold  at any  time  to  the note-issuing  authority,  the central banks 
consider  that open  market operations  with the banks, effected by means  of these 
securities,  influence  the  composition  of  bank  liquidity,  rather  than  its  overall 
volume.  In fact  the  volume  of  bank liquidity  does  not  change  when  the central 
bank  intervenes  to  convert  short-term  securities  into  money  of  account  in  its 
books  or  vice  versa,  since  they  both  constitute  liquid  reserves  for  the  banks. 
In this  case,  action on interest rates is  of  special importance in the broad context 
of  open  market  policy. 
It is  different when it comes  to operations in long-term securities, which the banks 
cannot  convert  into  balances  at  the  central  bank  as  in  the  case  of  short-term 
securities;  in consequence,  any  purchase or sale  of long-term securities  effected by 
the  authorities  with  the  banks  changes  the· volume  of liquidity  in the  hands  of 
the  latter. 
86.  In  the  other Community countries  (France)  Italy)  Belgium), it is  considered 
that  open  market  operations  in  short-term  securities  can  change  the  volume  of 
liquidity at the disposal of the banks.  In fact,  in Italy, the purchase or sale by the 
monetary  authorities  of securities  which  they  had  undertaken  to  negotiate  at any 
time  are  not  regarded  as  open  market operations;  open market intervention only 
occurs  in  the  case  of  quantitative  changes  in  the  money  base.  In  France,  in 
principle  the  banks  have  the  possibility  of  converting  into  central  bank  money 
the  short or longer-term  securities  they  hold  only  to  the  extent that  the  issuing 
authority itself  is  prepared  to  agree.  In that case,  the  central  bank, by accepting 
the money  market securities, permits  a change in the volume of immediate liquid-
ity  at  the  disposal  of  the  banks. 
In Belgium also,  the monetary authorities (Securities Stabilization Fund &  National 
Bank)  have  the  possibility  of changing  the  volume  of  bank liquidity  by interven-
tion in short-term securities.  For this purpose the Securities Stabilization Fund can 
issue  certificates  with  a  view  to  mopping  up  liquidity,  and it also  has  a  line  of 
credit  at  the  National Bank;  though it only  uses  such facilities  in  the last  resort. 
It should  be  pointed out that in  Belgium  open  market  operations  are  sometimes 
effected  also  in  long-term  securities. 
It goes  without  saying  that in these  last  three countries  the  aim  of  open market 
interventions can also  be to influence  the level of interest rates. 
Connection with external money markets 
87.  In all  the  countries,  open  market  policy  is  connected  with  the  regulation  of 
short-term  capital  movements  to  and  from  foreign  countries. 
This  latter aspect  of open  market  policy  has  assumed  great  importance  since  the 
national  money  markets  have  found  themselves  more  and  more  closely  linked 
with other national  markets  and  international  markets.  The  rates  in  the  national 
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markets  cannot  be  established  without  reference  to  the  level  of  rates  abroad. 
And the regulation of international movements  of funds  has  become an important 
element  in  the  policy  concerning  liquidity  and  rates,  in  particular  by  means  of 
direct foreign exchange transactions between the monetary authority and the banks 
(swaps).  The  operations  of  central  banks  in  the  money  market  with  a  view  to 
influencing these international movements will be considered later on in the section 
"regulation of operations  with foreign  countries". 
Importance and characteristics of open market policy 
88.  The importance  and  characteristics  of open  market  policy  among  the  instru-
ments  at the  disposal  of the  monetary  authorities  differ  according  to the country, 
and  have varied in the course of time for each one. 
One  characteristic  however  is  common  to  most  of  the  countries,  and  concerns 
action  on the  rates  of interest.  To  judge  by  the  considerable  relative  weight  of 
interventions  by  the  central  bank,  it appears  in general  that the  "prices"  in the 
money  market  are  largely  dependent on decisions  by the issuing  authority regard-
ing  the  rate  of  their  interventions.  This  is  not however  the  case  in the  Nether-
lands, when open market policy is  applied in that country, because of the relatively 
large extent of the market and the participation in it of the non-banking sector. 
For the rest,  the differences  are  more important. In Germany, open market policy 
has for a long time played a big part; it mainly concerns the rates of interest. Open 
market intervention by  the  Bundesbank consists  essentially  in adjusting  the  rates 
for  sales  and  repurchases  of  the  various  categories  of  money  market  securities, 
.according  to the way  in which  the market develops  and its own intentions in the 
matter of interest rate policy. 
Moreover,  apart  from  its  interventions  concerning  short-term  securities  with  the 
banks,  which  only  affect  the  composition  of  bank liquidity,  the  Bundesbank  has 
sometimes  carried out open  market operations  with a  view  to  changing  the total 
volume of bank liquidity. This  was  the case  when in 196  7  it bought for its own 
account in the financial  market, bonds issued by the State;  or when it effects  open 
market operations with the non-banking sector - a factor  specifically dealt with in 
the current  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  banking  liquidity in Germany,  but until 
now of relatively small importance. 
In the Netherlands, after having pursued a systematic open market policy between 
1952 and 1964, the Nederlandsche Bank has  abandoned operations on the internal 
market in favour of intervention in the foreign exchange market, which has proved 
more  efficacious  in  view  of  the  importance  of this  market.  In June  1971, when 
the  florin  rate  was  floating,  open  market policy  was  resumed. 
In Belgium,  where  intervention  has  been  practised  on  a  regular  basis  for  some 
time,  it is  aimed  in  general  at smoothing  out  the  erratic  market fluctuations  as 
regards both the rates  and the volume of bank liquidity;  it only plays  a relatively 
minor  part in monetary  policy  as  a  whole. 
In Italy,  operations  for  the  purchase  and  sale  of securities  in large  quantities  in 
order to change the volume of bank liquidity have been effected according to need. 
Recently  intervention  by  the  Bank  of  Italy  with  regard  to  Treasury  bonds  has 
become more frequent, but it is of minor importance and is only aimed at smooth-
ing  out fluctuations  in  the cash  holdings  of the  banks.  In Italy only  operations 
which affect the volume ot the money base are regarded as open market operations. 
In France,  intervention in the money  market has  assumed  growing in1portance  in 
monetary policy.  For several  yeats,  intervention by the Bank of France  has  been 
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intended essentially to maintain the market rates at levels comparable to the levels 
of rates  ruling  abroad,  in order  to  avoid  undesirable  movements  of capital.  The 
central bank has  thus come  to supplement the liquidity of the banks by purchases 
or acquisitions  "en pension,  of  public  or private  effects.  Since  the beginning  of 
1971  these  operations - effected  at rates  below the discount  rate - have  played 
a predominant part in the refinancing of the banks, so  that recourse  to rediscount-
ing  is  now regarded  as  of secondary importance. 
Para. ·III:  Compulsory  reserves  and  other banking  coefficients 
Definition and scope 
89.  In all the Community countries rules  exist whereby the banks are required to 
maintain  specified  ratios  between  certain  assets  and  certain  liabilities  or between 
certain liabilities and the banks' own funds. 
This  method of control enables  the central banks  in the  majority of the member 
States to exert pressure directly on the volume of the banks' liquid funds and thus 
represents  a  very  useful  supplement to  the  refinancing  and  open market  policies. 
In fact,  the  requirement that certain ratios  be observed  between elements  in the 
balance sheet, in particular the system of compulsory reserves, represents a particul-
arly effective way of limiting the possibilities for granting bank credits by imposing 
by  regulation  a contraction in the banks' liquidity. 
Banking coefficients and ratios between :elements in the balance sheet 
90.  Certain banking coefficients establishing ratios between elements in the balance 
sheet  are  based in essence  on  the  need  to  safeguard  the  solvency  of  the  banks. 
These coefficients,  which are  in force  everywhere except in Italy, will not be dis-
cussed  here in view  of the  small  part they play in monetary policy. 
Apart  from  their  role  in  the  sound  conduct  of  the  banks,  coefficients  for  bank 
liquidity can be used for purposes of monetary policy.  This is  not in practice  the 
case in the Community. In France and Belgium, however, coefficients have  existed 
or  still  exist  which  are  aimed  at  directing  or containing  the  use  of bank  funds 
within certain limits and which also  have  an effect  on banking liquidit¥ from  the 
point  of  view  of  monetary  policy.  Cases  in point  are,  in  France,  the  old  cash 
ratio or the ratios still in force  for medium and long-term credits and, in Belgium, 
the  old  reinvestment  ratio. 
Compulsory reserves:  types &  .use 
91.  As  regards  the  system  of compulsory  reserves,  this  is  at present used in  the 
Community  in  two  different  ways  corresponding  to  two  quite  distinct  require-
ments: 
- an  obligation  on  the  banks  to  maintain  deposits  at  the  central  bank  in pro-
portion  to  certain  liabilities  (compulsory  reserve  deposits).  This  requirement 
is  designed  to neutralize  some of the banks' liquid funds  and so  to reduce  the 
credit  multiplier;  the  reserves  constituted  in  Italy  in  the  form  of  one-year 
Treasury  bonds  serve  the  same  purpose; 
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an  obligation on the  banks  to observe prescribed ratios between certain hold-
ings  of  securities  and  certain  liabilities  (compulsory  reserves  in  long-term 
securities in  Italy).  This requirement induces the banks to invest part of their 
resources  in  securities  to  finance  sectors  of the  economy  regarded  as  of first General  purpose  instruments 
prtorlty  (principally  the  public  sector).  Other  countries  have  different  coef-
ficients, but they are more or less  related to reserves in the form of securities; 
they  will be  dealt  with in the  succeeding  section. 
Compulsory reserves in the form of deposits have proved to be an effective means 
of  controlling  bank liquidity,  to  the  extent  that they  sterilize  part of  the banks' 
operating  resources.  Even  when  the  coefficients  are  held  at  the  same  level  the 
system produces  a regular  withdrawal of bank liquidity, thus reducing  the rate of 
the  credit  multiplier  (that is  to  say  the  possibilities  for  development of credits), 
since  the~.Jconstant growth  of liabilities  gives  rise  to  the  constitution of reserves. 
As  the expansion of  the fiduciary  currency  circulation in the hands  of  the public 
also  gives  rise  to a regular drain on bank liquidity, the determination of the coef-
ficient  for  the  reserves  must  take  account  of  the  more  or less  high  percentage, 
according  to  the  country,  of fiduciary  currency  in  the  total  money  supply. 
Para.  III-1:  Regulation  of the compulsory reserve  deposits 
Present utllizati.on of the reserve deposits 
92.  All  the  Community  countries  have  this  instrument  but at  present it is  only 
being  used  in Germany,  Italy  and France. 
In the  Netherlands,  the  system  of  compulsory  reserves  has  not been  used  since 
1963,  since  when  the Dutch  authorities  have  preferred  to  reduce  the  coefficient 
to zero, to prevent the banks from reacting to stringency in the money market \py 
sales  of foreign  exchange  to the Nederlandsche  Bank.  It is  to be noted  however 
that  the  Bank  is  empowered  in certain  circumstances  to  demand  that  the  banks 
should  maintain interest-free  deposits  in its books.  It is  to support  the  policy of 
restriction of credit that the Bank frequently imposes this requirement as a penality 
on the banks which have overstepped the norms laid down in the matter of credits. 
This system comprises  an element  similar to one in the new system introduced in 
France  in  1971, which  permits  more  systematically  the imposition of  compulsory 
reserves  according  to  the  volume  of  credits  granted. 
In Belgium  this  instrument was  only  employed for  one  year,  between July  1964 
and  August  1965.  In this  section  a  comparison  will  be  made  however  between 
the  regulations  existing both in the countries in which the instrument is used and 
in those in which the compulsory reserve coefficient is  for  the time being nil. 
In Germany  and  France  the  reserves  on deposit  account  are  made  active  use  of 
by  varying  the  coefficients  fairly  frequently.  In  Italy,  on  the  other hand,  it is 
not usual  to change  the rate of the reserve deposits,  flexibility  in the compulsory 
reserve  policy  being  achieved  in  this  country  by  varying  the  composition  of  the 
compulsory  reserves  as  a  whole (on deposit and in the form  of securities). 
Use of the reserves as working capital 
93.  In all  the countries  except  Belgium  and  Italy  the  amount of the compulsory 
deposits  to  which  the  banks  are  subject  need  only  be  observed  as  a  monthly 
average, which enables them in the interval to use  the reserves to cover temporary 
cash  deficits,  on  condition  that  they  make  up  the  deficiency  by  inflating  their 
reserves  on other days  in the  month.  But if the  required monthly average  is  not 
attained,  the German and French banks, unlike  the Dutch banks, are subject to  a 
penal interest payment  related  to the shortfall in the  reserves. 
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Germany 
Description  Minimum reserves 
Maximum rates applicable  (%) 
sight deposits  (a)  30 
time  deposits  20 
savings deposits  10 
deposits  of non-residents  100 
Rates in force  8.4  (average) 
Numerator  total deposits 
Denominator  short and medium-term 
liabilities 
short, medium &  long-
Institutions liable  term credit institutions 
(including  savings 
banks) 
Volume in milliards of currency units  7.0 
(a)  Deposits at sight and_  up to 30_"·days. 
TABLE  6 
Compulsory  reserve  ·deposits 
(position  at  end  1970) 
France  Italy 
Compulsory reserves  Compulsory reserves 
110  110 
- 10 
7.5  sight deposits  10 
2.5  time deposits 
total deposits  total deposits 
liabilities payable in up  short  &  medium-term 
to 3  years  liabilities 
banks handling money  banks 
and near-money 
1.8  5.2 
(b) In special circumstances the rate may be raised to  15% after consultation with the banks. 
Netherlands  Belgium 
Cash  reserves  Monetary reserve 
110  (b) 
20 
7 
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94.  Table  6  sets  out  the  principal  features  of  the  requirements  regarding  com-
pulsory reserve  deposits  in the various Member States.  The credit institutions are 
subject  to the compulsory  reserve  requirements  to  the extent that their liabilities 
are  of  a  monetary  or  quasi-monetary  nature.  The  savings  banks  however  are 
exempt  from  these  requirements,  except  in  Germany. 
Basis 
95.  The basis of calculation for determining the amount of the compulsory reserves 
is provided, although with variations from country to country, by the total of short 
and  medium-term  deposit  (sight  deposits,  time  deposits  and  savings  deposits). 
At the beginning  of  1971,  France  also  introduced  reserves based  on the amount 
of credits  granted by  the  banks  and  the financial  establishments.
1 
The  maximum  coefficient,  below  which  the  central  bank can  generally  vary  the 
coefficient in force, is determined by an authority outside the Bank.2 It is considered 
in fact  that such a decision  should be taken by a body with statutory powers. 
The system  of  compulsory  reserves  in force  in Germany  and  France  provides  for 
the application of different coefficients to the deposits of residents and non-residents. 
In Germany the Bundesbank can also fix  particular reserve coefficients for increases 
in liabilities in relation to a certain date. 
In all  the countries in which the compulsory reserve system is  employed, a distinc-
tion is  made between small and large banks. This is done by allowing more or less 
sizable  rebates  on  the  liabilities  subject  to  reserves  and/or by  applying  different 
coefficients  so  as  to ease  the burden for  the small establishments.  With regard to 
Italy,  the  high  level  of the  coefficient  imposed  is  made  easier  to bear by  paying 
interest on reserve  deposits,  contrary to the practice  in other countries. 
Para.  III-2:  Reserves in the form  of securities and the relative coefficients 
96.  Italy  stands  alone  in  having  introduced  for  its  global  reserve  coefficient  a 
distinction between reserves to be held on deposit accounts and reserves to be held 
in  the form  of securities.  Among  the  latter  a  distinction  must  also  be  made  be-
tween  the  reserves  represented by  1-year  Treasury  bonds  and those  consisting  of 
private or public long-term securities.  The reserves  in the form  of Treasury bonds 
are  comparable  as  to  their  purpose  and  impact  on liquidity  to  reserve  deposits, 
for  their counterpart is  immobilized.  On the other hand, the object of reserves in 
the form  of long-term securities is  to channel a portion of bank resources into the 
financing  of the public debt or of certain sectors  of the  economy. 
Variations in the reserves in the form  of long-term securities in Italy are  made by 
providing  that increases  in reserves  should  be  effected  in  particular categories  of 
securities,  according  to  the case  for financing  one  sector or another. 
1 In  France,  since  1971,  the  central  bank  has  in  fact  been  delegated  powers  by  the  National  Credit  Council  to 
impose  compulsory  reserves  simultaneously  on  deposits  and  the  volume  of  credits  granted.  This  new  system  has 
been  introduced  to  provide  the  central  bank  with means  of  acting  on  the  distribution  of credit  that  is  sufficiently 
effective  but  less  rigid  than  the  restriction  of  credit.  This  new  regulation  also  imposes  compulsory  reserves  for 
credits  on  cer~ain non:banking  financial  intermediaries  whose  resources  are  principally  provided  by  the  banks. 
From  ~ne pomt  of  v.1ew  one  can  liken  to  the  reserves  the  compulsory  deposits,  on  which  no  interest  is  paid, 
proportionate  to  the  mcrease  in  credits  beyond  the  ceilings  prescribed  in  the  credit  restrictions  which  the  banks 
have  been  required  to constitute  in France  and  the  Netherlands. 
2 In  the  Netherlands,  the  maximum  coefficient  is  laid  down  in  the  gentleman's  agreement  between  the central  bank 
and  the  banks,  which  governs  the  system  of  compulsory  reserves. 
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In France and Belgium  there exist coefficients  which  can  be related to the Italian 
system in that they provide for particular uses for the funds but which differ from 
it as  regards  the methods of utilization on the one hand their purpose and effects 
on the other hand. It is  a question in France of the minimum portfolio of effects 
representing  medium-term credits  which  limits  the banks' possibilities  of  mobiliz-
ing these effects  at the Bank of France, and in Belgium of the monetary reserve in 
the form of holdings  of public effects,  a form which has  not yet been put to use. 
Para.  IV:  Quantitative  global  action  on  credit 
General 
97.  Action  to  adjust bank liquidity  is  not always  sufficient  to limit  an  expansion 
of credits,  especially  in  a situation of  strong inflationary pressure.  In fact,  raising 
interest rates may have no effect on the operations of the banks, which in a period 
of inflation easily find  customers  prepared to pay  high  rates;  raising  interest rates 
may also  attract an influx of capital from abroad which will increase bank liquidity. 
Similarly,  variations  in  the  compulsory  reserves  may  prove  insufficient.  Finally, 
action  by  the  monetary  authorities  to  contain  bank  liquidity  cannot  be  isolated 
from the creation of. money coming from  the public sector or from  abroad. 
In these  circumstances  the monetary authorities  in certain  countries  resort  to the 
restriction  of  bank  credits.  This  is  an  instrument  the  introduction  of  which  is 
aimed at limiting the rate of expansion of credits. The method consists in limiting 
for  a certain time  the  growth in the volume of bank credits  to  the private sector 
to  a specified percentage in relation to a base date or period. 
Methods of employment 
98.  This technique is  only employed, regularly or occasionally, by the central banks 
in  France,  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium;  the  Luxembourg  authorities  have  also 
resorted  to  it  since  1970.  In  the  Netherlands  its  employment  results  from  a 
"gentleman's  agreement"  between  the  issuing  authority  and  the  banking  sector. 
In Belgium  and  France  the restriction  applies  in principle  not only  to short-term 
credits but also  to medium and long-term credits for which different growth rates 
may  possibly  be  fixed.  In the  Netherlands,  the  limitations  on credits  are  aimed, 
apart from  the whole  field  of short-term credits  which  are  subject  to ceilings,  at 
the total long-term use  of funds,  including investment in securities;  in periods  of 
restriction,  the  increase  in  long-term  assets  may  not exceed  the  increase  in long-
term liabilities, unless the ceilings  applicable  to short-term credits  are not reached. 
Normally,  the  institutions  subject  to  the  placing  of  their  credits  are  the  banks; 
in  Belgium  it  also  applies  to  the  public  credit  institutions,  the  private  savings 
banks and the  life  assurance  companies.  In the  Netherlands it applies  also  to the 
agricultural credit banks,  since  1969  to the savings  banks,  and since  1970  to the 
postal  giro  service. 
In countries in which the restriction of credit has not been applied on a permanent 
basis  (France, Belgium), it has been applied strictly but for limited periods. In the 
Netherlands inflationary pressure was of frequent occurrence during the 1960s and 
led  the  authorities  to  apply  the  system  of  quantitative  restrictions  from  1961 
onwards  with only  short interruptions. Because  of the regular and general way in 
which this instrument has been employed in that country, its method of application 
has  tended to be  more  flexible  there. 
Sanctions  are  provided  to  ensure  the  observance  of  the  relative  regulations.  In 
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France  since  1970, and in the Netherlands, banks  which have exceeded  the limits 
have  been  required  to  deposit  at the  central  bank,  in a  special  account  bearing 
no interest,  an  amount equal  to or proportionate  to that by  which  the ceiling  is 
exceeded.  In Belgium,  overstepping the limits  prescribed gives  rise  to a reduction 
of at least equal amount in the rediscount ceilings;  a similar rule was  also  applied 
in France  until  1970. 
Restriction  of  credits  has  been used-by  reason  of  its  very nature-under  dif-
ficult  conditions, characterised by severe  and at times persistent inflationary press-
ures.  It has  had to  be applied  in a pragmatic  fashion  and with a  certain amount 
of  flexibility,  making  relatively  frequent  adjustments  according  to  the  trend  of 
assets  and liabilities  at the banks.  In addition it has been applied in certain cases 
in such  a way  as  to  allow the banks to  select from  among several base  dates for 
the calculation of the growth of the credits they grant, in order to ensure that the 
arbitrary  choice  of  a  base  date  or period  by  the central bank does  not work to 
the disadvantage  of  certain banking establishments.  Finally,  the monetary  author-
ities  can  use  a  certain  amount  of discrimination  regarding  the  credits  granted to 
the different  economic  sectors,  thus  favouring  foreign  trade  and  the financing  of 
investment,  for  example. 
As  a  general  rule,  the  French  and  Belgian  authorities  consider  that  the  use  of 
credit restriction is  to be recommended especially in a period of severe inflationary 
pressure,  when  the  effectiveness  of  the  other  instruments  proves  inadequate  or 
requires time to operate. In the long run, in fact,  the restriction of credit hampers 
the normal play of competition between the banks and affects  their profit.;earning 
capacity unequally. The Netherlands' point of view in the matter is  more complex, 
however,  as  was  seen  in the  previous  chapter in considering  the  monetary  policy 
of  that country.  ·  · 
Section II - Instruments for specific purposes 
99.  The instruments to be examined below are classed as having a specific purpose. 
That does  not mean  that they  are  of secondary importance, but simply  that they 
are aimed at controlling a particular source of liquidity or are  designed to achieve 
particular  objectives. 
Consideration will be given  in turn to: 
- the regulation of relations with foreign countries; 
- the selective control of domestic credits; 
- the  instruments  of  control  of  the  local  authorities. 
Para.  I:  Regulation  of relations  with  foreign  countries 
Para.  I-1:  General 
Importance of the problem 
100.  Recent years have been marked by short-term capital movements 1 of increas-
ing  volume  prompted by considerations of yield  and sometimes  by speculation on 
changes  in rates.  These  movements  have  not only  affected  the effectiveness  of the 
1 Long-term  capital  movements  do  not  come  within  the  scope  of  the  present  study  (except  to  the  extent  to  which 
they  are  linked with  short-term  movements)  and  so  are  not  dealt  with here. 
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monetary policy pursued by the national authorities, but they have also occasioned 
or aggravated  serious crises  which have  rocked the international monetary system. 
Several  structural  factors,  running  parallel  to  the  incidence  of cyclical  factors  on 
the balance  of payments,  have  contributed  to  increases  in movements  of capital. 
Particular features are: 
- the  increasing  internationalization of  the economies;  this  finds  reflection  in a 
considerable  expansion  of international trade  which  is  an  important source  of 
short-term  capital  movements  owing  to  shifts  in the  terms  of  payment, 
the  development  of  multinational  enterprises, 
the  extension of banking networks beyond the frontiers,  giving  the enterprises 
easier  access  to  foreign  credit  resources, 
the  development  of  the  Euro-currency  market,  especially  of  the  volume  of 
liquid  funds  which  pass  through  this  market. 
The ·market in Euro-currencies is  one which the authorities find  it hard to control 
and in which  are invested short-term funds  which can be shifted very easily from 
one  national  market  to  another in  search  of  the  highest  return. 
For this  reason,  differences  of economic  trend between two or more countries-
which  are  reflected  particularly in a  difference  in interest  rates or the weakening 
or appreciation of the currency of one country in relation to that of another - are 
liable to set off  unlooked for movements of funds  from  one market to another, so 
affecting  the  autonomy of national  monetary  policies. 
It must be added that even when two economies  develop on parallel lines, failure 
to  harmonize  the  use  of  the  instruments  of  monetary  policy  can  also  provoke 
movements of capital.  In fact  if two countries follow  a  restrictive policy, but one 
of them does it by raising rates of interest and the other by exercising a quantitat-
ive control of credit while maintaining  lower rates than those ruling in the other 
country,  movements  of  capital  may  occur  despite  the  similar  trend  of  monetary 
policies. 
Problems and means of action of the monetary authorities 
101.  These 1novements of short-term funds  may  set the monetary authorities prob-
lems  of  two  kinds: 
- undesirable  variations  in  the  level  of  the  foreign  currency  reserves, 
- disturbance  of  control  of  liquidity  creation  (both  as  regards  the  quantity  of 
liquidity  and in the matter of interest rates). 
It is  to  be  noted however  that in certain circumstances,  to the  extent that these 
movements can be controlled by the authorities, they  are capable, not of upsetting 
the policy followed,  but of reinforcing it as  regards  the objectives of the moment. 
Several  n1eans  of action  are  available  to the monetary  authorities  to enable  them 
to  influence  the  flows  of  short-term  capital  in  a  more  or  less  flexible  manner. 
In this  connection,  the  controls  aimed  at  containing  international  movements  of 
funds  are  not  the  same  for  residents  and non-residents. 
102.  Non-residents  (bank  and  non-banks)  in  all  the  Community  countries  enjoy 
complete  liberty,. thanks  to  the  external convertibility  of the currencies,  to effect 
movements  of  capital  and  it  is  to  them-particularly  the  multi-national  com-
panies - that the bulk of the movements of capital which escape  all  control must 
be attributed.  A  very  important instrument at  the disposal  of  the  authorities for 
limiting  these  movements  of  capital  consists  in  reducing  or even  forbidding  the 
payment of interest on deposits of non-residents.  In Belgium, besides  the prohibi-
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tion to pay interest, the existence  of .  a parallel foreign  exchange  market produces 
the same  result  as  regards  the limitation of capital  movements;  the fluctuation of 
rates in the free  market serves according to circumstances to discourage the inflow 
or outflow  of  funds. 
103.  The  transfers  of  residents  can  be  controlled  by  the  monetary  authorities 
either  under  regulations  promulgated  by  the  exchange  control  authority  or  by 
means of instruments which operate in an indirect and flexible manner. As  between 
residents,  the regulations  make  a distinction between the  banks  on the  one hand 
and  corporate bodies  and private persons on the other. 
As  far  as  non-banking residents are concerned, a distinction must be made between 
the Federal Republic  and the BLED on the one hand, and the other countries  on 
the other. In the case of the first two there is complete liberty for foreign exchange 
operations; in the BLED, however, short-term capital transactions must be effected 
in a free  market in which  rates  may  fluctuate  beyond the limits laid down in the 
international  monetary  agreements. 
In  France,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands,  under  the  exchange  control  regulations 
private  parties  may,  as  in  the  other  countries,  effect  movements  of  funds  con-
nected  with  international  trade  transactions,  which  includes  the  possibility  of 
granting  or  receiving  short  and  medium-term  credits  connected  with  the  oper-
ations.1  For movements  of  capital,  the  control may  be  more  or less  liberal  from 
country  to country.  In case  of need,  the  authorities  in certain countries  consider 
that  resort to  a  strict  exchange  control  is  a  necessary  instrument  for  limiting 
movements  of  funds  and  supporting  their policy. 
As  for  the  banks,  these  are  in  principle  free  in all  the  Community  countries  to 
effect  any  kind of  transaction with foreign  countries.  However,  the  authorities in 
the  various  countries  have  means  of influencing  the  flows  of  capital  which  pass 
through  the banks  or the impact  they  have  on liquidity,  even if, for  one  reason 
or another  they  allow  international margins  in, interest  rates  to continue. 
Certain' central banks. may  seek first of all  to offset flows  of capital themselves by 
encouraging or compelling the banks - as  the case may be - to effect transfers in 
the  opposite  direction  to  those  which  occur  spontaneously  (regulation of the  net 
external  position  of  the  banks).  They  can  also  try  to  control  these  flows  or 
neutralize  their  impact  on  domestic  liquidity  by  means  either  of  quantitative 
instruments  (open  market  policy,  restriction  of  credits)  or  of  various  specific 
measures:  imposition  of particular  compulsory  reserves  on  non-resident  deposits, 
imputation  to  rediscount  ceilings  of  net  resources  borrowed  abroad,  restrictions 
on  interest  payment  on  deposits.  These  measures  will  be  reviewed  below.  An 
examination  will  be  made  of  their  use  and  their  methods  of  application  in  the 
different Community countries,  though it is  pointed out that the. present text was 
published  on  30  June  1971  and  takes  no  account  of  the  numerous  amendments 
made  subsequently  as  a  result  of  the  currency  crisis  in the  summer of  1971. 
Para.  I-2:  Regulation  of  the  net  external  positions  of  the  banks 
104.  As  has  been  seen,  in all  the Community  countries  the banks  are  authorized 
1 This  last  possibility  opens  the  door  to  the  by-passing  of  exchange  control - which  provides  for  authorization  of 
purely  monetary  transactions  with  foreign  countries- and  to  transfers  of  short-term  funds  by  the  acceleration  or 
slowing  down· of  payments  connected  with  commercial  transactions.  These  "leads  and  lags"  can  assume  substantial 
proportions. 
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to .  maintain  assets  and  liabilities  in relation  to  non-residents  in  foreign  exchange 
and the  national  currency.  At the end  of 1970, the entire banking system in the 
Community countries  had a total amount  of about $  34 milliard of assets  abroad 
and  $  38  milliard  of  liabilities  (Table  7). 
According  to  whether  the monetary  authorities  in the  member  countries  wish  to 
prevent  inflows  and/  or outflows  of  short-term  capital  or,  on  the  other hand,  to 
promote the one or the other, they have endeavoured to equalize the net external 
positions  of the banks 1  and  have  in turn: 
- imposed  a balanced net position; 
- permitted, encouraged of forbidden a creditor position; 
- permitted  or forbidden  a  debtor  position. 
For this  purpose the central bank can  proceed  by  means  of directives  and by in-
direct  means  in the  form  of "swaps". 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
~~ 
TABLE  7 
External  short-term  positions  of the  commercial  banks 
(end year  positions) 
(in  million  dollars) 
GERMANY  FRANCE  ITALY 
Assets  Liabil- Net  Assets  Liabil- Net  Assets  Liabil- Net  ities  ities  ities 
1,480  1986  -506  2,349  2,462  -113  2,458  2,651  -193 
1,521  1,884  -363  3,108  3,301  -193  3,272  3,077  +195 
3,023  2,181  +  842  3 781  4,343  -562  3,577  3,562  +  15 
3,902  3,674  +  228  5'403  5,464  -61  5,160  4,423  +737 
4,553  5,510  -958  7,526  8,152  -626  7,240  7,164  -76 
4,527  7647  -3,120  7,667  8,132  -465  10,118  10,101  +  17 
NETHERLANDS  BELGIUM 
LUXEMBOURG 
Assets  Liabil- Net  Assets  Liabil- Net  ities  ities 
1965  1,218  1,185  +  33  967  1,497  -530 
1966  1,517  1,563  -46  1,329  2,035  -706 
1967  1,485  1,640  -155  1,591  2407  -816 
1968  1,986  2,076  -90  2,548  3,208  -660 
1969  3,290  3,291  - 1  3 951  4,526  -575 
1970  4,808  4,969  -161  6,483  7,331  -848 
Source:  Statistics of the Secretariat of the European Monetary Agreement. 
1 By the  net external  positions  of  the  banks  is  understood  the  net  spot  position  in national  currency  and in foreign 
exchange  with  foreign  countries. 
70 Instruments  for  specific  purposes 
i)  Regulation of the net external  positions  of the banks by means of directives 
105.  Italy and the Netherlands have for several years been operating an exchange 
control  the principles  of which are  identical but the methods  of which  are  some-
what  different. 
In  Italy,  this  instrument  permits  the  active  and  flexible  regulation  of  internal 
liquidity. It can have  rapid effects,  for it is  applied to  a limited number of banks 
which are the only ones authorized to maintain a position vis-a-vis foreign countries. 
In the Netherlands, the regulation of the banks' net external positions (which also 
include the external long-term positions) is regarded in particular as  an instrument 
of  a  structural  nature.  Its principal  object  is  to  limit  the  banks'  possibilities  of 
offsetting by funds  from  abroad  the effect on bank liquidity of a persistent deficit 
in the balance  of payments.  Since July  1964, the date of their introduction, these 
provisions  have  laid  down  that the banks  cannot  maintain  a  net  debtor position 
with  foreign  countries  (with  an  exemption  limit  of  Fl.  5  million  per  bank).  In 
addition,  after  the  banks  had  effected  large  exports  of  capital  in  1969  and  were 
thus  in  a  strong net creditor position,  thanks  in particular  to  assistance  obtained 
from  the  Nederlandsche  Bank,  the  latter  imposed  reduction  quotas  on  this  net 
position. 
In France,  by  virtue of powers conferred on it to issue  legislative provisions and 
regulations,  the  central  bank  controlled  the  net  external  positions  of  the  bank 
for  a certain period.  A  directive  issued  at  the beginning  of  1969  and with-drawn 
on 1st July 1970 required the banks to balance their net foreign exchange positions 
or to maintain  a debtor position  with a view  to  replenishing  the  official  reserves 
(in  the  event  of  a  creditor position being  maintained  deposits  would have  to be 
constituted with the Exchange Stabilization Fund) rather than to influence internal 
liquidity. 
In Belgium  a similar  control, introduced for  the  same  purpose, has been in force 
since  1969;  its effect has been to contain or reduce the net creditor position of the 
banks.  On the other hand the recommendation made  to the banks in March  1971 
to  reduce  their net  debtor  positions  is  aimed  at reducing  an  excessive  expansion 
of internal liquidity; holdings in excess of the authorized position incur the penalty 
that non-interest-bearing deposits  have  to be constituted at the National Bank. 
ii)  Control  of  the  net  external  positions  of  the  banks  by  intervention  in  the 
forward  foreign  exchange  market 
106.  Intervention in the forward  foreign  exchange  market,  generally  in the form 
of  " swaps"  (spot  sales  of  foreign  currencies  against  simultaneous  forward  pur-
chases,  or  vice  versa),  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  short-term  movements  of 
bank funds  has  been effected  more  especially  in  Germany,  Italy  and  the Nether-
lands.  In France  and  Belgium  there  has  also  been intervention,  which  is  known 
in  France  as  "mises  ou  prises  en  report".  In  Belgium  intervention  is  rare.  In 
France  it has  been  more  frequent,  but of  minor  importance  and  intented  mainly 
to  reduce  bank  liquidity;  at  times  the  banks  have  also  been  required  to  place 
foreign  exchange deposits with the Exchange Stabilization Fund. 
The operations described in the preceding paragraph  represent a very flexible  and 
very  rapid means  of  influencing  or promoting  movements  of funds.  This  form  of 
intervention  has  assumed  particular  importance  in  the  Federal  Republic,  where 
the  la\V  has  not invested  the central bank with the  power to  act  directly  on the 
net external  positions  of  the banks  by  means  of  precise  directives. 
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The  intervention  operations  have  generally  taken  the  form  of  dollar  "swaps" 
concluded between the monetary authority and the commercial banks.  Most often 
they have been for the purpose of exporting funds,  so  that the monetary authority 
has  sold  dollars  spot  and  has  repurchased  them  forward  sometimes  at par (Italy, 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands),  sometimes  at  rates  above  those  ruling  in  the 
market  (Germany  and  the  Netherlands),  and  sometimes  at  a  lower  rate  (Ger-
many). 
The  central  banks  consider  however  that  operations  of  this  nature  have  their 
limits,  since  they  help  to  provide  funds  to  the  international  market  which  risk 
being  returned  subsequently  to  the  domestic  market. 
In the  Netherlands  the  monetary  authorities  have  also  concluded  "swaps"  at par 
with the commercial banks with a view  to avoiding excessive increases in the rate 
of interest in the domestic  money market in a  period of a  temporary  shortage of 
liquidity. In this case  the "swaps" are arranged the other way round:  the monetary 
authorities buy dollars  spot and  resell  them forward,  thus  guaranteeing  the banks 
an  interesting forward  rate. 
Para.  I-3:  Other  instruments  for  the  control  of  short-term  movements  of funds 
applicable  to  the  banks 
107.  Certain  instruments  of monetary policy  already  considered  above  in connec-
tion with the instruments for  general purposes are  of particular use in influencing 
short-term  movements  of  funds  by  reason  of  their  flexibility  and  the  possibility 
they offer for  applying discriminatory  treatment either as  between currencies or as 
between residents  and  non-residents. 
From  this  point  of  view  three  means  of  action  may  be  considered:  compulsory 
reserves,  control  of  interest-payments  on  bank  deposits,  and  rediscount  ceilings. 
It is  in Germany  that these  techniques  are  the  most  highly  developed;  their use 
being  aimed essentially  at preventing funds  from  entering the country  rather than 
sending  them  out. 
Compulsory  reserves  have  been  used  for  this  purpose  in  Germany  (and  this 
measure  has  recently  been  made  possible  in  France)  by ·imposing  specific  coef-
ficients  on  the  totals  or  increases  in  the  totals  of  non-resident  deposits  and/  or 
of  the banks'  loans  abroad.  The level  of  this  type  of coefficient  can  be raised  as 
high  as  100 %  of  the  total  liabilities  of  the  banks  to  non-residents. 
In Germany, on several occasions, interest payments on non-resident deposits have 
been  made  subject  to  prior  authorization  (a  measure  applied  in  such  a  way  as 
almost to amount to a prohibition), in order to discourage imports of capital; France 
had a similar control from  1963  to  1966. Belgium has introduced one recently. 
The  rediscount  ceilings  have  been  employed  in  the  Federal  Republic  to  combat 
an  influx  of  capital  through  the  banks;  for  this  purpose  the ceilings  are  lowered 
by  the amount  of capital  borrowed abroad that is  not subject  to  the constitution 
of  compulsory  reserves.  In  this  context,  the  ceilings  are  sometimes  reduced  ac-
cording  to the  amount of  securities  made  available by the banks  to non-residents 
"en pension". 
In the BLED the  existence of a  free  foreign  exchange  market reserved for  capital 
operations,  in  which  rates  can  fluctuate  beyond  the  margins  authorized  under 
international  monetary  agreements,  has  made  it  possible  to  check  sometimes 
outflows  of  capital,  and  sometimes  (since  May  1971)  inflows. 
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Para.  II:  Selective  control  of domestic  credits 
108.  Among  the  instruments  considered,  some  lend  themselves  to  employment 
in a  selective  manner.  In this  case,  the monetary  authorities  may  make  specified 
categories  of  credits  subject  to  a  particular  regime. 
Selective  control is  considered to be tied up with general monetary policy  to the 
extent that it tends  to reinforce it or to mitigate certain of its effects.  Selectivity 
can be applied  to certain sectors of utilization, to certain operations and to certain 
monetary and financial institutions. It can operate in a qualitative or a quantitative 
manner. 
Any  of  the  countries  in  the  Community  may  resort  to  selective  application  of 
certain  instruments,  but  there  are  appreciable  differences  in  the  importance  at-
tached  in each  country  to  this  policy.  A  selective  orientation  of  monetary  policy 
is  given  some  importance,  especially  in France and Belgium. 
The  instruments  of  selective  control  over  the  distribution  of  domestic  credits 
operate  essentially  by  differentiating  between  the  conditions  of  access  to  credit. 
This  may  come  out  in a  preferential  or restrictive  sense  as  regards  the  term  of 
the credits or the conditions  on which  they  may  be granted (in favour  of certain 
sectors  in certain  forms  or through certain institutions). 
A policy for  the  restriction  of credit  lends  itself  readily  to  selectivity  taking  the 
form  of a preference  accorded  to one credit rather than another according  to the 
requirements of particular sectors or regions or other considerations. The selectivity 
may also  take the form of differentiation in the conditions and cost of refinancing. 
It is  for  this  purpose  that increased  rates  are  employed  in Belgium,  France  and 
Italy,  and  preferential  rates  in  Italy  and  to  a  limited  extent  in  France.  The 
monetary authorities can finally  take action in the form of individual examinations 
of  the  records  or prior mobilization  agreements,  and  by a  procedure  for  the  ap-
proval  of  credits  by  the  central  bank  in  France  (medium-term  credits)  and  in 
Belgium  (certification  applicable  to  certain foreign  trade  bills).  It is  clear  that it 
is  to  the  differentiation  and  variation  of  rates  and  the  fixation  of  ceilings  that 
recourse  is  most  generally  had. 
Among  the  different  sectors  that  are  the  subject  of  selective  action  by  the mo-
netary  authorities,  mention  should  be  made  of  instalment  sales  and  investments 
in fixed  capital. 
Most countries  resort more  or less  frequently  to  measures  tending  to  change  the 
terms· of instalment  credit  by  varying,  according  to  the  requirements  of the eco-
nomic situation, the amount of the initial deposit, the period of the credit, its cost, 
and even the overall volume of the credits that may be granted. 
As  regards  the financing  of capital investment, the system of medium-term credits 
for  the  financing  of purchases  of plant  and  equipment  that can  be mobilized  at 
the central bank makes  it possible  in France  to  operate  on  a  selective  basis  by 
giving  priority  to  certain  applications. 
Para.  III:  Instruments  of control  by  the  local  authorities 
General 
109.  From  the  point  of view  of monetary  policy,  importance  is  attached  to  the 
management  of  the  cash  resources  of  the  local  authorities  (also  referred  to  as 
lower  or  regional  authorities  according  to  the  terminology  in  use  in  particular 
countries)  and  to  recourse by them  to the capital  market.  The interest takes  dif-
ferent  forms  however  according  to  the  country. 
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The institutions contemplated here are the local authorities invested with a measure 
of  financial  autonomy,  that  is  to  say  the  Lander  and  the  "local  authorities"  in 
Germany/  the  regions,  provinces  and  local  authorities  (communes)  in  Italy,  the 
provinces  and local  authorities  (communes)  in Belgium  and the Netherlands,  and 
the  local  authorities  (communes)  in Luxembourg.  In France  the local  authorities 
come  under  the  Treasury's  financial  jurisdiction. 
The  liquid  funds  of  the  local  authorities  are  treated  as  part of  the  liquidity  in 
the  economy,  except  when  they  are  centralized  in  the  Treasury;  thus  they  are 
excluded  completely  from  it  in  France,  where  they  are  wholly  centralized  and 
managed  by  the Treasury.  Nor  are  they  included in Germany  to  the extent that 
they  are  deposited  at  the  Bundesbank.  When  they  are  included  in  the  liquidity 
of  the  economy  their  apportionment  among  the  banking  sector  on  the one hand 
and the central bank and the Treasury on the other hand give rise to a modification 
of  bank liquidity. 
Local authority deposits 
110.  To the  extent that the liquid holdings  of  the local  authorities form  part of 
the liquidity of the  economy,  it is  important to know where  they  are  held.  This 
is  subject  to  regulation  in all  countries  except  the  Netherlands;  but besides  the 
regulations in the matter it is  also necessary to indicate where in practice the bulk 
of these  funds  are  held. 
Not  including  their  balances  at the  Treasury  the  local  authorities  hold  their  de-
posits  with  the  following  bodies.  In  Italy  they  are  held  at  the  big  banks.  In 
Belgium  the deposits  must be held with the National Bank,  the Caisse  Nationale 
d'Epargne et de  Retraite or the Credit Communal;  in fact  the major part is  held 
with  this  institution,  just  as  in  the  Netherlands  the  majority  of  the  deposits  is 
effected  with  the  Bank  voor  Nederlandsche  Gemeenten  (which  is  itself  a  part 
of  the  lower  authorities).  In  Germany,  by  virtue  of  the  Law  on  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  the  Lander  (like  the Federal  Government) must  deposit  their funds 
at  the  Bundesbank;  deposit  with  other  institutions  requires  the  consent  of  the 
central  bank;  the  local  authorities (communes)  on  the  other  hand  are  free  as 
regards  the  deposit  of their funds.  In Luxembourg the local  authorities generally 
deposit  their funds  at the  State  Savings  Bank. 
Credits 
111.  To  the  extent  that  a  monetary  policy,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  is 
applied  in  relation  to  the  local  authorities,  it is  concerned  principally  with  the 
possibilities  of  this  sector's  undertaking  borrowing  operations  both at  short  and 
at medium  and  long  term. 
Short-term credits 
The short-term  financing  of the local  authorities is  effected in all  the countries  at 
the  banks  or  possibly  the  central  bank,  except  in  France,  where,  as  the  cash 
resources  of  these  institutions  are  handled  by  the  Treasury,  all  their  short-term 
t  The  budgets  of  the  Lander  hold  a  considerable  place  in the sum  total  of public  finances.  They  are  integrated  in 
the  central public budgets  (see  below in the  section concerning  Germ~ny). 
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financing  requirements  are  controlled  and  eventually  supplied  by  the  Treasury 
itself. 
In Germany,  credits  can  be  granted  by  the  Bundesbank  to  the  Lander,  and  by 
the  banks  to  the  Lander  and  the  local  authorities.  A  ceiling  has  been  fixed  by 
legislation  up  to  which  the  Bundesbank  can  provide  assistance  in  the  form  of 
cash credits or of credits against Treasury bonds. It is  to be noted that even below 
the ceiling limit the Bundesbank is  not obliged to  provide credits. 
In Belgium,  cash  credits  are  provided  particularly  by  the  Credit Communal,  and 
the law provides for  no  quantitative limits  on the  borrowing powers  of the local 
authorities.  Their loans  both at short  and  long  term,  however,  are  subject  to  ap-
proval  by  the  higher  administrative  authorities. 
As  regards  their  short-term  financing,  the  local  authorities  in  the  Netherlands 
represent  a  special  case,  since  they  can  borrow  at  short  term  from  the  private 
sector. Their indebtedness is  subject to a permanent ceiling related to their current 
receipts ("cash norm"). Since  1967, the Nederlandsche Bank, in order to reinforce 
control in this  sector, has  set limits, in accordance with the provisions  relating to 
the quantitative restrictions on credit, to the assistance  which the banks can grant 
to  the  local  authorities. 
Long-term credits 
The long-term financing of the local authorities is effected by the banks and savings 
banks,  by  specialized  financial  intermediaries  or public  bodies,  and  by  direct  re-
course  to  the  capital  market.  The  control  of  long-term  borrowing  by  the  local 
authorities is  rather a question of supervision of sound business management, and 
is  exercized  directly by  the government or governmental bodies  appointed for  the 
purposes.  It should  be pointed out that  in  the  Netherlands  the  government  can 
direct, if excessive stringency develops in the capital market, that the local authori-
ties'  requirements  in  this  market  are  centralized  at the Bank voor Nederlandsche 
Gemeenten in order to avoid disturbances in the market and excessive fluctuations 
in interest  rates. 
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MONETARY POLICY  IN THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC  OF GERMANY CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC FACTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Section I  - Institutional framework and structural aspects 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
Statutory bases 
1.  In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  main  statutory  bases  of  monetary 
policy  are  the Deutsche  Bundesbank  Act  (  Gesetz iiber  die  Deutsche Bundesbank) 
of  1957,  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth (Gesetz  zur  For-
'dering  der  Stabilitat  und  des W achstums  der  Wirtschaft)  of  1967  and  the  Ex-
ternal Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschafts gesetz) of 1961. The functions 
of  monetary  policy  dealt  with in  these  Acts  are  the  responsibility  of  either  the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  or  the  Federal  Government.  The  basic  provisions  on  the 
supervision of the banking system are to be found in the Act on the Credit System 
which  entered into  force  at  the  beginning  of  1962. 
Para.  I-1:  The  Deutsche  Bundesbank  Act 
Duties and powers of the Bundesbank 
2.  Section 3  of the Bundesbank Act assigns  to the Bundesbank  the task of "safe-
guarding the currency". The Bundesbank's main powers are those of fixing interest 
and discount  rates, fixing  minimum  reserve  ratios up to  the limits  set out in the 
Act,  and laying  down  the principles  of its  credit and open-market  operations.  In 
exercising  these  powers,  the  Bundesbank  is  independent  of  instructions  from  the 
Federal Government. While performing its duty it is, however, required to support 
the  general  economic  policy  of  the  Government. 
Co-operation between Government and Bundesbank 
Section  13  of  the Bundesbank Act lays  down the following  rules  on co-operation 
between the Government  and  the  Central Bank: 
a )  The  Bundesbank  shall  advise  the  Federal  Government  in  monetary  policy 
matters  of  substantial  importance  and  furnish  it with  information  at  its  re-
quest. 
b)  The members  of  the  Federal Government have  the  right  to participate in the 
discussions  of  the Central Bank  Council,  the decision-taking  body of the Bun-
desbank.  They  have  no  right  to  vote,  but may  propose  motions.  If they  so 
request,  a  decision  will  be  deferred  for  up  to  two  weeks. 
c )  The  Federal  Government  must  associate  the  President  of  the  Deutsche  Bun-
desbank  with its  discussions  on  important  matters  affecting  monetary  policy. 
79 GERMANY - BASIC  FACTS 
Members of the Central Bank Council 
The Central Bank Council,  the supreme body of the Bundesbank,  is  composed of 
the  President  and  the  Vice-President  of  the  Bundesbank,  the  other  members  of 
the Directorate (no more  than eight,  at present six)  and the  11  Presidents of the 
Land Central Banks  (the main branches  of the Bundesbank in the Lander, includ-
ing  West Berlin).  The members  of the Directorate  are  nominated  by  the Federal 
Government and the Presidents of the Land Central Banks by the Federal Council 
("Bunde  srat")  (the  latter on  proposals  from  the  appropriate  authority  of  the  in-
dividual  Lander),  after  consulting  the  Central Bank Council. 
They  are  appointed by  the President of the Federal Republic for  a  term of office 
of  not  more  than eight  and not  less  than  two  years;  they  may  not be  removed 
before the expiry of their term for reasons other than personal ones,  the initiative 
being their own or that of the Central Bank Council.  The President of the Deut-
sche  Bundesbank,  who presides over the Directorate, also  takes the chair at meet-
ings  of  the  Central Bank  Council,  which  usually  meets  once  a  fortnight. 
Para.  I-2:  The Act to  Promote Economic Stability and Growth 
Statutory basis for overall control of the economic process 
3.  The Act is  based  on the recognition  that in present and future conditions  the 
efficiency  of the system  of the free  market economy can  be safeguarded only if it 
is  supplemented  by  overall  control  of  the  major  aggregates  of the economy.  The 
Act  sets  up  the  necessary  institutional  machinery.  It supplements  and  improves 
the traditional instruments of short-term economic and monetary policy  and hence 
widens  the Federal Government's and  the Bundesbank's freedom  of action  in the 
economic  policy  :field.  The  Act  is  at  the  same  time  designed  to  create  the  con-
ditions necessary for achieving balanced development of the economy, which, avoid-
ing  undue  conjunctural fluctuation,  help  to  secure  adequate  economic  growth for 
the  longer  term  too. 
General  objectives of economic policy 
4.  Section 1 of the Act defines general economic policy objectives. All economic and 
financial  policy  measures  taken  by  the Federal  Government and  the  Lander must 
accordingly  be  designed  to  "contribute,  in  the  framework  of  the  free  market 
economy,  at  the  same  time  to  price  stability,  to  a  high  level  of employment and 
to external equilibrium, along with steady and adequate economic growth". Comp-
liance  with these  objectives  is  required  not only  of the  Federal  Government and 
the Lander, but also  of the Federal Railways,  the Federal Post Office,  the E.R.P. 
Special  Fund  and  the  public  boards  and  corporations  directly  controlled  by  the 
Federal  Government.  The  local  authorities  and  local  authority  associations  must 
also  take  account  of  these  basic  objectives  of  economic  policy  in  their  budget 
policy. 
Principles and measures for overall control 
5.  The  principles  and  measures  for  which  the  Act  provides  to  safeguard  pursuit 
of these  objectives  have  sometimes  a direct but sometimes only  an indirect relev-
ance  for  monetary  policy;  examples  of  the  latter  type  include  in  particular  the 
provision under  the Act for  the preparation of a  "subsidy report"  at  intervals of 
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two  years,  and  for  the  forward  planning  of  the  revenue  and  expenditure  of the 
Federal  Government  and  the  Lander for  a period of five  years. 
The measures  laid down in the Act relate  to  the following four main fields: 
i)  Information 
A  definition  of  the  basic  aims  of  economic  policy  is  given  in the  Act  itself.  The 
annual  economic  report  of  the  Federal  Government,  submitted  in  January,  sets 
out  and  explains  the  economic  and  financial  aims  envisaged  for  the  current year 
and  the  proposed  economic  and financial  policy.  The report also  contains  a  state-
ment  of  the  Federal  Government's  views  on  the  annual  opinion  on  the  general 
economic  trend rendered by the Council of Experts. The report on subsidies  sub-
mitted  every  two  years,  similarly  throws  more  light  on  economic  and  financial 
policy. 
To  enable  the  Government's  economic  policy  and  the  autonomous  decisions  of 
the  parties  to  collective  agreements  to  be co-ordinated,  the  Federal  Government, 
if a basic objective of economic policy is endangered, makes available target figures 
for  "concerted  action"  by  the  regional  and  local  authorities,  trade  unions  and 
employers'  associations.  In practice,  these  target  figures  are  discussed  in  advance 
with  the  parties  concerned.  The  Deutsche  Bundesbank  also  takes  part  in  these 
discussions. 
ii)  Financial  planning 
The Act introduces forward planning, for a period of several years, of the revenue 
and  the  expenditure  of  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Lander. 
iii) Coordination among the public authorities 
To improve coordination  of  the measures  taken by  the Federal Government,  the 
Lander and  the  local  authorities  in matters of economic  and financial  policy,  the 
Act  introduces  elements  of  a  cooperative  federalism  into financial  policy,  in par-
ticular by the establishment of a Council on Economic Trends and, more recently, 
a  Financial  Planning  Council.  The  Bundesbank  may  take  part in the  discussions 
of  either  body. 
iv)  Creation  of new instruments of short-term  economic  policy 
These  include  the  provisions  for  influencing private demand by  tax  measures  and 
for  influencing  the  public  authorities'  investment  policy,  measures  to  widen  the 
Bundesbank's  room  for  manoeuvre  in liquidity  policy,  provision  for  anti-cyclical 
equalization  reserves  of  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Lander,  rules  for  the 
borrowing  and  debt  redemption  operations  of  the  public  authorities,  and  pro-
visions  for  the  management  of  the  public  authorities'  demand  for  credit. 
Para.  I-3:  The  External  Trade  and  Payments  Act 
6.  The  Act  empowers  the Federal  Government  to  control  and  restrict by  regula-
tion  the  various  sectors  of foreign  trade  and  payments,  in certain  circumstances. 
Under  the Act,  the governing principle is  freedom  of foreign  trade and payments, 
but  there  is  a  proviso  enabling  restrictions  to  be introduced. 
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The Act itself and the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation based on it already 
include  a  number  of  such  restrictions.  When issuing  statutory regulations  in the 
fields  of capital  movements,  payments  and  transactions  in foreign  securities  and 
gold,  the  Federal Government  must  act  in agreement  with the Bundesbank.  The 
issue of authorizations in these fields is  the responsability of the Bundesbank. 
Para.  I-4:  The  Act on  the  Credit  System 
Cooperation between the Federal Supervisory Office for the 
Credit System and the Bundesbank 
7.  In the  field  of  bank  supervision,  this  Act  provides  for  cooperation  between 
the  Federal  Supervisory  Offices  for  the  Credit  System  and  the  Bundesbank.  In 
some  fields,  particularly  that  of  large-scale  loans,  the  Bundesbank  has  its  own 
duties  of supervision.  The  Federal Government,  after consulting  the  Bundesbank, 
nominates  the President of  the Federal Supervisory Office,  the  appointment being 
made  by  the  President  of  the  Federal  Republic.  The Federal  Supervisory  Office, 
after  consulting  the  central  associations  of  the  credit institutions, prescribes  rules 
for  the  capital  resources  and  the  liquidity  of  the  banks,  in  agreement  with  the 
Bundesbank. Where the Federal Minister of Economics  or the Federal Supervisory 
Office  fixes  terms  on  which  loans  may  be granted and deposits  accepted,  the  ap-
propriate  statutory  regulations  may  be  issued  only  with  the  cooperation  of  the 
Bundesbank.  These conditions  must be so  determined  as  to  support the  measures 
taken by  the Bundesbank in the  field  of credit policy. 
Para.  II:  Structural  aspects 
Para.  II-1:  Structure  of the  financial  institutions 
Structure of banking system 
8.  In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  predominant  type  of  bank  is  the 
'all-purpose' bank (Universalbank), which engages  in all types of banking business. 
Besides  accepting  sight,  time  and  savings  deposits  it takes  up  longer-term  funds; 
conversely,  it grants  not only  short-term  but also  medium  and  long-term  credits 
and loans.  Even  the  savings  banks,  which in the past had largely  concentrated on 
savings  deposit  business  and  the  corresponding  long-term  lending  business,  have 
made  increasing  inroads  into the short-ter1n  deposit  and credit business.  Although 
specializing primarily in lending to medium and small-sized industry and craftsmen, 
the larger among the savings banks and more particularly their central organizations 
in the shape of the central giro institutions, are  in substantial measure also  doing 
large-scale lending business, providing finance  to industry and taking part in issuing 
syndicates.  For  the  credit  cooperatives,  the  central  institutions  of  the  credit  co-
operatives render  services  similar to  those rendered by the central giro  institutions 
for the savings banks. The private and public mortgage banks finance  their lending 
-the bulk of  it long term- almost  exclusively  through issuing  debentures  and 
raising  long-term  loans.  The  groups  of  institutions  that  belong  to  the  banking 
sector  and  the volume  of business  done by them  are  listed in Table  1. 
Building societies and the insurance system as institutional investors 
9.  In  the  Federal  Republic,  building  societies,  insurance  companies  and  social 
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insurance  funds  play  an  important  role  as  institutional  investors,  in addition  to 
the  credit  institutions  mentioned. 
On  the  liabilities  side,  building  societies  primarily  receive  deposits  from  their 
savers, and on the assets side grant building loans to the same group of customers. 
In the  post-war  period,  building  societies  have  been  among  the  most  successful 
institutions of the German credit system,  the reasons  for  their rapid growth lying 
in the  urgent  need  for  housing  and  substantial  government  assistance.  Insurance 
institutions  primarily  provide  medium  and  long-term  finance  for  residential  con-
struction  and  also  for  industry.  The  forms  of  investment  are  governed  by  the 
investment rules of  the authority supervising  the insurance system. 
Para.  II-2:  The  banking  system and  the  securities  markets 
Unregulated capital market 
10.  In the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  securities  markets,  i.e.  the  market 
for  fixed-interest  securities  and  the  equity  market,  are  free  from  any  restrictive 
provisions  limiting  access  to  the  market,  either generally  or for  certain categories 
of issuer.  Where  there  are  legal  provisions,  they  are  primarily  on points  of  or-
ganisation.  Under sections  795  and 808a of the German Civil Code,  for instance, 
all  domestic  issues  of  bearer bonds  and  registered  bonds  except for  those  of  the 
Federal Government,  the  Lander,  the Federal Post Office  and the Equalization of 
Burdens Fund, are subject to government authorization. However, the rule requir-
ing  authorization  is  intended  in  particular,  to  allow  an  examination  of  the  bor-
rower's  credit  standing;  its  ma,in  purpose is  therefore  to  protect the saver.  Only 
by  way  of  exception  did  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Economics  make  use  of  these 
rules  in 1965 and  1966  to achieve  a better spacing of  issues,  the object being to 
safeguard  the  ability  of  the  market  to  function. 
Issuing syndicates and the Central Capital Market Committee 
11.  In the  Federal  Republic,  share  and  loan  issues  are  as  a  rule  placed  through 
banking  syndicates,  the only  exception being  issues  of mortgage bonds and 'com-
munal'  bonds,  which  the respective  issuing  institutions distribute  themselves.  For 
a  specified  commission  (the  so-called  'Bonifikation')  the  banking  syndicate  un-
derwrites  the whole  of  the issue  at a fixed  underwriting price  and  then places it 
with the public  or,  in the  case  of an issue  of shares, offers  it for  subscription  to 
existing shareholders. In doing so,  the banks forming the syndicate bear the issuing 
risk, i.e. if the issue  is  not successful  they are  obliged  to take the unsold portion 
into their own portfolios. Timing, amount and terms of share and debenture issues 
are negotiated with the respective issuers.  Loan issues of the Federal Government, 
the Federal Railways  and the Federal Postal Administration are floated by the Fe-
deral  Loan  Consortium,  which  consists  of some  80  credit institutions  led  by the 
Bundesbank.  In the negotiations on the time of issue,  the amount of the loan and 
the  terms,  the  Consortium  is  represented by  the  so-called  Inner Committee.  The 
Central Capital Market Committee, which the major issuing banks set up in 1957 
on a  voluntary  basis,  meets  at  intervals  of several  weeks  inviting  representatives 
of the Bundesbank and sometimes also  the Government to discuss  the situation on 
the bond market and,  in the light of the market situation makes recommendations 
on  the  order  and  timing  of  loan  issues  with  a  view  to  preventing  any  undue 
bunching  of  issues  and  consequent  excessive  strain  on  the  market.  For  public 
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sector issues,  the  Council  on Economic Trends set up under the Act to Promote 
Economic  Stability  and  Growth  may,  if necessary,  order  that  the  timing  of  the 
issues be staggered.  The Bundesbank is  entitled to take part in these  discussions. 
Under  section  20(2)  of  the Bundesbank  Act,  loans  of  the  Federal  Government, 
its  Special Funds  and  the Lander are  to be floated  primarily by  the Bundesbank; 
in  all  other  cases,  the  Bundesbank  must  give  its  agreement  to  the  issue  being 
floated. 
Position of the banks on the securities market 
12.  The credit  institutions  not only  help  to  place  issues  of other borrowers but 
also  play  an  important  role  as  issuers  of their own debentures and as  purchasers 
of  such  securities.  Of  a  total  of  DM  158,000  million  worth  of  fixed-interest 
securities  issued  by  domestic  borrowers  in  circulation  at  the  end  of  December 
1970,  some  DM  118,000  million  or about  three-quarters  were  debentures  issued 
by banks. At the same date the credit institutions held DM 68,000 million worth 
of domestic fixed-interest  securities  (mainly bank bonds). The scale on which they 
act  as  buyers  on  the  securities  market  depends  on  their  liquidity  situation  and 
the current demand for direct credits.  The general  principle is  that the banks are 
free  to  decide  whether  or not  to  buy  securities.  For individual  banking  groups, 
however,  there  may  be  restrictions  under  law  or by-laws,  mainly  in  respect  of 
the investment of funds  in specified  types  of security.  The savings  banks' choice 
of securities is  restricted by the rule that the investments must be in securities of 
trustee  status.  Under  their  by-laws,  savings  banks  are  forbidden  to  purchase 
shares  for  their  own  account,  but  they  have  recently  been  authorized  to  buy 
investment  fund  certificates  on a  limited  scale. 
Price support 
13.  Intervention  on  the  capital  market  to  regulate  and  support  security  prices, 
mainly with a view to preventing unduly violent chance fluctuations, is, as  a rule a 
matter for the banks forming  the syndicate, i.e.  the same banks which floated the 
securities  involved  and  arranged  for  their  admission  to  stock  exchange  dealing. 
Price  support,  the extent  and timing of which is  normally  laid down in the un-
derwriting agreement, is  the responsibility  of the issuer,  the only exception being 
shares, where it is only possible for the banks forming the underwriting syndicate 
to  give  price  support at  their own cost,  in view  of the basic  prohibition  of ac-
quisition by a  company of its  own shares. 
On  the  bond  market,  price  support  for  public  authority  loans  is  a  particularly 
important feature.  The  prices  of loan  issues  of  the Federal  Government  and its 
Special  Funds  are  supported  by  the  Bundesbank,  which  acts  by  order  and  for 
account  of  the  issuer.  From  August  1967  to  the  beginning  of  February  1969, 
however,  the  Bundesbank  also  carried  out  open-market  operations,  for  its  own 
account, in loan issues  of the Federal Government, the Federal Railways  and the 
Federal Post Office. 
Statutory provisions regulating the capital market 
14.  Under  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth  of  1967,  the 
Federal  Government,  acting  by  statutory  decree  and  with  the  approval  of  the 
Bundesrat,  may  inter  alia  restrict borrowing-and therefore  also  the floating  of 
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loans - by  the  public  authorities  and  fix  the  terms  and  maximum  amounts  of 
these  loans;  the  validity  of the relevant  statutory decrees  must be limited to one 
year.  Section  22  of  the  Foreign  Trade and Payments  Act  empowers  the  Govern-
ment to restrict  the acquisition  of foreign  securities by residents  in the case  of a 
balance-of-payments  disequilibrium;  the  same  applies  to  public  offers,  in  the  Fe-
deral  Republic  of  Germany,  of  loans  by  foreign  borrowers  if the  capital  market 
is  thereby  seriously endangered.  Article  73  of the EEC Treaty, however,  restricts 
the  autonomous  exercise  of these rights. 
Dependence of capital market on money market 
15.  With  the  banks  and  savings  banks  heavily  committed  on  the  bond  market, 
the  Bundesbank's  credit  policy  measures,  which  are  primarily  aimed  at  changing 
the liquidity situation of the banks, usually have a prompt and comparatively sharp 
impact on the bond market.  Where the measures  restrict liquidity, the banks first 
cut down their securities purchases while seeking for a time to maintain their direct 
credit business  at its current level or even  to expand it, given earlier promises to 
grant credit  and  the  growth in demand  for  credit. 
With the banks largely  withdrawing as  purchasers of securities,  a  substantial part 
of  the  previous  demand  for  securities  disappears,  entailing  a  rapid  rise  in yields 
as  demand  for  capital  on  the  bond market  usually  takes  some  time  to  react  to 
the  fall  in  the  supply  of  capital.  Conversely,  if the  Bundesbank's  policy  is  ex-
pansionary, the revival  of buying by the banks  also  contributes to a comparatively 
rapid  fall  in  the  rate  of interest  on  capital. 
Para  II-3:  Structure  of  monetary  wealth  for;nation 
Predominance of institutional saving 
16.  In  its  financial  accounting,  the  Bundesbank  gives  data  on  monetary  wealth 
forn1ation  for  the economy  as  a  whole,  the  structure of which  reflects  the invest-
ment habits of the various  sectors.  Table 2 shows  the substantial share of institu-
tional  saving  in monetary  wealth formation by the domestic  non-financial  sectors. 
In the  period  1966  to  1970,  about  30%  of  monetary wealth formation  was  ac-
counted  for  by  an  increase  in  savings  deposits.  The  second  largest  contribution 
came  from  time  deposits,  whose  share  in  monetary  wealth  for1nation  during  the 
same  period  fluctuated  widely  and  averaged  some  17%. Funds  placed  with  the 
insurance  system  accounted  for  11%, contributing almost  twice  as  much as  funds 
placed  with  building  societies.  The  share  of  saving  through  securities  in  the 
increase in claims  by the domestic  sectors was  14 ~%.  The upward trend in cash 
holdings and sight deposits was  by no means an even one:  their share in monetary 
wealth formation was  3% in 1966, rising to to 17% in 1967 and falling again to 
10% in 1968;  it was  14% in 1969 and, in  1970, almost  19% (also  see  Section 
II, Para.  I, of  this  Chapter). 
Para.  II-4:  Importance  of  financial  transactions  with  abroad 
Strong economic links with abroad 
17.  The strength of the economic links between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and abroad is shown clearly by Table 3, where column 6 gives the value of exports 
of goods  and  services  as  a percentage of the  gross  national product. 
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After falling  appreciably in the wake of the DM revaluation of 1961, the share of 
exports of goods  and services  in the gross  national product steadily  rose  again  in 
the  period  up  to  1969.  In  1970,  after  the  second  revaluation  of  the  DM  in 
October  1969,  it declined  slightly. 
Capital movements liberalized 
18.  Movements  of  money  and capital across  the frontiers  of the  Federal Republic 
are  almost  fully  liberalized.  However,  from  time  to  time,  restrictions  become 
necessary  to  ward  off  speculative  inflows  of  foreign  currency.  At  present,  the 
payment  of  interest  on  assets  in non-residents'  accounts  in  monetary  institutions 
in  the  Federal  Republic  and  the  acquisition  of  money  market  paper  by  non-
residents  and  the  conclusion  of  'en  pension'  operations  with  them  are  subject 
to approval. 
Section· II - Liquidity 
Liquidity of non-banks  and of the banking system 
19.  For the purpose of monetary policy,  a distinction must be made between two 
forms  of i'liquidity':  the  liquidity  of  the  domestic  non-banking  sector  and  the 
liquidity  of  the  banks.  When  reference  is  made  to  the  'liquidity  policy'  of  the 
Central Bank in the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  what is  understood  in the Federal 
Republic  is  always  the  influencing  of  the  liquidity  of  the  banks  by  measures  of 
credit  policy. 
Para.  I:  The  liquidity  of the  economy 
Definition of the volume of money 
20.  The  expression 
1'liquidity  of  the  economy'  is  little  used  in  the  Federal  Re-
public.  The  concept  co):llmonly  employed  is  'volume  of  money'  (Geldvolumen) 
or 'money  supply'  (  Geldversorgung).  However,  the  exact  delimitation  fluctuates, 
since  short-term  time  deposits  are  sometimes  included  in the  volume  of  money 
and sometimes left out. An endeavour by the Bundesbank to dispel this uncertainty 
by  including  in  a  general  way  in  the  volume  of  money  time  deposits  with  a 
maturity of less  than  three  months had to be abandoned when it became evident 
that  under  particular  conditions  (definite  expectations  of a  reduction  of  interest 
rates) pronounced shifts would occur in this term category, so  tlmt the delimitation 
no  longer  yielded  any  reliable  information  concerning  monetary  development. 
Recently  the  Bundesbank  has  therefore  included  in the  volume  of  money  in the 
narrow  sense  (  Mt)  only: 
- Notes  and  coin  in  circulation  (excluding  cash  balances  held  by  credit  insti-
tutions); 
- Sight deposits of domestic non-hanks, excluding public authority deposits with 
the Bundesbank (which  are  not  treated as  part of the volume  of money  since 
they  are  often  subject  to  special  influences). 
Besides  this  the  Bundesbank  considers  all  time  deposits  of  domestic  non-banks 
for periods of less  than four years  as  near-money amounts. Money and near-money 
amounts  taken  together  are  considered  as  volume  of  money  in  the  widest  sense 
(M2).  Savings  accounts on the other hand, despite their formal short-term character, 
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are  not considered as  near-money,  since  their  character from  the  economic  angle 
is  to be judged predominantly different from  that of time deposits. 
Sources of money supply 
21.  Statistical  information  on  money  and  near-money  supply  in  the  Federal  Re-
public  of  Germany  is  based  on  the consolidated  balance-sheet  of  the banks  and 
the  Bundesbank.  The  trend  of  the  money  supply  is  reflected  in  the  balance  of 
changes  in all balance-sheet items which  do not fall  under the concept of money 
and  near  money  and  are  grouped  according  to  specified  criteria.  The  most  im-
portant sources  of money supply are,  lending  by  the banking  system  as  a  whole 
(the  Bundesbank  included)  to  domestic  non-banks,  and  domestic  business  enter-
prises' and private individuals' foreign  transactions, which statistically are reflected 
as  an  overall  increase  or decrease  in net  claims  of the  banking  system  on non-
residents  (see  Table  4 ).  The  expansionary  effect  which,  depending  on  the  cir-
cumstances,  lending  and  foreign  exchange  movements  may  have,  is  counteracted 
by  the  reduction  in  volume  of money  caused  by  the  simultaneous  formation  of 
monetary  capital  with  the banks.  Formation  of monetary  capital  with  the  banks 
from  domestic  sources  includes  the  increase  in  savings  and  time  deposits  made 
by  non-banks  for  periods  of four  years  or  more,  the  proceeds  of  sales  of bank 
bonds  to  buyers  other  than  credit  institutions,  and  additions  to  the banks'  and 
the  Bundesbank's  O\vn  capital  and  reserves.  A  further  determining  factor  in the 
trend of the volume  of money  and near-money  is  the change  in sight deposits of 
public  authorities  with  the  Bundesbank.  (Any  increase  in Central  Bank  balances 
of the public  authorities arising out of domestic cash  transactions  tends to reduce 
the  volume  of  money,  and  vice  versa.) 
The  consolidated  balance-sheet  of  the  banks  and  the  Bundesbank,  published 
regularly in the Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank, shows directly the 
level  of  the  volume  of  money:  it  also  provides  information  on  the  credit insti-
tutions'  holdings  of time  and  savings  deposits  of non-banks.  Short-term claims  of 
non-banks  on  the public  authorities  (Treasury  bills,  Treasury  bonds,  etc.),  which 
in some  countries are  regarded as  forming a part of ..the  secondary liquidity of the 
economy,  alongside  time  deposits,  play no significant role in the Federal Republic. 
Para.  II:  Bank  liquidity 
Bank:  liquidity 
22.  By  'Bank liquidity' is  meant  the credit institutions' holdings of Central Bank 
money  (balances  with  the  Central  Bank)  and  other  short-term  assets  which  can 
be used to gain access  to Central Bank money, less  compulsory minimum reserves 
and advances  taken against security. Short-term assets  eligible  for  rediscounting  at 
the Central Bank include  trade bills within the rediscount quota limits, short-term 
funds  employed abroad, and money-market paper. The justification for  taking such 
assets  into  account  in considering  the liquidity  position is  that the Central Bank 
itself is  ready - and,  indeed, in some cases  obliged - to take  them over and, in 
exchange,  to make Central Bank money available.  These assets are therefore some-
times  referred to as  constituting 'potential liquidity' while the amounts of Central 
Bank money  actually  held by the banks  are  considered as  'actual' or 'cash liquid-
ity', irrespective of the fact  that they are immobilized under the minimum reserve 
requirement. It is, however, more appropriate to distinguish between 'immobilized 
liquidity'  and  'free liquidity  reserves'  of the banks  and  to  apply  the term  'bank 
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liquidity'  only  to  the  latter.  This  is  the practice  followed  by  the  Bundesbank  in 
its  analyses. 
Central Bank balances and free liquidity reserves 
23.  The  amount  of  the  Central  Bank  balances  of  the  banks  is,  as  noted before, 
almost  exclusively  determined  by  the  obligation  to  hold  minimum  reserves  with 
the  Bundesbank.  As  the  minimum  reserve  requirement needs  to  be satisfied  only 
as  a  monthly  average,  the  banks  need  not maintain  balances  for  the  purpose  of 
making current payn1ents in addition to the minimum reserve balances;  the reserve 
balances  are  in fact  also  working  balances  (see  point 48). 
The liquidity  of the banking system  or  the  free  liquidity  reserves  consist  of: 
1.  Excess balances, i.e. balances held with the Central Bank in excess  of minimum 
reserve  requirements; 
2.  Domestic  money-market  paper  in  the  portfolios  of  the  banks,  i.e.  all  paper 
bought by  the  Bundesbank  on  the  open  market  or by  way  of  rediscounting, 
yet  not  reckoned  against  officially  fixed  rediscount  quotas,  i.e.  Treasury  bills 
and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  of  the  Federal  Government,  of  the 
Federal Government's  Special  Funds  and  of  the  Lander  Storage  Agency  bills, 
prime  acceptances,  Export Credit Company  bills  (B-ceiling),  and  medium-term 
notes  (Kassenobligationen) within 18  months of their maturity date, which, in 
accordance with an  undertaking given by  the Bundesbank at the time of issue, 
have  been  included  in the  arrangements  to  regulate  the money  market; 
3.  Short-term  claims  on foreign  credit  institutions, excluding  claims  denominated 
in  foreign  currency  and  payable  at  sight  (which  are  regarded  as  working 
balances),  and  foreign  bills,  foreign  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest-bearing 
Treasury  bonds  acquired  as· money-market  investments; 
4.  Unused  rediscount  quotas,  i.e.  officially  fixed  rediscount  quotas  less  bills  held 
by  the  Bundesbank  to be  reckoned  against  these  quotas; 
5.  Less  advances  on securities,  obtained from  the Bundesbank to offset short-term 
fluctuations  in liquidity and constituting a charge on the liquidity reserves since 
they  must  be  repaid.  -
Determinants of bank liquidity 
24.  In analysing  bank liquidity,  use  is  mainly  n1ade  of  the weekly  returns  of the 
Bundesbank,  the  foreign  position  of  the  credit  institutions  and  data  from  their 
reports for the balance-sheet statistics. For the purposes of its analyses, the Bundes-
bank  groups  the  determinants  of bank  liquidity  according  to  whether  they  arise 
predominantly  from  market  factors  or  predominantly  from  credit  policy. 
Changes  in  bank liquidity  itself  are  brought  about  by  the  combined  influence  of 
market  factors  and  credit  policy  factors. 
The  predominantly  market  factors  are: 
- Changes  in  the  note  and  coin  circulation; 
Changes  in  the  net foreign exchange reserves of the Bundesbank and in money-
market investments  of the credit institutions  abroad; 
Changes  in the net balances of non-banks  (particularly public authorities) with 
the  Bundesbank; 
Changes  in  the  public  authorities'  money-market  indebtedness  to  the  banking 
system  (including  the Bundesbank). 
The  predominantly credit policy  factors  are: 
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- Changes  in minimum  reserve  requirements; 
- Open-market operations  in domestic  money-market  paper with  non-banks  and 
in domestic  long-term  securities; 
- Cuts  in rediscount  quotas. 
Table  5 shows  the determinants of bank liquidity for  1969 and  1970. 
Liquidity of the individual credit institutions 
25.  The  definitions  used  here  relate  to  the  banking  system  as  a  whole.  On the 
other hand, in dealing with the liquidity of individual banks or of banking groups, 
we may  also include those assets which a single institution (though not the banking 
system  as  a whole)  can  use  to obtain Central Bank balances.  These  include credit 
balances  with  other  credit  institutions,  securities  which  are  negotiable  in  the 
capital  market  or can  serve  as  collateral  for  advances,  bills  not  eligible  for  dis-
count  at  the  Central  Bank  provided  that  they  can  be  placed  with  other  credit 
institutions,  etc.  However  important  these  liquid  assets  may  be  for  individual 
banks  or single  groups of banks, in considering the liquidity policy of the Central 
Bank  they  are  of  no  great  significance.  From  the  standpoint  of  liquidity  policy 
they  are  a  means  of  evening  out  liquidity  between  individual  members  of  the 
banking  system. 
Para.  III:  Liquidity  and  public  finance 
Obligation on Federal and Lander to deposit funds with the Bundesbank 
26.  Section  17  of  the  Bundesbank  Act,  which  is  entitled 'Deposit Policy',  binds 
the Federal Government, the Special  Assets Equalization Fund, the E.R.P.  Special 
Assets  Fund and  the  Lander  to  deposit  their liquid  funds  with the Bundesbank. 
Funds  may  not  be  deposited  or  invested  elsewhere  without  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesbank.  In deciding  on  applications  for  authorization  to  deposit  funds  else-
where,  the Bundesbank is  guided by considerations  of monetary and credit policy, 
but under the Bundesbank  Act  it must  also  take into  account  the interest of the 
Lander  in  maintaining  their  State  and  Land  banks.  On application,  the  Lander 
were therefore granted overall quotas for the liquid funds  which they may  deposit 
with these  institutions.  Additional provisions on the obbligation to deposit public 
funds  with  the  Bundesbank  are  to  be  found  in  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic 
Stability  and  Growth  of  196  7,  some  of  these  provisions  having  been  amended 
in  the  meantime. 
In detail, these provisions relate to the placing of liquid funds of the social pension 
insurance  funds 
1  and  the  Federal  Labour  Office  (Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit) 2  in 
mobilisation  and  liquidity  paper,  and  to  the  formation  and  liquidation  of  anti-
cyclical  equalization  reserves  provided  for  under  Sees.  5  to 8,  13  to  15,  and  26, 
of  the  Act  to  Promote Economics  Stability  and  Growth (see  points  82  and  83 ). 
Liquidity effect of public cash transactions 
27.  The depositing  of  public  cash  balances  and  redemption  of  debts  with  the 
Central  Bank  have  the  effect  of  reducing  the  liquidity  of  the  commercial  banks, 
1 Amended  1383b(2)  of  the  Reich  Insurance  Code  (Reichsversicherungsordnung)  and  of  110b(2)  of  the  Employees' 
Insurance  Act  (Angestelltenversicherungsgesetz). 
2  Amended  220(3)  of  the  work  Assistance  Act  (Arbeitforderungsgesetz). 
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while  drawings  on the credit balances  maintained  with the Central Bank and the 
utilization of cash  advances  increase bank liquidity.  In the Federal Republic, cash 
surpluses  or  deficits  of  the  public  authorities,  in addition  to  directly  influencing 
demand  in the  economy  as  a  whole,  have  a  direct  effect  on the  liquidity  of the 
banking  system,  to the extent that they lead to  changes  in credit balances  and in 
indebtedness at the Central Bank.  Bank liquidity may also  be influenced by purely 
financial transactions which do not affect the cash position of the public authorities. 
Long-term  borrowing,  for  instance,  the  proceeds  of which  are  immobilised  with 
the  Central  Bank,  or  the  consolidation  of shorter-term  instruments  of public  in-
debtedness held by the banks have  the effect of reducing bank liquidity. 
Bundesbank lending to the public authorities 
28.  The rules governing the granting of cash advances to the public authorities by 
the  Central Bank  are  contained  in Sec.  20  of  the Bundesbank  Act.  This  section 
gives  the Bundesbank  authority  to grant to  the Federal Government,  the Lander 
and  specified  public  Special  Funds  'short-term  credits  in the form  of current ac-
count advances or advances against Treasury bills (cash advances)' up to the limits 
which are laid down in the Act. In the case of the Federal Government, the ceiling 
is  DM  6,000  million.  The  ceilings  which  the  Act  fixes  for  the  Lander  and  the 
Special Funds  are considerably lower. From the standpoint of liquidity policy, two 
considerations  are  important: 
a)  The establishment  of a  ceiling  does  not,  itself,  mean  that the  administrations 
concerned have a claim to Central Bank credit up to this amount;  there is  no 
'automatic' right to borrow. The statutory ceilings  represent rather the utmost 
limit to which the Bundesbank may  go,  at its discretion,  in granting credit to 
the  public  authorities.  It may,  for  reasons  of  monetary  policy,  decline  to  go 
as  far  as  that  limit.  Furthermore,  the  ceilings  may  only  be  used  for  'cash 
advances',  that  is,  advances  for  meeting  temporary  difficulties,  but  not  for 
covering  permanent budgetary deficits. 
b)  The  credit  ceilings  can  be  drawn  upon  in  the  form  of  current  account  or 
Treasury bill  advances.  (Where the Treasury bills  are  accompanied  by  a Bun-
desbank promise  to  rediscount them,  the volume of these in circulation in the 
market must, under Sec.  20 of the Bundesbank Act, be regarded as  utilization 
of  the credit  ceiling  granted  by  the  Bundesbank;  this  applies  in principle  to 
all  Treasury bills  issued by the Federal Government.)  In this  way  the Central 
Bank is  largely able  to cover the central authorities' need for short-term credit 
through  the  money  market,  within  the  limits  of  the  ceiling,  since  it handles 
the placing  of bills  on  the  market.  It should  be noted  that  the  non-interest-
bearing Treasury bonds ('U-Schatze') with maturities of 6 to 24 months issued 
by the Federal Government and other public authorities to cover their financial 
requirements  are  not reckoned against  the credit ceiling. 
Claims on the public authorities shown in the Central Bank balance sheet 
29.  The items of the Central Bank balance sheet under which claims on the public 
authorities  are  entered  are: 
3.1.  Cash  credits  (book  credits) 
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3 .1.1.  The Federal Government 
3.1.2.  Federal  Government  special  funds 
3.1.3.  Lander Liquidity 
3.2.  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds 
3.2.1.  The  Federal  Government 
3.2.2.  Federal  Government  special  funds 
3.2.3.  Lander 
3.3.  Equalization  claims  and  non-interest-bearing  bonds 
3.3.1.  Equalization claims  arising from  conversions  of own balance  sheets 
3.3.2.  Equalization  claims  purchased 
3.3.3.  Non-interest-bearing  bonds 
3.4.  Claims  on  the  Federal  Government  in  respect  of  the  acquisition  of  claims 
resulting  from  post-war  economic  aid 
4.  Securities. 
For details of these items in the  ~undesbank return see  'The weekly return of the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank',  in  Bundesbank  Monthly  Reports  Volume  21,  No  1, 
January  1969 p. 13. Since  this date, however, there have been certain regroupings. 
Total indebtedness of public authorities 
30.  The  Bundesbank  reports  on the  indebtedness  of the  public  authorities  under 
section  VII  ('Public  finance')  of  the  statistical  part  of  its  Monthly  Report,  in 
special  articles  (see Monthly Report August  1970, p.  13) and its Annual Reports. 
Table  6, taken from  the April 1971  Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
shows  the  trends  in  total  indebtedness  and in the  different  types  of debt of the 
various  public  authorities  over  a  number  of years.  Details  of the  types  of ·paper 
offered  (Treasury  bills,  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  and  loan  issues)-
especially  their  maturities,  rates  of  interest  and  placing  on  the  market-were 
discussed in points  10, 11, 13, 14  and 28. Here, it should be added that medium-
term notes,  which normally  have maturities of 3, 3;.2  and 4  years,  are issued by 
the  Bundesbank,  acting  by  order  and  for  account  of  the issuers,  by  tender.  The 
final  issuing  prices  are  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  bids  received;  allotment  is 
1nade  at a uniform price by first  satisfying all bids under which the bidder's price 
limit is higher than the issue price fixed.  Bids under which the prices offered match 
the  issue  prices  fixed,  are  scaled  down,  if necessary. 
Creditors of the public authorities 
31. A breakdown of indebtedness of the public authorities by 'groups of creditors 
is  only  available  for  the public authorities  as  a whole (see  Table 7). 
Detailed  comments  on  changes,  partly  a  function  of  business  fluctuations,  in  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  public  authorities  can  be  found  in  the  Annual 
Reports  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank.  In  1970  (1969)  the  taxation  load  quota 
(Steuerbelastungsquote ),  (i.e.,  the ratio of tax receipts to gross  national product at 
current  prices)  was  22·7%  (24·1% );  total  expenditure  by  the  public  authorities 
over  the  same  period  amounted  to  easily  38%  (39%)  of  the  gross  national 
product. 
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INSTRUMENTS OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Introduction 
Instruments under the Bundesbank Act 
32.  For the execution of its tasks  the Deutsche Bundesbank is  armed by the Bun-
desbank  Act  not  only  with  the  traditional  central  bank  instrument  of  discount 
policy  (Bank  rate)  but also  a  number  of  additional  instruments  of credit  policy. 
These  are: 
a )  The power  to  change  the  minimum  reserve  obligation  of  the banks; 
b)  Open-market  operations  (changing  the  terms  of  sale  and  purchase  of  money-
market paper, and buying  and  selling certain long-term  securities on the bond 
market with the object of regulating  the  money  market); 
c)  The  power  to  influence  the  holdings  of  public  balances,  in  particular  their 
allocation  between  the  central  bank  and  the  commercial  banks,  and  also  to 
influence the manner in which public cash deficits are financed; 
d)  The  right  to  lay  down  conditions  for  access  to  rediscount  credit  from  the 
central bank (qualitative requirements applicable to rediscountable paper, quan-
titative  limitations  by  way  of  rediscount  quotas); 
e)  The  right  to fix  the  rate  for  advances  on  securities; 
f)  Engage in intervention in the foreign  exchange market, for example by offering 
favourable  terms  to cover  exchange  risks  (swap  policy). 
The  Act  to  Promote Economic  Stability  and  Growth of  196  7 provided a further 
extension  of  the  instruments  available  to  the  Bundesbank  (cooperation  of  the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank in the public  authorities'  Council  on  Economic Trends,  the 
right  of the  bank to propose  to  the  Federal  Government that  the social  security 
funds  be  required  to  immobilize  funds  with the  Bundesbank). 
Indirect effect of instruments of the Bundesbank 
3  3.  With the instruments  available  to it, the Bundesbank endeavours  to influence 
demand in money terms, on the one hand by influencing bank liquidity and on the 
other hand by acting on the interest rates charged or paid in the banks' credit and 
deposit  business  and  on  the  money  and  capital  markets.  In their  lending  policy, 
the banks are  above  all  guided by their liquidity position and by  the interest that 
can  be  earned  by  alternative  investment,  while  the  behaviour of bank  customers 
can  only be  influenced  through  the Central Bank instrument of interest manipula-
tion.  The  instruments  of  liquidity  policy  (minimum  reserves,  rediscount  quotas, 
open-market  operations  with non-banks)  always  affect  interest rates  as  well,  since 
they  change  the  supply-demand  relationship  on  the  money  market.  Some  instru-
ments  of  interest  rate  policy  (such  as  Bank  rate  and  the  rate  for  advances  on 
securities,  open-market  operations  in  money-market  paper),  on  the  other  hand, 
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also  exert  a  certain  influence  on  bank  liquidity,  in  that  the  cost  of  converting 
liquid  reserves  into  Central  Bank  money  is  raised  or lowered. 
Given  the  indirect  method  of  operation  of  Central  Bank  policy,  it  is  of  great 
importance  that the Act  to Promote Economic  Stability  and Growth should have 
broadened the basis  for  the support which  monetary  policy  may  receive  from .  the 
way the public authorities handle  their finances.  The German Parliament has  thus 
drawn  the  practical  conclusion  from  the  realisation  that if the  Bundesbank  acts 
on its own towards the aim of safeguarding the currency this can often only be at 
the expense  of  other  equally  important economic  policy  aims. 
Section I - Refinancing policy  .1 
Para.  I:  General  background 
Policy on discount rate and on the rate for advances on securities 
34.  Under  Section  15  of the  Bundesbank  Act,  the  Bank is  authorized,  'in order 
to influence the amount of money in circulation and the volume of credit granted', 
to fix  'such rates of interest and discount as  are appropriate to the business under-
taken'.  Changing  interest  rates  (mainly  Bank  rate  and  the  rate  for  advances  on 
securities) is,  however,  not the only way in which  the Bundesbank may  influence 
recourse  to refinance credit. Under Section  15  of the Bundesbank Act it may  also 
restrict or extend recourse  to its refinance  facilities  by changing other terms. 
Only credit  institutions  may  apply  to  the  Bundesbank  for  rediscount  credit  and 
advances on securities (Sec.  19 of the Bundesbank Act). The banks have no general 
claim  to refinancing  by the Bundesbank.  Particularly  in lending on securities,  the 
granting of advances  is  always  made  dependent on the situation of the individual 
borrower;  the fact  that securities  have  been entered in the  Bundesbank's  List of 
Securities  Eligible as  Security for Advances does not in itself give the banks hold-
ing such  securities  a claim  to advances  on them. 
Para.  II:  Discount  credit 
Minimum requirements to be met by rediscountable 
(qualitative red-iscount policy) 
3  5.  Section 19  of the Bundesbank Act authorizes the Bundesbank in dealings with 
the banks,  to buy and sell bills  at its :fixed  discount rate (see  Table 8) including 
Treasury  bills  issued  by  the  Federal  Government,  the  Lander  and  the  Federal 
Govern1nent's  Special  Funds  (Federal  Railways,  Federal  Post Office,  Equalization 
of Burdens Fund, E.R.P. Special Fund), providing that these satisfy the conditions 
prescribed in the Act. The Bundesbank Act does no more than lay down minimum 
requirements for rediscountable bills (bills maturing in not more than three months 
and with three  good names);  but within the framework of its general conditions 
of business the Bundesbank can state which bills it will discount. It has for example 
frequently  refused  to  discount  bills  relating  to  certain  classes  of business.  This 
happened  inter  alia  with bills  for  hire  purchase  finance,  for  bridging,  :finance  of 
building  projects  and  with bank  acceptances  to  the  extent  that  these  were  not 
intended to provide short-term finance  for  particular transactions. 
~~·· 
1  For the  exact  meaning of  this  term,  refer  to Part I, point 71. 
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The Bundesbank's  refusal to rediscount bills  relating to certain classes  of business 
makes  business  of this  sort more  difficult,  at least  to the extent that the cost of 
credit  to  the ultimate  borrower will  be  higher in the absence  of  a  rediscounting 
facility. From the standpoint of credit policy, the refusal to discount certain classes 
of bills is  generally of only minor importance;  in most cases  the banks have other 
bills  at their disposal which they can,  if necessary,  present to the Bundesbank for 
rediscounting. 
Bank  rate is/ also  normally charged on advances  made  to public authorities within 
the  statutory  ceilings  (see  point  28). 
Since 1956  no discounting on preferential terms 
36.  Before  the  Bundesbank  was  established  in  the  Federal  Republic,  the  former 
Bank  Deutscher  Lander  applied,  until  May  1956,  special  rates  for  rediscounting 
foreign  bills  and bills  to finance  exports. 
Initially, the preferential discount rate was  uniformly fixed  at 3 %  p.a.  Later, dif-
fering  rates  were  charged,  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  rediscount  rates  of  the 
foreign  central  banks  concerned.  Since  then,  preferential  discount  rates  have  no 
longer been granted as  the Bank must apply its measures globally if it is  to ensure 
that credit policy  is  effective. 
Rediscount quotas and their calculation 
(quantitative rediscount policy) 
37.  For liquidity policy,  the fact  that the total volume of rediscount credit at the 
disposal  of  each  bank is  limited by  rediscount quotas is  more important than the 
qualitative  limits  placed  on  the  bills  bought by  the  Bundesbank.  All  bills  which 
are  rediscounted  at  the  Bundesbank  are  as  a  rule  reckoned  against  this  quota. 
Purchases by the Bundesbank do not count towards rediscount quotas if they relate 
to promissory notes drawn within the limits of the rediscount  quota B ceiling (to 
finance  export business), granted by the Bundesbank to the A.K.A.  Export Credit 
Company  or drawn  within  the  limits  of  the  rediscount  quota  II ceiling  granted 
to the Gesellschaft zur Finanzierung  von Industrienlagen mbH (to finance  business 
with the  German Democratic Republic)  or to prime acceptances  that have  passed 
through the money market and when bought have no more than 29 days  to run. 
The level of  the so-called  standard quotas  depends  as  a rule on the 'liable funds' 
of  the credit institutions (capital including published reserves) and  the 'multiplier' 
applicable  at  the  time;  the  'multiplier' may  however vary  for  different  groups  of 
banks.  The  rediscount  quotas  are  calculated  individually,  on  the  basis  of  the 
standard  quotas,  and  notified  individually  to  the  banks. 
Regular global reductions 
38.  In past  years,  several  global  reductions  were  made  in  the  standard  quotas; 
such was  the case  in 1957, 1959,  1960, 1965, 1966,  1969 and 1971. In addition, 
to  stem  inflows  of funds  the  rediscount  quotas  set  were  for  a  time  cut  by  the 
amounts  by  which  foreign  borrowings  of  the  banks  or  en  pension  transactions 
done by  the banks with foreigners  exceeded a specified initial figure.  General cuts 
in the  standard  quotas  appear  necessary  from  time  to  time,  even  irrespective  of 
the  direct  requirements  of  credit  policy,  because  the  own  funds  of  the  banks 
increase  continually  with increases  in their own capital  and  reserves;  if  the mul-
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tiplier for  calculating  the  standard quota  remained unchanged,  the refinance  limit 
would rise  too  sharply. 
39.  As  pointed  out  already  in  point  24,  the  determinants  of  bank  liquidity 
include  changes  in  the rediscount quotas.  Any rise  in the rediscount ceiling  tends 
to expand  the unused  rediscount  quotas  and  therefore contributes  to an  increase 
in the  free  liquidity reserves  of the  banking system;  reductions in the  rediscount 
. ceilings  have  the  opposite  effect. 
Para. III:  Advances on  securities 
Type of securities eligible as collateral and limits for purposes of lending 
40.  Under sec.  19  of  the Bundesbank  Act  the  Bundesbank may  grant  'Lombard 
credits',  i.e.  interest"bearing  loans  against  the  pledge  of  specified  securities  and 
debt-register  claims,  the  lending  limit  varying  with  the  type  of  pledge  offered. 
The securities  that may  be pledged  are specified in the 'List of  Securities Eligible 
at  the Deutsche  Bundesbank  as  Security  for  Advances'  (Lombardverzeichnis).  In 
principle,  the Bundesbank  may  grant advances  against  the  security  of: 
a )  Bills  of  exchange  which  satisfy  the  conditions  for  the  purchase  of  domestic 
bills, for  not more  than nine-tenths of their nominal value; 
b)  Treasury  bills  issued  by  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  the  Federal  Rail-
ways,  the Federal Post Office  the Special Equalization Fund, the E.R.P. Special 
Fund  or a  Land  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and  maturing  within 
three  months  from  the date  the  advance  is  granted,  for  not more  than nine-
tenths  of  their nominal  value; 
c)  Non-interest"bearing  Treasury  Bonds  issued  by  one  of  the  public  authorities 
listed  under b)  and  maturing  within  one  year  from  the  date  the  advance  is 
granted, for  not more  than three-quarters of their nominal value; 
d)  Fixed-interest-bearing  debentures  and  debt-register  claims  where  the  issuer  or 
debtor is  one of the public administrations  listed under b), for  not more than 
three-quarters of their quoted value; 
e)  Other  fixed-interest-bearing  bonds  and  debt-register  claims  from  the  List  of 
Securities  Eligible  at the Deutsche  Bundesbank  as  Security  for  Advances,  for 
not more  than three-quarters  of their quoted value; 
f)  Equalization  claims  entered  in the  debt  register  under  sec.  1 of  the  Act  on 
the  Redemption  of  Equalization  Claims,  for  not more  than  three-quarters  of 
their nominal value. 
If no stock exchange  quotation is  available  for  the securities  mentioned under d) 
and e),  the Bundesbank assesses  the scope for realizing them and accordingly fixes 
the  value  that  is  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  lending. 
Principles governing lending 
41.  Whether  an  advance  on  secur1t1es  is  granted  depends  on  the  general  credit 
situation  and  the  situation  of  the  individual  borrower.  In principle  the  Bundes-
bank grants advances  on security only when they are required to bridge temporary 
liquidity  difficulties,  and when it has  no  objection  to the purposes for  which the 
advance is  to be applied. Advances on securities, calculated as  a daily average over 
a  month  should  not  exceed  about  20%  of  the  rediscount  quota.  Advances  on 
securities  should  be  utilized  on  a  current  account  basis;  they  must  be  repaid 
within 30  days.  The rate  for  advances  on securities  has  always  been higher  than 
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the discount  rate;  for  a long  period the difference  was  never  m~re than 1 %  p.a., 
but of late it has  widened  to  up to 3 %  p.a.  (see  Table  8). 
Para.  IV:  Effects  of the discount  rate  and the rate  for  advances  on  securities 
Influence on the level of interest rates 
42.  The fixing  of the  discount  rate  and  of  the  rate for  advances  on securities  is 
the central element in the interest rate policy  of  the Bundesbank.  In the Federal 
Republic, the interest rates which banks charge on advances to non-bank customers 
and the interest rates  they pay on deposits from  these customers  are no longer by 
official  intervention directly related to the discount rate.  While before April 1967, 
when  bank  interest  rates  were  liberalized,  the  maximum  rates  for  the  various 
types of credit had been  automatically  revised  with every  change  in the discount 
rate,  their actual  level has  since  been determined by  the  market situation and by 
competition,  which  themselves  are  strongly  dependent  on  the  liquidity  situation. 
In general, however, the interest rates charged to borrowers move with the current 
level of  the discount rate since  the interest rate  policy  and the liquidity policy of 
the  Bundesbank are  as  a  rule  closely  related.  Similarly,  the creditor interest rates 
applied  in  deposit  business  which  previously  had  also  been  subject  to  an  upper 
limit, have  also  been formed by the free  play  of market forces  since  interest rates 
were liberalized. Deposit interest rates therefore do not escape the influence exerted 
by  the  yields  on funds  employed  in  the  capital  market,  with which  placings  on 
deposit accounts  have  to compete.  But deposit  rates  and rates for  one-month  and 
in particular,  three-month  money  on  the  money  market  still  continue  to  be  de-
termined to some extent by the level of Bank rate. As  against this, the call money 
rate  can  fall  well  below  Bank  rate  since  the  banks  can  only  run down  the  dis-
count  credits  they  have  taken  up  as  and  when  the  bills  fall  due.  The  rate  for 
advances  on  securities  has  greater importance for  the formation of money  market 
rates.  In times  of  comparatively  abundant  bank  liquidity,  when  little  or  no  use 
has  been made  of advances  on securities,  the rate for such  advances  constitutes a 
sort of upper limit for the call money rate, since no bank will normally be prepared 
to pay  on the  money  market  rates  that  are  higher  than  the  rates  it would have 
to pay for very  short-term recourse to Central Bank advances on securities. When, 
on the  other hand, bank liquidity  is  very  tight  and banks have  already  taken up 
a substantial volume of advances on securities, call money rates may very well rise 
beyond the rate for advances on securities since some banks may  no longer be able 
to switch to advances on securities, for instance, because they are short of securities 
that are eligible as  collateral. In such a situation the rate for advances on securities 
becomes  for  a  time  the  lower  limit  for  the  call  money  rate,  since  any  increase 
supply  of  funds  available  on  the  money  market  will  be  fully  absorbed  by  those 
banks which wish to repay the debts they have contracted in the form of advances 
on securities.  (In a similar way,  Bank rate forms  the lower limit for interest rates 
on money  market  transactions  of longer  duration  whenever  the  banks  are  more 
deeply in debt to the Bundesbank for discount credit.) 
Changes  in  the  Bundesbank's  discount  rate  and  in  its  rate  for  advances  on 
securities  usually  entail  a  shift  in  the  pattern  of  interest  rates  in  the  Federal 
Republic.  The  tendency  is  for  interest rates  to  change  much  more  in short-term 
business  than in longer-term  business,  i.e.  more  vigorously  on the money  market 
than on  the  capital  market,  and more  vigorously  for  short-term lending  than  for 
long-term lending. This is, however, less  true of the banks' creditor interest rates, 
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mainly  because of the limited flexibility  of interest rates on savings  deposits with 
the  shortest term, i.e.  the savings  deposits  subject  to  statutory periods of notice; 
the leading banks in the savings deposit business (the savings banks) maintain this 
rate,  often  referred  to  as  the  'basic'  interest  rate  for  savings  deposits  (Spareck-
zins  ),  at as  constant a level as  possible and it is  traditionally fairly low. At present 
it still applies to just on 60% of all savings deposits, but this percentage is  steadily 
declining. 
External limitations on interest rate policy 
43.  Since the restrictions on international capital movements were lifted, the inter-
dependence  of the  world's  main :financial  centres  has  grown  steadily.  The effects 
of changes in Central Bank rates  and changes  in domestic interest levels on inter-
national  movements  of  short-term  capital  have  constantly  gained  in  importance. 
For the interest rate policy of the Central Bank, this has introduced new elements 
which  in  certain  circumstances  may  make  it more  difficult  if not  impossible  to 
pursue a  given  course even though such  a course would be in line  with domestic 
economic  requirements. 
Section II - Minimum reserve policy 
Para.  I:  Legal  requirements 
Historical background 
44.  Compulsory  minimum  reserves  were  first  introduced  in  Germany  in  1948, 
when  the Bank Deutscher  Lander  was  founded.  It is  true that the  1934  Act on 
the  Credit  System  contained  a  general  provision  to  the  effect  that  the  banks 
should keep  balances  at the Central Bank sufficient  to cover  a certain unspecified 
percentage of their· customers'  deposits.  But the purpose of this provision was  to 
ensure  the  liquidity  of customers'  deposits  rather  than  to  further  any  particular 
credit  policy:  moreover, it was  never implemented. 
Legal bases of current minimum reserve regulations 
45.  The  mtntmum  reserve  requirements  laid  down  in  1948  in  the  Act  on  the 
Bank  Deutscher  Lander  were  incorporated  into  the  Bundesbank  Act  of  26  July 
1967 in a modi:fied  form.  Sec.  16(1) of the Deutsche Bundesbank Act as  amended 
on 22  July  1969 provides: 
'In order  to  regulate  the  volume  of money  in circulation  and  of  credit  granted, 
the  Deutsche Bundesbank may  require  that credit institutions shall maintain  with 
it balances  on current  account  (minimum  reserve)  representing  a fixed  percentage 
of their  liabilities  in respect  of sight  deposits,  time  deposits  and  saving  deposits 
and  also  short- and  medium-term  borrowing  with  the  exception  of  liabilities  to 
other  credit  institutions  which  are  subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations.  The 
percentage :fixed  by  the Bank shall  not exceed  30 %  for  sight deposits,  20% for 
time  deposits  and  10 %  for  savings  deposits;  for  liabilities  to non-residents  (Sec-
tion 4 ( 1, point 4) of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act) the Bank may, however, 
:fix  a percentage of up to 100 %. Subject  to these limits, the Bank may,  according 
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to  general  considerations,  fix  differential  ratios,  particularly  for  certain  types  of 
institutions,  and  may  exclude  certain liabilities  from  the basis  of calculation.  For 
credit  institutions  within  the  meaning  of  Section  53  of  the  Act  on  the  Credit 
System,  liabilities in respect  of sight deposits within the meaning of the first  sen-
tence include debit balances on clearing account'. 
Based on the  minimum  reserve  requirements of the Bundesbank Act,  the Bundes-
bank issue  Minimum Reserves  Orders  fixing  the details  of  the  reserve  obligation 
and of the maintenance of reserves. The Bundesbank publishes the currently valid 
Minimum  Reserves  Order in  its  annual  reports.  Changes  are  always  announced 
immediately  in the Federal  Government  Gazette (Bundesanzeiger ). 
Para.  II:  Structure  of the  minimum  reserve  system 
Credit institutions subject to minimum reserve resolutions 
46.  In the  Federal -Republic,  the  vast  majority  of  credit  institutions  are  subject 
to  minimum  reserve  requirements.  The  first  sentence  of  Section  16( 1)  of  the 
Bundesbank  Act  establishes  the principle  that all  banks  must  maintain  minimum 
reserves.  The  Bundesbank  may,  however,  fix  differential  ratios,  particularly  for 
certain categories  of institutions, according  to general considerations. Acting under 
Section  1(2e) of the Minimum Reserves  Order, the Bundesbank,  for  instance, ex-
empted  the  institutions  specializing  in  long-term  business  from  the  minimum 
reserve  requirement  for  one  year  at a  time,  provided the  share  of the long-term 
debit items  in the volume  of business  averaged  at least  90 %  during a  specified 
reference  period. 
Calculation of minimum  reserve requirement and of actual reserves 
4  7.  The basis  of  calculation  for  the  minimum  reserves  which  the  banks have  to 
maintain with the Bundesbank in the form  of balances  on current account is  the 
banks' 'liabilities subject to the reserve  regulations',  that is  all liabilities maturing 
in less  than  four  years  vis-a-vis: 
- Non-banks, 
- Credit institutions  which  are  not subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations, 
- Banks  abroad, 
in  respect  of  deposits  and  borrowed  money. 
The following  liabilities  are excluded:  those  to the  Bundesbank,  those  in respect 
of borrowings  earmarked  for  some  specific  purpose  and  certain deposits  referred 
to  in the  Bundesbank's  Minimum  Reserves  Order. 
Among  the liabilities  which  are  subject  to the reserve  requirements,  a  distinction 
is  made  between: 
- Sight liabilities (liabilities with a term or period of notice of less than 30 days 
or one  month); 
- Time  liabilities  (liabilities  for  a  fixed  period or at  notice  of  at least  30  days 
or a  month),  and 
- Saving  deposits. 
The minimum reserve requirement (Mindestreserve-Soll) is determined by applying 
the percentage rates (reserve ratios) fixed by the Bundesbank to the average amount 
of  the  credit  institution's liabilities  subject  to  the  regulation  over  a  period  of  a 
month.  The  banks  have  the  alternative  of calculating  this  average  either  on the 
basis  of the figures  at the end of each day,  including non-working days,  from  the 
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16th of the previous  month  to the  15th of the current month,  or uniformly  for 
all  types  of  liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve  requirement  on  the  position  at the 
23rd  and  last  day  of  the  previous  month  and  the  7th and  15th of  the  current 
month. 
The  actual  reserve  (1st-Reserve)  is  the  average  of  the  balances  maintained  with 
the  Bundesbank  per  calendar  day. 
Flexible reserve holding 
48.  This  method  of  calculation  allows  the  banks  considerable  flexibility  in  the 
management of their minimum reserve holdings.  As  the minimum reserve  require-
ments  must  be  complied  with  only  on  the basis  of  a monthly  average,  they  can 
use  their  Central  Bank  balances  to  make  payments  and,  if  necessary,  can  dra\v 
on them freely  so  long as  the reserves  are correspondingly increased on other days 
of the relevant period. The banks therefore need not maintain at the Central Bank 
any  other  special  balances  for  the  purpose  of  making  current  payments.  The 
balances which the banks keep with the Bundesbank to meet the minimum reserve 
requirements  thus  also  serve  as  working  balances,  although  the  average  balances 
which  the  banks  need  for  this  purpose  could  as  a  rule  be  lower.  Consequently 
'excess'  reserves  - that  is  to  say  balances  held  at  the  Bundesbank  beyond  mi-
nimum reserve  requirements - are,  as  a rule, very small.  They are in some cases 
due  to  unavoidable  errors  in forecasting,  and  they  generally  amount  to  no  more 
than 1% to 2% of  the actual  requirement;  only during  a few  months  of heavy 
speculative inflows from abroad have they been substantially higher. 
Differentiation in minimum reserve ratios according to  ..• 
49.  The  third  sentence  of  Section  16(1)  of  the  Bundesbank  Act  gives  the  Bun-
desbank the right to introduce a further differentiation, within the maximum limits 
laid down, in the minimum  reserve ratios for  the various types  of liability subject 
to  the reserve  requirement according  to general considerations  but not for  special 
reasons  related to an individual case  (for the degree of differentiation in minimum 
reserve  ratios,  see  Table  9). 
•  ••  •Bank places' and -non-Bank places" 
50.  For example,  the  ratios  for  sight  liabilities  and  savings  deposits  are  differen-
tiated  according  to  'Bank  places'  (Bankpliitze)  and  'non-Bank  places'  (N  eben-
pliitze).  A  'Bank  place'  for  the  purposes  of  the  minimum  reserve  regulations  is 
a place  in which the Bundesbank has  an office  or branch.  For banks in 'non-bank 
places'  (Nebenpliitze ),  the  reserve  ratios  for  sight  liabilities  and  savings  deposits 
are set lower than for banks in 'Bank places' since the for1ner  are as  a rule obliged 
to  keep  more  till  money,  in  particular  for  their  savings  account  business,  as  a 
considerable  proportion of  the savings  deposits  can  be withdrawn without notice . 
.•. amount of llabllities subject to the reserve requirements 
51.  The  minimum  reserve  ratios  for  sight  and  time liabilities  are  in addition dif-
ferentiated  according  to  the  size  of  the  credit  institutions;  the  institutions  are 
divided  into  various  reserve  classes,  according  to  the  amount  of  their  liabilities 
(including  savings  deposits)  subject  to  the  reserve  requirements  (see  Table  9a). 
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... depos.its of residents and non-residents 
52.  Furthermore where necessary  for credit policy reasons, the Bundesbank makes 
liabilities  towards  non-residents  subject  to  higher  reserve  ratios  than  liabilities 
towards residents, in order to stem the flow  of foreign money into German banks. 
The  Bundesbank  introduced  such  higher  reserves  for  the , first  time  from  May 
1957  to March  1959, and then again from February  1961  to January  1962, from 
April  1964  to  January  1967  and,  most recently,  from  June  to  October  1969.  In 
the periods 1961/62 and 1964/67 the maximum ratios that applied to the minimum 
reserves  on  foreign  liabilities  ranged  from  10% to  30 %  according  to  the  type 
of liability.  They were in part also  designed to provide an additional incentive for 
the  export  of  money,  since  from  May  1961  to  December  1966  banks  had been 
allowed  to  deduct  the  amount  of  balances  (whether  sight  or time  deposits)  and 
money-market investments held abroad from  the liabilities to non-residents subject 
to  the  reserve  requirement  ("offsetting  privilege").  The  more  this  relieved  them 
of  their  minimum  reserve  requirement  on foreign  liabilities,  the  more  the  banks 
-naturally  made  use  of this  concession. 
By  virtue of the amendment  to Section  16 of the Bundesbank Act, in force  since 
23  July  1969, the Bundesbank may  now raise up to  100 %  the minimum reserve 
ratio  applying  to  the  entire  foreign  liabilities. 
Reserves for increase in liabilities 
53.  Lastly,  the Bundesbank has  from  time  to time fixed  special  minimum reserve 
ratios  for  any  increase  in liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve  requirement,  especially 
non-resident  deposits.  These  were  first  applied  during  the  period  of  restraint  of 
1959/60. Special reserve ratios in respect of the increase in liabilities to foreigners 
subject to the reserve  requirement applied from January 1960 to April 1961, from 
December 1968  to October 1969, from  April to August 1970, and have currently 
been  if force  since  December  1970.  From  July  to  November  1960  and  from 
September  to  November  1970,  the  Bundesbank imposed  reserve  requirements  on 
increases  in  domestic  liabilities. 
Special rate of interest 
54.  If a bank fails to maintain with the Bundesbank the full balance required under 
the minimum  reserve  regulations,  interest is  charged on the amount by which the 
actual reserves  of the credit institution fall  short of the minimum  reserve require-
ments,  at  a  penal  rate  of  3 %  above  the  current  Bundesbank  rate  for  advances 
against  securities  for  periods  of  30  days  at a  time  (see Table  8). 
No interest on reserves 
55.  It is  not the practice of the Bundesbank to pay interest on minimum  reserve 
balances.  The result is  that the credit institutions  subject  to the minimum reserve 
requlations  suffer  a  loss  of  earning  power  varying  directly  with  the  minimum 
reserve ratio.  Minimum reserve policy has  therefore not only a purely quantitative 
effect  on  bank  liquidity  but  also  influences  the  level  of  interest  rates.  When 
minimum  reserve  percentages  are  raised  the banks  try  to  offset  the  deterioration 
in  their  profitability  by  putting up  their charges  to  borrowers,  there being  little 
scope in such  a situation for  passing on the burden to depositors e.g. by reducing 
deposit interest.  . 
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Para.  III:  How  the  system  operates 
56.  As  an  instrument  of  policy,  minimum  reserve  regulations  are  used  by  the 
Bundesbank  when  the  trend  in bank  liquidity  calls  for  a  corrective,  to  prevent 
either a major rise in liquid reserves or a drain on reserves. At times the Bundes-
bank also uses  the minimum  reserve policy  to counter very short-term fluctuations. 
in  liquidity.  In  December  1969,  for  instance,  it  lowered  the  minimum  reserve 
ratios  by  10 %,  for  that  one  month only. 
Quantitative effect 
57.  With  m1n1mum  reserve  ratios  rema1n1ng  unchanged,  the  steady  rise  in  the 
credit  institutions'  liabilities  subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations  suffices  by 
itself to immobilize liquidity. The real importance of the minimum reserve weapon, 
however,  lies  in the  power of  the  Bundesbank  to  alter  the  reserve  ratios.  From 
the  date  of  introduction  of  minimum  reserves  ( 1  July  1948)  to  the  middle  of 
1970,  the Bundesbank  and its  predecessor,  the Bank Deutscher Lander,  made  50 
changes  in the minimum reserve  ratios.  (The various  changes  in reserve  ratios for 
the  period since  1 January  1961  and the current level of minimum  reserve  ratios 
are shown in Table 9.) A 1 % increase (reduction) in the average minimum reserve 
ratio  (reserve  requirements  as  a  percentage  of  liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve 
requirement)  would  entail  a  corresponding  immobilization  or  release  of  liquidity 
of  some  DM  3,000  million  in terms  of  the  situation  at  the  beginning  of  1971. 
The minimum reserve ratios in force  in March  1971  meant that some DM 26,900 
million  or 8·4 %  of  the liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve  requirement  had  to  be 
maintained  as  reserve  balances  with  the  Central Bank,  while  at the  peak  of  the 
1959/60  credit  restrictions,  the  reserves  required  of  the  credit  institutions  had 
averaged  12·6% of  the liabilities  subject to the reserve requirement. 
Influence on free liquidity reserves 
58.  To  meet  an  increase  in  m1n1mum  reserve  obligations  for  which  there  is  no 
counterpart  in the  shape  of  simultaneous  liquidity inflows  the  banks  as  a  whole 
can  only  convert  their interest-bearing  free  liquidity  reserves  (see  point  23)  into 
balances  at  the  Central  Bank,  where  they  are  immobilized.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  minimum  reserve  ratios  are  reduced,  immobilized  balances  are  set free  and 
are reconverted by  the banks into interest-bearing liquid assets.  In either case  the 
liquidity of the banking system is  affected. Whether the banks acquire the necessary 
additional Central Bank balances mainly by drawing on their domestic open-market 
paper or by presenting bills  at the Central Bank for rediscounting will depend on 
circumstances  (e.g.  relative  rates  of  interest). 
The important point is  that the financing  of  increased  minimum  reserves  is  done 
at the expense  of  the  free  liquidity  reserves  of  the banks.  They will,  as  a  result 
sooner  or later feel  obliged  to exercise  greater restraint in lending. 
Section III - Open market policy 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
il'he money market as a market !for Central Bank balances  ••• 
59.  The Bundesbank's open market policy is  closely related to the special features 
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of  the  German  money  and  capital  market.  The  money  market  in  the  Federal 
Republic comprises,  firstly,  dealing in Central Bank funds,  mainly  between banks. 
On  this  market,  credit  institutions  make  surplus  Central  Bank  funds  available 
to other banks;  according  to  the periods involved,  distinctions  are  made  between 
the  markets  in  call  money,  in money  at  one  day's  notice,  and  in loans  for  one 
month,  three  months  etc.  Until  1967,  the Agreement on Creditor  Interest Rates 
(Habenzinsabkommen)  and/  or  the  Regulation  on interest  rates  (Zinsverordnung) 
kept non-banks  away  from  this market, the idea being to prevent non-banks from 
enjoying the terms  available  to banks. Of late, however, sellers  and buyers on the 
money  market  have  included  some  non-banks,  especially  large  industrial  firms, 
although their share in the market as  a whole is very small. The Bundesbank does 
not  operate  on  this  market. 
•·· and as a market for money-market paper 
60.  The  money  market comprises,  secondly,  dealings  in money-market  paper,  i.e. 
in Treasury  bills,  non-interest  bearing  Treasury  bonds,  Storage  Agency  bills,  and 
prime  acceptances. 
Dealings  in  money-market  paper  take  place  mainly  between  the  Bundesbank  and 
the  credit  institutions.  There  are  also  transactions  between  the  Bundesbank  and 
certain  public  authorities  (especially  the  Federal  Post  Office,  the  E.R.P.  Special 
Fund and the social  security funds).  Business  undertakings  and private individuals 
were unable  to  acquire  money-market paper as  long  as  the  agreement on creditor 
interest  rates  was  in force;  they  placed  their  liquid or temporarily  idle  balances 
as  sight, time or savings  deposits with the banks. There are  practically no dealings 
in money-market paper among banks or between banks and non-banks, i.e. without 
the participation of the Bundesbank. The interest rates on this market are therefore 
determined solely  by  the Bundesbank,  which  fixes  the  terms  on which it sells  or 
buys money-market  paper.  The volume of sales  and purchases,  on  the other hand, 
is determined by the extent to which the other partners in the market take up the 
paper  offered  by  the  Bundesbank. 
Open market transactions on the capital market 
Under Section  21  of the Bundesbank Act,  the Bundesbank  may  also,  in order to 
regulate  the money  market,  deal  in long-term  securities.  It first  started with this 
type of open  market business  in  1967,  though limiting its dealings  to buying and 
selling  fixed-interest-bearing  securities  issued  by  public  authorities.  In contrast  to 
the sales and repurchases of money-market paper, the Bundesbank, in these transac-
tions,  takes  a direct decision  on what amounts  to purchase or sell,  while the con-
sequent  effects  on  prices  and  hence  on  the  long-term  interest  rate  only  appear 
indirectly. 
Para.  II:  Open  market  transactions  on  the  money market 
Varying interest rates for money-market paper 
61.  As  mentioned  before,  money-market  paper  comprises  Treasury  bills  and  so-
called  non-interest-bearing  Treasury bonds-("U-Schatze"- discounted  like  Treas-
ury bills) of the Federal Government, the Federal Post Office, the Federal Railways 
.and  the Lander,  and Storage Agency  bills and prime acceptances.  The Bundesbank 
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fixes  buying  and  selling  rates  (discounts)  for  this  type  of  paper, 
1  varying  them 
according  to  the  trend  on  the  money  market  and  the  aims  of  its  credit  policy. 
The  rates  at  which  money-market  paper  is  repurchased  before  maturity  are  not 
published.  They  are  fixed  at  a  certain  margin  above  the  published  selling  rates. 
These  margins  may  vary  according  to  the state of the  money market, the way in 
which  the  Bundesbank  wishes  to  influence  the  market  and  the  type  of  security 
concerned;  but the margins  between  selling  and  repurchase  rates  are  narrow and 
often  remain  unchanged  for  fairly  long  periods  so  that  the  rates  at  which  the 
Bundesbank  will  repurchase - although  somewhat  higher - vary  in  accordance 
with its  selling  prices.  Table  11  shows the changes in selling rates for  the various 
classes  of money-market  securities  since  the beginning of  1958. 
Differences in ways money-market paper of the Federal Government is created 
62.  Treasury bills and non-interest bearing Treasury bonds of the Federal Govern-
ment can  be created in various ways  in the Federal Republic.  One method is  for 
the  Federal  Government  to  decide,  in  agreement  with the  Bundesbank,  to  cover 
part  of  its  borrowing  requirements  through  the  issue  of  short-term  securities 
(other  things  being  equal,  this  leads  to  an  increase  in  bank  liquidity  since  the 
buyers are mainly banks; conversely, a decline in the volume of such paper reduces 
bank liquidity). 
In addition  to  this  "normal" method of creating  such  paper  there are  two other 
possibilities.  To enable  the Bundesbank  to sell  Treasury bills  and Treasury bonds 
irrespective of  the financing  requirements  of the public  authorities,  Section 42  of 
the Bundesbank Act  provides  that the Bundesbank may  ask  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  to  convert all  or part of the Bank's equalization claim  on the Government, 
which  totals  DM  8,000  million  and  arose  during  the  currency  reform  in  1948, 
into  Treasury  bills  or  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds.  The  securities  thus 
created  are  referred  to  as  ''mobilization  paper".  The  Bundesbank  is  under  an 
obligation  to  the  Federal  Government  to  meet  all  liabilities  arising  out  of 
mobilization paper. In practice, therefore, this type of paper represents issues by the 
Bundesbank  rather  than  by  the  Federal  Government. 
Liquidity paper 
63.  To put the Bundesbank  in a  position  to  sell  Treasury bills  and non-interest-
bearing Treasury bonds even beyond the limits set by the amount of the equaliza-
tion  claim,  a  clause  was  added  to  the  Bundesbank  Act  (Section  42 a)  under the 
Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth of  196  7,  requiring  the  Federal 
Government,  once  mobilization  paper  has  been  put  into  circulation  up  to  the 
amount  of  the  equalization  claim,  to  make  available  to  the  Bundesbank,  at its 
request,  additional  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest  bearing Treasury  bonds  up to 
a  maximum  of  DM  8,000  million.  The  Act  calls  this  type  of  paper  "liquidity 
paper". Under this procedure, the Bundesbank does  not surrender assets;  it shows 
the  nominal  amount  in  a  special  account  among  its  liabilities.  The  counter-value 
may only be used to redeem the paper at or before maturity. 
I  But see  Point 70  below. 
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Treasury bills and non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds iof other public authorities 
64.  Unlike mobilization paper and liquidity paper, in respect of which the Federal 
Government figures  only formally as  debtor while the actual debtor is the Bundes-
bank,  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  of  the  Lander  and 
the Federal Railways  and  non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds of the Federal Post 
Office  are put into circulation only in connection with actual borrowing operations 
of  these  authorities.  Issue  of  Treasury  bills  are  governed  by  the  ceiling  which 
Section 20( 1) of the Bundesbank Act places on cash advances and in addition they 
must  be  made  through  the  Bundesbank.  Non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  of 
these  authorities  likewise  must be issued  through or in agreement with the  Bun-
desbank,  failing  which  the  Bundesbank  way  refuse  to  include  them  in  its 
arrangements  to regulate the money market. Since, other things being equal, a rise 
in  the  circulation  of  such  paper  increases  bank  liquidity  (and  since  a  decline  in 
circulation reduces it), the control thus exercised by the Bundesbank is  of consider-
able  importance. 
Storage Agency bills and prime acceptances 
65.  The  Bundesbank  also  regulates  the  market  in  "Storage  Agency  bills";  these 
are  issued  by  the  Import  and  Storage  Agencies  within  the  ceiling  of  the  credits 
granted to them by banking syndicates,  and up to a limit agreed with the Bundes-
bank,  in  the  form  of  Government-guaranteed  promissory  notes,  for  the  purpose 
of financing  stocks  of certain basic  foodstuffs  (cereals,  fats,  meat,  etc.).  The Bun-
desbank  is  prepared  to  take  up  these  securities  up to  the  limit  to which it has 
promised  to buy  them (currently DM 850  million)  and also  to sell  such securities 
if it holds them in its portfolio. In addition, there is  a "prime acceptance"  market 
in  the  Federal  Republic.  Dealings  on  it  are  confined  to  bank  acceptances  of  a 
special  type,  "prime acceptances",  the  market  in which  the Bundesbank  has  pro-
mised  to  support.  The  period  to  maturity  must not exceed  90  days.  The ceiling 
currently  applying  to  Bundesbank purchases  of  prime  acceptances  is  DM  1,500 
million. 
Medium term notes 
66.  In  196  7  the  range  of money-market  paper was  also  enlarged  when  the  Bun-
desbank  declared  during  the  recession  that it was  prepared,  until further  notice, 
to include in its money market regulation arrangements, medium-term notes of the 
Federal Government, the Federal Post Office,  the Federal Railways and the Lander, 
provided  these  securities  had  a  remaining  life  of less  than  18  months.  Medium-
term  notes  issued  since  1969  are  no  longer  covered  by  this  arrangement.  In 
contrast  to  the  practice  followed  in  open-market  transactions  in  Treasury  bills 
and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds,  interest  rates  are  not  fixed  in advance 
for eventual purchases and sales of medium-term notes on the open market. 
Money-market paper a form of investment for liquid funds 
6  7.  Money-market  paper  is  suitable  as  a  form  of  investment  for  banks'  liquid 
Central Bank  balances  not needed  at the  particular moment,  because  of  its  com-
paratively  short  maturity  period  (the  maximum  period  to  maturity  for  money-
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market paper is  24 months) and because it can at any time (even before maturity) 1 
be  returned  to  the  Central  Bank  and  thus  exchanged  for  Central  Bank  money. 
In the case of Treasury bills there is a promise to discount. No such formal promise 
is  attached to non-interest bearing Treasury bonds, but the Bundesbank has  always 
taken up such bonds when offered, at its currently fixed price. The Bundesbank is, 
however,  not  always  prepared  to  sell  paper  of  all  maturities  as  desired  by  the 
banks.  In a  period of easier  credit,  for  instance,  it may  wish  to  ensure  that the 
increase  in bank liquidity (resulting, for example, from cuts in minimum reserves) 
exerts  an  influence  on the money  market also.  In such cases  the Bundesbank may 
either  confine  the  sale  of money  market  paper  to  securities  with a  short life  or 
discontinue sales  altogether.  Conversely,  in periods  of credit  restraint  the Bundes-
bank has  often sold  only Treasury bonds  running for  a longer period and bearing 
a  higher  rate  of  interest. 
Scale of open-market transactions in short-term securities 
68.  Since  1955,  when  open-market  operations  began,  a  substantial  amount  of 
surplus  funds,  mainly  arising  from  the  heavy  foreign  exchange  inflows  into  the 
Federal  Republic,  have  at  times  been placed  in "mobilization paper".  In August 
1958, the circulation of such  paper reached a temporary peak of nearly DM 7,200 
million.  During a second period of open-market policy, from  1959 to  1967, these 
open-market  operations  lost  somewhat  in importance  again,  mainly  because  from 
the  beginning  of  19 59  onwards  the  credit  institutions  no  longer  kept  their  free 
liquidity  reserves  at  home  only  but  maintained  them  increasingly  abroad  in the 
shape  of short-term  investments  ("exports of  money).  By  the beginning  of  1967, 
the  circulation  of  mobilization  paper  with the  banks  had  dropped  to  some  DM 
1,500  million.  In  the  following  years  little  if any  mobilization  paper  has  been 
made  available  to  the banks;  initially, this was  intended to help increase liquidity 
on the money  market  and contribute  to  the  downward  tendency  of interest rates 
for short-term economic  policy reasons.  In the periods of foreign  currency specula-
tion-until  the  1969  revaluation- selling  mobilization  paper  would  have  run 
counter to efforts  to channel as  far  as  possible out of the country the amounts of 
foreign exchange which had come in. Since July 1970 mobilization paper has again 
been sold to the banks. As  the margin for the issue of this paper had been exhaust-
ed by  the  beginning  of  January  1971,  a  start was  made  also  with  the  issue  of 
liquidity paper.  At the end of April  1971, the total of mobilization  and liquidity 
paper in circulation was  around DM 9,000  million. 
Para.  III:  Open  market  policy  on  the capital  market 
Open market transactions witb public loan issues 
69.  In the middle  of  1967, open-market policy  entered a  new phase.  During the 
recession  of  the first  half  of  196  7,  the  Bundesbank  considerably  increased  bank 
liquidity by reducing minimum reserve requirements and by taking other measures. 
Surpluses  on payments  transactions  with  abroad  further  added  to the increase  in 
liquidity.  It soon  emerged,  however,  that instead of placing  this  increase  in their 
liquid funds  on the domestic money market (where it would have tended to bring 
interest rates down),  the banks  mainly invested it on foreign  money markets with 
1 However,  see Point 70  below. 
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the  result  that  the  level  of  domestic  interest  rates  did  not fall  in the  way  that 
credit  policy  would  have  required.  In  August  1967  the  Bundesbank  therefore 
decided to ease  the situation on the money market by buying for its own account, 
bonds  of  the  Federal  Government and  its Special  Funds  on the  open  market. By 
the  end  of the  year,  the  Bundesbank  had  siphoned  DM  1,300  million  worth of 
fixed-interest  securities  off  the market. This resulted in a further increase in bank 
liquidity \and  brought  about  a  further  fall  in  interest  rates.  The  tendency  for 
interest  rates  to decline continued during  1968,  although from  1967  to  1968  the 
net  calls  of  domestic  and  foreign  issuers  on  the  German  capital  market  rose  by 
some  DM  6,000  million  to  nearly  DM  22,000  million.  In  January  1968  the 
Bundesbank was already in a position to begin selling securities again to the market. 
By  the  end  of  1970,  it had  been  able  to  scale  down  its  holdings,  with certain 
fluctuations,  to  less  than one fifth  of  the peak level. 
Para.  IV:  Effects  of  open  market  policy 
Open market policy and bank liquidity 
70.  The  impact  of  the Bundesbank's  open  market  transactions  on bank  liquidity 
varies.  Money-market paper forms  part of the credit institutions' liquidity reserves 
(see  point  23 ).  When  the  credit  institutions  acquire  money-market  paper  from 
the  Bundesbank or return such  paper,  these  transactions  merely  lead to a change 
in  the  pattern  of  the  banks,  liquidity reserves;  the  banks'  Central  Bank  balances 
fall  and  their holdings  of money-market  paper increase  accordingly,  or vice-versa. 
However, if the Bundesbank engages in open market transactions in money-market 
paper with non-banks or generally in mobilization and liquidity paper (non-interest-
bearing  Treasury  bonds)  which  it refuses  to  take  back  before  maturity 1  and  in 
long-term  securities,  this  results  in  a  change  in  the  banks'  liquid  resources.  For 
example, if the Bundesbank  sells  non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds  to the social 
security funds,  the latter will shift  the counterpart from  the credit institutions  to 
the  Bundesbank,  and  this  will entail a reduction  in bank liquidity.
2 
Open market policy and interest rate policy 
71.  The Bundesbank's  open  market transactions  with credit institutions in instru-
ments  of  short-term  indebtedness  must be considered  as  relating  to interest rate 
policy  rather  than  to  liquidity policy.  Just  as  the  Central  Bank's  official  discount 
rate influences the whole level of interest rates, changes in the Bundesbank's selling 
and repurchase rates also  have far-reaching effects that make themselves felt mainly 
on  the market  in Central  Banlc  funds  described  above.  For instance, if the  Bun-
desbank  offers  Treasury bills  with a currency of 90  days  at the fixed  selling rate, 
nobody  on  the  market  in  three-month  loans  will  be  content  to  accept  a  lower 
interest rate.  Open market  sales  of  money-market  paper by the Bundesbank  tend 
to reduce  supply  on  the  market  for  Central  Bank  funds,  and  the  money  market 
situation  is  affected  accordingly.  Returning  money-market  paper,  on  the  other 
I  Since  April  1971  the  Bundesbank  has  also  been  offering  - for  the  time  being  only  to  social  security'  funds\-
liquidity  and  mobilization  paper  (non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds)  which,  contrary  to previous  practice,  are  not 
accepted  back  before  maturity.  To  compensate  for  the  reduced  degree  of  liquidity,  a  somewhat  higher  interest  rate 
is  paid  on  these  securities. 
2 This  effect  is  independent  of  the  way  in  which  the  money-market  paper  sold  or  bought  by  the  Bundesbank  was 
created;  it  is  therefore  the  same  for  genuine  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  as  for 
mobilization  and  liqu,idity  paper. 
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hand,  represents  for  the  banks  an  alternative  to  obtaining  Central  Bank  money 
by  rediscounting  bills.  Through  its  selling  and  repurchase  rates,  the  Bundesbank 
also  influences  the  extent  to  which  the banks  employ  liquid  reserves  in money-
market investments abroad. An element that must also  be taken into consideration 
when comparing yields  obtainable at home and abroad is  the cost of forward cover 
for  the foreign  currency  involved  (cf.  Section  IV). 
Section IV  - Policy governing intervention on the forward 
foreign exchange market 
Changeover to convertibility 
72.  At the end of December  1958, the Dm was  made convertible  again,  together 
with the currencies of important European O.E.E.C. countries. While most partner 
countries  only  moved  to  non-resident  convertibility  for  current  transactions,  the 
Bundesbank  made  the  DM  almost  fully  convertible,  extending  convertibility  to 
residents  and  capital  movements.  In the preceding years,  the changeover  to con-
vertibility had been prepared by the gradual introduction of liberalization measures; 
since  the  autumn  of  1957,  short-term ·international capital  movements  had been 
almost fully liberalized. 
Growing interdependence of international credit markets 
73.  With  the  DM  freely  convertible,  communication  between  the  German  and 
foreign  credit  markets  strengthened. Externally  this  was  reflected  in the fact  that 
the German banks increasingly engaged in international money and credit business. 
Their  investments  abroad  from  "money  exports",  for  instance,  rose  some  DM 
2,500  million  (at the  end  of  1959)  to almost  DM  7,000  million  (at the  middle 
of  1967),  and  continued  to  nearly  DM  12,000  million  by  the  middle  of  1970. 
This growth in interdependence forced  the Bundesbank, in its monetary policy -
and  particularly  in  interest  rate  policy - to  take  more  account  than  before  of 
developments  in  other  countries. 
Use  of  swap·  policy 
74.  At the beginning  of October  1958,  the Bundesbank for the first  time  offered 
domestic  credit institutions  the  possibility  of  concluding  with is  "swap"  transac-
tions  in U.S.  dollars  for  up to three months,  and in some cases  even six  months. 
Since  that period, the Bundesbank has used this instrument over longer or shorter 
periods.  When  making  a  swap  transaction,  the  Bundesbank  sells  dollars  spot  to 
the  credit  institutions  and buys  them back forward  at a  fixed  rate.  The forward 
rate has,  as  a rule, been lower than the spot rate, i.e. the Bundesbank has charged 
a forward discount for covering the exchange risk. Sometimes, however, the Central 
Bank has  also  waived its right to charge the cost of covering the exchange risk by 
executing  swap  transactions  with  the  banks  at  par,  i.e.  free  of  charge-as  for 
instance in late  1959/early 1960-or has  even allowed  the banks a forward rate 
at a premium  over  the spot rate (Autumn/Winter 1960-1961). 
Encouragement of money exports 
75.  The  Bundesbank's  swap  policy  has  so  far  always  been aimed  at encouraging 
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domestic  credit  institutions  to  export  money.  When  the  Bundesbank  began  to 
intervene in the forward foreign exchange market at the end of 1958, its intention 
was  to  get  the  German credit institutions  off  to  a  good  start in building  up an 
adequate  holding  of  short-term  foreign  investments  by  which  means  the  banks 
could take a  part in holding  the country's foreign  exchange reserves.  At the same 
time  this  influenced  the  development  of the  domestic  n1oney  market,  where  as  a 
result  of  the  increased  attractiveness  of  external  money  markets  the  supply  of 
funds  on  the  domestic  money  market  tended  to  fall.  Later,  however,  when  the 
higher  interest  rates  obtaining  on  foreign  money  markets  sufficed  by  themselves 
to  attract  the  liquidity  reserves  of  German  banks,  the  Bundesbank  gradually 
switched over to charging a forward discount in its swap  transactions,  raising  this 
step  by  step  to the level  of  the  market  rate,  and  at the same  time  withdrawing 
from  the  market.  Its  swap  commitment,  which  in  1960  had  risen  to  over  DM 
4,000 million, was  gradually  run down completely.  With some fluctuations it was 
eliminated  altogether  by  May  1963.  Whenever  the  Bundesbank  undertook  new 
commitments  during  the  years  1960  to  1963  it  endeavoured  to  keep  in  check 
in this way the influences  on international money markets exerted by the repatria-
tion  of money  by  the  commercial  banks.  In March  1964,  the banks  were  again 
offered  exchange  risk  cover  at  reduced  cost,  though  only  for  the  acquisition  of 
U.S.  Treasury bills. The restriction of cover to U.S.  money-market paper only was 
an  attempt  to  limit  the  repercussions  on  the  international  money  market  as  far 
as  possible  and  to  avoid  providing  additional  encouragement  to  the Euro-money 
market.  In the spring of  1965  the Bundesbank again  withdrew from  the forward 
exchange market; it was not until November 1967, after the devaluation of sterling, 
that  the  Bundesbank  resumed  its  forward  cover  operations,  endeavouring  to 
strengthen confidence  in the  dollar  parity  and  thereby  to contribute  to  an  easing 
of conditions  on  the Euro-currency  markets.  These  operations  were  therefore  not 
designed  to  influence  the  domestic  money  market.  In  contrast  with  previous 
practice, the  Bundesbank did not require the foreign  exchange sold to be used for 
specific  purposes;  the  banks  were  therefore  also  enabled  to  conclude  with  the 
Central Bank  forward  cover  operations  in  respect  of  foreign  investments  already 
made or in respect of foreign  claims  of their customers. The objective of restoring 
quieter  conditions  in  the  international  monetary  situation  was  also  predominant 
when the  Bundesbank  again  entered into heavy  swap commitments from  the end 
of  August  1968  onwards.  After  15  November  1968  the  Bundesbank  offered  to 
cover  the  exchange  risk  only  in respect  of money  market investments  abroad;  in 
September  1969  it discontinued  its  swap  operations  in connection with the  tem-
porary floating  of the DM exchange  rate. From 7 May  to 20 May  1969 the Bun-
desbank  had  already  withdrawn  from  the  market  as  it  realised  that  the  credit 
policy  objective  of  the  swap  operations,  to  channel  speculative  foreign  exchange 
inflows  back  to  foreign  money  markets  and  keep  them  there,  was  being  under-
mined  by  "Roundabout"  transactions  (" Karussellgeschiifte")  by  means  of which 
the banks were able, without using their own funds, to secure a profit correspond-
ing roughly to the difference between the forward discount of the market and that 
of  the  Bundesbank. 
Outright intervention on the forward market 
76.  At  the beginning  of  June  1970  the floating  of  the Canadian  dollar  rate  and 
the  consequent  unrest  on  the  foreign  exchange  markets  touched  off  a  fresh  rise 
in the inflow of foreign exchange  into the Federal Republic,  and on 15 June 1970 
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the  Bundesbank  began  temporarily  to  engage  in  outright  intervention  on  the 
forward  market  in  U.S.  dollars.  (Such  transactions  had last  been  effected  at the 
end of November 1968 to counteract current speculation on a revaluation.) At the 
beginning of April  1971  the Bundesbank for a  time bought three-months  forward 
dollars  at  its  lower  intervention  point  with  the  aim  of  countering  speculative 
currency  movements. 
Section V  - Instruments of the Act to Promote Economic Stability and 
Gro'\vth 
Indirect and direct incidence on monetary policy 
77.  As  noted above in the description of the institutional framework of monetary 
policy,  the  196  7  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth  defines  the 
general objectives of economic policy in the Federal Republic and sets out a number 
of principles  and measures to be employed in the event that one or more of these 
objectives  should be endangered.  Some  of these instruments have  an indirect and 
others  a  direct  significance  for  monetary  policy.  The  following  is  an  account  of 
the  full  range  of  these  instruments  although  some  of  them  have  already  been 
discussed in the preceding  chapters in the relevant context. 
Para.  I:  Instruments  indirectly  significant  for  monetary  policy 
Tasks of the Council on Economic Trends and the Financial Planning Council 
78.  The public authorities' Council on Economic Trends was set up as  an advisory 
body to help co-ordinate the economic and financial  policy of the Federal Govern-
ment  and Lander  and in particular  to  harmonize  the ways  in which the  various 
regional  and  local  authorities  manage  their budgets.  Members  of the Council  are 
the  Federal  Minister  of  Economics,  the  Federal  Minister  of  Finance,  one  repre-
sentative of  each Land,  and four  representatives  of the local authorities and local 
authority  associations.  The  Deutsche  Bundesbank  has  a  right  to participate.  The 
public  authorities'  Council  on  Economic  Trends  considers  all  measures  of  short-
term  economic  policy  necessary  to  attain  the  objectives  of  the  Act  and  also 
examines  ways  and  means  of meeting  the borrowing  requirements  of  the public 
authorities  (sec.  18  of the  Act).  The decisions  of the public  authorities'  Council 
on  Economic  Trends  are  not  binding;  the  Federal  Government  may,  however, 
give  force  of  law  to  the  Council's  recommendations  on  the  formation  of  a  com-
pulsory  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserve  (sec.  15  of  the  Act)  or -with  the 
agreement  of  the  Bundestag  or  the  Bundesrat - on  credit limits  for  public  bor-
rowers  (sec.  20  of  the  Act). 
In practice,  however,  considerable  importance  attaches  to  the  Council's  decisions, 
given  the  political  weight  of its  members. 
In addition to the Council on Economic Trends a Financial Planning Council was 
set  up to harmonize  the  financial  plans  covering  a  period of  several  years  which 
the Federal Government and the Lander are  required to draw up under Section 9 
read with Section 14 of the Act. 
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Instruments of tax pollcy 
79.  Aggregate  demand,  incomes  and  liquidity  may  also  be  influenced  by  other 
measures of taxation policy. If there is danger of the,economic climate overheating, 
the Federal Government may  suspend, for a maximum period of one year, declin-
ing-balance  depredation  and  also  the right  to  special  depreciation allowances  and 
to accelerated depreciation (sec.  26 of the Act). In periods when economic activity 
shows  signs  of  flagging,  on the  other  hand,  the  income  tax  and  corporation  tax 
liability  for  the  particular  assessment  period  may  be  cut by  up  to  7 · 5%  of the 
purchase  or  manufacturing  cost  of  the  assets  involved  (sec.  26  of  the Act).  The 
Federal  Government  may  also  increase  or reduce  income  and  corporation  tax  by 
up to 10% for  a  period of one year  (sec.  26  and 27  of the Act).  For all  these 
measures,  the  relevant  statutory decree  must  be  approved  by  the  Bundestag  and 
the  Bundesrat.  The  approval  of  the  legislative  bodies  is  not required if advance 
payments  towards income  tax, corporation tax and trade tax are adjusted  to meet 
the prospective tax liability,  a move which under sees.  26  and 28  of the Act may 
still be made  in the  calendar year  following  the assessment  period. 
Public investbnent policy as an element of control 
80.  Section  6  of  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth  provides 
that  in  the  event  that  the  expansion  of  demand  exceeds  the  capacity  of  the 
economy,  the  Federal  Minister  of Finance  may  be  authorized  to  make  building 
and construction starts  and  the  acceptance  of commitments  extending into future 
financial  years  dependent  on his  approval.  Any  funds  thus  saved  must,  after  the 
end  of  the  financial  year,  be  used  for  supplementary  redemption  of  debt  with 
the  Bundesbank  (see  point  84)  or for  payment  into  the  anti-cyclical  equalization 
fund  (see  point 83).  If, on the  other hand,  the general  economic  trend weakens 
dangerously,  the planning of suitable investment  projects  by the Federal Govern-
ment  must  be  accelerated  so  that  work  on  them  can  be  started  at short  notice 
(sec.  11  of the  Act).  · 
Para.  II:  Instruments  directly  significant  for  monetary  policy 
Combating disruptions from foreign trade and payments 
81.  To deal  with disruptions  that might  be  caused  by  the increasing  interdepen-
dence  of the  national  economies  and by  the  diverging  trends  in  prices  and costs 
in  the  various  economies,  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth 
places  certain  obligations  on  the  Federal  Government.  Where  general  economic 
equilibrium  is  being  disrupted  by  developments  in  foreign  trade  and  payments 
which  cannot  be  dealt  with by  means  of  domestic  economic  measures  or which 
can  be  dealt  with  only  at  the  expense  of  other  basic  aims  of economic  policy, 
Section  4  of  the  Act  requires  the  Federal  Government  to  make  use  of  the 
opportunities presented by international coordination. Should this prove inadequate, 
the Federal Government is to safeguard external equilibrium by using the available 
instruments  of  economic  policy.  These  and  similar  measures  of  economic  policy 
(for instance exchange  rate modifications) can,  however, be  taken only within the 
limits  set  by  existing  international  obligations. 
Widening the Bundesbank's room for manoeuvre in 
open-market pollcy 
82.  In the  course  of  the  1948  currency  reform,  some  DM 8,000  million  worth 
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of  claims  on  the  public  authorities  (equalization  claims)  accrued  to  the  German 
central  banking  system  by  means  of  balance-sheet  adjustments.  The  revision  of 
Sec.  42  of the  Bundesbank  Act  affected  by  Sec.  29  of  the Act to Promote Eco-
nomic  Stability  and  Growth,  gives  the  Central  Bank  the  unrestricted  right  to 
mobilize  all  of  its  equalization  claims  on  the  Federal  Government  up  to  their 
nominal value.  There were,  however,  doubts  as  to whether  the  amount  of some 
DM 8,000 million of money-market paper would be sufficient in all  circumstances. 
Sec.  29  of  the Act  to Promote Economic  Stability and Growth therefore requires 
the Federal Government to make available to the Bundesbank an additional amount 
of up  to DM 8,000  million worth of Treasury bills  or non-interest-bearing Treas-
ury bonds (liquidity paper) once  the operatin fund of mobilisation paper has  been 
exhausted.  The  sale  proceeds  of  this  paper  are  immobilised  by  the  Bundesbank. 
They may be used only to redeem liquidity paper falling due or repurchased before 
maturity  by  the  Central  Bank.  The  Bundesbank's  room  for  manoeuvre  in  open-
market  policy  has  thus  been  widened  considerably. 
Immobilization of funds of the wage and 
salary earners' pension insurance funds and of the Federal Labour Office 
83.  Sec.  30  of  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth  originally 
authorized  the  Federal  Government  to  require;  for  the  period  of  one  year,  that 
the wage-and  salary-earners'  pension  insurance funds  and  the  Federal Labour Of-
fice 1  place  a certain proportion of their funds  in mobilization and liquidity paper. 
Under the third Act to Modify the Pension Insurance System (Rentenversicherung-
sanderungsgesetz) and  the Work Promotion Act (Arbeitsforderungsgesetz)  the  Fe-
deral  Government  and  the  Bundesbank  may,  to  the  extent  they  deem  necessary 
for  reasons  of  short-term  economic  and monetary  policy,  order· those  institutions 
to  place  a  specific  proportion  of  their  liquid  funds  in  money-market  paper.  No 
statutory decree  is  required for  this purpose.  The Bundesbank is  under an obliga-
tion  to  take  back  this  paper  before  maturity  if  this  is  necessary  to  ensure  the 
solvency  of  the pension  insurance  funds  or of  the  Federal  Labour  Office. 
The instrument of the anti-cyclical equalization reserve 
84.  For credit policy,  an immobilization of excess  tax revenues or of Federal Go-
vernment  and  Lander funds  released  through  cuts  in expenditure  by  transferring 
them to a reserve account  at the Bundesbank means a reduction in bank liquidity. 
Conversely,  the  subsequent  mobilization  of  such  reserves  and  their  expenditure 
will entail an  increase in bank liquidity.  As  the establishment or running down of 
such  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserves  also  has  a  direct  influence  on the  demand 
potential  of  the  regional· and  local  authorities  concerned  and  therefore  directly 
influences  demand  in  the  economy  in  general,  this  is  an  effective  way  of  sup-
porting the Central Bank's credit policy. 
The Act to Promote Economic Stability and Growth provides that the anti-cyclical 
equalization  reserve  is  to be  created  exclusively  at  the  Bundesbank.  The  reserve 
may be built up on a voluntary or a compulsory basis. Section 5 of the Act specifies 
that if demand is expanding too rapidly for the capacity of the economy,  provision 
should be made,  in drawing up the budget,  to earmark funds  for  the redemption 
1 Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit;  before  1  July  1969,  Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeitsvermittlung  ttnd  Arbeitslosenversicberung 
(Federal  Labour  Exchange  and  Unemployment  Insurance Office). 
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of debt (point  85)  or for  "transfer into  an  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserve".  If 
the Federal Minister  of Finance,  acting  under Section  6( 1) of the  Act  makes  the 
use  of  certain  appropriations,  certain  building  and  construction  starts  and  the 
acceptance  of  commitments  extending  into future  fiscal  years  subject  to  his  ap-
proval,  he  is  bound to  use  the  funds  thus  released  either for  the  redemption of 
debt  or for  payment  into  the  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserve.  These  provisions 
also  apply to  the Lander, mutatis mutandis (sec.  14  of the Act). If it is  necessary 
to prevent a disruption of general economic  equilibrium,  the Federal Government 
with  the  approval  of  the  Bundesrat  may  order  the  compulsory  payment,  within 
specified  limits,  of Federal  Government  and  Lander  funds  into  the  reserve  (sec. 
15( 1) of  the  Act).  Section  15( 4)  of  the  Act  also  binds  the  Federal  Government 
and  the  Lander  to  make  payments  into the anti-cyclical  equalization  reserves  out 
of the  tax receipts  that have  accrued  to them through  the increase in the rates of 
income  tax  and corporation  tax (see  point 79). 
The  funds  paid  into  the  compulsory  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserves  may  be 
released  only  through  statutory  decree  by  the  Federal  Government  with  the 
agreement  of the Bundesrat  and  only  for  the purpose  of preventing  a  slackening 
of  general  economic  activity  that  would  endanger  the  basic  aims  of  economic 
policy (sec.  15(5) of the Act). Nor may  the reserves built up on a voluntary basis 
be used for  purposes other than for promoting a revival in economic activity [sec. 
7(1) read with sees.  5(3) and 6(2) of the Act to Promote Economic  Stability and 
Growth]. 
Public debt policy 
85.  Together  with  the  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserve,  the  most  important  in-
strument of  an anti-cyclical budget policy is  to ensure that the borrowing or debt 
repayment  operations  of  the  public  authorities  are  appropriate  to  the  current 
economic  trend.  Where  the  general  level  of economic  activity weakens  in  a  way 
that  endangers  the  general  basic  aims  of  economic  policy  (sec.  1 of  the  Act  to 
Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth),  the  Federal  Government  may  order 
that additional funds  be spent  (sec.  6(2) of the Act).  This  additional expenditure 
is  subject  to  approval  by  the  Bundestag  (sec.  8  of  the  Act).  If the funds  from 
the  anti-cyclical  equalization  reserve  are  not  sufficient,  the  Federal  Minister  of 
Finance  may  raise  additional  loans  of  up  to  DM 5,000  million,  over  and  above 
the  borrowing  powers  conferred  under  the  Budget  Act.  Where  appropriate,  the 
loans are to be raised through issues of money-market paper (sec.  6(3) of the Act). 
Limits on public demand for credit 
86.  Under  the  Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth  the  Federal Go-
vernment has  been empowered on the basis of statutory decrees  adopted with the 
approval  of  the  Bundesrat,  to curtail borrowing by the  Federal Government,  the 
Lander, the local authorities and communal associations, and also  the public special 
funds  and  the administrative associations  of local  authorities (sec.  19  of the Act). 
87.  Sec.  20  of the Act  authorizes  the Federal Government  to do  this  by placing 
an  upper  limit  on the  amount  that may  be borrowed.  This  ceiling  must be such 
that  the  authority  or body involved  is  still  entitled,  per budget  years,  to  take  a 
minimum volume of credit equalling  80 % of the average annual borrowing during 
the  past  five  years,  with  specified  credits  (such  as  cash  advances  and  loans  to 
112 Act  to  Promote  Economic  Stability  and  Growth 
provide  working funds)  not counting towards  the ceiling.  In the case of the local 
authorities,  the  ceiling  may  be  lowered  to  70%. The  Lander  must  allocate  the 
amounts thus released to such local authorities as  have  to make  particularly urgent 
investments. 
88.  Within  the  upper  limit  placed  on  borrowing,  the  authorities  may  stipulate 
that borrowings  of  a certain  type  and  amount  (particularly loan  issues  and  loans 
against  promissory notes)  may  be raised only  in conformity with a time-table and 
only  on  certain  terms.  This  time-table  is  drawn  up  by  the  Council  on  Economic 
Trends,  taking  account  of the  situation  on  the  capital  market. 
89.  The  validity  of  a  statutory  decree  curtailing  borrowing  may  not  exceed  one 
year. The Federal Government is required to inform the Bundestag of  the adoption 
of  the statutory  decree  and  if asked  to revoke  it (within  6  weeks  of  the  pro-
mulgation  of  the  decree)  must  do  so  immediately. 
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113 TABLE  1 
Banking  groups  and  volume  of business  done  by  them 
End of  1970 
-·--------------------------------------------------·~-----------------------------
Banking group 
Commercial  banks 
Large banks 
Regional  banks and  other commercial  banks 
Private bankers 
Central giro  institutions 
(including Deutsche  Girozentrale) 
Savings  banks 
Central institutions of  credit  cooperatives 
(including Deutsche  Genossenschaftskasse) 
Credit  cooperatives  (Schulze-Delitzsch) 
Credit  cooperatives  (Raiffeisen) 
Memorandum  item 
Credit  cooperatives  (Raiffeisen)  including  those  not 
required to submit returns 
Mortgage  banks 
Private mortgage  banks 
Public mortgage banks 
Instalment credit institutions 
Banks with special functions 
Postal  Giro  and  Postal  Savings  Bank offices 
All banking groups  (2) 
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Volume  of  business  (1) 
DM  million 
203,609 
83,565 
99,196 
20,848 
129,965 
187,608 
31,375 
34,853 
28,189 
(46,100) 
111,583 
53,666 
57,917 
8,919 
68,957 
15,680 
820,738 
as a  percentage 
of all banking 
groups 
24.8 
10.2 
12.1 
2.5 
15.8 
22.9 
3.8 
4.3 
3.4 
(5.5) 
13.6 
6.5 
7.1 
1.1 
8.4 
1.9 
100.-
(1)  Items: Balance-sheet total plus the following items: own drawings in circulation discounted and credited to the bor-
rowers in account, endorsement liabilities on rediscounted bills of exchange, bills from bill holdings sent out before ma-
turity for collection. 
(2)  All institutions furnishing returns for bank statistics. 
114 TABLE  2 
Financial  asset  formation  by  domestic  non-financial  sectors  (1) 
DM  '000 million  o/o 
Item 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
(p)  (p)  (p) 
---------------------------
1. Cash holdings and 
sight deposits  1.42  964  6.45  10.48  16.99  3.1  17.2  10.2  13.6  18.6 
2. Time  deposits  (2)  7.38  7.46  14.25  14.64  12.96  16.3  13.3  22.5  19.0  14.Z 
3. Savings  deposits  17.25  18.41  21.95  20.94  20.43  38.0  32.8  34.6  27.2  22.4 
4. Funds placed with 
building and loan 
associations  4.66  2.81  2.69  4.30  5.90  10.3  5.0  4.2  5.6  6.5 
5.  Funds placed with 
the insurance sys-
tern  (3)  6.12  6.72  7.56  8.28  8.23  13.5  12.0  11.9  10.8  9.() 
6. Acquisition of mon-
ey-market  paper  0.58  0.12  0.16  -0.15  1.21  1.3  0.2  0.3  -0.2  1.3 
7.  Acquisition  of  se-
curities  (4)  5.46  4 79  7.83  13.03  15.25  12.0  8.5  12.3  16.9  16.7 
8.  Other claims  2.54  6.24  2.54  5.48  10.17  5.6  11.1  4.0  7.1  11.Z 
------------------------------
Total  45.40  56.19  63.43  77.00  91.14  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Tables and explanatory notes on the capital finance account of the Deutsche Bundesbank for 1960 to 1969, July 
1970; Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank,  May  1971. 
(1)  Households, enterprises (including housing but excluding banks and other institutional investors) and public author-
ities; discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding. 
(2)  Including funds chan,nelled through banks and public authority holdings in banks incorporated under public law. 
(3)  Including pension funds. 
(4)  Fixed-interest securities and shares. 
(p)  Provisional. 
115 TABLE 3 
Gross .  national  product  and  exports  of goods  and  services 
in  the Federal  Republic of Germany 
Gross  national  Balance  Exports  Exports  Trade balance  product at  Exports (1)  of service  Total  as a  percentage 
current  transactions  of columns  of GNP 
market prices  (fob)  Receipts  3  and 4  Period 
Column  5 
million  DM '000  DM  '000  DM '000 
DM '000  million  million  million  Column  2 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
1960  302.3  47.9  13.0  60.9  20.1. 
1961  332.6  51.0  12.9  63.9  19.2 
1962  360.1  53.0  14.3  67.3  18.7 
1963  384.0  58.3  15.0  73.3  19.1 
1964  420.9  64.9  16.5  81.4.  19.3 
1965  460.4  71.7  18.1  89.8  19.5 
1966  490.7  80.6  20.4  101.0  20.6· 
1967  494.6 (p)  87.0  22.2  109.2  22.1 
1968  538.9 (p)  99.6  23.6  123.2  22.9 
1969  602.8 (p)  113.6  26.3  139.9  23.2 
1970  679.0 (p)  125.3  29.5  154.8  22.8 
Source:  M3nthly R.ep;>rts of the Deutsche Bundesbank; Statistical Supplements to the Monthly Reports of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Series 3,  Balance of payments statistics. 
(1)  Special trade (i.e. excluding trade in free ports and bonded warehouses)  accOrding to official export statistics. 
(p) Provisional figures. 
116 Item  1963 
I.  Bank lending  to  domestic non-banks  + 26,844 
II.  Net  external  claims  +  3,264 
III.  Monetary  capital  formation  with  banks 
·from domestic sources  (1)  + 24,021 
IV.  Central  Bank  deposits  of  German  public 
authorities  - 607 
v.  Other influences  - 1,820 
---
VI.  Money and near-money  +  5,962 
Currency  in  circulation  and  sight  deposits 
( =  money stock)  +  4,874 
of  which:  Currency in  circulation  (2)  +  1,269 
Sight deposits  +  3,138 
Near-money  (time  deposits  of 
less than four  years)  +  467 
---
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
(1)  Excluding time deposits for  a  period of less  than four  years. 
~  (2)  Excluding banks' cash holdings  • 
........ 
TABLE  4 
Money  stock  and  its  determinants 
Increase ( +  ) or decrease (-) 
1964  1965  1966 
+ 30,194  + 34,165  + 28,203 
+  2,002  - 210  +  3,241 
+ 26,078  + 28,743  + 30,494 
- 851  - 1,111  - 529 
- 913  - 824  - 964 
------------
+  6,427  +  6,124  +  6,468 
+  6,056  +  5,499  +  515 
+  2,376  +  1,767  +  1,224 
+  3,023  ·+  3,805  - 130 
+  657  - 73  - 579 
(in  DM million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970 
+ 32,892  + 39,990  + 53,394  + 50,761 
+  5,123  + 11,249  - 3,208  + 14,653 
+ 26,577  + 41,877  + 37,968  + 36,049 
+  285  +  1,189  +  443  +  4,089 
+  373  - 951  - 574  - 8,768 
+ 14,185  + 18,150  + 14,548  + 16,508 
+ 11,526  +  7,222  + 11,201  +  8,790 
+  631  +  959  +  2,102  +  2,200 
+  7,671  +  4,572  +  3,861  +  6,590 
+  3,224  +  1,691  +  5,238  +  7,718 
-.  -- -~ foo.-.4  ...... 
00 
Item 
I.  l\Iarket factors 
1.  Currency in circulation (increase: -) 
2.  Non-banks' net balances with Bundesbank (increase: -) 
of which: 
Cash balances  (net)  of Federal  Government,  Llinder,  Equalization 
of Burdens Fund 
Special deposits in respect of anti-cyclical reserve, anti-cyclical sur· 
charge and Federal education loan 
3.  Public authorities' money-market indebtedness to banks and Bundes· 
bank (increase:  +) 
4.  Net foreign exchange holdings  (1) 
5.  Other factors 
Total 
II.  Credit policy factors 
1.  Minimum reserve required of banks  (2)  (increase: -) 
2.  Open-market  operations  with  domestic  non-banks  (3)  (purchases  by 
Bundesbank:  +) 
3.  Cuts in rediscount quotas 
Total 
TABLE  5 
Bank  liquidity 
(in DM '000 million) 
1970 
1969  1970  I 2nd qtr.  1st qtr.  3rd qtr. 
Changes during period, calculated from the averages  of the four bank week 
return dates in the month 
-2.2  -1.8  I 
+ 0.9  -3.0 
+ 0.6  + 2.6 
-0.1  -4.9 
-4.9  -0.8 
-6.0  +20.2 
+ 2.4  +  2.4 
-9.8  +16.9  I 
-0.5  -9.8 
-1.2  -2.3 
-3.0  -0.7 
-4.7  -12.8 
+  1.7 
-2.0 
-1.2 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-2.9 
+  1.5  ----
-2.5 
-2.1 
+ 0.1 
-0.4 
-2.4 
-0.7 
-1.0 
+ 0.1 
-1.3 
+ 0.1 
+  4.6 
+  0.7 
+  3.7 
-0.3 
--0.5 
-0.3 
-1.1 
-0.7  I 
-1.5 
+  0.0 
-1.0 
+  0.1 
+  8.2 
-0.2 
---~ 
+  5.9  I 
-6.2 
-0.6 
-6.8 
4th qtr. 
-2.2 
+ 1.5 
+ 3.7 
-1.7 
-0.2 
+10.3 
+  0.4 
+  9.8 
-1.2 
-1.3 
-2.5 ~ 
~ 
\0 
TABLE 5  (Continued) 
III. Increase ( +) or decrease (-)in bank liquidity, total (I plus II) =  change 
in free liquidity reserves  -14.5 
1.  Excess balances (4)  -0.3 
2.  Domestic money~market paper (5)  -7.4 
3.  Money-market investments abroad  (6)  + 3.3 
4.  Unused rediscount quotas  -8.2 
5.  Advances on securities (utilisation: -)  -1.9 
IV.  Banks' free liquidity reserves  (?) 
in DM '000  million  19.8 
as  %  of total deposits  (8)  6.8 
- ---~----------~---------- ----------
Source:  Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for  the Year  1970,  page 48. 
(1)  Net monetary reserves of Bundesbank and other banks' short-term money-market investments abroad. 
(2)  Excluding Federal Post Office. 
(3)  Including Federal Post Office. 
+  4.1  -4.9  +  2.6 
-0.4  -0.7  +  0.2 
+ 2.2  - 0.6  + 0.2 
+  0.3  -1.3  -0.2 
+ 1.7  -1.9  + 0.4 
+ 0.3  -0.4  + 2.0 
Position at end of period 
25.4  15.2  18.5 
7.8  5.3  6.3 
(4)  Difference between minimum reserve requirement and banks' total Central Bank balances on the average of the four bank week return dates. 
-0.9  + 7.3 
-0.5  +  0.6 
+ 0.5  +  2.1 
+ 0.8  +  1.0 
-0.2  + 3.4 
-1.5  + 0.2 
19.4  25.4 
6.4  7.8 
(5) Domestic Treasury bills and discountable Treasury bonds,  Storage Agency bills,  prime acceptances, B-ceiling bills of the Export Credit Company and mediumterm notes of domestic public issuers to 
the extent they are included in the Bundesbank's money-market regulating arrangements. 
(6)  Shorter-term claims on foreign banks (excluding foreign currency claims payable at sight), foreign Treasury bills and other foreign bills acquired as money-market investments (mainly bankers's accep-
tances). 
{7)  Excluding investments by the Post Office. 
(8)  Sight, time and savings deposits (excluding deposits for periods of four years and over) of nonbanks and foreign banks. TABLE 6 
Indebtedness  of the  public authorities  (*) 
Bundesbank credits 
Treasury  Discount- Tax 
End of  month  Total  able Treas- reserve 
Current  Special  bills  ury bonds  certificates 
account  credits 
advances  (1) 
Public  authorities,  total 
1965  Dec.  82,981  1,408  2,314  523  805  51 
1966  Dec.  92,291  1,164  2,505  1,196  2,447  51 
1967  Dec.  107,175  2,220  1,578  204  7,678  51 
1968  Dec.  115,870  1,344  783  150  8,603  47 
1969  Dec.  116,141  1,974  722  - 2,360  47 
1970  Dec. (e)  123,209  2,334  387  - 1,700  50 
Federal  Government 
1965  Dec.  33,017  921  2,314  523  670  -
1966  Dec.  35,581  667  2;505  1,196  2,272  -
1967  Dec.  43,468  2,062  1,578  204  7,475  -
1968  Dec.  47,192  1,344  783  150  8,317  -
1969  Dec.  45,360  1,790  722  - 2,360  -
1970  Dec.  47,323  1,915  387  - 1,700  -
Equalization  of  Burdens  Fund 
1965  Dec.  6,154  154  - - - -
1966  Dec.  6,358  54  - - - -
1967  Dec.  6;828  - - - - -
1968  Dec.  7,079  - - - - -
1969  Dec.  7,122  114  - - - -
1970  Dec.  6,824  108  - - - -
Source:  Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, April 1971. 
(*) Excluding public authorities' mutual indebtendness.  For data on the years 1950 to 1964 see Monthly Report of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, April 1967,  p. 24. 
(1) Special credits to, and claims on,. Federal Government. 
(e)  Partly estimated.  Discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding. 
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Medium-
term 
notes 
1,168 
1,259 
3,189 
4,044 
3,659 
3,250 
1,017 
1,210 
2,625 
3,240 
3,163 
2,900 
152 
11 
111 
211 
200 
100 Loan issues 
(2) 
11,195 
12,092 
14,230 
16,074 
16,266 
17,473 
6,274 
6,667 
7,284 
7,911 
8,324 
9,240 
1,697 
1,809 
1,795 
1,862 
1,709 
1,755 
Loans of  domestic 
non-banks  Commuta-
Bank  tion and  Equaliza- compensa- credits  Social  tion debt  tion  claims 
security  Other  (5) 
funds  (3) 
24,749  6,591  6,339  1,006  20,489 
29,519  7,245  7,868  997  20,336 
34,114  3,387  8,690  973  20,175 
42,536  6,957  9,221  926  19,902 
50,051  6,101  9,884  904  19,585 
56,991  5,715  10,938  865  19,332 
758  4,259  410  1,006  11,802 
676  4,879  535  997  11,808 
750  6,102  535  973  11,790 
5.421  4,891  751  926  11,703 
9,853  4,223  1,066  904  11,653 
11,800  4,019  1,680  865  11,605 
456  262  382  - -
501  287  423  - -
758  275  461  - -
957  223  460  - -
1,274  167  507  - -
1,337  105  567  - -
(2)  Excluding items in the issuers' portfolios; including Federal savings bonds. 
(3)  Including debt-register claims. 
(4)  Claims of foreign creditors, and debt denominated in foreign currency. 
(5)  Since end-1969 excluding items in the Federal Government's own portfolio. 
(in  DM million) 
Covering  Foreign 
claims  debt (4), (5) 
3,035  3,309 
3,238  2,376 
3,391  2,296 
3,331  1,951 
3,116  1,473 
2,819  1,356 
- 3,065 
- 170 
- 1,091 
- 1,755 
- 1,302 
- 1,213 
3,035  17 
3,238  34 
3,391  37 
3,331  35 
3,116  34 
2,819  33 
121 TABLE 6  (Continued) 
Bundesbank credits 
Treasury  Discoml.t- Tax  Medium-
End of month  Total  able Treas- reserve  term 
Current  Special  bills  ury bonds  certificates  notes 
account  credits 
advances  (1) 
E.R.P.  Special  Fund 
1965  Dec.  565  - - - - - -
1966  Dec.  560  - - - - - -
1967  Dec.  706  - - - - - -
1968  Dec.  1,075  - - - - - -
1969  Dec.  1,227  - - - - - -
1970  Dec.  1,296  - - - - - -
Lander  Governments 
1965  Dec.  17,401  333  - - 135  51  -
1966  Dec.  20,328  442  - - 175  51  38 
1967  Dec.  24,188  158  - - 203  51  453 
1968  Dec.  26,339  - - - 286  -47  593 
1969  Dec.  25,771  70  - - - 47  296 
1970  Dec. (e)  27,767  311  - - - 50  250 
Local  authorities 
1965  Dec.  25,844  - - - - - -
1966  Dec.  29,465  - - - - - -
1967  Dec.  31,986  - - - - - -
1968  Dec.  34,186  - - - - - -
1969  Dec.  36,663  - - - - - -
1970  Dec. (e)  40,000  - - - - - -
122 Loans of domestic 
non-banks  Commuta-
Loan issues  Bank  tion and  Equaliza- Covering  Foreign  compensa- (2)  credits  Social  tion debt  tion  claims  claims  debt (4), (5) 
security  Other  (5) 
funds  (3) 
- 65  - 500  - - - -
- 60  - 500  - - - -
- 206  - 500  - - - -
- 591  - 483  - - - -
- 777  - 450  - - - -
- 879  - 417  - - - -
2,646  3,514  836  1,031  - 8,687  - 168 
3,052  5,592  823  1,504  - 8,528  - 122 
4,452  7,593  820  1,949  - 8,385  - 123 
5,515  8,762  735  2,083  - 8,199  - 119 
5,477  9,067  673  2,108  - 7,932  - 101 
5,776  10,775  616  2,182  - 7,727  - 80 
578  19,957  1,232  4,017  - - - 60 
563  22,689  1,257  4,906  - - - 50 
699  24,806  1,191  5,245  - - - 45 
786  26,806  1,108  5,444  - - - 42 
756  29,080  1,037  5,754  - - - 35 
702  32,200  975  6,093  - - - 30 
123 TABLE  7 
In.debtedness  of the public authorities  by groups  of creditors 
Claims  on  the  public  authorities  at the  end  of  the  year 
DM '000 million 
Creditors 
1967  1968  1969 
1. Banking system 
a)  Bundesbank  13.1  11.2  12.0 
b)  Banks  57.4  68.5  70.1 
2.  Domestic non-banks 
a)  Social  security funds  9.8  8.6  6.8 
b)  Other (1)  24.5  25.5  25.6 
3.  Foreign  creditors  (e)  2.4  2.1  1.6 
Total  107.2  115.9  116.1 
1970 (e) 
11.6 
75.0 
6.3 
28.7 
1.6 
123.2 
as a  percentage of total indebtedness 
Creditors 
1. Banking system 
a)  Bundesbank 
b)  Banks 
2. Domestic non-banks 
a)  Social  security funds 
b)  Other (1) 
3. Foreign  creditors  (e) 
Total 
Source:  Annual Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
(1)  Public and private creditors (residual). 
(e)  Partly estimated. 
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1967 
12.2 
53.6 
9.1 
22.9 
2.2 
100.0 
1968  1969  ~970 (e) 
9.7  10.3  9.4 
59.2  60.4  60.9 
7.4  5.9  5.1 
21.9  22.0  23.3 
1.8  1.4  1.3 
100.0  100.0  100.0 TABLE 8 
Rates  for  discounts  and  advances  of Deutsche  Bundesbank  (*) 
and  special  interest  charged  for  failure  to  meet  minimum  reserve  requirement 
Discount rate  Rate for  advances 
Applicable from  (1),  (2)  on securities 
0/o  p.a. 
0/o  p.a. 
1948  July  1  5  6 
Dec.  1  5  6 
1949  May  27  4%  5% 
July  14  4  5 
1950  Oct.  27  6  7 
Nov.  1  6  7 
1951  Jan.  1  6  7 
1952  May  29  5  6 
Aug.  21  4%  5% 
1953  Jan.  8  4  5 
June  11  3%  4% 
1954  May  20  3  4 
1955  Aug.  4  3%  4% 
1956  March  8  4Yz  5% 
May  19  5%  6% 
Sep.  6  5  6 
1957  Jan.  11  4%  5% 
Sep.  19  4  5 
1958  Jan.  17  3%  4% 
June  27  3  4 
1959  Jan.  10  2 a/,  3 .,. 
Sep.  4  3  4 
Oct.  23  4  5 
1960  June  3  5  6 
Nov.  11  4  5 
1961  Jan.  20  3%  4% 
May  5  3  4 (3) 
1965  Jan.  22  3%  4% 
Aug.  13  4  5 
1966  May  27  5  6:Y4 
1967  Jan.  6  4%  57~ 
Feb.  17  4  5 
April  14  3%  4% 
May  12  3  4 
Aug.  11  3  3% 
1969  March 21  3  4 
April  18  4  5 
June  20  5  6 
Sep.  11  6  7% 
Dec.  5  6  9 
1970  March  9  7%  9% 
July  16  7  9 
Nov.  18  6%  8 
Dec.  3  6  7% 
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
{*)  Until July 31, 1957 rates of Bank deutscher Lander or Land Central Banks. 
(1  ). Also the rate for  cash advances. 
Special rate of interest 
charged to banks for failure 
to meet minimum reserve 
requirement 
% p.a.  above rate 
·for advances 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
(2) Until May 1956 lower rates also applied to foreign bills and bills to finance exports; fixed special rates were charged 
on certain credits to the Reconstruction Loan Corporation, which ran out at the end of 1958  (for details see footnotes to 
this table in the Monthly Report of'the Deutsche Bundesbank, Vol. 15, No 3, March 1963, p. 62). 
(3)  An allowance off % per annum was granted in respect  of the advances  on securities  utilized  by  banks  between 
December 10,  1964 and December 31,  1964. 
125 .Applicable 
from 
1961 Feb.  1 
March 1 
April  1 
June  1 
July  1 
Aug.  1 
Sep.  1 
Oct.  1 
Dec.  1 
1964 Aug.  1 
1965 Dec.  1 
1966 Jan.  1 
Dec.  1 
1967 March 1 
May  1 
July  1 
.Aug.  1 
Sep.  1 
1969 Jan.  1 
June  1 
Aug.  1 
Nov.  1 
Dec.  1 
1970 Jan.  1 
July  1 
Sep.  1 
Dec.  1 
1961 Feb.  1 (5) 
May  1 
1962 Feb.  1 
1964 April  1 
1967 Feb.  1 
March 1 
May  1 
July  1 
Aug.  1 
Sep.  1 
1968 Dec.  1 (5) 
1969 Jan.  1 (5) 
Feb.  1 (5) 
May  1 (5) 
June  1 (5) 
Aug.  1 (5) 
Nov.  1 
Dec.  1 
1970 Jan.  1 
April  1 
July  1 
Sep.  1 
Dec.  1 
Bank places 
1  I  2  I  3  I 
TABLE  9 
Reserve  ratios  (•\-) 
Sight liabilities 
I  Non-Bank places 
Reserve class 
4  I  1  I  2  I  3  I  4 
Liabilities to residents subject to the reserve requirement  (2) 
19.5  18  16.5  15  15  13.5  12  10.5 
18.2  16.8  15.4  14  14  12.6  11.2  9.8 
17.55  16.2  14.85  13.5  13.5  12.15  10.8  9.45 
16.25  15  13.75  12.5  12.5  11.25  10  8.75 
15.6  14.4  13.2  12  12  10.8  96  8.4 
14.95  13.8  12.65  11.5  11.5  10.35  9.2  8.05 
14.3  13.2  12.1  11  11  9.9  8.8  7.7 
13.65  12.6  11.55  10.5  10.5  9.45  8.4  7.35 
13  12  11  10  10  9  8  7 
14.3  13.2  12.1  11  11  9.9  8.8  7.7 
13  12  11  10  10  9  8  7 
14.3  13.2  12.1  11  11  9.9  8.8  7.7 
13  12  11  10  10  9  8  7 
11.7  10.8  9.9  9  9  8.1  7.2  6.3 
11.05  10.2  9.35  8.5  8.5  7.65  6.8  5.95 
10.15  9.35  8.6  7.8  7.8  7  6.25  5.45 
9.5  8.75  8.05  7.3  7.3  6.55  5.85  5.1 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
10.6  9.8  8.95  8.15  8.15  7.35  6.5  5.7 
11.65  10.75  9.85  8.95  8.95  8.05  7.15  6.25 
10.45  9.65  8.85  8.05  8.05  7.25  6.45  5.65 
9.45  8.7  8  7.25  7.25  6.55  5.8  5.1 
10.45  9.65  8.85  8.05  8.05  7.25  6.45  5.65 
12.05  11.1  10.2  9.25  9.25  8.35  7.4  6.5 
tl12.05  11.1  10.2  9.25  9.25  8.35  7.4  6.5 
13.8  12.7  11.65  10.6  10.6  9.55  8.5  7.4 
I 
I 
Liabilities to non-residents subject to the reserve requirement  (4) 
20.15  18.6  17.05  15.5  15.5  13.95  12.4  10.85 
30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
13  12  11  10  10  9  8  7 
30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
13  12  11  10'  10  9  8  7 
11.7  10.8  9.9  9  9  8.1  7.2  6.3 
11.05  10.2  9.35  8.5  8.5  7.65  6.8  5.95 
10.15  9.35  8.6  7.8  7.8  7  6.25  5.45 
9.5  8.75  8.05  7.3  7.3  6.55  5.85  5.1 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5.7  4.95 
9.25  8.5  7.8  7.1  7.1  6.4  5  .. 7  4.95 
13.8  12.7  11.65  10.6  10.6  9.55  8.5  7.4 
15.2  14.05  12.85  11.7  11.7  10.55  9.35  8.2 
10.45  9.65  8.85  8.05  8.05  7.25  6.45  5.65 
9.45  8.7  8  7.25  7.25  6.55  5.8  5.1 
10.45  9.65  8.85  8.05  8.05  7.25  6.45  5.65 
10.45  9.65  8.85  8.05  8.05  7.25  6.45  5.65 
12.05  11.1  10.2  9.25  9.25  8.35  7.4  6.5 
12.05  11.1  10.2  9.25  9.25  8.35  7.4  6.5 
13.8  12.7  11.65  10.6  10.6  9.55  8.5  7.4 
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Time liabilities 
1  I  2  I  3  I  4 
13.5  12  10.5  9 
12.6  11.2  9.8  8.4 
12.15  10.8  9.45  8.1 
11.25  10  8.75  7.5 
10.8  9.6  8.4  7.2 
10.35  9.2  8.05  6.9 
9.9  8.8  7.7  6.6 
9.45  8.4  7.35  6.3 
9  8  7  6 
9.9  8.8  7.7  6.6 
9  8  7  6 
9.9  8.8  7.7  6.6 
9  8  7  6 
8.1  7.2  6.3  5.4 
7.65  6.8  5.95  5.1 
7  6.25  5.45  4.7 
6.55  5.85  5.1  4.4 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.2!: 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.2!: 
7.35  6.5  5.7  4.9 
8.05  7.15  6.25  5.35 
7.25  6.45  5.65  4.85 
6.55  5.8  5.1  4.35 
7.25  6.45  5.65  4.85 
8.35  7.4  6.5  5.55 
8.35  7.4  6.5  5.55 
9.55  8.5  7.4  6.35 
13.95  12.4  10.85  9.3 
20  20  20  20 
9  8  7  6 
20  20  20  20 
9  8  7  6 
8.1  7.2  6.3  5.4 
7.65  6.8  5.95  5.1 
7  6.25  5.45  4.7 
6.55  5.85  5.1  4.4 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.25 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.25 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.25 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.25 
6.4  5.7  4.95  4.25 
9.55  8.5  7.4  6.35 
10.55  9.35  8.2  7 
7.25  6.45  5.65  4.85 
6.55  5.8  5.1  4.35 
7.25  6.45  5.65  4.85 
7.25  6.45  5.65  4.85 
8.35  7.4  6.5  5.55 
8.35  7.4  6.5  5.55 
9.55  8.5  7.4  6.35 
(*)  Reserve ratios applying until end-January 1961  were last published in the Monthly Report for May 1969. 
(1)  By way of divergence, from January I, 1969 the ratio for savings deposits with banks in reserve class 4 at Bank places 
is  equal to the respective reserve ratio for time liabilities. 
(2)  Since the coming into force of the External Trade and Payments Act, residents within the meaning of  section 4 of that 
Act. 
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(3)  These ratios had to be applied subject to the proviso that a bank's total minimum reserves (reserve for the total ofli-
abilities plus reserve for their increase) do not exceed 30% in the case of  sight liabilities, 20% in the case of  time liabilities %  of liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve  requirement 
avings deposits  Increase in liabilities 
Notes on reserve requirements 
for increase in liabilities 
Applicable 
lank  I  Non-Bank  Sight  I Time  I  Savings 
ces  (1)  places  liabilities  liabilities  deposits  from 
~. 7  7.25  1961 Feb.  1 
:.1  6.75  \  March 1 
r.s  6.5  April  1 
r.2  6  June  1 
~. 9  5.75  July  1 
j,6  5.5  Aug.  1 
).3  5.25  Sep.  1 
;  5  Oct.  1 
;  5  Dec.  1 
;.6  5.5  1964 Aug.  1 
).6  5•5  1965 Dec.  1 
).6  5.5  1966 Jan.  1 
L6  5.5  Dec.  1 
).94  4.95 
·)  no special ratios 
1967 March 1 
).61  4.68  May  1 
).15  4.3  July  1 
l.8  4  Aug.  1 
l.25  3.55  Sep.  1 
l.7  3.9  1969 Jan.  1 
).4  4.5  June  1 
).95  4.95  Aug.  1 
).35  4.45  Nov.  1 
l.8  4  Dec.  1 
).35  4.45 
I 
1970 Jan.  1 
).15  5.15  July  1 
I 
Additional  reserve  ratios  for  increase 
over  the  average  level  of  the  months 
).15  5.15  40  20  April to June  1970  (3)  Sep.  1 
7.05  5.9  no special ratios  Dec.  1 
I  I 
Reserve ratios for increase over the level 
I}  7.5  30  20  10  of November 30, 1959  (6)  1961 Feb.  1 
[)  10  May  1 
5  5  1962 Feb.  1 
[)  10  1964 April  1 
3.6  5.5  1967 Feb.  1  I~  5.94  4.95  no special ratios  March 1 
I~ 
5.61  4.68  May 
5.15  4.3  July 
:t.8  4  Aug. 
:1:.25  3.55  Sep. 
:1:.25  3.55  100  Reserve ratio for increase over the level  1968 Dec. 
l.7  3.9  100  of  November  15,  1968  (3)  1969 Jan. 
Reserve ratio for increase over the level 
:1:.7  3.9  100 
of  November  15,  1968  or  January  15, 
1969  (3)  Feb. 
i.7  3.9  100  Reserve ratio for increase over the level  May 
7.1  5.9  100  of April 15  or 30,  1969  (3)  June 
7.8  6.5  100  Aug. 
5.35  4.45  Nov. 
:1:.8  4  special ratios  Dec. 
5.35  4.45  ~  no  1970 Jan. 
Additional reserve ratio for increase over 
the level of March 6, 1970 or the average 
5.35  4.45  30  level  of  the return  dates  February,  7,  April 
6.15  5.15  30  15, 23 and 28, 1970  July 
Additional  reserve  ratios  for  increase 
6.15  5.15 
over the level  of the months  April to 
40  20  June  1970  (3)  Sep. 
Additional reserve ratio for increase over 
7.05 
the  level  of  the  return  dates  October 
5.9  30  23  and  31,  and  November  7  and  15,  Dec. 
1970 
and 10% in the case of  savings deposits. This regulation applied to the reserve for the increase in liabilities to non-residents 
until end-August 1969 only. 
(4)  Since the coming  into force of  the External Trade and Payments Act, non-residents within the meaning of  section 4 of that  Act. 
(5) These ratios only applied to liabilities up to the basic level listed in the column "Notes on the reserve requirements 
for increase in liabilities". 
(6)  From July 1960 to end-January 1962  these ratios also applied to the increase over the level of May 31, 1960 incus-
tomers' drawings on credits opened with third parties abroad.  Up to this level the liabilities in question remained exempt 
from the reserve requirement during the period mentioned. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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00 
From August  1959 to June 1968 
TABLE  9a 
Minimttm  reserve  classes  (*) 
Reserve  class  Banks with liabilities subject to the reserve  requirement  Reserve class 
(including  savings deposits) 
1  of  DM  300  million  and over  1 
2  of  DM  30  to under 300  million  2 
3  of  DM  3  to under 30  million  3 
4  under DM  3  million  4 
-~~----
&urce:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Since  July 1968 
Banks with liabilities subject to the reserve requirement 
(including  savings  deposits) 
of  DM  1,000  million  and over 
of  DM  100  to under 1,000 million 
of  DM  10  to under 100  million 
under DM  10  million 
-~~-------
(*} ..  The reserve class into which any bank is to be placed is determined by the amount of its liabilities subject to the reserve requirement in the preceding month. ~ 
N 
\0 
TABLE  10 
Public  authorities  money-market  paper  in  circulation  (*) 
Public authorities 
Position  Treasury bills  Discountable 
at end  Total  Treasury bonds 
of  year 
Total 
Federal  Federal 
Total  Govern- Lander  Govern- Total  Lander 
ment  ment 
1958  1,834  545  - - - 311  - 311 
1959  1,727  716  65  65  - 394  230  164 
1960  1,987  1.151  - - - 986  881  106 
1961  1,578  541  - - - 441  408  34 
1962  1,523  533  - - - 480  479  1 
1963  1,541  452  - - - 401  401  -
1964  1,748  598  - - - 547  547  -
1965  2,463  1,378  523  523  - 805  670  135 
1966  4,687  3,693  1,196  1,196  - 2,447  2,272  175 
1967  8,684  7,933  204  204  - 7,678  7,475  203 
1968  9,327  8,800  150  150  - 8,603  8,317  286 
1969  3,308  2,407  - - - 2,360  2,360  -
1970  2,750  1,750  - - - 1,700  1,700  -
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
(*)  Excluding mobilisation and liquidity paper, Storage Agency bills, and Federal Railways' trade bills. 
(1)  Land of Bavaria. 
Tax 
reserve 
certifi-
cates (1) 
Lander 
234 
256 
164 
100 
53 
51 
51 
51 
51 
51 
47 
47 
50 
(2)  Treasury bonds of  the Federal Railways deposited as security for loans.  Discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding. 
Federal Railways and  Federal Post Office 
Treasury  Discountable 
bills  Treasury bonds 
Total 
Federal  Federal  Federal 
Railways  Railways  Post Office 
1,289  399  590  300 
1,012  297  445  270 
837  199  445  192 
1,037  182  590  264 
990  187  571  232 
1,089  344  445  300 
1,150  400  450  300 
1,084  342  450  292 
994  256  450  288 
751  1  450  300 
527  1  226  300 
900  200  400  300 
1,000  300  400  300 
(in  DM million) 
Memo  item: 
Earmarked 
Treasury 
bonds  (2) 
382 
429 
442 
521 
585 
619 
522 
634 
708 
740 
665 
743 
492 Applicable from 
1958 Jan.  2 
Jan.  6 
Jan.  17 
April  15 
May  30 
June  27 
July  11 
Aug.  11 
Oct.  28 
1959 Jan.  10 
April  9 
April  15 
Sep.  4 
Sep.  23 
Sep.  30 
Oct.  16 
Oct.  23 
Oct.  28 
Dec.  21 
1960 Feb.  29 
March  3 
June  3 
Nov.  2 
Nov.  3 
Nov.  11 
Dec.  20 
1961  Jan.  20 
Feb.  9 
I!'eb,  14 
March  3 
March  8 
March 17 
March 23 
April  26 
May  5 
Oct.  4 
Oct.  20 
1962 Jan.  4 
March 30 
April  13 
June  6 
July  16 
Aug,  1 
Oct.  3 
1963  Nov.  25 
1965 Jan.  22 
Aug.  13 
1966 Jan.  7 
Feb.  23 
March  4 
May  27 
Dec.  30 
1967 Jan.  6 
Jan.  17 
Jan.  20 
I!'eb.  17 
April  14 
May  8 
May  10 
May  12 
June  2 (1) 
1969 April  18 
June  20 
Sep.  12 
Dec.  8 
1970 March  9 
July  16 
Aug.  4 
Sep.  9 
Nov.  18 
Dec.  1 
Dec.  3 
Dec.  30 
TABLE  11 
Rates  of the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  applying  to  sales 
of money-market  paper  in  the open  market 
(% p.a.) 
Treasury bills  of 
Discountable Treasury bonds  Federal Government 
and Federal  of Federal Government, Federal 
Railways  Railways and Federal Post Office 
running for  running for 
30 to 59  60 to  90  6  12  18  24 
days  days  months  months  months  months 
3  3/8  3  1/2  3  3/4  4  4  1/4  4  1/2 
3  1/4  3  3/8  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  3/8 
3  1/8  3  1/4  3  1/2  3  3/4  4  1/8  4  3/8 
3  1/8  3  1/4  3  1/2  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8 
3  1/8  3  1/4  3  1/2  3  5/8  3  3/4  4 
2  5/8  2  3/4  3  3  1/8  3  1/4  3  1/2 
2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  3  1/8  3  3/8 
2  3/8  2  1/2  2  3/4  3  3  1/8  3  3/8 
2  1/4  2  3/8  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  3  1/4 
2  1/8  2  1/4  2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  1/8 
2  2  1/8  2  3/8  2  1/2  2  3/4  3 
1  7/8  2  2  1/4  2  3/8  2  5/8  2  7/8 
2  3/8  2  1/2  2  3/4  3  3  1/4  3  1/2 
2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  3  1/4  3  1/2 
2  5/8  2  3/4  3  3  1/8  3  3/8  3  5/8 
2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  1/8  3  3/8  3  5/8 
3  1/2  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  1/4  4  1/2 
3  1/2  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  1/4  4  3/8 
3  5/8  3  3/4  4  4  1/4  4  3/8  4  1/2 
3  3/4  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  3/8  4  1/2  4  5/8 
3  7/8  4  4  1/4  4  1/2  4  5/8  4  3/4 
4  3/4  4  7/8  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8  5  1./2 
4  5/8  4  3/4  5  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8 
4  3/8  4  1/2  4  3/4  4  7/8  5  5  1/8 
3  7/8  4  4•1/4  4  3/8  4  1/2  4  5/8 
3  5/8  3  3/4  4  4  1/8  4  1/4  4  3/8 
3  1/8  3  1/4  3  1/2  3  5/8  3  3/4  3  7/8 
3  3  1/8  3  3/8  3  1/2  3  5/8  3  3/4 
2  7/8  3  3  1/4  3  3/8  3  1/2  3  5/8 
2  3/4  2  7/8  3  1/8  3  1/4  3  3/8  3  1/2 
2  5/8  2  3/4  3  3  1/8  3  1/4  3  3/8 
2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3  3  1/8  3  1/4 
2  3/8  2  1/2  2  3,4  2  7,8  3  3  1,8 
2  1!4  2  3t8  2  5/8  2  3/4  2  7/8  3 
2  1/8  2  1/4  2  1/2  2  5/8  2  3/4  2  7/8 
2  2  1/8  2  3/8  2  1/2  2  5/8  2  3/4 
1  7/8  2  2  3/8  2  1/2  2  5/8  2  3/4 
1  3/4  1  7/8  2  1/4  2  3/8  2  5/8  2  3/4 
1  7/8  2  2  3/8  2  1/2  2  3/4  2  7/8 
2  2  1/8  2  1/2  2  5/8  2  7/8  3 
2  1/8  2  1/4  2  5/8  2  3/4  3  3  1/8 
2  1/4  2  3/8  2  3/4  2  7/8  3  1/8  3  1/4 
2  3/8  2  1,2  2  7t8  3  3  1/4  3  3/8 
2  1/2  2  5/8  3  3  1/8  3  3/8  3  1/2 
2  1/2  2  5/8  3  3  1/8  3  1/4  3  3/8 
3  3  1/8  3  5/8  3  3/4  4  4  1/8 
3  3/4  3  7/8  4  3/8  4  1/2  4  5/8  4  3/4 
3  7/8  4  4  7/8  5  5  1/8  5  1/4 
3  7/8  4  5  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8 
3  7/8  4  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8  5  1/2 
4  7/8  5  5  5/8  5  3/4  5  7/8  6 
4  5/8  4  3/4  5  3/8  5  1/2  5  5/8  5  3/4 
4  3/8  4  1/2  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8  5  1/2 
4  1/4  4  3/8  5  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8 
4  4  1/8  4  3/4  4  7/8  5  5  1/8 
3  5/8  3  3/4  4  3/8  4  1/2  4  5/8  4  3/4 
3  1/4  3  3/8  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  3/8  4  5/8 
3  1/4  3  3/8  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/4  4  1/2 
3  1/4  3  3/8  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8  4  3/8 
2  7/8  3  3  3/8  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8 
2  5/8(1)  2  3/4  3  3/8  3  5/8  3  7/8  4  1/8 
3  5/8  3  3/4  4  3/8  4  1/2  4  5/8  4  3/4 
4  5/8  4  3/4  5  1/8  5  1/4  5  3/8  5  1/2 
5  5/8  5  3/4  6  6  1/8  6  1/4  6  1/4 
5  5/8  5  3/4  6  1/4  6  3/8  6  1/2  6  5/8 
6  7/8  7  7  3/4  7  5/8  7  1/2  7  3/8 
6  5/8  6  3/4  7  3/4  7  5/8  7  1/2  7  3/8 
6  5/8  6  3/4  7  7/8  7  3/4  7  5/8  7  1/2 
6  5/8  6  3/4  7  3/4  7  5/8  7  1/2  7  3/8 
6  1/8  6  1/4  7  1/2  7-3/8  7  1/4  7  1/8 
6  1/8  6  1/4  7  1/4  7  1/8  7  6  7/8 
5  5/8  5  3/4  7  6  7/8  6  3/4  6  5/8 
5  5/8  5  3/4  6  3/4  6  5/8  6  1/2  6  3/8 
Source:  Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Storage 
Agency bills 
running for 
30 to 59  60  to  90 
days  days 
3  1/2  3  5/8 
3  3/8  3  1/2 
3  1/4  3  3/8 
3  1/4  3  3/8 
3  1/4  3  3/8 
2  3/4  2  7/8 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
2  1/2  2  5/8 
2  3/8  2  1/2 
2  1/4  2  3/8 
2  1/8  2  1/4 
2  2  1/8 
2  1/2  2  5/8 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
2  3/4  2  7/8 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
3  5/8  3  3/4 
3  5/8  3  3/4 
3  3/4  3  7/8 
3  7/8  4 
4  4  1/8 
4  7/8.  5 
4  3/4  4  7/8 
4  1/2 .  4  5/8 
4  4  1/8 
3  3/4  3  7/8 
3  1/4  3  3/8 
3  1/8  3  1/4 
3  3  1/8 
2  7/8  3 
2  3/4  2  7/8 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
2  1,2  2  5,8 
2  3/8  2  1/2 
2  1/4  2  3/8 
2  1/8  2  1/4 
2  2  1/8 
1  7/8  2 
2  2  1/8 
2  1/8  2  1/4 
2  1/4  2  3/8 
2  3/8  2  1/2 
2  1/2  2  5/8 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
2  5/8  2  3/4 
3  1/8  3  1/4 
3  7/8  4 
4  4  1j8 
4  4  1/8 
4  4  1/8 
5  5  1/8 
4  3/4  4  7/8 
4  1/2  4  5(8 
4  3/8  4  1/2 
4  1/8  4  1/4 
3  3/4  3  7/8 
3  3/8  3  1/2 
3  3,8  3  1,2 
3  3/8  3  1/2 
3  3  1/8 
2  3/4  2  7/8 
3  3/4  3  7/8 
4  3/4  4  7/8 
5  3/4  5  7/8 
5  7/8  6 
7  1/8  7  1/4 
6  7/8  7 
6  7/8  7 
6  7/8  7 
6  3/8  6  1/2 
6  3/8  6  1/2 
5  7/8  6 
5  7/8  6 
(1)  To facilitate banks' liquidity arrangements for December 1967,  as from October 25  Federal Government Treasury 
bills falling due by the end of December were sold at the following rates: from October 25: 2%, from November 9: I!%, 
from November 10: I!%. 
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1 
1 
.Applicable from 
958  Oct.  6 
959  Jan.  23 
Feb.  12 
March  6 
June  1 
July  8 
July  11 
July  17 
Oct.  24: 
Oct.  29 
Nov.  3 
Nov.  18 
Dec.  1 
960  Jan.  11 
Jan.  14: 
.Aug.  24:  (1) 
Sep.  26 
961  Jan.  20 
Feb.  3 
Feb.  9 
Feb.  13 
Aug.  14 
Dec.  15 
962  Jan.  2 
Jan.  8 
Jan.  10 
Feb.  14 
March  8 
March 30 
July  16 
Minimum 
and maximum 
period (months) 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-3 
1-6 
1 
2-6 
1 
2-6 
1 
2-6 
1-6 
2-6 
3-6 
1/2-6 
1/2-6 
1/2-6 
1/2-6 
1/2-6 
1/2-6 
1-6 
1-6 
1-6 
1-6 
1-6 
2-6 
1-6 
1-2 
over  2-6 
over  1-2 
over  2-6 
~---- - -------------
TABLE  12 
Rates  of Deutsche  Bundesbank  for  U.S.  dollar  swaps  with  domestic  banks  (*) 
Discount (-)  Minimum  Discount (-)  Minimum  Discount (-) 
premium ( +)  .Applicable from  and maximum  premium(+)  .Applicable from  and maximum  premium ( +> 
in  % p.a.  period (months)  in  % p.a.  period (months)  in  % p.a. 
at par  .Aug.  1  over  1-2  -1  Nov.  12  61-90  -23/4 
-1/8  over  2-6  -3/4  Nov.  13  61-90  -3 
-1/4  Sep.  24  over  1-2  -3/4  Nov.  15  (4)  61-90  -31/2 
-3/8  over  2-6  -1/2  Nov.  25  (5)  61-90  -3 
-1/2  1963  Jan.  7  over  1-2  -1  Dec.  2  30-90  -23/4 
-5/8  over  2-6  -3/4  Dec.  30  30-60  -3 
-3/4  61-90  -31/4 
-7/8  1964  March 10  (2)  3-6  -1/2  1969  Jan.  2  30-90  -31/4 
-1/2  July  13  3-6  -1/4  Jan.  3  30-79  -31/2 
-1/2  80-90  -31/4 
-1/4  1967  Nov.  27  (3)  up to 3 months (not  -13/4  Jan.  7  30-79  -33/4 
-1/2  before Jan. 2  1968)  80-90  -31/2 
-1/8  Nov.  29  from Jan. 2 to Jan.  -21/4  Jan.  27  30-79  -4 
-1/2  31,  1968  up  to  3  -2  80-90  -37/8 
at par  Dec.  1  months from Jan 2  -21/2  Feb.  12  30-90  -41/8 
at par  to Jan. 31,  1968 up  -21/4  March  3  80-90  -41/2 
at par  Dec.  28  to 3 months  1-3  -31/2  April  22  80-90  -4 
at par  1968  March  8  1-3  -2  April  24:  60-79  -41/2 
+1  March 11  1-3  -21/2  80-90  -4 
+  11/2  March 12  1-3  -3  May  7  60-79  -51/2 
+1  March 15  1-3  -4  80-90  (
6
)  -5  (6) 
March 22  1-3  -31/4  May  21  60-79  -6  +  1/2  80-90  -51/2  +  1/4  May  24:  2-3  -33/4 
at par  June  28  2-3  -4  June  2  60-90  -6 
-1/4  Aug.  29  2-3  -3  June  10  60-90  -7 
at par  Aug.  30  2-3  -21/2  June  11  60-90  -71/2 
-1/4  Sep.  3  1-3  -21/2  July  17  60-90  -51/2 
-3/8  Sep.  11  1-3  -23/4  July  21  60-90  -5 
-1/2  Oct.  2  B0-89  -3  July  25  60-90  -45/8 
-1/2  90  -23/4  July  28  60-90  -41/4 
-1/2  Oct.  10  30-80  -3  Aug.  5  60-90  -4 
-1/2  81-90  -21/4  Aug.  14  60-90  -5 
-1/4  Oct.  11  30-80  -31/4  Aug.  29  60-90  -4 
-3/4  81-90  -23/4  Sep.  1  60-90  -33/4 
-1/2  Nov.  7  30-60  -31/4  Sep.  18  60-90  (7)  -4 (7) 
61-90  -21/2 
(*) The fixing of swap rates does not necessarily mean that the Bundesbank regularly concluded swaps at these rates; it also happened that the Bank discontinued such operations for a time.  Unless stated 
otherwise, the rates applied only to money-market investments abroad. 
(1)  From August 24 to November 11,  1960 also to facilitate financing ofimport and transit transactions. 
(2)  From March 10,  1964 to November 26,  1967  only for acquisition of U.S.$ Treasury bills. 
(3)  From November 27,  1967  to November 14,  1968  on earmarking for specific purposes. 
(4)  From November 15  to November 22,  1968  only for  acquisition of U.S.$ Treasury bills. 
(5)  From November 25,  1968  to September 29,  1969  only for  money invested abroad  • 
(6)  From May 7  (13.00 hrs)  to May 20,  1969 the Bundesbank was not in the market. 
(1)  From September 29,  1969  (11.30 hrs)  to March 31,  1971  swaps were suspended  • Part three 
MONETARY  POLICY  IN FRANCE CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC FACTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
1.  The  aim  of monetary  policy - more  particularly  as  it applies  to  the  granting 
of credit - is to control the process by which the economy is supplied with means 
of payment, to the maximum extent compatible with achievement of the economic 
and social  objectives set by the public authorities. In France this policy makes use 
of  a  v.ride  range  of  instruments. 
However, the procedures utilized can be fully  understood only if the organization 
- both structural and institutional-of the French monetary and financial  system 
has  first  been described. 
The action taken bears on liquidity in both its aspects:  the liquidity of the banking 
system and the liquidity of the economy. Some indication of the concepts of liquid-
ity  as  applied  by  the  monetary authorities seems  therefore  to be needed too. 
These preliminary comments are intended to facilitate analysis of the means brought 
to bear to guide or limit the monetary activities of the banks and, in this  way, to 
control  the  conditions  for  the financing  of  the  economy  in general.  In order to 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  their  action  the  monetary  authorities  have  in recent 
years  supplemented  and  perfect  the  instruments  used  to  control  bank  liquidity; 
more recently,  by restricting the scope of rediscounting and extending their money 
market intervention policy,  they have tried to give  more flexibility to the methods 
for providing  the  banks  with  liquidity.  . 
In the interim,  at times of severe inflationary strain, they have  had to experiment 
with direc;:t  action on the volume of credit supplied by the banks to the economy. 
Section I · Institutional framework and structural aspects 
2.  In order  to  bring  out  the  institutional  and  structural  features  of  the  French 
banking  and  monetary  system,  the  bodies  responsible  for  implementing  credit 
policy  must  be  distinguished  from  the  banking  or  financial  institutions  whose 
business it is to allocate loans to or manage the deposits and savings of individuals, 
businesses,  etc. 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
3.  In accordance  with the general line  laid down by the public  authorities, credit 
policy  is  implemented by  the Bank of France  ("Banque de  France") and  the  Na-
tional  Credit Council ("Conseil National du Credit") with the aid  of the Banking 
Control  Commission  ("Commission  de  Controle  des  Banques" ). 
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Para.  I-1:  The  Bank  of  France 
4.  The Bank of France has very wide responsibilities for the supervision and control 
of money  and credit. Its authority and independence are guaranteed by its Statute. 
The President of the Republic appoints the Governor and the two Deputy-Govern-
ors by decree adopted in the Cabinet. Following reforms made from 1936 onwards, 
the  members  of  the  General Council of  the Bank, with the exception of the one 
member  elected  by  the  staff,  are  appointed  by  law  or chosen  by  the  authorities 
on the strength of offices  they  hold or responsibilities  they  bear at national level. 
The Law of  2 December 194  5  conferred on the Bank the status of a nationalized 
establishment by  transferring  the ownership of its capital to the State. 
The Bank keeps  in constant touch  with the  Government in carrying out its mis-
sion,  particularly  as  regards  its  participation  in  the  management  of  the  Govern-
ment  accounts  and  of  the  official  foreign  exchange  reserves.  In  addition,  it is 
closely  associated with the National Credit Council;  its Governor is  Deputy Chair-
man. of the Council and its various  departments lend their assistance to the latter. 
In the  same  way,  the  Bank  of France  seconds  secretarial  staff  and  inspectors  to 
the  Banking  Control  Commission,  over  which,  moreover,  its  Governor  presides. 
5.  In  the  credit  field  the  Bank  of  France  employs  two  kinds  of  intervention, 
inseparable in their application but different in nature and basis. 
In  the  first  place,  it plays  the  traditional  role  of  rediscounting  institution  and, 
more  generally,  supplier  of  liquidity,  with  which  it is  invested  by  its  Statute. 
The facilities  it provides  are  confined  to bank and financial  institutions and  take 
the form  either of discounting  on predetermined conditions or-at present, pre-
dominantly - of  flexible  intervention  on  the  money .market.  The  Bank  thus  re-
gulates liquidity by general or selective measures  concerned both with the volume 
of  resources  made  available  to  the  banking  system  and  with interest  rates. 
In the second place, the Bank of France has regulatory functions, in clearly defined 
fields,  which  are  delegated  to  it by  the  National  Credit  Council  or. the  public 
authorities. It has indeed the powers  to implement the technical procedures of the 
rules  adopted  and  make  the  necessary  adjustment  with  the  frequency  and  speed 
which  circumstances  sometimes  demand.  It is  thus  the  Bank  which,  for  instance, 
specifies  the  ratios  and terms  of application of  the minimum reserve  system or of 
the  minimum  holdings  of  medium-term  credit  paper.  By  virtue  of  the  decree 
of 5 February 1970, it can  also  set a limit to the volume of loans  to the  economy 
or require banks, particularly those  which have  exceeded their lending ceilings,  to 
place  special  interest-free  deposits  with  it. 
6.  The  Bank's  contribution  to  the  management  of public  finance  is  subjected  to 
very  strict rules,  and  is  mainly  of  two  kinds: 
- Loans  and  advances  to  the  Government,  the  ceiling  for  which  must  be  fixed 
by  agreements  ratified  by  law. 
- Discounting  of  so-called  pledged  bonds  ("obligations cautionnees,), which are 
certificates  representing  debts  to  the  Government on  account  of turnover  tax 
and indirect taxes. 
In addition,  the  acquisition  or  taking  "en pension" 1  of  short-term Treasury bills 
t Under  an  agreement  to  sell  back  to  the  former  owner. 
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which the Bank carries out as  part of its intervention on the money  market helps 
the  management  of  the  Government accounts  to  the extent that it facilitates  the 
banks'  tendering for  Treasury bills.  These operations  are nevertheless part of the 
general  context of  the Bank's intervention in the money  market and do  not differ 
fundamentally from the mobilization of commercial paper. 
7.  In the  sphere of  external finance,  the  Bank's  role  is  to  manage  the  Exchange 
Stabilization  Fund ("Fonds  de  Stabilisations  des  Changes")  on behalf of  the  Go-
vernment  and  in  accordance  with  general  instructions  given  by  the  Minister  of 
Finance.  · 
The fluctuations  in the gold  and foreign exchange reserves  of the Bank of France, 
the  trend of advances  to the Exchange  Stabilization Fund or of the latter's  franc 
holding, and the variations in short-term liabilities to non-residents, constitute one 
of the basic facts of domestic monetary policy and, more particularly, credit policy. 
Para.  I-2:  National  Credit  Council 
8.  The National  Credit  Council,  set up by  the law  of  2nd December  1945, has 
been invested  with very  wide  powers  giving  it,  on  the one  hand,  a consultative 
and initiatory  role  in everything concerning  money  and credit and,  on  the other, 
the  right  to  take  decisions  in  matters  affecting  credit  control  and  banking 
organization. 
The  Council  is  presided  over  by  the  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Finance 
and  its  Deputy Chairman  is  the  Governor  of  the Bank  of  France,  who,  in  fact, 
generally  takes  the  chair  at meetings.  It has  a  further  45  members  representing 
Government Departments, banking  and financial  bodies, users of credit and trade 
union  organizations. The principality of Monaco  is  represented in the Council for 
any  particular discussions  of decisions  of concern to it. 
9.  In  the  exercise  of  its  powers  of  control  the  National  Credit  Council  takes 
individual  decisions.  The most  important of  these  concern  inscription on the  list 
of  banks  and  registration  of  financial  establishments. 
In monetary policy  matters it acts  through decisions  of a general nature prepared 
in close liaison with the Bank of France and the public authorities. These decisions 
apply in various  spheres, for example,  the  system of interest rates, the control of 
bank liquidity (minimum  reserves  and  minimum  portfolio of  medium-term  paper) 
or,  again,  the  rules  governing  of consumer credit. 
Para.  I-3:  The  Banking  Control  Commission 
10.  By  the  law  of  13  June  1941;  which  set  it up,  the  Banking  Control  Com-
mission  was  given  the  task  of  supervising  the  implementation  of  the  rules  and 
regulations  governing  banking  and  of  penalizing  any  infringements  noted.  The 
Commission,  whose  chairman  is  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  France,  normally 
includes  four  other  permanent  members,  of whom  two are  senior  civil  servants, 
one  a  representative  of  the banks  and  one  a  representative  of  their  staffs.  A  re-
presentative  of  the financial  establishments  also  takes  part when  the business  in 
hand  concerns  this  category  of institution. 
11.  As  part  of  its  supervisory  function,  the  Commission  has  been vested  with 
certain  regulatory  powers.  It  is,  in  particular,  responsible  for  determining  the 
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conditions  for  impletnenting  the  banking  ratios  provided  for  in  the  regulations 
in force to ensure the banks' solvency, only one of which had actually been applied 
until recently:  this is  the liquidity ratio which is  a minimum ratio between liquid 
and  mobilizable  assets  on  the  one  hand  and  short-term  liabilities  on  the  other. 
'Since  30  September  1969  the  banks  have  been  required  to  observe  a  ratio 
described as  that for  "granting non-rediscountable medium  and long-term credits". 
From  the  same  date  they  have  also  had  to  calculate-although  without  any 
maximum  having  yet  been  imposed  on  them - a  ratio  known  as  the  "stable 
resources investment ratio", the principle of which was established in March 1966. 
The  implementing  procedures  have  since  been  recast.  The  new  rules  make  it 
possible  to  identify certain  forms  of immobilization  and  to  avoid  excesses  in this 
field. 
The Commission  also  has  very wide  powers  of investigation.  In the  main, it exer-
cises  these  by  examining  documents  which  the  credit  establishments  under  its 
jurisdiction  are  required  to  submit  at  regular  intervals  and,  as  a  further  check, 
by  on-the-spot  controls  carried  out by  inspectors  of  the  Bank  of  France. 
In its  judicial  role  the  Commission  may  impose  sanctions  extending  as  far  as  the 
closure  of banks  and financial  estabishments  found  guilty  of  grave  infringements 
of  the  rules  and  regulations  applicable  to  them. 
Para.  II:  Structural  conditions 
Para.  II-1:  Structure  of the  financial  intermediaries 
12.  The key  feature  of  the  French financial  system  is  the  distinction  applied,  in 
law  and  in  practive,  between  banks,  which  administer  deposits  of  a  monetary 
nature,  and  the  specialised  financial  institutions,  which  operate  with  resources 
provided by  savings  or by  the  banking system.  In addition,  the Treasury  plays  a 
part  as  a  collector  of  capital  and  distributor  of  loans.  In  this  respect  it has  a 
function similar to that of the specialized institutions. 
1) Banks 
13.  The  first  category  of  financial  intermediaries  comprises  what  one  may  call 
"common law" banks, whether private  or nationalized,  and certain banking estab-
lishments  described  as  having  special  legal  status  and  directly  dependent  on the 
authorities. 
Deposit banks, merchant banks, long and medium ·term credit banks 
14. With the exception of the "special legal status" establishments (see below), banks 
must  be  "inscribed"  by  the  National Credit Council  on a list of  approved  estab-
lishments  and  divided,  in accordance  with  the law,  into three  categories:  deposit 
banks,  merchant  banks  ("banque  d'affaires")  and  long  and  medium-term  credit 
banks.  In  law,  enterprises  whose  normal  activity  is  to  receive  funds  from  the 
public  and  employ  thetn  for  loan  operations  are  regarded  as  banks. 
The distinction between deposit banks  and merchant banks has  become much  less 
marked  since  a  decree  of  25  January  1966  laid  down  that  both  categories  of 
establishment may  receive  sight  deposits .  or time deposits  of any  duration. A few 
differences  still  exist  in  respect  of  the  employment  of  funds,  where  the  deposit 
banks are still subject to more  severe quantitative restrictions concerning participa-
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tion in companies'  capital.  For the long and medium-term credit banks, which, in 
fact,  are  few  in number,  the  rule  is  that  they  may  not accept  deposits  having  a 
maturity  of  less  than· two  years.  The breakdown of the banks between the  three 
legal categories  is  therefore  of little consequence  from  the  monetary  policy  angle. 
Establishments with special legal status 
15.  To  the  "inscribed"  banks  must  be  added  those  of  the  special  legal  status 
establishments which accept funds  of a "monetary" or "near-money"  nature. Their 
activity is concentrated on particular sectors:  the financing of external trade (French 
Foreign Trade Bank:  "Banque  Fran~aise du Commerce Exterieur");  loans to small 
and  medium-sized  firms  (popular  banks:  "banque  populaires");  credit  to  agricul-
ture  (agricultural credit  institutions:  "caisses  de  credit  agricole");  mutual  credit. 
These  institutions,  which  are  usually  semi-public,  are  under  the  direct control of 
the  authorities,  which  in  general  apply  to  them  the  same  obligations  as  those 
governing  the  activities  of  the  "inscribed"  banks.  They  are  furthermore  subject 
to  the  influence  which  the  Bank  of France  exerts  over  all  establishments  which 
call  on its  help. 
The special legal status banks carry out operations similar to those of the "inscribed" 
banks.  However,  some  of  them-in  the  main,  the  agricultural  credit  insti-
tutions-also  engage  in long-term  operations (bond issues  and loans),  which  are 
excluded  to  some  extent  from  the  data  for  analysis  of  the  trend  of  money  or 
near-money. 
The channelling of resources to the economy 
16.  The role of the banking system in the channelling of resources to the economy 
assumes  different  aspects  according  to  the  duration  of  the  loans  and  credits  it 
provides. 
Following  ancient  tradition,  sanctified  by  the liquidity  rules  of  the Control  Com-
mission,  the bulk of  bank assets  consists  of  short-term credits (i.e.  not exceeding 
two  years)  to  firms  and  individuals.  Part of  these  credits  may  find  its  way  into 
the  assets  of  the Bank  of  France,  either  as  a  result  of  rediscounting  within  the 
limits  of the  ceilings,  or outside  these  for  certain  categories  of  credit  considered 
deserving of selective encouragement, or through the money market. Among short-
term investments must also be mentioned acquisitions of Treasury bills-generally 
one-year-offered to the banks under the periodical tender procedure. Since  1967, 
when  the  obligation  to  invest in Treasury  bills  was  abolished  altogether,  banks 
have  been subscribing  to them at interest rates determined by market forces. 
Medium term assets 
17.  The  banks'  medium-term  assets  largely  consist  of  paper  representing  credits 
rediscountable in accordance with a procedure which is  one· of the special features 
of  the  French  system  for  financing  the  economy. 
In the interests of  promoting  housebuilding,  installation  of productive  equipment 
and  expansion  of  exports  on deferred  payment  terms,  the  Bank  of  France  will, 
provided its agreement has  been secured beforehand, accept for  rediscount outside 
the  ceilings  paper  financing  these  activities;  alternatively,  since  January  1971, it 
will  admit  them  as  eligible  for  its  own money  market  transactions.  Medium-term 
credits  represented  by  renewable  three-month  bills  are  involved;  and  these  may 
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accrue  to  the  assets  of  the  Bank  of France  through  the  intermediary  of one  or 
more  first-stage  rediscounting  institutions. 
Until  the  end  of  1965  this  procedure  was  reserved  for  credits  of  a  maximum 
period of five  years  eligible  for  rediscount in full.  Since  then it has been adjusted 
with  the  aim  of  enabling  the  banks  to provide  longer-term  finance  while  at the 
same  time  limiting  the  extent  of  the  Bank  of  France's  rediscount  commitment 
(see  point  7  6 ). 
Since  1  August  1968,  the  mobilization  channels  for  medium-term  credits  have 
been  simplified  by eliminating  the intervention of the Caisse  des  Depots  et Con-
signations,  which  was  formerly  required  in  most  cases.  Only  one  intermediary 
institution-Credit  National,  Credit  Fonder de  France  or National  Agricultural 
Credit Fund ("Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole")-is  now interposed between 
the  bank of origin  and  the Bank  of France.  But the  endorsement  of the  French 
Foreign  Trade  Bank  or  of  the  Caisse  Nationale  des  Marches  de  l'Etat  is  still 
required to back certain operations, in accordance  with the respective  jurisdiction 
of  these  institutions. 
Long term assets 
18.  Funds employed in loans for periods of more than seven years or in negotiable 
securities account for only a small fraction of bank assets; and it is more especially 
the merchant banks an  the long  and medium-term credit banks  that handle oper-
ations  of  this  type. 
However,  since  the  recent  establishment  of  a  mortgage  loan  market  controlled 
by  the Credit .  Fonder de  France,  the banks'  granting  and  financing  or long-term 
loans  for  housing  construction  have  increased  appreciably  and  this  trend  seems 
likely  to  continue. 
Liabilities 
19.  Practically  the  whole  of the bank's liabilities  consists  of deposits,  and these, 
for  the most part, are  sight deposits in cheque or current accounts.  However, for 
some  years  now, a new trend has  become  apparent, broadly determined by official 
policy  on  interest  rates  and  taxation:  the  growth  of  sight  deposits  has  slowed 
down  and  that of "near-money"  deposits  has  accelerated. 
Growing  importance  has  been  assumed - particularly  since  196  7 - by  savings-
book deposits  (payable  on demand,  but in fact  relatively  stable),  housing  savings 
deposits,  and  even  more  by  time  deposits  in  the  form  of blocked  accounts  or 
certificates of deposit ("bons de caisse"). At the end of 1970 these three categories 
accounted for nearly half of all deposits administered by the banks. 
2)  Financial  institutions  which  do  not manage  deposits  of a monetary  nature 
20.  This  heading embraces  two  categories  of establishment very different in kind 
and importance:  on the one hand, those financial  establishments which  are in the 
nature  of initiators  of credit and whose  activities  are  complementary  to banking, 
and,  on  the  other,  public  or  semi-public  institutions  specializing  in  medium  or 
long-term  lending  operations. 
Financial estabHshments 
21.  Financial  establishments  must  be  registered  by  the  National  Credit  Council, 
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and they come  under its authority.  But they  are  distinct from  the  banks  because 
they  may  finance  their  operations  only  from  their  own  resources,  or from  those 
they  obtain  from  the  banking  system,  to  the  exclusion  of  direct  contributions 
from  the public.  As  they are  not empowered to receive  deposits from  the public, 
these  establishments  are  largely  dependent  on  the  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions, which refinance nearly 90% of the loans  they grant. The dependence 
of the financial establishments on the banks is frequently reinforced by legal links; 
the banks often find  it advantageous  to set up separate undertakings or enter into 
legal  relationships  with  them,  endowing  them  with  an  appropriate  organization 
to handle operations of a particular type. 
As  regards  their  lending,  the  financial  establishments  are  concerned  chiefly  with 
medium  and  long-term  lending  and  with  financing  instalment  sales  ("ventes  a 
temperament").  Their  share  of  the  aggregate  volume  of  the  operations  of  the 
financial  intermediaries  (banks  and  financial  institutions  of  all  categories)  is  still 
relatively  small. 
22.  The  institutions  engaged  in  collecting  and  redistributing  capital  outside  the 
banking circuit proper are therefore essentially public or semi-public bodies lending 
at medium  or long  term.  They  include  the  Caisse  des  Depots  et Consignations, 
the  Credit National  and the Credit Fonder de  France.  To these should be added 
the National Agricultural Credit Funds, already mentioned for its banking activity, 
and also  the savings banks ("caisses d'epargne"), although the latter do not directly 
grant credit. 
Savings Banks 
23.  The savings banks play an important part in the French financial  system. Most 
of them were  set up early in the  19th century  and their traditional function  is  to 
collect  small  savings.  Although  the differences  between their customers  and those 
of the banking sector proper are tending to become blurred, particularly now that 
interest rates  payable  to depositors  have  been harmonized  and  the  savings  banks 
offer a wider range of facilities for investment, the social purpose of their operations 
is  brought out by the exemption from tax of interest accruing to holder of savings 
book accounts  (known  as  "livres A"), which  are  limited  to  20,000 francs. 
Interest  on  other  saving  books,  where  there  is  no  deposit  maximum,  attract 
normal tax. The savings banks do not manage any deposits of a monetary character. 
The  power  of  the  French  savings  banks  to  decide  on  the  investment  of  their 
resources  is  strictly limited.  Both the National  Saving  Institution ("Caisse  Natio-
nale  d'Epargne")  (attached  to  the  Post  Office  administration)  and  the  ordinary 
savings  banks  must  entrust  the  funds  they  collect  to  the  Caisse  des  Depots  et 
Consignations.  Nevertheless,  they  are  entitled  to  propose  the  grant  of  loans  to 
local  authorities  and  even,  within  a  rather  narrow  set  of  rules,  to  make  certain 
loans  to  individuals,  namely  loans,  for  building  and  personal  loans,  particularly 
of  a  "social"  nature. 
The Caisse des Depots et consignations 
24.  The  Caisse  des  Depots  et Consignations  holds  a  particularly  important place 
in the  French financial  structure,  because  of  the  source  of  the  funds  it employs 
as  much  as  by  reason  of  the  volume  and  the nature  of its  operations. 
Drawing  the  major  part  of  its  resources  from  deposits  gathered  by  the  savings 
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banks, the Caisse  des  Depots participates in the circuit of semi-liquid investments. 
On  the  other  side,  it lends  at  medium  or  long  term  and  invests  in  negotiable 
securities.  The purpose of  all  these  operations is  to finance  the capital equipment 
of local  authorities  (departments  and  communes),  housing  construction  and,  to  a 
lesser  extent,  investments  in industry.  It also  uses  a  proportion  of its  resources 
to  lend  to  the  Treasury  in  various  ways. 
The contribution of the Caisse  des  Depots  to the collection of semi-liquid  savings 
and  the  financing  of  the  economy  confronts  the  public  and  monetary  authorities 
with two apparently conflicting types of problem:  on the one hand, how to supply 
the  Caisse  des  Depots  with  abundant funds  in order  to  sustain  the  development 
of  the  priority  financing  it  undertakes,  and  on  the. other,  how  to  promote  the 
growth  of  deposits  with  the  banks  that  are  less  volatile  than  sight  accounts.  It 
is  with these aims in view that efforts to harmonize terms for deposits, particularly 
as  regards  interest rates  and liability  to tax,  have  been  made  in recent  years. 
The Caisse des  Depots also acts as  the first-stage  rediscounting institution for loans 
for  subsidized  housing  (known  as  special  loans);  their  maximum  amount  at  any 
time  is  fixed  by  agreement  between  the  Ministry  of Finance,  the  Credit  Fonder 
de  France  and  the  Bank  of  France. 
After  passing  through  the portfolio of the Credit  Fonder de  France,  virtually  all 
the  bills  representing  these  loans  are  accepted  for  rediscount  by  the  Caisse  des 
Depots.  Within agreed  limits  the Caisse  des  Depots retains  the bills  in  question 
or mobilizes  them at the demand and for the benefit of the Treasury. For the rest 
it obtains  refinance,  if necessary,  by  recourse  to  the  Bank  of F  ranee. 
Lastly,  the  Caisse  des  Depots  places  its  temporarily  spare  funds  in  the  money 
market, thus exerting a direct influence  on the liquidity of the banks. 
Other financial organizations 
25.  The Credit  National  and  the  Credit  Fonder de  France,  which  specialize  res-
pectively  in the financing  of industrial or commercial  equipment and in mortgage 
loans  for  the  building  or  purchase  of dwellings,  obtain  the  major  part  of  their 
funds  by  issuing  long-term  bonds.  They also  employ public  money  earmarked for 
certain types  of operation  and  the proceeds  of selling  to  the banks  their mediun1-
term  paper,  which  is  negotiable in the market. 
The  National  Agricultural  Credit  Fund  is  also  important  in  this  connection  in-
asmuch  as  its loans  to finance  farm  equipment are largely drawn from savings. 
3) The  role  of the  Treasury  as  a financial  intermediary 
26.  Through its borrowing and lending operations, the Treasury plays  an important 
part in the financing  of the economy which is  separate from  its  administration of 
Government  finances  in  the  strict  sense. 
27.  The French Treasury participates in the management of book money by virtue 
of  the  large  volume  of  depositors'  balances  it holds,  either  directly,  by  way  of 
"private fund"  accounts  opened  with its  agents,  or indirectly  through  the  postal 
cheque  service.  Through these institutions the Treasury manages  substantial funds 
representing  about  14% of  total  monetary  claims  and 20% of book money.  It 
also  takes  in  large  deposits  from  correspondents (local  authorities,  public  boards, 
etc.). 
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28.  The Treasury also  has  a  hand in  the collection of semi-liquid  saving  through 
the  certificates  ('"bons  sur formule")  it sells  to the  public.  Issued at one,  two or 
five  years'  maturity,  they  can  nevertheless  be  repaid  after  three  months  on  the 
sole condition that the holder accepts  a rate of interest lower than he would enjoi 
if he kept the  certificate  until  normal  maturity. 
In addition,  the  Treasury's  agents,  like  the  banks,  are  now  empowered  to  open 
time accounts for individuals and firms Deposits on these accounts are still relatively 
small,  whereas  the  outstanding  amount  of  the  Treasury  certificates  represents 
nearly  15 %  of all  semi-liquid  savings. 
29.  Apart  from  sight  deposits,  calls  on  "near-money"  resources  now  account  for 
the  bulk  of  Treasury  borrowing.  Nevertheless,  at  varying  intervals,  there  have 
also  been  long-term  loans,  the  proceeds  of  which  have  either  been  absorbed  in 
general  Government  funds  or been  earmarked  for  specific  purposes,  as  was  the 
case  in 1965,  1966  and  1967, when the Government issued bonds  to increase  its 
contribution to  the financing  of industrial  equipment  and exports.  These calls  on 
the capital market have generally remained small. The emergence of a considerable 
budget  deficit  in  1968  led  the  authorities  to  increase  Government  borrowing  of 
liquid  and  short-term  savings,  although  without  basically  changing  their  desire 
to  reserve  the  largest  possible  share  of  the  issues  market  for  industrial or com-
mercial firms,  both nationalized and private. The year 1969 marked a rapid return 
to  budgetary  equilibrium,  and  this  was  consolidated  in  1970. 
As  counterpart to the funds it collects the Treasury grants loans which, because of 
the  risks  involved  or because  of  social  and  regional  considerations,  are  held  to 
justify  special  terms  outside  the scope  of lending by the  banking system  and the 
specialized  institutions.  Loans  from  public  funds  are  granted  chiefly  through  the 
Economic  and  Social  Development  Fund ("Fonds  de Developpement  Economique 
et Sociale" ),  for  operations concerning industrial, agricultural or commercial enter-
prises,  or  though  the  Fund  for  Lending  to Moderate  Rent  Housing  Institutions 
("Caisse de  Prets aux  Organismes  d'Habitations a Loyer Madere"), for operations 
concerning subsidized housing. 
Although the Treasury's activities in this field are not directly linked with monetary 
policy, they nevertheless exert an indirect influence on the liquidity of the economy 
and on that of the  banking  system.  They  are,  therefore,  one of the  basic  factors 
determining the conditions in which monetary equilibrium is  maintained. 
4) Changes in the banking system in the past ten years 
30.  For ten years  or so  the French banking system has  been adjusting to the new 
circumstances  of the economy  while  retaining  its  most  characteristic  features.  Its 
development,  while  flexible  and  steady,  has  largely  been  determined  by  reforms 
in  the  relevant  body  of  regulations. 
a)  Principles  and  objectives 
31.  One of the  main  aims  of official  policy  has  been  to fit  the  banks  to manage 
a  greater  volume  of savings  by  enabling  them  to  offer  the  public  a  wider  range 
of  investment  opportunities  than  in  the  past.  To  achieve  this  result  it  seemed 
necessary  to make  the banks more competitive, not only with each other, but also 
with other French financial  institutions and even with foreign  banks. 
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A  characteristic  feature  of  the  French  financial  system  is  the  way  in which  the 
various financial  circuits have continued to be kept too separate. Various measures 
have  therefore  been  taken to promote interpenetration of the markets. 
Finally,  the  banks  have  been encouraged  to  take  a  greater part in  the provision 
of  medium  and  long-term finance  (particularly  for  new  housing)  in proportion  as 
their  resources  have  assumed  more of the character of savings. 
b)  A1e~sures taken 
32.  The  chief  reforms  have  been  adopted  and  implemented  mainly  since  1965. 
Despite their diversity,  they  have  a common feature:  to give  a more  liberal slant 
to  the  existing  regulations. 
33.  Concentration  in banking,  which  had got off  to  a  good  start  soon  after the 
war, was speeded up by the fixing  of a minimum level of capital, which has since 
been  raised  several  times.  The need  to  modernise  administration, which  was  still 
too  expensive  for  small  establishments,  was  a  further  incentive  to  the  banks  to 
concentrate. 
This  movement  took  various  forms:  pure  and  simple  takeovers  of  small  banks, 
mergers, acquisition of holdings,  cooperation  agreements between groups of banks 
of  different  categories. 
At the same  time,  control of the  opening of new branches,  which  required prior 
authorization by the National Credit Council was relaxed and eventually, in 196  7, 
abolished.  The  banks  are  therefore  now  free  to  determine  the  number  and  geo-
graphical  ditsribution of their branches.  They  have  made  much  use  of their new 
opportunities, but mainly by setting up small establishments requiring little in the 
way  of staff. 
34.  Decrees  issued  in  1966  and  1967  appreciably  reduced  the  distinctions  that· 
used to exist between deposit banks and merchant banks. The same  rules  are now 
applied  to both categories  as  regards  the funds  they  may  accept.  As  regards  their 
assets,  the  restrictions  on  participations  by  deposit  banks  in  the  capital  of 
manufacturing or trading companies have been eased. 
The  deposit  banks have  made  quite  extensive  use  of the  recently  granted facility 
of  accepting  deposits  for  terms  above  two years,  mainly  by issuing  certificates  of 
deposit  ("bons  de  caisse").  The  merchant  banks  for  their  part  have  developed 
their branch network or have sought closer ties with deposit banks already having 
widespread  branches.  At the  cost  of  shedding  a  few  excess  holdings  or  splitting 
their operation,  some  have  opted to become  deposit  banks. 
3  5.  In  1965  a  policy  was  adopted  of  harmonizing  the  interest  rates  which  the 
various  categories  of  institution  collecting  liquid  or  short-term  savings  may  pay 
their  depositors. 
The banks have  thus been able to align  the deposit interest rates on those applied 
by  the  Treasury  or certain financial  institutions. 
Arrangements for  taxing interest paid have  themselves  been modified.  The exemp-
tion from  tax  of the  interest on a first  savings  book (the amount of which is  in 
any  case  limited)  is  now  the  only  exception  made  in  favour  of  savings  banks 
compared  with savings  book accounts  with ordinary banks. 
The  legal  ceiling  on  rates  paid  by  banks  on  time  deposits  (i.e.  of  at least  one 
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month's  maturity) has  been  gradually  relaxed.  It is  now restricted  to deposits  of 
100,000  francs  or less  and,  among  these,  only  to  those  committed for  a  year  at 
the  most.  At the  same  time,  the maximum  rates  have  been  gradually  raised.  On 
the other hand, payment  of interest on sight  deposits has  been forbidden. 
The banks  have  taken  advantage  of  all  there changes  to -increase  their customers 
and  improve  their  position  with regard  to  the  other deposit  networks. 
36.  Finally,  there  have  been  a  number  of  measures  bearing  on  the  granting  of 
credit. 
Since  April  1966  banks  have  been  free  to  fix  their  own  lending  terms;  these 
previously  could  not fall  below  a  minimum  linked  to  the  Bank  of  France's  dis-
count  rate. 
A  new  formula  for  short-term  credit  has  been  introduced,  which  is  intended  to 
replace,  at least in part,  the discounting of paper representing commercial drafts.
1 
This  "commercial claims  mobilization credit",  as  it is  called, has  the characteristic 
of  separating  the  credit  operation  in  the  strict  sense  from  the  collection  of  the 
claim. 
The  longer  maturities  of  credits,  which  are  necessitated  by  the  volume  of  re-
quirements  for  finance,  and  which  the  increase  in  the  banks'  stable  resources 
should make possible, has been achieved, on the one hand, by increasing (from five 
to seven years) the maximum duration of medium-term credits rediscountable with 
the  Bank  of  F  ranee  and  on  the  other,  setting  up  a  mortgage  market  enabling 
housing loans  of over ten years'  maturity to be mobilized.  Finally the granting of 
credit by  way  of leasing  ("credit  bail") has  expanded rapidly  since  1967. 
Para.  II-2:  Banking  system  and  capital  market 
37.  French banks have only very small  holdings of negotiable  securities. 
Despite  more  active  participation  in  the  placing  of  bonds  with  the  public  and 
with  institutional  investors,  particularly  since  the  recent  introduction  of  the 
technique of firm  acceptance,  their portfolio of securities  has  remained unchanged 
in  relative  value  (2 %  of  total  loans  and  investment). 
38.  The  rapid  development  of open-ended funds  in  the form  of Variable  Capital 
Investment Companies ("Societe d'Investissement a  Capital Variable" or "SICA  V") 
has  nevertheless  enchanged  the  role  of  the  banks  on the capital  market, for it is 
mainly the banks which have  set up these institutions and manage  their funds. 
In France there is  no institution whose  specific  function is  to regulate  the capital 
market. 
Para.  II-3:  Habits  of the  public  as  regards  investment  and  liquidity 
39.  This  question  is  discussed  in Section  II of this  chapter. 
Para.  II-4:  Volume  of  financial  transactions  with  non-residents 
40.  Exports  of  goods  and  services  accounted  for  about  15% of  Gross  National 
1 The  new  feature  is  that  paper  representing  the  original  claims  is  discounted,  whereas  the  former  system  involved 
the discounting  of  the underlying  financial  instrument  itself. 
145 
10 FRANCE - BASIC  FACTS 
Product in 1970. This percentage was  appreciably  higher  than  those  of preceding 
years. 
41.  Capital movements had been very substantially liberalised early in 196  7.  Since 
November  1968  they  have  been  again  subject  to  control.  The  repercussions  of 
these  reuglations  on  the  operations  of  the  banks  are  analysed  in  the  following 
section. 
Section II ·  Liquidify 
42.  Liquidity has  to be considered from both its aspects:  liquidity of the economy 
and  liquidity  of  the  banking  system.  After  defining  the  concepts  of  liquidity  in 
the light of  this distinction, this section will aim  at showing how the management 
of the  Treasury's  accounts  and  the  conditions  in which  liquidity  itself is  formed 
can  interact. 
43.  The liquidity of the economy comprises the totality of instruments of payment 
or even of liquid or short-term savings held by the various sectors of the economy. 
The liquidity  of  the banking  system  is  basically  concerned  with balances  held  at 
the  central  bank.  These  two  concepts  are,  however,  closely  linked  in  the  sense 
that in France, as  in most other countries, the monetary authorities aim at controll-
ing the liquidity of the economy mainly by adjustment the liquidity of the banking 
system. 
Para.  I:  Liquidity  of· the  economy 
Definition 
44.  As  regards  the  range  of  factors  entering  into  calculations  of  the  liquidity  of 
the economy, the definition currently accepted in France occupies a middle position 
between a narrow concept confined  to  purely monetary assets  and a wide concept 
embracing  not  only  assets  and  claims  of  relatively  distant  term  but also  certain 
borrowing  rights. 
Constituent elements 
Though acknowledging that any distinction is bound to be arbitrary to some extent, 
the  National  Credit  Council,  in its  annual  reports,  takes  liquidity  to mean  assets 
held  in  the form  of  and  short-term  investments  of a  maximum  duration  of  two 
. years, and, indeed, investments of two to five  years' duration if they can be repaid 
in advance.  These investments, which are generally know as  "liquid or short-term 
savings",  can  be  transformed  rapidly  into  money  according  to  the  wish  or  re-
quirements  of  their  holders,  without  risk  or  loss  on  the  value  of  the  capital. 
They  comprise  near-money  assets  managed  by  the  banks  (bank-book  accounts, 
time  deposits,  certificates  of  deposit),  time  accounts  with  the  Treasury,  saving 
banks  deposits  and  bills  issued  to  the  public  by  the  Treasury  and  the  National 
Agricultural  Credit  Fund. 
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Relationship between Uquidity and other economic variables 
45.  Changes  in liquidity  are  fully  meaningful  only if they  are  seen in relation to 
particular economic  data. Thus  "liquidity of the economy"  is  undestood in France 
as  a  relative  concept,  measured by comparing  the  average  amount of liquidity in 
absolute  terms, as  defined  above,  with an economic aggregate giving  a fair  indica-
tion of the level of incomes and transactions- the Gross National Product. 
As  regards  money  supply  in  the  strict  sense,  by  relating  it  to  Gross  National 
Product and examining  the indices  of velocity  of circulation of the different types 
of money,  it is  possible  to form  an  idea  of  the  proportion of money  spent and 
the proportion  saved  up  or placed in reserve  for  later  spending.  This  distinction 
has  proved  useful  in  analysing  the  trend  of  liquidity,  for  it sheds  light  on the 
public's attitude to money. 
46.  The monetary  authorities  watch changes  in the liquidity of the economy  and 
investigate their meaning, for  experience has  shown that the behaviour of holders 
of  cash  and  the  channelling  of  savings  towards  less  liquid  forms  of  investment 
largely  determine  monetary  equilibrium.  The  analysis  of  the  liquidity  of  the 
economy,  to  which  a  special  chapter is  devoted in the  annual  report of  the Na-
tional  Credit  Council,  covers  both  the  general  trend  and  that  of  the  various 
components. 
As  regards  the  overall  equilibrium,  the  trend  and  level  of  the  liquidity  of  the 
economy  are  not always  easy  to interpret. The indications  they yield are therefore 
linked with other aspects  of the monetary  situation,  such  as  movements of prices 
or  wages  and  the  balance  of  payments  position.  Despite  these  difficulties,  the 
meaning  to  trends  in the liquidity  of  the  economy  can  guide  the  actions  of the 
monetary  authorities.  The  choice  of  an  appropriate  policy  will  depend  on  the 
explanation  provided  for,  e.g.,  a  rapid  increase  in liquidity:  was  this  due  to  a 
deliberate  propensity  on  the  part of  the  public  to increase  its  cash  holdings,  or 
to  excessive  creation  of  money? 
Furthermore, the threat posed by a high level of liquidity in the economy - namely 
that in  some  circumstances  it may  hamper  or reduce  the effectiveness  of central 
bank  action  to  control  spending -largely depends  on the  actual  composition  of 
the  liquidity.  This  is  why,  in  recent  years,  and  particularly  since  1965,  French 
policy  on interest rates has  tended to encourage the formation of relatively stable 
investments and the partial funding of means  of payment. This policy  has  yielded 
results, since the proportion of investments with the character of savings  rose from 
39% to 52% of  total liquidity between  31st December  1964  and  31st Decem-
ber 1970. 
Sources of liquidity 
47  ~  The attention paid to the level of liquidity of the economy must obviously not 
involve  neglect  of  the  movements  and sources  of the creation  of money,  whether 
it be  a  matter  of  variations  in foreign  exchange  reserves,  credit  to  the  Govern-
ment and local  authorities or lending_ to industry and commerce. 
The trend of these  three rriain  sources  of finance  for the economy is  traced in the 
reports  of  the National  Credit  Council  in the  table  "Contra-items of  money  and 
near-money  supply"  (" Contreparties  des  disponibilites  monetaires  et  quasi  mone-
taires"). 
The amount of the foreign  exchange  reserves  shown  by  the net balance  of those 
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items  in the  balance  sheet of the  Bank  of France  which  reflect  gold  and foreign 
currency  movements.  Problems  of  statistical  harmonization  in  particular  make  it 
impossible for  the present to quote the foreign  exchange claims  and commitments 
of  the  banks.  However,  although  not  worked  into  the  overall  statement,  the 
external  position  of  the  banks  is  closely  watched  by  the  monetary  authorities 
along  with fluctuations  in  the  balance  of  payments.  _ 
Claims  of  the banking  system  on the Treasury comprise  direct facilities  provided 
by  the  Bank  of  France  (loans  and  advances  to  the  Government,  discounts  of 
pledged bonds),  current account  balances  with the  Post Office,  and  the coin  and 
inscribed  Treasury bill  holdings  among  the  assets  of the  Bank of  France  and the 
banks.  Claims  on  the  Treasury  held  by  private  persons  and  companies  include 
three  categories  of  asset  regarded  as  forming  part of  the  money  supply:  current 
accounts with the Post Office, claims on Treasury agents (so-called "private funds"), 
and coin in circulation. 
The credits  to  the  economy  among  the  contra-items  to  the  supply  of money  and 
near-money  are  those  which  are  financed  by  the  Bank  of  France  and  the  banks. 
To obtain an  overall picture of the credits of a monetary nature made  available to 
the  economy,  one  should  add  the proportion  of  short and  medium-term  lending 
which  is  financed  by  the  specialized  institutions  from  savings  and  which,  being 
rediscountable  at  the  Bank of France,  can  lead  to the  creation of money. 
The  inter-dependent  nature  of  these  various  sources  of  money  supply  makes  it 
necessary  for  their  analysis  to  be  carefully  shaded  and  precludes  any  isolated 
interpretation  of  the  variations  affecting  a  particular  contra-item  of  the  money 
supply. 
48.  On 31  December  1970,  liquidity  was  divided  almost  equally  between liquid 
or semi-liquid  savings  and  cash  resources.  For liquidity  as  a  whole,  the  share  of 
the Bank of France, the banks  and the postal cheque  system was  70%, as  against 
30 %  for  savings  banks  deposits  and  Treasury  bills. 
A  look  at  past  trends  reveals  that  the  public  is  tending  to  shift  its  liquidity  or 
savings  preference  away  from  cash  holdings  in banknotes  to  balances  in bank  ac-
counts  and  Post  Office  current  accounts,  or even  to  savings  deposits  (bank-book 
accounts,  certificates  of  deposit  and  time  accounts).  This  has  been partly a  spon-
taneous  development  and  partly  the  result  of  official  measures,  particularly  with 
regard  to  interest  rates. 
Thus,  although  the proportion of notes  and  coin  is  still high,  it nevertheless  fell 
between  1958  and  1970  from  46%  to  32%  of  total  money  supply,  while  the 
share  of  bank  deposit  money  rose  from  54%  to  68 %.  At  the  same  time  a 
relative  increase  in the  supply  of  near-money  managed  by  the banks  (bank-book 
accounts,  certificates  of deposit  and  time  accounts)  could  be observed  in relation 
to the total of sight and  time deposits with banks (from 12% at the end of 1958 
to 44 %  at the end of  1970). In like manner, over the past ten years  or so,  the 
share of liquid  savings  has  expanded and that of money supply in the strict sense 
has contracted (52% and 48 %  respectively, as  against 34% and 66% in 1958). 
Relationship between liquidity and G.N.P. 
49.  In the course of the years  1958 to 1970 the ratio of liquidity to the Gross Na-
tional Product in France rose sharply from  44 % to 56%. It nevertheless remains 
a  lower proportion  than in most Western countries. 
The same is  not true of the ratio of money supply in the strict sense to the Gross 
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National  Product.  At 33 %  in  1968,  it was  among  the  highest  in the  countries 
considered. For this reason, despite the successful  reduction of this  ratio to 27 % 
in 1970, the monetary authorities consider that further progress must yet be made 
in developing  liquid or sen1i-liquid  forms  of  saving. 
Para.  II:  Bank  liquidity 
Constituent  elements 
50.  The cash  resources  of the banking system,  considered in absolute terms, com-
prise  the banks' holdings  of bank notes  and their balances  in Post Office  current 
accounts  and with the central bank.  Before the minimum reserve regulations were 
introduced,  the  amount  of these  liquid  holdings  was  very  low,  being  kept  at or 
near  the minimum level  necessary  for  the  day-to-day  running of the banks. 
Since January  1967 banks have been required to hold balances  at the central bank 
to  an  amount  calculated  in proportion  to  their  liabilities.  This  rule  was  supple-
mented in February  1971  by  a  system  of reserves  based  on credits  granted.  Ar-
rangements  based  on  calculations  of  averages  (see  point  89)  make  this  system 
sufficiently  flexible  for  the banks  to have  ready cash  available  when they have  to 
meet  peak  demand. 
51.  As  the banks do not normally, on average, hold excess reserves,  their liquidity 
reserves  are  basically  "potential", i.e.  they  consist  mainly  of paper negotiable  on 
the money market or rediscountable at the Bank of France:  public and commercial 
bills,  and  financial  bills  representing  short  or medium-term  credits  covered  by  a 
rediscount  agreement. 
52.  In a general way the expression "liquidity of the banking system" is  associated 
in France with a  relative  concept which  involves  both the position of  the banks 
with regard  to their  reserve  obligations  and the extent to which  they  can  call on 
the  facilities  of  the  Bank  of F  ranee. 
Fluctuations of bank liquidity  are  measured by the trend of the banks'  indebted-
ness  to  the Bank of France,  as  shown in the first  instance by the total amount of 
this  indebtedness,  but also  with  due  regard  to  the breakdown  between facilities 
obtained at fixed  rates  (rediscounting)  and those provided at variable rates  (inter-
vention  on  the  money  market). 
Factors affecting bank liquidity 
Various  factors  act  on  banking  liquidity  i.e.,  they  determine  the  expansion  or 
contraction  of  the liquid  assets  of  the  banks  and  the  possibilities  of recourse  to 
the  central  bank.  Son1e  of  these  factors  result  from  the  influence  on  the  banks 
of  autonomous  forces:  inward  or  outward  move1nents  of  notes,  movements  of 
gold  and foreign  exchange,  Treasury operations. The other factors  are  determined 
by  the  monetary  authorities  by  means  of  rules  for  the  direct  control  of  bank 
liquidity:  minimum  reserves,  rediscount  ceilings  and  minimum  holdings  of  bills 
representing  rediscountable  medium-term  credits. 
Movements in fiduciary circulation 
53.  Although it has  been tending to decline  for many years now use of the bank-
note  as  a  vehicle  for  payment  and  a  medium  for  hoarding_  remains  relatively 
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widespread  in  France,  so  that  the  public's  demand  for  notes  is  still  one  of  the 
chief  limitations  affecting  the  banks'  cash  reserves  and  their  power  to  create 
money.  Quite  apart  ftom  the  basic  trends  determined  by  economic  and  psycho-
logical  conditions  which  have  an  influence  on  the  liquidity  held  by  individuals 
and firms,  the  circulation  of  notes  is  also  subject  to  specific  monthly  or seasonal 
movements. 
Outflows  of  notes,  chiefly  due  to  wage  payments,  exert  heavy  pressure  on  the 
banks'  cash  reserves  at  the  end  of  each  month.  Conversely,  inflows  of  notes  in 
the  course  of  the  month  are  a  factor  tending  to  expand  bank  liquidity.  These 
fluctuations  become  greater at certain times of the year,  for example, at the quar-
terly  tax  maturities  or  the  holiday  periods.  But  the  flexible  application  of  the 
reserves  system  obtained by basing  the calculations on averages  has  cushioned the 
effects  of  movements  of  notes  on  bank liquidity. 
Movements o~f gold and currencies 
54.  Foreign  exchange  transactions  can  have  a  bearing  on  franc  liquidity  within 
the banking  system  as  a  result of the buying  and  selling  operations  of the Bank 
of  France  on  the market  through  the  Stabilization  Fund. 
At  times  of  liberalization  banks  are  authorized  to  vary  their  foreign  exchange 
investments  and  commitments  as  they.  think best.  In fact  their anxiety  to avoid 
speculative  positions,  except  for  very  small  amounts,  has  always  led  them  to 
operate  with  forward  cover. 
55.  Exchange  Control,  which  was  re-established  in  November  1968,  forbids  the 
banks  to  engage  in  operations  which  are  tantamount  to  speculation  against  the 
franc, whether for  their own account or on behalf of customers or correspondents. 
Such  operations  include  increases  in net foreign  currency  claims,  lending  abroad 
in francs,  and purchases of foreign currency against francs  on a swap basis.  These 
operations  can  lead  to  temporary  outflows  from  the  official  exchange  reserves,  in 
particular for  the benefit of non-residents anxious  to borrow in France in order to 
reconstitute  or  increase  their  foreign  exchange  holdings.  Such  outflows  have  a 
restrictive effect  on the  franc  liquidity  of  the banking system. 
Exchange control on the other hand does not prevent French banks from procuring 
francs  by borrowing  foreign  currency  abroad  for  a  specific  period and lending it, 
on a  swap  basis,  to  another  foreign  correspondent  against  francs.  These  foreign 
currency/  franc  swaps  with  foreign  correspondents  have  a  directly  expansionary 
effect  on franc  liquidity  to  the  extent that the  correspondents  are  obliged  to sell 
foreign  currency  on the exchange  market to procure the funds  necessary  for  their 
franc  deposit. 
In a  general  way  forward  covering  of  swaps  of foreign  currencies  for  francs  is 
arranged  by  banks  with  their  foreign  correspondents  when,  after  taking  account 
of the  discount  or premium  quoted  on  the  foreign  exchange  market,  disparities 
appear between French money  market rates  and  those  ruling on foreign  markets. 
Although  market  forces  keep  the  incentives  thus  produced  within narrow limits, 
the  control  of  money  market  rates  has  nevertheless  become  one  of  the  factors 
in the control of bank liquidity by the central bank. This is  still the case  to some 
extent  despite  the  reintroduction  of  exchange  control. 
Operations by the treasury 
56.  Lastly,  operations  by  the  Treasury-which  does  not  keep  accounts  at  the 
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banks-are  a  third  factor  affecting  bank  liquidity,  since  all  transfers  of  funds 
between the Treasury  and  the banks have  an effect on their accounts  at the bank 
of issue. Bank liquidity will therefore react to budget policy and the Government's 
cash  position.  It will  also  vary  according  to the methods  of financing  adopted  to 
meet  Treasury  requirements. 
57.  Thus movements of notes and foreign exchange  and variations in the Govern-
ment's cash holdings, exerting influences that reinforce or offset each other according 
to the season, broadly constitute the money market data on which the central bank 
must base its methods and its decisions. 
Monetary authority interventions 
58.  Discount policy  was for  a  long time the main instrument of monetary policy, 
enabling  the  central  bank  to  exert  a  general  influence  by  varying  the  cost  and 
consequently the volume of rediscounting. The rediscounting process  also  provided 
an opportunity for selective scrutiny, case by case, of bank lending to the economy. 
In the  post-war  years  French  monetary  policy  has  tended to lean  towards  direct 
action  on bank  liquidity  for  purposes  of  quantitative  and  even  selective  control 
of the granting of credit. 
The instruments by which the Bank of France influences bank liquidity-studied 
in  detail in the  second  chapter - have  thus been perfected and differentiated. 
Interest  rate  policy  has  been  broadened  to  take  account  of  both  internal  and 
external considerations.  Quantitative  control has  been  strengthened by  the estab-
lishment  of  rediscount  ceilings-and  also  by  "floors"  ("planchers")  for  invest-
ment  in  Government  securities  (these  were  subsequently  relaxed  and  eventually 
abolished  in  1967).  It had  been supplemented in 1960  by  the introduction of a 
"liquid  assets  ratio"  ("coefficient  de  tresorerie"),  a  milder. form  of  which  still 
survives  today, provisionally, in the form of the minitnum portfolio of bills repre-
senting medium-term credits. 
Since  January  196  7 the arrangements in force  have largely rested on the minimum 
reserves  system, which has  been applied in practice in such a way as  to regularize 
the  daily  movements  in the  banks' cash  situation brought about by the influence 
of  autonomous  factors. 
Lastly,  by  its  intervention  on  the  money  market,  the  Bank  of  France  suits  its 
action to the day-to-day  situation by supplying the liquidity needed for the proper 
balance  of  the  market  or,  more  rarely,  by  mopping  up  excess  liquidity  at  rates 
corresponding  to  the  internal  and  external objectives  that have  been fixed.  Since 
the  beginning  of  1971, the  Bank  of  France  has  mainly  concentrated  on  action 
through the money  tnarket, at rates which have fallen  below Bank rate (see point 
80  below). 
Para.  III:  Liquidity  and  public  finance 
59.  Through a large number of widely varied activities the French Treasury exerts 
a  predominant  influence  on the formation,  level  and  composition of liquidity. 
In the  first  place,  as  in  all  countries,  the  management  of the public  finances  as 
required  by  the  budget  policy  adopted  partly  determines  how  the  economy  is 
supplied  with  liquidity  and  is  hence  one  of  the  essential  factors  of  monetary 
policy, according to 'vhether the strategy chosen aims at strict balancing of revenue 
and expenditure or allows  a deficit  to emerge. 
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In addition,  the Treasury participates  in the working of the  various  channels  for 
payments within  the economy  through its management of "private fund" deposits 
and  postal  cheque  accounts. 
Lastly,  the  Treasury  plays  an  important  role  in  the  money  market  and,  more 
generally,  in determining  the  trend of liquidity  of the banking  system. 
Para.  III-1:  Fiscal  policy  and  financing  of the  deficit 
60.  As  the agent responsible for execution of the budget,  the Treasury influences 
the  formation  of  liquidity  by  varying  its  position  of  more  or less  indebtedness 
towards  the  banking  system  according  to  the  trend  of Government revenues ·  and 
expenditure. 
It is  true  that  a  budget  deficit  mainly  due  to  expenditures  which  are  the  final 
responsibility  of  the Government has  not  the  same  significance  and  scope  as  one 
that derives from  the  assumption by the Treasury of responsibility for investment 
expenditure  of  an  economic  nature  (loans  and  advances  for  housing,  loans  from 
the  Economic  and  Social  Development  Fund  to  nationalized  and  private  enter-
prises).  For about  fifteen  years  now,  the  French budget for  current  Government 
revenue  and  expenditure  has  only  rarely  been  in deficit.  From  1963  to  1966  it 
even  showed  surpluses. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  the  monetary  financing  of  Treasury  expenditures, 
whatever  the  justification  for  them,  may  run  counter  to  action  to control  credit 
in periods of strong inflationary pressure. That is  why, in the stabilization program-
me  introduced in 1963, the principle of strict neutrality on the part of the public 
finances  with respect to the creation of money was  adopted and applied for several 
years. Through this policy the Treasury undertook not only to avoid having overall 
recourse  to credit from  the Bank  of France  and the  banks, but also  to offset, by 
reducing  its· indebtedness  to  the  banking  system,  funds  placed . at  its  disposal  by 
private  persons  and  firms  holding  postal  cheque  accounts  or "special  fund"  ac-
counts. 
Although, for  economic  policy  reasons,  this  attitude  was  modified  in  1967,  and 
particularly in 1968, it highlighted  the co1nplementary  nature of budgetary action 
and  action  on  credit.  Since  then,  the  1970  and  1971  Finance  Acts  have  marked 
a  return  to  principles  of  strict  budget  orthodoxy. 
Para.  III-2:  Monetary  functions  of  the  Treasury  in  the  economy 
61.  As  in  most  countries,  the  Treasury  is  responsible  in France  for  the  minting 
of coin,  which  is  then put into circulation  by  the Bank  of France for  account  of 
the  State.  In addition,  in  contrast with  the  practice  frequently  noted  elsewhere, 
the  French  Treasury  has  a  large  volume  of funds  deposited  with it,  particularly 
through  the postal cheque  system  (see point 27  above). 
62.  Apart  from  its  role  in  the management  of  the  currency,  the  Treasury has  a 
direct, .  if small,  part in actual  money  creation. 
On the internal plane the Treasury creates  money when, to pay a supplier, a civil 
servant or a pensioner, it credits a Post Office  current account or a "private fund" 
account. 
In external  relations  the  influence  of  the Treasury  on the creation of money  has 
diminished  because  of  the  rules  now  governing  its  relations  with  the  Exchange 
Stabilization  Fund  ("Fonds  de  Stabilisation  des  Changes")  and  the  principles on 
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which  the  monetary  ·agreements  of  France  with the  countries  of  the  Franc  Area 
have  been based for  some  years. 
As  regards  transfers  of funds  between France  and  abroad,  the action  needed  for 
adjustment of foreign exchange supply and demand is  the responsibility of the Ex-
change  Stabilization  Fund, which  is  managed  by  the Bank  of  France  and  has  no 
direct accounting relationship with the Treasury.  In earlier days,  prior to a reform 
in  1949,  the  surplus  or  deficit  on  the  balance  of  payments  involved  a  payment 
from  or  to  the  Treasury.  Subsequently,  and  up  to  May  1962,  complementary 
arrangements  transferred to the books  of  the  Bank of France  all  those operations 
representing  the  counterpart  of  dealings  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund, 
whether  these  were  the  payment  of  that  portion of the French  quota subscribed 
in gold, franc  drawings  made within the limits of the quota or under the "general 
arrangements  to  borrow"  or,  conversely,  French drawings  on the Fund. 
In the same way, changes in France's monetary relationships with several countries 
of  the  Franc  Area  have  reduced  the  Treasury's  action  in  this  field.  However,  it 
continues  to  supply  the  banks  of  issue  of  the  countries  or  territories  linked  by 
"operation  account"  agreements  (overseas  departments  and  territories,  states  of 
Africa  and Madagascar)  with the metropolitan francs  they need for  settlements in 
that  currency  or  purchases  of  foreign  exchange.  In  return  the  institutions  in 
question must provide the Treasury with any funds which may be required to make 
transfers in to  their own currency. 
63.  The  Treasury's  function  in  the processes  in which  liquidity  is  created  in the 
economy is  not limited to purely monetary assets.  It is  also  involved in the collec-
tion of semi-liquid  savings  by placing  with the general public Treasury certificates 
("bons sur formules")  of  one,  two or five  years' currency (redeemable  after three 
months)  and by  the facilities  it offers  for  opening  time accounts  in its  books (see 
point  28  above)/ These  certificates  were  for  a  long  time  exempt  from  tax  and 
became  the  channel  for  a  privileged flow  of  funds  in favour  of  the  Treasury.  In 
1965  the  ter1ns  of  remuneration  and  taxation of liquid or short-term investments 
offered by all  financial  intermediaries were harmonized,  and at present subscribers 
to  Treasury  certificates  do  not enjoy  any  special  advantages. 
Para.  III-3:  Bank  liqiudity  and  Treasury  operations 
64.  The  Treasury  is  not  only  the  agent  for  implementation  of  the  Finance  Acts 
and  the  administrator  of  funds  deposited  by  the  public;  it  also  pools  the  cash 
resources  of the local  authorities,  thus  playing  the part of banker to a number of 
public authorities and establishments classified  as  "correspondents". It must there-
fore  be able  on a  day  to  day  basis  to ensure  that the  transfers between its own 
complex system of monetary activities and the banking system take place smoothly. 
It makes  the necessary  settlements  through its  current  account  with the Bank of 
France,  the  only banking institution empowered  to  keep  Treasury  accounts  in its 
books. 
Because  of  this  centralization,  almost  all  the  operations which  affect  the Govern-
ment's accounts  have repercussions on the banks' balances  at the central bank. 
In view of its borrower position, the Treasury is  practically never in credit on its 
current account. Thanks to the advances  the Bank of France makes to the Govern-
ment,  the  ceiling  of  which  is  fixed  by  law,  the  Treasury  can  always  adjust  its 
receipts  and  its payments.  As  soon  as  a  surplus  of receipts  emerges  it is  used  to 
pay  off  earlier  drawings  on  the  advances  account.  Like  those  of  the  banks,  the 
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Treasury's resources are thus essentially "potential", consisting of the opportunities 
for direct recourse to the Bank of France through the unutilized margin for drawing 
on the advances  account  and  the right to mobilize  its holdings  of pledged bonds. 
The  volume  of  the Treasury's  requirements  of  "central bank"  money  and,  in the 
final  analysis,  the incidence of its operations on bank liquidity depend at the same 
time  on the general  balance  of budget revenue  and expenditure,  the trend of the 
different  components of money  supply,  the scope  for borrowing outside the bank-
ing  system  (in  particular  by  long  and  short-term  loans  placed  with  the  general 
public)  and, finally,  on  the  contributions or requirements of its "correspondents". 
The latter, who  have  large  sums  of  money  to deal with, place  their  surplus cash 
temporarily at the disposal of the Treasury, either directly in the form of deposits 
on  account  or by  subscribing  to  Treasury  paper.  The  consequent  movements  of 
funds - often subject  to not easily foreseeable  swings - bring a large element of 
irregularity  into  the  fluctuations  of the  Treasury's  accounts. 
Greater flexibility  has  recently been introduced into the relations  of  the Treasury 
with some  of its chief correspondents (in particular the Caisse  des  Depots et Con-
signations  and  the  National  Agricultural  Credit  Fund)  in  order  to  allow  them 
greater latitude in the management of their current resources. These establishments 
have  thus been able  to increase  their direct participation i;l the money  market. 
In  the  course  of  a  budget  year  the  requirements  of  the  Treasury  are  prone  to 
seasonal  fluctuation  resulting  to  a  great  extent from  poor  timing  of  Government 
revenue  and expenditure. Despite staggering  of the dates on which taxes  are  due, 
the variations in the Government's accounts during the year are  still very marked. 
When  the. Treasury's  operations  affect  bank  liquidity  in  the  same  direction  as 
movements  of  notes  or foreign  exchange,  they  either bring  the  cash  position  of 
the  banks  under  strong  pressure  or help  to  make  the  money  market  too  liquid. 
Either way  the central bank has  to take  regulatory action to redress  the situation. 
65.  The  Treasury  also  exerts  direct  influence  on  the  money  market  by issues  of 
Treasury  bills  offered  to  the  banks.  . 
For  many  years,  the  system  of  minimum  holdings  ("planchers")  of Government 
securities,  which  obliged  the banks  to hold  a  volume  of  Treasury bills  calculated 
in proportion to their liabilities, meant that the requirements of the Treasury were 
to some extent covered automatically at interest rates independent of market forces. 
From  1960,  the  operation  of  the  liquid  assets  ratio  ("coefficient  de  tresorerie"), 
w·hich  had  extended  the  compulsory  holding  requirement  to  assets  other  than 
Treasury  bills,  made  it possible  gradually  to  reduce  the  quota  of  minimum  port-
folios  of  Government  securities  ,in  line  with  the  improvement  of  Government 
finances.  Then,  following  reforms in 1963  and  1964,  a distinction  was  drawn be-
tween  the  liquid  asset  certificates  ( "certificats  de  tresorerie")  eligible  for  the 
minimum holding and available on tap at fixed rates, and the Treasury bills allotted 
by  tender on market  conditions.  However, because  of the  difficulties  experienced 
by  banks  in  procuring  assets  eligible  for  the  numerator  of  this  ratio,  Treasury 
bllls  remained  in  brisk  demand  and  the  allotment  rates  remained  very  close  to 
discount  rate. 
This is  no longer the case.  In January 1967, the minimum reserve system replaced 
the  liquid  assets  ratio  system.  Government  securities,  which  banks  are  no longer 
obliged  to  hold  now  compete  with  other  possible  forms  of  investment,  so  that 
tender  rates  how depend wholly  on  money  market conditions. 
On the other hand, Treasury bills  have  regained a predominant place  as  the basis 
154 Liquidity 
of  money  market operations  both in inter-bank  transactions  and in interventions 
by  the central  bank. 
66.  The Treasury's indebtedness to the bank of issue is  recorded in the following 
items  of the weekly statement of the Bank of France: 
- Coin:  the entries  under  this  head  represent  coin  the equivalent of which has 
been credited to  the  Treasury's  account  and which is  still held in the Bank's 
tills. 
- Post Office  current  accounts:  this  head  comprises  the  balances  on the  postal 
current accounts  opened in the Post Office's  books  in the name  of  the Bank. 
This  is  a  technical  advance  corresponding  to  the  time  necessary  to  settle  the 
Bank's  claim  on  the  postal  cheque  system  by  the  debit  of  the  Treasury's 
account. 
- Loans  to  the  Government:  this  item  results  from  the  grouping  of  various 
earlier loans  into  a  single  credit line.  The ceiling  of  these  loans  was  fixed  at 
6,500  million  francs  by  an  agreement  concluded  between  the Bank of France 
and the  Government on 29  October  1959  but was  reduced  to  5,450  million 
francs  by an agreement of 3  May  1962. 
On that date, the financing  of France's participation in the International Monetary 
Fund, previously borne by the Treasury, was transferred to the Exchange Stabiliza-
tion  Fund.  In this  way,  the  Treasury  recovered  the  use  of funds  which,  to  the 
round amount of  1,050  million  francs,  were used  to  help  repay  loans  previously 
granted by  the  Bank  of  France. 
- Advances  to  the Government:  the ceiling  of these  advances  has  been fixed  at 
3,452  million  since  31  January  1969  under  an  agreement  concluded  on  4 
December  1969 between the Bank and the Government. The amount outstand-
ing  changes  daily  in consequence of movements in the Treasury's position. 
- Pledged  bonds  ("obligations  cautionnees)":  these  are  classed  under  the  sub-
heading  of  the  portfolio  of  paper  representing  short-term  credits,  and  are 
mobilized with the Bank of France by the Treasury. They are short-term notes, 
backed  by  guarantee,  made  out  to  the  order  of  the  Treasury,  and  generally 
bought by those  liable  to pay  customs  duties  and indirect  taxes  of which the 
Government  agrees  to  defer  collection. 
- Government  securities:  that  part  of  the  items  "Bills  discounted"  and  "Bills 
bought on  the  money  market"  corresponding  to  the Treasury  bills  in current 
account  purchased or taken  "en pension"  by  the Bank on the money  market. 
On the liabilities side  the credit balance of  the Treasury's current account appears 
in the  subheading  "other credit accounts". 
The  Treasury  has  no  accounts  with  the  commercial  banks.  Its  current  account 
with the Bank of France is  fed by payments of all kinds made by the public agents 
and the  Treasury's correspondents.  It is  debited with all  the  settlements made in 
cash  or by book  transfer on the instructions  of the public agents.  Credits to the 
account  also  include  the proceeds of discounting or the cashing  of pledged bonds. 
Finally,  debits  and  credits  can be the counterpart of entries  on the account  "Ad-
vances  to the  Government"  where  the Treasury  uses  its  receipts  to reduce  these 
or,  conversely,  where  it  borrows  within  the  limits  fixed,  to  cover  liquidity  re-
quirements. The credit balance of the Treasury's current account is, in fact, gener-
ally  very  small. 
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67.  In twelve years, from  the end of 1958 to the end of 1970, the national debt 
(including  the  debt  of  the  annexed  Post  Office  budget  but excluding  sight  bills 
held  by  certain  international  organizations)  rose  from  105,000  to  166,000  mil-
lions francs.  However, the rate of growth was not constant and the movement of 
the individual  constituents in particular did not coincide. 
a)  As  regards  the increase of the debt, a period of relatively strong growth up to 
1963 was  followed, from  1964 to 1966, by a much slower advance. Between 1967 
and  1969 the rise was  again  appreciable, but it flattened out in 1970. 
b) During this period, the structure of the Treasury's debt underwent considerable 
changes. 
A  glance  at  the  general  picture  will  show  that  the  deposits  of  Treasury  corres-
pondents  increased  more  rapidly  than  the  other headings  of  public  debt.  At  the 
end of  1970, these deposits, which included in particular the countervalue of Post 
Office  current accounts,  amounted to  some  64,000 million francs,  against less  than 
25,000 million twelve years earlier. They represented 39 %  of the Treasury's debt 
compared  with  22 %.  Conversely,  the  rest  of  the  public  debt,  represented  by 
securities  placed  with private persons  and banks  and by loans  and advances  from 
the  Bank  of  France,  increased  by  only  28% over  the  same  period,  rising  from 
81,000 million  to  103,000 million francs,  and bringing its ratio to the  total debt 
down  from  77 %  to  62 %. 
Examination  of  this  second  part of  the  public  debt  reveals  a  clear  tendency  for 
the duration of Treasury borrowings  to shorten. 
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THE INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
I ntrod  uc tion 
68.  Bank  rate  was  for  a  long  time  the  main  instrument  of  monetary  control in 
France.  However,  after  the  second  world  war,  the  economy  was  subjected  at 
various  times  and over  long  periods  to strong inflationary  strains which it would 
not have  been possible to combat by  the traditional means  without an increase in 
interest rates  considered incompatible  with reconstruction and development objec-
tives.  The  monetary  authorities  therefore  endeavoured  to  improve  and  diversify 
the instruments available to them for keeping the granting of credit within bounds. 
Nevertheless,  action through interest rates has  remained one of the main weapons 
in  the  armoury,  but it has  assumed  various  forms  and  has  been  extended  with 
varying  degrees  of  stringency  to  lending  and  deposit  terms  (cost  of  credit  and 
remuneration  of deposits). 
Monetary policy has been supplemented by the introduction of procedures designed 
to influence  total bank  liquidity.  These  procedures  have  been utilized  to prevent 
money  creation  from  playing  an  excessive  part in the  financing  of the  economy. 
They have  gradually  been extended to cover  all  the methods by which banks can 
procure liquidity from  the central bank. The introduction of the minimum reserve 
system in January  1967  aimed at simplifying the controls over bank liquidity and 
putting  them  on  a  new  basis,  with an  eye  to  imparting  more  flexibility  and  ef-
ficiency  to  the operations of the  Bank of France. 
Furthermore, direct  influence  has  been brought to bear on the granting  of credit 
by procedures  of various  kinds. 
In the first place,  the monetary authorities have used selective action to  encourage 
the  development  of  the  priority  sectors  of  the  economy  in conformity  with  the 
general guidelines  of the Plan, or, conversely,  to control more  closely  the growth 
of  vertain  categories  of credit or of the financing  of certain branches  of activity. 
Various  methods have  been used for this purpose:  differential rates,  specific  regu-
lations, such as  those applying to consumer credit, individual scrutiny of applications 
prior to the granting of large credits or mobilization agreements. 
Secondly, during periods of restraint and where a rapid slow-down of the creation 
of  money  was  needed,  experiments  have  been  made  in  limiting  the  growth  of 
outstanding  credit  with  a  view  to  strengthening  the  other,  now  traditional, 
methods. 
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Section I - Refinancing policy 1 
Para.  I:  General 
Different types of financing by the Bank of France 
69.  It is  the duty of the Bank of France, which has  the privilege  of issuing legal 
tender  money,  to stand  ready  in the  last  resort  to  refinance  the  whole  banking 
system. 
This refinancing takes place according to the law and internal regulations governing 
the operations  of  the  bank of issue. 
Aside from  purchases of foreign  exchange,  the Bank of France  keeps  the banking 
system  directly  supplied  with  money  by  means  of  three  refinancing  techniques: 
rediscounting, intervention on the money market and - though the sums involved 
here  are  relatively  very small-advances  on securities. 
These techniques are used to implement monetary policy, for they make it possible 
to influence, directly or otherwise, the cost, nature and total amount of the banks' 
lending. 
Discount houses 
70.  The Bank of France maintains direct banker-customer relations with the banks, 
particularly as  regards  rediscounting of short-term credits. On the other hand,  for 
a considerable proportion of its credit facilities it deals with the specialized financial 
institutions. 
In this way, its contributions to the money market involve discount houses ("mai-
sons de reescompte"), whose function is the initial offsetting of the banks' liquidity 
surpluses  and  requirements. 
Paper representing medium-term credit reaches  the portfolio of the Bank of France 
through  the  first-stage  rediscounting  institutions  (see  17  above).  But  the  role  of 
these institutions is  mainly to examine dossiers  and study the advisability of loans 
from both the economic and the financial  point of view.  Their contribution to the 
actual  financing  is  of  relatively  little  importance.  On  the  whole,  the  first-stage 
rediscounting  institutions  retain  hardly  more  than  6 %  of  the  total  amount  of 
credits  which  pass  through  their portfolios. 
The Bank of France refinances in all a varying proportion of the credits distributed 
by  the banks.  At the end of December  1970  the figure  was  about  20 %. 
Para.  II:  Refinancing 
71.  Apart from two specific rules  which require it to discount Treasury certificates 
having  less  than  three  months  to  run  and  held  by  private  persons,  and  paper 
representing the financing  of stocks of certain specified cereals, the Bank of France 
is  completely free  to decide  whether or not to provide facilities  by way  of redis-
count,  purchases,  "en pension"  operations  or advances. 
Para.  II-1:  Rediscount 
72.  The bank  of issue  accepts  in its  portfolio  only  bills  offering  every  guarantee 
of  solvency  and  liquidity,  i.e.,  under  the  terms  of  the  legal  instruments  which 
t  For  the  exact  meaning  of  this  term,  refer  to  Part  I,  point  71. 
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govern its operation,  commercial paper of at most three months tenor, guaranteed 
by at least three signatures, or two of known soundness, according to the case. 
Apart from  this  statutory requirement concerning  the characteristics of the paper, 
and  in  the  light  of  the  economic  nature  of  the  credits  refinanced,  the  Bank  of 
France makes  certain of its facilities  subject to prior mobilization agreements  and 
the  observance  of liability  ceilings. 
These  arrangements  make  it possible  to  limit  and  to  channel credits  which  the 
bank of issue  provides,  through rediscounting,  at fixed  rates  on terms  which,  up 
to  January  1971, were  traditionally  lower  than  those  of its interventions on the 
money  market.  Since  then the cost of placing bills  at the Bank  "en pension"  has 
retnained  below  the  discount  rate. 
Charging of higher rates 
73.  Independently  of  the  discount  rate  charged  in  most  instances,  higher  rates 
have  been or are  still  charged  for  certain types  of  facility.  In the past (in  1947 
and  1948)  the  ordinary  rate  was  reserved  for  discounting  commercial  bills  and 
public securities, financial  paper being  accepted  at a half point more.  This distinc-
tion was  no  longer  appropriate when rediscount  ceilings became  general,  and was 
never re-established.  On the other hand,  as  part of the  1965 reform of  the redis-
count  system  for  medium-term  credits,  an  extra  ;2 %  has  been  applied  since 
October  1970  to  the  discounting  of  paper  corresponding  to  the  second  redis-
countable  annuity. 
Finally,  since  1951,  there  has  been  provision  for  higher  rates  when  the  banks, 
having  reached their rediscount ceilings,  make  further call on the Bank of France. 
Until  recently,  two  rates-generally  described  professionnally  as  "enfer"  and 
"super-enfer" - were  applied,  the  first  to  refinancing  granted within the limit of 
one-tenth  of  the  ceilings,  and  the  second  above  this  limit.  This  distinction  was 
dropped  in  December  1967,  and  now  there  is  only  a  single  system-practically 
never used-of recourse  to  "en pension"  operations  above  the ceilings;  the rate 
for  these  has  been  fixed  at 2 ;2 points above  Bank rate. 
'Charging of lower rates 
Conversely,  a  rate lower  than Bank  rate  was  applied between 1957  and  1969  to 
the  discounting  of  external  claims.  There  have  been  increases  since  then  which 
have brought the rate of discount of short-term external claims into line with the 
ordinary  rate,  while,  however,  maintaining  a  lower  rate  for  medium-term  claims 
on countries  other than those  of  the  European  Community. 
74.  Financial  paper  representing  short or medium-term  credit  can  be accepted  in 
the  portfolio  of  the  Bank  of  France  only  when  a  "mobilization  agreement"  has 
been concluded  following  a  case-by-case  study. 
However, credits  for  the mobilization  of external claims  of less  than six  months' 
maturity  and  of  hire  purchase  sales,  along  with  the  credits  to  finance  cereals 
stocks backed  by  an  endorsement of the National Cereals  Office  ("Office National 
Interprofessionnel des  Cereales") are  not considered case-by-case  but are  governed 
by  special  rules.  · 
Introduced in 1947, at the time when a liquidity ratio was imposed on the banks, 
the  mobilization agreement  procedure provides the bank of issue with an effective 
instrument  of selective  credit  policy. 
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Rediscount ceilings 
75.  For the purposes  of  general control of bank liquidity,  rediscount  ceilings  are 
fixed  for  each  bank.  Before  1948  their  main  purpose  was  to  ensure  that  each 
establishment  resorted to rediscount  only  to an extent justified by the volume of 
its  business  and,  more  especially  its  own resources.  These ceilings  were  therefore 
based  on considerations  of  safety  and  did  not apply  to  the  big  banks,  which  in 
any  case  did  little  rediscounting  at  that time.  Since  then,  the ceilings  have been 
changed  several  times  in  the  light  of  monetary  or  economic  policy  objectives. 
Thus,  in  the  course  of  1957,  the  Bank  of  France  decided  to  reduce  them,  first 
by 20% in two  stages  of  10 %, and  then  again  by  15 %, in view  of the very 
strong  inflationary  pressures  in  evidence  at  that  time.  Subsequently,  individual 
increases were granted to keep  in step with changes of structure at certain banks, 
but these  increases  remained  relatively  limited.  In October  1970,  shortly  before 
the abolition  of the credit restriction measures,  the rediscount ceilings  were again 
lowered, by 10 %  for those below 30 million francs  and 20 %  for those above. 
In order to make  the system less  rigid the banks were in 1951  given  the facility 
of obtaining  extra liquidity  above  the ceilings  allotted  to  them  by placing  paper 
"en pension"  at  rates  higher  than  Bank  rate.  Under  its  interest  rate  policy,  the 
Bank  of  France  aimed  at  adapting  the  level  of  these  rates  to  the  trends  of  the 
money  market. 
The system  of rediscount ceilings  does  not apply  to all  rediscountable paper held 
by  the  banks.  Certain  categories  of  paper  are  eligible  for  rediscount  outside  the 
ceiling, for  reasons of selective policy. 
Paper eligible for rediscount 
76.  Taking  into  account  these  various  rules,  the  paper  eligible  for  the  discount 
portfolio of the Bank of France may be listed as  follows: 
1 - Short-term  credits 
a)  The  following  are  rediscountable  at  the  ordinary  discount  rate,  within  the 
limits  of  the  ceiling  allotted  to  each  establishment: 
- Commercial  drafts (" tirages  commerciaux")  within three months of matur-
ity  and  in  principle  drawn  for  three  months  at  most,  subject  to  the 
observance of the normal usances as fixed  by the Bank of France; 
- Notes representing a group of commercial claims, made out by the creditor 
to the order of his banker and rediscountable under the mobilization credits 
procedure for commercial claims  briefly described in Part one. These notes 
bear only  two  signatures; 
- Three-month financial  bills (" effets financiers"),  renewable up to two years, 
provided an agreement for their rediscount has been concluded beforehand. 
b)  The following  are  accepted  outside the ceiling: 
- Promissory  notes  ("billets  a ordre")  of  at  most  three  months  tenor, 
subscribed  by  approved  stocking  agencies,  representing  stocks  of  cereals, 
and  endorsed  by  the  National  Cereals  Office; 
- Renewable three months commercial bills ("effets de commerce"), represent-
ing external claims  of a duration of eighteen months or less.  A  rediscount 
agreement  for  the  mobilizable  amount  of  the  credit  is  required  only  for 
the proportion not due until after six  months. 
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2  - Medium-term  credits 
The  Bank  of France  accepts  for  rediscount  outside the ceiling  paper representing 
medium-term credits covered by a mobilization agreement.  The rediscounting facil-
ity,  which  originally  covered  all  outstanding  credits,  has  been  gradually  reduced 
by  a  phased  reform begun  in January  1966. 
Credits for equipment and construction, granted for a maximum duration of seven 
years,  may  now be mobilized  only in respect of that portion having  at most  two 
years  to run. 
Mobilization  credits  for  medium-term  external  claims  could,  until  30  June  1971, 
be refinanced  during  period of five  years,  irrespective  of  the  original  duration of 
the  credit.  Since  1st  July,  the  mobilisation  facility  has  depended  on  the  total 
duration  of  the  credits.  It is  available  at most for  the  three nearest annual  ma-
turity dates, when the credits are granted for five  years or longer, but not exceding 
seven  years. 
3  - The discount portfolio of the Bank of France also  includes pledged bond (see 
point 66  above)  presented by  the Treasury. 
With the exception of the Treasury certificates  sold by private persons,  the Bank 
of France  no  longer discounts  Government securities  ('''effets  publics") at a fixed 
rate.  It acquires these where necessary  via  the money  market. 
Submissions  of  short  and  medium-term  credit  paper  for  discount  have  dwindled 
since  the intervention rate of the Bank of France on the money  market fell below 
Bank  rate (see point 72  above). 
Para.  II-2:  Advances  on  Securities 
77.  This  heading covers  advances  granted on current account  to individuals, firms 
or banks  against  collateral  which  may  consist  of: 
- French  Government  securities,  or 
- Negotiable  securities  against  which  the  Bank  of  France  is  authorized  by  its 
statutes  or later  instruments  to  grant  advances;  however,  for  these  securities 
to be  accepted  as  collateral  a  decision  of the  General Council  is  needed  for 
each issue. 
The  General  Council  also  fixes  the  proportionate  amount  of  the  loan  and  deter-
mines the rate to be applied to these transactions, a rate which is generally a point 
or a point. and  a half  above  the  official  discount  rate. 
The banks do not make much use of this form of recourse to the Bank of France. 
Thus,  at  31  December  1970,  advances  on securities  to  them  amounted  to  some 
2·6  n1illion  francs,  whereas  the  total  of  the  discount  portofolio  and  of  paper 
bought  on  the  money  market  approached  52,000  million  francs.  Advances  on 
securities  are  also  made  to  firms  and  individuals;  at  the  end  of  1970  the  total 
was  close  on  60  million  francs. 
As  part of their borrowing against  securities,  banks  for a long  time  made  use  of 
the five  to thirty-day  facilities  on Government  securities introduced in 1935. 
These  advances,  guaranteed  by  Government  securities  with  less  than  two  years 
to run and held in excess  of the "bills ceilings"  imposed on the banks from  1948 
to  196  7,  were granted within the limits  of an  individual ceiling  at a rate which, 
since  1965,  had  become  identical  with Bank  rate. 
Their place among  the operations of the bank of issue was always a rather modest 
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one.  In December  1967 the Bank of France put an end to this form of fixed-rate 
advance. 
Para.  III:  Effectiveness of refinancing  policy  and of action  through  interest rates 
78.  Interest-rate  policy  has  to  take  account  of  ocnsiderations  that  sometimes 
conflict,  making  its  conduct  difficult  and  even,  in  certain  circumstances,  obliging 
the monetary  authorities  to  set limits  to  its  use. 
Internally,  market  forces  practically  always  tend  to  push  rates  upward  because 
of the heavy capital requirements  that are  not fully  covered by savings.  Financing 
of  investment  by firms  already  heavily  in debt  and  with  a  reduced  capacity  for 
self-financing  calls  for  low interest rates  particularly when  the business  climate is 
slack, while at the same time money creation has  to be kept under control in order 
to contain inflation. 
The  return  to  external  convertibility  of  the  franc  in  1959  and,  even  more,  the 
abolition  of  almost  all  obstacles  to  financial  dealings  with  foreign  countries-a 
measure  decided  on in  196  7 - had magnified  the influences  exerted from  abroad 
on the formation  of interest rates,  in particular those of the Paris money  market. 
Interest-rate policy  had  therefore  to  take  account  of external  trends  even where 
they  conflicted  with  the  internal  objectives  of  monetary  policy. 
The reintroduction of exchange control. in November 1968 did not completely free 
the  market  from  these  influences  and  official  interest  rate  policy  since  then  has 
been  determined  both by  internal  considerations  and  by  the problems  connected 
with external relations. 
Para.  III-1:  Discount  rate  and  intervention  by the  Bank  of France 
79.  In France,  the use  of Bank rate ("le taux d'escompte") still has an important 
place among the instruments of monetary policy.  First, it has  force  as  an indicator 
of the  direction of official  action  on money  market rates.  Futhermore,  as ·long  as 
rediscounting  is  used  as  a  refinancing  procedure,  its efficacy  stems  from  the high 
level  of  indebtedness  of  the  banks,  so  that  variations  of  this  rate  and  money 
market rates have immediate repercussions on the banks' profit and loss conditions 
and, indirectly, on the cost of bank credit to the economy. 
It is  true  that  when  the  economy  is  under  relatively  severe  strain,  a  moderate 
increase in the cost of credit has  only a limited influence  on the decision of firms 
and interest rate policy needs  to be reinforced by more directly effective measures. 
Nevertheless, the changing of Bank rate is still a valuable pointer or warning signal. 
It tells, in unambiguous  terms,  the direction in which monetary policy  is  moving. 
The  Bank  of  France  has  been  induced,  for  selectivity  reasons  or  to  supplement 
quantitative  control measures,  to  make  use  of  special  discount  rates.  These  rates 
are  above  or below  Bank  rate  according  to  the  nature  of  the  operations  or the 
objectives  fixed. 
80.  Apart from  the variation  in the  rates  charged  on discounts,  in its operations 
on  the  money  market  the  Bank  of  France  adjusts  its  interest  rate  policy  to  cir-
cumstances. 
Until  recently,  the rates  for  dealings  on this  market,  where  the main  business  is 
liquidity exchanges between banks, were closely dependent on the rediscount rates 
of the Bank of France and the first-stage  rediscounting institutions. When liquidity 
was  plentiful on the money  market,  banks  which  had  not exhausted  their  redis-
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count potential  would  avoid  borrowing on  the  market at a  rate  higher  than the 
Bank of France charged. Those temporarily in possession of excess liquidity would 
prefer to use it to reduce their rediscount position whenever the market rate tended 
to be below  the official  discount  rate.  When, on the other hand, a  tightening of 
their cash positions obliged all the banks to use up their rediscount margins market 
rates  would  rise  above  Bank rate,  but without for  long  going  beyond the higher 
rate charged  for  "en pension"  accommodation  in excess  of the ceilings. 
In a general way,  the Bank of France allowed market trends to develop freely  up 
to  1964,  while  controlling  them  indirectly  by  its  discount  policy.  Apart  from 
facilities  provided at the same  rate as  discount rate and kept within narrow limits 
fixed  bank by bank, its intervention on the money market remained marginal  and 
aimed  only  at facilitating  the balancing  of operations  there. 
Since  1964, and particularly from January 1967 onwards, the relaxation of controls 
on external financial  operations has  made  it necessary for  the Bank of France  to 
intensify its intervention in the money market in order to keep rates under control 
and thus regulate the flows  of short-term capital between France and abroad. 
By  dissociating Bank rate, considered more  as  a guide-line for the internal cost of 
credit (see point 81  below), from call money or one month money rates, maintained 
at a  different  level  to allow  for  foreign  rates,  the Bank  of France has  been able 
to  limit  external  influences  on  French  interest  rates  as  a  whole.  Thanks  to the 
rapid  easing  of interest  rates  on international markets  that appeared in the early 
months of 1971, this objective has consequently induced the Bank to maintain the 
rate  for  its  intervention in the  money  market  at  a  level  below  Bank  rate.  The 
result of this  policy has been a considerable reduction in rediscounting and,  simul-
taneously,  an  increase  in  the  facilities  provided at variable  rates.  This  should,  it 
would  seem,  lead  to some  modification  of the  reference  data  used  by  banks  for 
determining  the  cost  of  their  lending. 
Para.  III-2:  Lending  rates 
81.  Until  1966,  under  rules  laid  down  by  the  National  Credit  Council,  the 
minimum terms applied to bank lending to firms  and individuals remained directly 
or indirectly  linked  to  the discount  rates  of the Bank of France.  The links with 
Bank  rate,  at first  very  strict,  were  made  less  so  in 1959  when,  to prevent  the 
Bank's  decisions  in this  matter being  fully  reflected  in  the cost  of credit,  to the 
economy,  the  Council  established  a  reference  rate which  varied  less  widely  than 
Bank  rate. 
Since April 1966 lending terms have no longer been subject to specific regulations. 
On the  other hand,  the  general  legislation  on  restrictive  practices  is  an  obstacle 
to  rate-fixing  agreements  between  establishments.  In practice,  the banks continue 
to take more or less  close  account of changes  in Bank .  rate, or, in a more general 
way,  the average  cost of refinancing  at the central bank. 
The  monetary  authorities  have  not stopped  keeping  a  careful  watch on  the  cost 
of bank credit in the light of their general objectives.  Since the rules on minimum 
terms were dropped, their influence has made itself felt mainly through the banks" 
need  to  have  recourse  to  the central bank.  In addition,  the  authorities  have  en-
deavoured to mitigate the causes  of dear money, partly by bringing about a reduc-
tion in commissions  charged  by the public and  semi-public  institutions which act 
as  first-stage  rediscounters  (Credit National, Credit Fonder de  France)  or as  gua-
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:rantors  (Caisse  Nationale  des  Marches  de  l'Etat)  and  partly  by  encouraging  the 
streamlining and improvement of financing  circuits. 
The authorities  have  also  aimed  at bringing  about  an improvement  in the  terms 
·-felt to be too severe - for certain loans. For example, a law of 28th December 
1966  on usury  and money  lending  sets  maximum  interest charges  to borrowers. 
Para.  III-3:  Deposit  rates 
82.  The  terms  of  remuneration  for  sight  and  short-term deposits  and savings  ac-
counts  are  regulated  by the  National Credit Council  for  the banks  subject  to its 
authority,  and  by  the  Minister  of  Economy  and  Finance,  in  accordance  with 
specific  procedures,  where  other financial  or banking  institutions  (savings  banks, 
popular banks, agricultural credit institutions, public agents) are concerned. 
83.  Until 1965 the use of preferential rates of interest and of special  tax systems 
favoured  the  channelling  of  savings  towards  the  Treasury  and  public  financial 
institutions.  The  aim  of  these  arrangements  was  to facilitate  Treasury  financing, 
while  at the  same  time  responding  to social  considerations. 
84.  However, it became  apparent - particularly  during preliminary  work on the 
Fifth  Plan - that  by  trying  to channel  savings  such  arrangements  could  hinder 
their growth.  In 1965,  therefore,  a  harmonization policy  was  adopted as  regards 
deposit  interest,  which  was  designed  to  stimulate  saving  and  improve  the  con-
ditions  for  financing  investment.  Without achieving  an  absolute  equality,  which 
would have run counter to the social natur~ of traditional savings bank deposits, the 
new arrangements  brought  more  uniformity  into  the  real  terms  of  remuneration 
on  short-term  saving  and  widened  the  range  of  choice  between  the  various 
collection channels. 
Harmonization was  made  possible  by new  tax  rules.  Subject  to exemptions  of a 
limited  scope  (first  savings  bank  book  with a  ceiling  of  20,000  francs,  housing 
savings  accounts),  tax equality was  reintroduced by the 1966 Finance Act and the 
ministerial order ("arrete'') of 23  December  1965. The saver now has  the option 
of  accepting  a  standard  levy  of  25 %, exempting  him  from  income  tax,  rather 
than be  taxed  at the latter's progressive  rates. 
By  alignment on the yields  offering  tl}.e  saver the best return the reform led to an 
increase  in  the  majority  of short-term  deposit· rates· and  in  particular  those  paid 
on deposit and time accounts at the banks, while at the same time bringing greater 
differentiation  than previously,  according  to  the  degree  of liquidity  of the  funds 
deposited. 
In 196  7,  new  measures  were  adopted to facilitate  the adjustment  of  supply  and 
demand for caiptal. At present the rates payable on certificates of deposit and time 
accounts  in  excess  of  100,000  francs  or for  periods  of  over  a  year  have  been 
completely  liberalized,  while  e·anings  on ·other deposits  have  been  increased.  At 
the same  time, the payment of interest on sight deposits of a monetary nature has 
been forbidden  in a effort  to influence  the pattern of liquidity and encourage the 
partial  funding  liquid  assets,  while  cushioning· the  repercussions  of  the  other 
measures  on  the profitability  of the  banks. 
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Section II - Control of bank liquidity 
General remarks 
85.  Since  it was introduced early in 196  7, the minimum  reserve system  has  been 
one  of the instruments used  to control bank liquidity in France.  Its effectiveness 
is  promoted by supplementary arrangements  tending to restrict the scope for bank 
recourse  to  the Bank  of France. 
Thus,  the  system  of  rediscount  ceilings-applied  to  short-term  credit  paper-
has  been maintained,  and the monetary  authorities  have  allowed  a modified  forn1 
of  the old "liquid assets  ratio"  to survive by requiring the banks to freeze  among 
their assets  a proportion of  their holdings of medium-term credit paper. 
In the framework  of  these  general  arrangements .  and taking  due  account  of  the 
daily influences on bank liquidity, the Bank of France operates on the money market 
to promote the adjustment of the banks' cash situation and influence market rates 
as  required by internal and external considerations. 
Para.  I:  Minimum  reserve  policy . 
86.  The  system  of  minimum  reserves  ("reserves· obligatoires"),  which  is  applied 
in various forms in many countries, was introduced in France in January 1967. 
Previously, the main instrument for control of bank liquidity was  the liquid assets 
ratio  ("coefficient  de  tresorerie")  which  required  the  banks  to  hold  among  their 
assets  cash,  Government  securities  and  rediscountable  medium-term  paper  to  an 
amount calculated  as  a  proportion of demand  liabilities.  The effectiveness  of  this 
ratio  derived  particularly  from  the  fact  that  the  components  of  the  numerator 
either entailed some  constraint in the management  of ·their liquid  assets  or could 
not be created without the  agreement of the Bank of France.  Well suited to the 
circumstances prevailing at the time it was introduced, it operated satisfactorily for 
several  years.  Subsequently,  disadvantages-connected  particularly  with  changes 
in· the composition of bank assets-gradually  appeared and made it necessary for 
the  liquid  assets  ratio  to  be  replaced  by  a  device  less ·dependent  on  the lending 
techniques  in force  and better adapted  to objectives  of a purely monetary nature. 
Para.  I-1:  Legal  basis  of the reserve  system 
87.  The minimum  reserve  system  was  introduced by  a decree  of 9 January  1967 
which  applies,  not only  to  the  French  and  foreign  banks  under  the  authority  of 
the  National  Credit  Council,  but also  to  all  the  special  status  establishments-
French Foreign Trade Bank,  popular banks,  agricultural credit institutions, mutual 
credit  institutions,  maritime  credit ·institutions,  cooperative  credit  establishments 
- which  receive  deposits  from  the  public,  given  that,  by  their  lending,  they 
participate in the creation of money. For convenience, some of these establishments 
have been authorized, by ministerial orders, to put up their reserves  through their 
central institutions.  The  system,  originally  based  exclusively  on  the demand  liabi-
lities  of  the  banks,  was  extended  by  decree  of 23  February  1971  to the  credits 
granted  both by  the  banks  and  by  financial  establishments  (the latter  as  defined 
by the law of 14 June 1941). 
The  decrees  of  9  January'  1967  and  23  February  1971  laid  down  the  basic 
principles  of  the  system,  leaving  it to  the National Credit Council  and  the Bank 
of  F  ranee  the  responsibility  for  fixing  the practical  details.  Thus,  a decision  of a 
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general  nature  by  the  National  Credit  Council,  dated  26  February  1971,  super-
seding  that of  10  January  1967, specified  the factors  to  be taken into considera-
tion in calculating the reserves  and delegated to the Bank of France the power to 
fix - subject to maxima - the actual reserve ratios and the penalty rate of interest 
to be charged in the event of shortfalls. These details were embodied in instructions 
of 26 February and 25  March  1971. 
Para.  I-2:  Calculation  of the  reserves 
1 -Bases  of calculation 
a)  Reserves  against  demand  liabilities. 
88.  The basis of the calculation, i.e. the denominator of the reserve ratio, is  made 
up of  the demand liabilities  shown on the liabilities  shown on the liabilities  side 
of  the  metropolitan  balance  sheets  of  the  establishments  concerned,  under  the 
following  heads: 
1)  Customers'  accounts:  cheque  accounts,  current  accounts  and  certain  miscel-
laneous  deposit  accounts,  on  the  one  hand,  and  bank book  accounts  (except 
housing  savings  accounts,  which  are  subject  to special  investment obligations), 
certificates  of  deposit  and  accounts  with  fixed  maturities  whose  initial  term 
is  less  than  three  years,  on  the  other. 
2)  Accounts of non-banking  firms  admitted to  the  money market. 
3)  Accounts in  the name of banks established abroad (including branches abroad). 
For the  purposes  of the calculation,  all  the establishments  are  permitted to  enter 
liabilities  of  less  than  or equal  to  10  million  francs  at  half  the  actual  amount, 
giving  a  maximum  abatement  of  5  million  francs,  chargeable  without  distinction 
to  any  category  of liability. 
The  reserves  themselves,  i.e.  the  numerator  of  the  minimum  ratio,  consist  ex-
clusively of liquid funds  put up in the form  of non-interest bearing deposits at the 
Bank of France and credited to the ordinary current accounts  opened for  banking 
establishments. 
b)  Reserves  against  credits  granted. 
The calculation  of  reserves  against credits  granted is  based,  in the  first  place,  on 
lending  of  all  kinds  (with  the  exception  of  guarantees  and  endorsements)  the 
beneficiaries of which are not themselves required to set aside reserves, and, in the 
second place on the granting of credit, by way  of leasing ("credit-bail). 
Under  the present rules,  these  loans  are  taken  into  account  only  for  that part in 
excess  of 80% of  their amount on 5 January  1971. 
2-Methods  of  calculation 
89.  Calculation of the reserves is  based on the principle of monthly averages. This 
average,  which  applies  solely  to  the amounts  to  be  kept in account,  is  calculated 
arithmetically  in the  light  of the number of calendar  days  in  a period extending 
from  the  21st of each  month to  the 20th of the following  month. 
This  method of  calculation  enables  the banks  to meet  their ·commitments flexibly 
and cushions  the impact  a sudden money  market tightness can  have  on their cash 
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situation. The reserves  are not blocked in a special account and can be utilized in 
accordance with the banks' requirements. Thus, during the first part of the monthly 
control  period,  when  their  cash  position  is  under  strain  because  of outflows .of 
notes, the banks  can  allow  their reserve  account  to fall  below the required mini-
mum,  at  the  cost  of  building  up  excess  balances  a  little  later  when liquidity  is 
more  plentiful. 
Para.  I-3:  Minimum  reserves  ratio 
90.  The  National  Credit  Council  has  set  at  15 %  for  liabilities  and  10 %  for 
lending the maximum level at which the Bank of France may  fix  the reserve ratio 
requirement  without  reference  back  to  it.  Since  18  May  1971  this  power  has 
been  raised  to  100 %  for  liabilities  on non-residents'  accounts. 
Within  these  limits,  the  Bank  of  France  has  fixed  differential  rates.  In the  first 
place,  a  higher  ratio  (9 ~  %)  is  required  for  sight  liabilities-these  being  in 
the  nature  of money  supply-than  for  bank  book  accounts  and  time  accounts 
(4 ~  %).  . 
In  the  second  place,  franc  accounts  opened  on  behalf  of  banks  or  branches 
established  abroad  are,  according  to  the  circumstances,  exempt from  the  reserve 
obligation  or subjected  to it at  a  specific  rate.  At present it is  the  highest  rate 
( 9 ~  % )  which  is  applied  to  them. 
In  the  third  place,  banks'  foreign  currency  liabilities  are  not  at  present  subject 
to  the  reserve  obligation.  However,  for  a  short  period  from  10  July  to  20 
September  1968, liabilities  in foreign  currency  to residents  were made  subject  to 
the requirement at the rate of 10% to cope with an exceptional situation. 
Finally,  the  rate  applying  to credits  granted by the banks  and financial  establish-
ments  has  been fixed  at  ~  %  (for that part in excess  of 80% of their  amount 
on 5 January 1971). 
Para.· l-4: . Control  and  penalties 
91.  The  fact  that  the  reserves  are  recorded  in  its  books  gives  the  central  bank 
the means of exercising continuous control over the observance of the rules. Where 
the  required  minimum  reserve  is  not  formed  within  the  prescribed  period,  the 
Bank  of  France  automatically,  after  notification,  charges  penalty  interest  on  the 
amount ·of  the  deficiency. 
The Bank  of  France  has  been empowered  by  the National Credit Council  to  fix 
this  rate  within the limit of  a  maximum of 3  points above  Bank rate.  The Bank 
decides· ·the  actual  rate  in  the  light  of  the  conditions  obtaining  on  the  money 
market, so  that banks may not find  it to their advange  to maintain reserves below 
the  required  level.  The  rate  of penalty  interest,  initially  fixed  at 2  points  above 
discount rate, was  raised  with effect  from  15  March  1968 to  the maximum level 
permitted  by  the National  Credit  Council. 
Para.  1-5:  Effectiveness  of minimum  reserve  policy 
92.  By  obliging  the  banks  to  part  with  assets  in  order  to  form  the  required 
balances,  the minimum reserve system first  has the effect of associating  the central 
bank with every fresh  injection of money.  It thus  reinforces  the hold the central 
bank alr.eady  has  on the whole of the banking system through its role as  bankers' 
bank and  its  monopoly  of the  issue  of legal  tender. 
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Ho\vever,  despite  a continuous  downward  trend  over  the  past 25  years,  notes  in 
circulation  are  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  the  aggregate  money  supply,  and 
the monetary  authorities have  therefore fixed  the minimum reserve ratio,  at least 
initially, at a level lower than in most countries where a similar system is operated. 
In the overall set of instruments for the control of bank liquidity, the role of the 
reserves  is  to  effect  a  general  adjustment  of  the  cash  position  of  the  banks  to 
the  requirements  of  monetary  balance  in  the  prevailing  economic  situation.  To 
cope  with  daily  or  seasonal  fluctuations  of  bank  liquidity,  which  cannot  be 
entirely  corrected  by  the  machinery  of  periodical  averages  used  for  the  control 
of reserves,  the  central bank makes  use  of other means,  including,  in particular, 
its operations  on the money  market. 
93.  By  fixing  the  minimum  reserve  ratio on liabilities  at different  rates  according 
to  the nature  or origin  of  the balances,  the monetary authorities  can  also  nudge 
the composition of bank deposits in the right direction to suit internal or external 
objectives. For example, the formation of liquid or semi-liquid savings is  promoted 
by  applying  the lowest  rate  to  the fixed  deposits  of banks. 
The reserves  required in respect of bank lending provide  an  additional  means  of 
checking  the  expansion  of credit,  and  one  with  ~n efficacy  enhanced  by  the  fact 
that the effort to find  additional liquid funds is directly demanded of the initiating 
establishment  itself. 
Under  the  powers  delegated  by  the National  Credit  Council,  the  Bank  has  con-
siderable scope for raising the rate (from  ~  to 10 % ),  making much more restric-
tive  action  on  its  part possible  in  case  of  need. 
Para.  II:  Other  banking  ratios 
94.  In order to be in a position to pursue a flexible  interest rate policy, the Bank 
of France reserves the power to ensure at any time an appropriate division between 
the  fixed  rate  facilities  available  to  the  banks  through  rediscounting  and  the 
variable  rate  accommodation  they  can  get  on the  money  market. 
For  this  reason,  not  only  have  the  rediscount  ceilings  been  maintained  (see  7  5 
above),  but  a  ratio  known  as  the  "minimum  portofolio  of  paper  representing 
medium-term  credits"  has  also  been introduced  in order  to  limit  the  refinancing 
of this category of lending. Independently of the ratios mentioned above (minimum 
reserves and minimum portfolio of paper representing medium-term credits), which 
are a matter of monetary policy,  the Banking Control Commission for its part has 
imposed  on  the. banks  certain  ratios  related  to  risks,  deposits  or  capital  and 
reserves,  and  prompted by  the  desire  for  sound banking practice. 
The  most  important  and  oldest  of  the  rules  laid  down  concerns  the  minimum 
liquidity ratio ("coefficient de liquidite"). It has  been supplemented more  recently 
by  other  provisions  which  help  to  guard  against  the  risk  of  excessive  immobi-
lization of bank assets (see  97  below). The National Credit Council has extended 
this  latter regulation  to  the  financial  establishments. 
Para.  II-1:  The  minimum  porto/olio  of  paper  representing  ntedium-term  credits 
95.  The  so  called  liquid  asset  ratio,  introduced in  1960  and  kept  in force  until 
1966,  was  intended  to  avoid  the  danger  of  massive  resort  to  the  Bank  of 
France's rediscount facilities.  With this in view, it aimed at freezing,  in the assets 
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of  the banks,  a  large  part of  the  paper  held  outside  the ceiling  and allowing  it 
to be rediscounted only within limits fixed  by  the Bank of France. 
After the abolition of the cash  ratio, on the introduction of  the minimum reserve 
system,  two categories  of paper fully  recovered the right of rediscount:  short-term 
export drafts and bills  guaranteed by  the National Cereals  Office.  Mobilization of 
these  enabled  the  banks  to  procure  on  advantageous  terms  part  of  the  liquid 
resources  needed  to  form  their reserve  accounts.  On the other hand,  banks  were 
required  to  observe  a  new  set of  rules  concerning  the  paper  resulting  from  mo-
bilization of medium-term credits. 
Thus,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  gradual  transition  from  the  cash  ratio  to  the 
minimum  reserve  system  and to be in a position to limit the assistance which the 
Bank  of France  grants  at fixed  rates,  the  monetary  authorities,  in January  1967, 
introduced as  a temporary measure  the rule of the "minimum portofolio of paper 
representing  medium-term  credits". 
The reform, a year earlier, of the conditions for  rediscounting medium-term credits 
had  already  established  a limitation of  discount  facilities  for  new  lending.  But  a 
large  volume  of  medium-term  rediscountable  credits  remained  outstanding  from 
the  old  system,  which  provided  the  banks  with  wide  scope  for  immediate 
mobilization and which it was important to keep under control. 
Like  the cash ratio, of which it is  a simplified form,  the new instrument requires 
the banks  to maintain  a minimum  ratio  between components of their mobilizable 
assets  and components of their sight and term lhibilities, as  specified in the general 
decision  of the National Credit Council of  10 January  196  7. 
The  liabilities  entering  into  the  denominator  are  the  same  as  those  used  in  the 
calculation  of the  reserve  ratio  with the  exception,  however,  of  accounts  opened 
for  banks  and  correspondents  established  abroad.  Moreover,  an  abatement  of  50 
million  francs  is  applied  to  the  total liabilities  thus defined.  The effect  of this is 
to  exempt  the  smaller  banks  from  any  requirement to  hold these assets.  As  they 
do little medium-term lending, these banks would have had difficulties in observing 
the  rule  imposed. 
The  numerator  comprises  paper  discounted,  purchased  or accepted  "en pension", 
drawn  in  connection  with  medium-term  credit  and  mobilizable  under  the  terms 
laid  down  by  the  Bank  of  France.  In addition,  banks  were  authorized,  until 20 
October  1967,  to include in it, on a degressive  basis,  a proportion of  their port-
folio of medium-term credit paper not rediscountable until the later maturity dates. 
The  minimum  portfolio  ratio,  currently  16 %, was  chosen  in order to fix  limits 
to facilities  for  mobilization without forcing  the banks into excessive purchase of 
the  necessary  assets  on the  money  market on unfavourable  terms. 
Para.  II-2:  Liquidity ratio  and ratios  for  medium and  long-term credits 
96.  The liquidity ratio was  introduced by a Control Commission decision of 1948. 
It concerns deposit banks and,  since  1966, merchant banks, but does not apply to 
the  medium  and  long-term  credit banks.  Under  the rules  laid down  by  the Com-
mission, the ratio of liquid and realizable assets to sight or short-term commitments 
must  be  at  least  60 %. 
In fact  this  ratio, designed to protect the interests of bank customers, is generally 
exceeded - and by  a wide  margin - in current banking practice. 
97.  The expansion  of medium  and long-term  credits has  recently  led to the  rules 
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in force  being  supplemented  by  specific  measures  to  ensure  satisfactory  balance 
between, on the one hand, the holding of medium and long-term assets not eligible 
for  the  portfolio  of  the  Bank  of  France,  and,  on  the  other,  deposit  resources 
considered  as  durable. 
For this  purpose  two ratios  have  been  laid  down. 
The  first,  called  "ratio  for  granting  non-rediscountable  medium  and  long-term 
credits",  introduces  the  rule  of  a  maximum  commitment  in relation  to  a  bank's 
own funds  and  to its  time  deposits.  It is  particularly important for  the  medium 
and  long-term  credit  banks,  but it also  applies  to  the  others. 
As  a  general  rule,  and  subject  to  a  few  special  adjustments,  the  asset  concerned 
are  limited  to  three  times  the amount  of  the  durable  resources. 
The  second  ratio,  known as  the  "stable resources  investment ratio", establishes  a 
relationship  between  the  volume  of  non-rediscountable  three-month  or  longer 
credits  and fixed  assets,  on the one hand,  and  total durable  resources,  as  defined 
by  the  Control  Commission,  on  the  other.  Although  the  banks  have  been called 
upon to supply the relevant figures,  no maximum ratio has  been laid down so far. 
Section III - Control  of the money market and  links with 
foreign money markets 
Para.  I:  Money  market  intervention  policy 
Para.  I-1:  The  money  market 
98.  The expression  "money  market"  has  two  connotations,  one  broad  and  "eco-
nomic",  the  other  narro\v  and  technical. 
In the broader meaning,  the market comprises  all operations in which the various 
economic agents lend to or borrow from banks against sight or relatively short-term 
claims.  We are  dealing  here with a  market which  might better be described as  a 
short-term  money  market.  The money market in the narrow sense  has  a different 
purpose. It is  not a mere compartment of the short-term money market as defined 
above.  It enables  the  banks,  the  Treasury  and  certain  financial  institutions,  to 
effect  among  themselves,  or  with  the  bank  of  issue,  such  exchanges  of  claims 
against  balances  on  the  accounts  with  the  central  bank  as  may  be  necessary  to 
meet cash surpluses or deficits  arising from transactions with their customers. This 
functional  definition  covers  two  categories  of  operations  which  are  distinct  in 
practice:  on the one hand, rediscounting at a fixed  rate by the bank of issue  and, 
on  the  other,  operations  varying  rates  on  the  market,  including  intervention  by 
the  bank  of  issue. 
99.  In France,  the National  Credit Council,  with its  general  decision  of 28  June 
196  7,  defined  the money  market for  the purposes of the  regulations  as  consisting 
of  the  institutions  which  have  access  to  it. 
Authorized operators on the money market are considered to be, on the pne hand, 
the banks, establishments whose main activity is  registered as  financial,  and public 
or semi-public establishments of a financial nature, and, on the other, stock brokers 
("agents  de  change"),  investment  companies  and  insurance  institutions  in  the 
wide  sense  (in  particular  providence  and  pensions). 
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The  scope  of  this  decision  needs  clarification.  Since  some  of  these  undertakings 
actually have  no liquid funds  on accounts with the central bank,  they are  not in 
a  position to supply  additional cash  to the money  market in the  strict sense. On 
the other hand, the very fact  that they are considered as  authorized to lend on the 
n1arket  enables  them  to  obtain  interest  rates  close  to  the  market  level  for  the 
remuneration of their credit balances at the banks. 
100.  The working of the market is  facilitated by brokers ("courtiers"), who bring 
lenders and borrowers together, and six discount houses (" maisons de reescompte") 
acting  as  a  sort of  clearing  bank for  the  participants  by carrying  out borrowing 
and  lending  operations  of  varying  duration  for  their  own  account.  Intervention 
by the  Bank  of  France  keeps  the  market in balance  at interest rates  considered 
consonant  with  the objectives  of monetary  policy. 
101.  As  defined  and  described  above,  the  money  market  is  essentially  a  capital 
market in which the securities exchanged form the basis of the transfers. However, 
in some cases,  it is  the desire  to acquire  securities that motivates  transactions  by 
suppliers of funds. There is thus a section of the market which deals in mobilizable 
medium-term  credit paper.  This  paper is  bought by banks-particularly  deposit 
banks - which are not able to satisfy  the minimum portfolio rule with their own 
lending.  As  the  credits  or portions  of credits  concerned  are  mobilizable  without 
limit at the bank of issue  the rates  charged on the  market necessarily  stay  very 
close  to  the  Bank  of  France's  discount  rate  as  long  as  this  rate  remains  below 
money  market rates. 
Money transfers are made by various methods:  unsecured transactions, firm buying 
or selling  of paper,  and - chiefly - the placing of securities  "en pension". 
The mortgage market is  a  special  one on which banks  and various financial  insti-
tutions  exchange  negotiable  paper  created  to  back  credits  for  financing  building 
and  secured  by  mortgages. 
102.  The  Treasury  intervenes  in  the  money  market  proper  by  offering  bills-
uusally of one year's maturity-for tender every ten days.  But, apart from  these 
particular operations,  the management of the public finances  as  a whole indirectly 
influences  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  sector,  since  all  Treasury  operations  are 
centralized in its account at the bank of issue (see above 59). 
Para.  I-2:  Intervention  on  the  money  ma~ket 
General remarks 
103.  Intervention  by  the  Bank  of France  on  the  money  market  was  authorized 
by  a  decree-law  of  17  June  1938,  which  empowered  the  Bank  ''with  a  view 
to influencing  the volume  of credit  and  regulating  the  money  market,  to buy on 
the free  market, within the limits and on the terms fixed  by the General Council 
of  the  Bank,  negotiable  short-term  Government  securities  and  private  securities 
eligible  for  discount  and  to  resell,  without  endorsement,  paper  previously  ac-
quired". 
In this  way,  and according  to  the provisions  of the law itself,  the operations of 
the central bank on the free market do not concern long-term securities. Moreover, 
in  view  of  the  nature  of  their  deposits,  French  banks,  for  reasons  of  prudence 
and  by  tradition,  avoid  investments  in  long-dated  securities.  This  traditional 
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cautiousness  of the banking  system  towards  the long-term  securities  market tends 
to  separate  the  money  and  capital  markets.- The  interdependence  of  the  two 
markets  is  not very  marked  in  France. 
Paper eligible for the money market 
104.  Moreover,  by  virtue  of  the  decisions  of  its  General  Council,  the  Bank  of 
France's  money  market  operations  are  confined  to  strictly  limited  types  of short-
term  paper.  An  order  of  the  General  Council  dated  21  January  1971  extended 
the list of these  securities.  Those  eligible for  the Bank's operations on the money 
market  are  now:  Treasury  bills  in  current  account,  bills  issued  by  the  Credit 
Fonder and the Credit National, and all  the commercial paper (known as  "private 
paper") eligible  for  discount  subject  to  a minimum  amount.  Nevertheless,  in  the 
last  named  category  a  distinction  continues  to  be  drawn  between  what is  more 
properly  to  be  regarded  as  financial  paper  representing  short  or  medium-term 
credits  and  mobilizable  foreign  trade  claims  on  the  one  hand,  and  paper  of  a 
commercial  nature  payable  in  France  on  the  other. 
The  first  category  includes  paper  representing  credits  covered  by  a  rediscount 
agreement,  mobilizable  foreign  trade  claims,  paper  guaranteed  by  the  Caisse  Na-
tionale  des  Markes  de  l'Etat) or by  the  Nationals  Office,  as  well  as  promissory 
notes issued by the National French Railways Company. 
The  second  category  consists  of paper  representing  credits  for  mobilizing  trading 
claims  or credit sales  and  of other commercial paper drawn on France (drafts by 
a  supplier  on  a  purchaser). 
This division  into two categories  takes  on practical significance  from  the fact  that 
commercial paper belonging to the second category is  discountable only when there 
is  not enough paper of  the  first  category.  Furthermore, under the  same  order of 
January  1971  which  gives  the  Governor  full  freedom  to  diversify  the  rates  of 
intervention  not only  in accordance  with  the duration  of the facility,  but also  in 
accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  paper  presented,  the  "en  pension"  facilities 
granted on paper of the second category  have so  far been at a rate slightly higher 
than that applied  to similar operations on paper of the first  category. 
Securities held by the Bank as  a result of its operations on the money market are 
shown  in  the  balance  sheet  under  the  heading  "Paper  bought  on  the  money 
market". 
mstory of interventions on the money market 
105.  For a  fairly  long  period  prior  to  1964,  the  activity  of  the  Bank  of France 
on the money market was  somewhat marginal. 
Its intervention on the Treasury  bill  market,  which was  narrowly limited by the 
application  of  the  "floor"  and  "liquid  assets  ratio"  rules,  took  place  mainly  by 
firm  purchases, and its purpose was chiefly to make it easier for banks to re-arrange 
the maturities within their portfolio. It generally applied a fixed  rate to bills with 
less  than  three months  to run and a market  rate  to the longer ones.  In addition,. 
five  to  thirty-day  advances  on Government  paper not more  than two  years  from 
maturity were  granted up  to  a  maximum  fixed  bank by  bank. 
On the market  so-called  private paper (commercial paper)  the intervention of  the 
Bank  of  France  was  limited  to  "en  pension"  operations  of  very  short  duration 
granted at a fixed rate (in fact at Bank rate). These "pensions" had been introduced 
gradually between  1948 and 1951  to give more flexibility  to the policy of limiting 
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rediscount.  In October  1951, fearing  that the new facilities  might be misused  to 
circumvent  the regulations  in force,  the Bank of France fixed  "limits" to the  re-
course  of each  establishment. 
However,  by  techniques  similar  to  rediscounting  and  at  the  preferential  rate  of 
3%, the  Bank  would  buy  outside  the  limit  paper  mobilizing  export  claims  ma-
turing  in  less  than  two  years. 
The Bank's  operations  on the  money  market  at that  time  thus  aimed  merely  at 
supplementing  the  primary  technique  it employed  for  controlling  the volume  of 
bank liquidity, by the traditional means of rediscounting commercial paper. 
Before  1970 
106.  From  1964  onwards  the  Bank's  operations  became  more  far-reaching  and 
systematic.  In this  period,  when  the  Frerich  domestic  economy  was  under  fairly 
heavy inflationary strain, money  market rates tended to rise above  those prevailing 
abroad.  In order to keep a  tight rein on the short-term capital movements which 
this  difference  in  rates  might  have  triggered  off,  the  Bank  was  compelled  to 
intervene constantly on the market. at rates which allowed for the terms obtainable 
on  foreign  markets.  Subsequently,  and  in  particular  since  the  liberalization  of 
French  financial  relations  with  abroad,  the Bank maintained  this  policy  with the 
aim of  avoiding unwanted movements of funds between France and other countries. 
With this objective it was most of the time supplying extra resources to the banks 
in order to adjust the volume of bank liquidity. When, however, under the influence 
of seasonal  or fortuitous  factors,  the banks' requirements could be met purely by 
resort to  the Bank of France's fixed-rate facilities  and the money market rate thus 
tended to approximate to the official discount rate, the Bank would claim the right 
to intervene as  a borrower in order to maintain market terms  at the. desired level. 
Since  the  second  half of  1968  the balance  of payments  situation and the  internal 
monetary position have made it necessary to raise Bank rate gradually from 3 ~  % 
to  8 %.  Simultaneously,  persistent  strain  on  foreign  n1arkets  has  led  the  Bank 
of France  to raise  the rates  at which it intervenes on the money  market. 
As  the year  1969 ·was  marked by the spread of inflationary trends throughout the 
world  and  as  restrictive  action  was  taken  concurrently  in various  countries,  the 
internal  objectives  of  monetary  policy  did  not  conflict  with  the  external  ones. 
The outstanding feature of the policy followed by the French monetary authorities 
was  the  rapid  increase,  and  then  the  maintenance  at  a  high  level,  of the  volume 
and rates of intervention by the Bank of France on the money market, in conjunc-
tion with large  outflows of foreign  exchange on the one hand, and rising rates on 
the  international  markets  on  the  other. 
After 1970 
The trend was  more  complex  in  1970· and in the early  months of 1971. 
While  the  French  monetary  authorities  were  anxious  to  proceed  cautiously  with 
the  lifting of the restrictions  imposed  by  the recovery  plan on bank financing  of 
the company  sector,  the downward movement of international market rates which 
became  apparent in January  1970 led them to reduce rates of intervention on the 
market  to avoid  undesirable  inflows  of hot money.  At the end of December,  the 
aggregate  fall  amounted  to  about  three  points  in relation  to  the  level  at the be-
ginning  of the  year,  thus  bringing  the  rate of intervention on the  money  market 
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back into  the immediate  neighbourhood  of Bank  rate (7 % ),  which  had been cut 
by  only  one  point  in  the  course  of  the  same  period. 
The  continuing  fall  in international  rates  led  the  Bank,  from  January  1971,  to 
operate  on  the  money  market  at  rates  below Bank  rate.  The latter was  reduced 
by half  a  point on  8  January  1971,  and  then raised by  a  quarter of.  a  point on 
13  May  1971, so  that the gap is  between half a point and a little 'more  than one 
point,  according  to  the  category  of  paper.  At  the  same  time  the  variable  rates 
have fallen by one to about one  and a half points since the beginning of the year. 
The banks are therefore now able  to find  on the money market most of the liquid 
funds  they need  to adjust  their cash  positions. 
At the end of June  1971, the  discount  portfolio in the strict sense  accounted for 
only a fifth of the total facilities extended by the Bank of France to the banks;  and 
this  fraction  was  chiefly  made  up  of  medium-term  export  credit  paper,  which 
qualifies for mobilization rates lower than the money market rates. 
107.  As  regards  technical  procedures,  the  introduction  of  the  m1n1mum  reserve 
system  and the  abolition of  the  requirement for  minimum  investment in Govern-
ment  securities  and of the liquid  assets  ratio  provided an  opportunity to improve 
the Bank of France's money market techniques. 
The  Bank  ceased,  on  25  January  1967,  to  apply  the  limits  - in any  case,  not 
very  high - within which it supplied the banks with liquidity at the Bank  rate. 
Similarly  5  to  30  day  advances  on  Government  securities  were  discontinued  in 
December  196  7. 
Furthermore, the abolition of any obligation to invest in Treasury bills has restored 
these  bills  to  their  place  among  the  instruments  of  money  market  transactions, 
both  inter~bank and between banks  and  the Bank of France.  Moreover,  the tech-
nique  of holding  Government securities on current accounts  lends  great flexibility 
to the practical execution of operations  against Treasury bills. 
The diversification of the categories of paper admissible to the money market helps 
the Bank to  differentiate  the rates it applies  and thus makes  for  greater flexibility 
in  its  intervention. 
108.  For  a  long  time  merely  an  adjunct  in  the  supplying  of  the  banks,  cash 
requirements,  the  central  bank's  interventions  on  the  money  market  have  now 
become  an  important  part  of  the  machinery  for  controlling bank liquidity.  They 
provide  the  necessary  counterpart  for  the  operation  of  the  minimum  reserve 
system  and  give  the  Bank  of  France  the  means  of  conducting  an  appropriate 
interest  rate  policy. 
Para.  II:  Action  on  international  flows  of short-term  capital 
109.  The  monetary  authorities  can  influence  movements  of  capital  to  and  from 
abroad  by  using  statutory  powers  or by  acting  through  the  markets. 
A  - In  France  the  control  of  capital  movements  provided  for  when  exchange 
control  was  reintroduced  (see  52  above)  comprises  a  general  prohibition  on the 
export  of  capital,  supplemented,  as  regards  the  banks,  by  special  arrangements 
concerning  their  franc  and  foreign  exchange  positions. 
1)  The arrangements proper to the banks, introduced from December 1968, forbid 
them  to  take  up on  their own account  a speculative position against  the franc  or 
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to  provide  customers  or correspondents - particularly  foreign - with  the  means 
of doing  so.  On the one hand,  the banks' net holdings  of foreign  exchange-i.e. 
the  excess  of  their  claims  over  their  commitments  in  respect  of  their  spot  and 
forward  position  in foreign  exchange  - were  restricted  to  the position as  at  3 
September 1968; and, on the other hand, franc lending abroad was prohibited. 
110.  2)  These measures  have repercussions  on internal bank liquidity which  arise 
from  the restrictions on the increase of the banking system's external claims. 
The  control  of  franc  claims  on  non-residents  combined  with  the  regulation  of 
foreign exchange holdings sets limits to the banks' scope for short-term investments 
abroad,  and  thus  avoids  net exports  of  French capital  which  would  have  a  con-
tractive  effect  on bank liquidity  (see  52  above). 
111.  3)  By  virtue of specific  exchange control provisions, the Bank of France has 
the  means  of regulating  the foreign  position  of  the banks.  A  directive  issued  in 
1969 and rescinded  on  1 July  1970 had ordered the banks  to level off  their net 
foreign  exchange  positions  or to  maintain  net debtor positions.  While they were 
being  applied  the purpose  of  these  measures  was  to  secure  a  better distribution 
of foreign exchange reserves between the Bank of France and the banks. 
112.  4)  As  regards  interest rates,  the market is  not insulated from  the influence 
of  the  international  market.  Any  variation  in  rates  abroad  not  suitably  taken 
into  account  in  France  would  give  rise  to  short-term  capital  movements  which 
might  be  judged inopportune.  This  situation  thus  brings  into  play  considerations 
of an external nature which combine with internal factors  to determine the direc-
tion  of policy  on money  market  rates. 
113.  B  - Apart from  the  responsibilities  allotted  to  the  Bank  of  France  by the 
regulations  in force,  it makes it a  rule  not  to  intervene in the  forward  market; 
nor  does  it normally  provide  or  accept  foreign  exchange  in  the  form  of  swaps 
with  the  banking  system. 
Section IV ·  Direct action on· lending 
114.  However  effective  a  combination  the  policy  of  manipulating  interest  rates 
and  quantitatively  controlling  bank  liquidity  may  be,  the  need  has  appeared  for 
direct  action  on  lending.  This  is  either  to  round  off  general  arrangements  by 
selective measures of stimulation or restraint according to the branches of activity 
or the degree of advisability of providing finance,  or else, in times  of heavy strain, 
to  reinforce  the  policy  already  being  applied. 
Legal Basis 
115.  The  Bank  of  France  is  responsible  for  implementing  the  arrangements 
concerning  direct  action  on lending. 
The  procedure  of  fixing  a  maximum  for  the  expansion  of  outstanding  credits, 
applied  until  recently  by  a  simple  recommendation  from  the  Governor  of  the 
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Bank  to  the  whole  of the  banking system,  is  now based  on an  official  regulation 
(the decree of 5  February 1970). 
116.  Selective  action is  mainly exerted by  the Bank through its ability,  as  a redis-
counting  institution,  to  determine  the  eligibility  for  its  portfolio  of  the  paper 
presented. 
Para.  I:  Quantitative  control  of credit 
Role 
117.  Direct action  on the volume  of bank lending was  seen  to be necessary  once 
it had  become  clear  that the  traditional  machinery,  acting  on bank liquidity, did 
not  allow  the  desired  objectives  to  be  attained  rapidly  and  accurately.  But  it is 
an  inelastic  method  which  hampers  normal  competition  between  banks  and  its 
use,  confined  to periods  of severe inflationary  strain, is  therefore by way  of being 
exceptional. 
History 
118.  The  arrangements  for  direct  action  where  first  adopted,  on  7  February 
1958,  in a  particularly  drastic  form,  since  they  then included  the  principle  of  a 
halt  to  the  growth  of outstanding  bank credit,  apart  from  a  few  exceptions  in 
favour  of  export  financing.  These  arrangements  were  rescinded  on  5  February 
1959,  as  soon  as  monetary  recovery  had  begun. 
119.  This  system - sometimes  described  as  credit  constraint  (  "encadrement") 
- was  again  brought  into  use  from  1  March  1963.  This  time  the  control  was 
much less  severe than the previous measure had been, since it allowed outstanding 
lending  to  be  increased  by  a proportion fixed  initially  at  12 %  a  year  and  later, 
in  September  1963,  reduced  to  10 %.  These  lin1its  were  set  in  two  successive 
letters  addressed  by  the  Governor  of  the Bank of France,  Vice-President  of the 
National  Credit  Council,  to  the  President of  the  Association  of  Banks.  The  rule 
was  suspended  in  June  1965,  but for  some  time  afterwards  the  Bank of France 
·maintained  very  close  supervision  of  each  bank's  transactions.  The  control  '\Vas 
lifted  altogether  early  in  196  7. 
120.  In  November  1968,  as  part  of  a  general  policy  of  credit  restraint,  the 
monetary  authorities,  for  the  third  time,  placed  a  limit  on  the  banks,  lending. 
The measures  adopted were  more  stringent for  short-term credit and  non-mobiliz-
able  medium  and long-term credit than for mobilizable medium-term credit subject 
to  the control of rediscounting  institutions.  For 1969  they  authorized  an increase 
of less  than 3% in short-term lending and non-mobilizable medium and long-term 
credits. For mobilizable medium-term credits the increase could be 10% or 12 %. 
Similar  rates  of  increase  were  adopted  for  1970.  However,  from  the  very  first 
quarter  selective  relaxations  were  made  in  favour  of types  of lending  considered 
essential  to  the  development  of  the  economy,  especially  export  credits  and  mo-
bilizable  medium-term  equipment  credits.  These  concessions  were  confirmed  in 
the restrictive  measures  taken  in June for  the  second half-year.  In particular,  the 
mobilizable  medium-term  equipment  credits . and  credits  granted  in  the  context 
of  housing  savings  were  no  longer  subject  to  regulation.  · 
The restriction of credit expansion '\vas  abolished at the end of October 1970. 
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Para.· ·II:  Selective  control  of credit 
12L Ever since  the early  days  after the last war, selective action  on lending has 
been considered a necessary prop of economic policy, at first with an eye to ·speed-
ing  reconstruction and then to attaining the objectives of economiC expansion and 
full employment that the authorities set themselves, while at the same time keep-
ing a  close watch on the suitability of the financial  resources  used.  · 
This  action,  envisaged initially as  basic, gradually  lost its systematic character and 
became  mainly  an  adjunct  to  quantitative  controls  as  applied  in  practice.  From 
this  angle, it is  still one of the outstanding ·features of French credit policy  and, 
· more  particularly,  of the  role  played  by  the  Bank of  ~ranee. · 
Inventory of. risks 
122.  From  its  very  beginnings,  the  National  Credit  Council  has  been  concerned 
·to  see  that  the  information  necessary  to  implement  selective  action  on  credit 
should  be  available.  For  this  reason,  by  a  decision  dated. 7  March  1946  and 
amended several times  since, it imposed on banks and financial  establishments the 
obligation  to  report  regularly  to the  Bank of France  the· risks  assumed by  their 
lending to customers  and,  where appropriate, to supply  the Bank with any  infor-
mation  or  explanations  which  might  seem  called  for. 
The inventory of risks is  made monthly and is  supplemented by quarterly returns 
giving  a  more  detailed  breakdown  of  certain  itetJ.ls.  Leaving  aside  operations of 
small  amount,  it  covers  about  three-quarters  of  total  bank credit.  The  Central 
Risks  Department ("Service  Central des  Risques"). of the Bank  of France, which 
is  responsible  for  this  inventory,  is  thus  in  a  position  to  learn - and  to  com-
municate  to  the· establishments  maki11g  return.s - the  total amount  of credit  ob-
tained  by  each  borrower.  In  addition,  it acquires  a  statistical  instrument  which 
furnishes  the groundwork for detailed analysis of lending by branches of economic 
activity. 
123.  The arrangements for the centralization of risks  have  provided the National 
Credit  Council  with  the means  of· requiring the largest  bank credits  to be made 
subject  to  a  system  of  approval  known  as  .the  prior  authorization  procedure 
(decisions  of  9  January  1947  and  29  September  1948)  affecting  companies 
that use  credit· on a  large  scale. 
However, application of this  prior authorization procedure was suspended as  from 
1 July  1970;  It- has  been  replaced  by a  subsequent control applied by the Bank 
of  France.  This  is  based· on accounting  documents  which  have  to. be  submitted 
by  the banks  providing the main funds,  in respect  of firms  which have  borrowed 
more  than  25  million  francs. 
In addition,  the Bank of France  reserves  the right to require bankers  to provide 
any  supporting  evidence  concerning  credits  notified  to  the  Central  Risks  Depart-
ment even where the commitments of an  individual firm  fall  short of 25  million 
francs. 
124.  Information on the trend of bank lending analysed by economic sectors, has led 
the Bank of France,  on several  occasions,  temporarily to guide  the operations  of 
the  banks  by  recommendations  to  restrict  or  expand  their  lending  to  certain 
categories  of borrower. 
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Criterion 
125.  Lastly, as  regards medium-term credit with the cooperation of the specialized 
institutions, the Bank of France has far-reaching powers of selection based on study 
of the documents submitted in support of applications for mobilization agreements. 
In  accordance  with  long-established  practice,  only  short-term  commercial  bills 
representing  merchandise  sales  are  accepted  for  rediscount  at the  Bank of France 
without  prior  agreement  other  than  a  general  authorization.  On the  other hand, 
the  Bank  makes  the  acceptance  of  financial  bills  for  rediscount,  and  their  ad-
mission  to  money  market  operations,  conditional  upon its prior consent.  Because 
of  the  importance  attached by  the banks  to  their  ability  to  mobilize  such  paper, 
this  system  provides  the  means  of  assessing  bank  lending  individually,  from  the 
angle  of its economic  advisability. 
In fields  where social or regional considerations come into play, the procedure for 
loans financed from public funds  or from the resources of the specialist institutions 
enable  the  authorities  to channel credit very  accurately  towards  the objectives  set 
by  the  Government. This is  the case  in particular with the building loans  granted 
under  the  system  of  "special  loans",  and  with  the  action  of  the  Economic  and 
Social  Development  Fund. 
Instalment credit 
126.  Finally,  the expansion  of  instalment credit  sales  has  led the National  Credit 
Council  to  lay  down  fairly  strict  rules  on consumer  credit. 
The  Council's  decisions  in  this  field  are  motivated  particularly  by  the  desire  to 
moderate  demand  for  credit  loans  on  account  of  the  general  monetary  situation 
or,  on  the  contrary,  to  stimulate  the  activity  of  one  or more  specific  sectors  by 
more  liberal  measures  when  changes  in  the  economic  climate  justify  this.  They 
have  also  been dictated by the aim  to avoid  the application of interest levels  that 
are  considered  excessive.  However, on this  last point,  the entry into force  of  the 
new  general  law  on  usury  and  money-lending  has  made  it unnecessary  for  the 
National  Credit  Council  to  issue  particular  regulations. 
In order to act  on the  growth credit in the field  of  instalment sales  the  Council 
applies  three  rules.  First, it has  established  a maximum ratio between the volume 
of consumer  credit granted  by  banks  or financial  establishments  and  their capital 
and reserves. Secondly, it regulates the duration of loans by fixing maximum periods 
for  repayment adapted to  the various categories of goods.  Lastly, it lays  down the 
maximum  amount of loans expressed as  a proportion of the total cost,  prescribing 
differentiated  ratios  according  to  categories  of  consumer  goods.  These  last  two 
rules  apply,  not only  to all  lending  bodies, but also-in pursuance  of a decision 
by  the  authorities-to  all  sellers. 
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STATISTICAL ·TABLES 
Liquidity  of the  economy 
Contra-items  of  money  and  near-money  supply 
Liquidity  of  the  economy  and  G .N .P. 
Velocity  of  circulation  of  the  main  components  of  money  supply 
Liquidity  of  the  banking .systems 
Trend of the factors  determining the liquidity of the banking system 
(1958-1966) 
Trend of the factors  determining the liquidity of the banking system 
Short-term  treasury  debt 
Long-term  government  debt 
Breakdown  by categories ·of institution of  total investment in long-
term  public  and  private  seeurities  of  financial  intermediaires 
Central bank portfolio of rediscounts  and  advances  on securities 
Rediscount  portfolio  of  the  intermediary  rediscounting  institutions 
Open-market portfolio  of the Central Bank 
Rates  applied  to  refinancing  operations  by  the  Bank  of  issue 
Minimum  reserve  ratios  on banking  institutions 
Amount  of  Minimum  reserve  requirements  on  banking  institutions 
Rates  of the  various  banking  ratios 
Changes  in the  ratios  of the minimum  portfolio of  paper represent-
ing medium-term  credits 
Range  of  money  market  rates 
Banks  short-term  external  claims  and  liabilities .A.s  at 31  December  1958  1959  1960 
SUPPLY OF MONEY .AND  NEAR-
MONEY 
a)  Notes in circulation  33.88  34.14  38.40 
b)  Coin in circulation  0.78  0.76  1.13 
c)  Sight deposits  40.26- 48.21  55.34 
of which:  (i)  bank  (30.80)  (37.57)  (42.67) 
(ii) Post Office,  Bank 
of France, Treasury  (9.46)  (10.64)  (12.67) 
Total money supply  74.92  83.11  94.87 
Savings-book  accounts  at  banks  - 0.85  1.43 
Housing savings accounts at banks  - - -
Time deposits-Treasury  5.38  5.43  7 58 
National Agricultural  - - -
Credit Fund certificates  - 1.27  1.93 
Total supply of near-money  5.38  7.55  10.94 
1\Ioney and near-money supply  80.30  90.66  105.81 
Liquid. savings 
Near-money supply  5.38  7.55  10.94 
Savings banks  21.50  25.31  28.74 
Treasury certificates  12.16  15.85  19.41  -- -- --
Total  39.04  48.71  59.09 
.,.....  Source:  National Credit Council. 
00 
....... 
TABLE  1 
Liquidity ·of  the  economy 
1961'  1962  1963  1964 
---
43.32  48.88  5·i'.31  58.14 
1.28  1.48  1.77  1.99 
65.00  79.14.  92.21  100.44 
(50.38)  (61.57)  (72.15)  (78.58) 
(14.62)  (17.57)  (20.06)  (21.86) 
109.60  129.50  148.29  160.57 
2.04  2.92  3.94  5,09 
- - - -
9f66  10.96  10.63  12.09 
- - - -
2.74  3.81  5.02  6.58 
14.44  17.69  19.59  23.76 
124.04  147.19  167.88  184.33 
------
14.44  17.69  19.59  23.76 
32.64  . 37.85  ,_  43.38'  51.95 
23.30  26.90  28.90  29.44  -- -- -- --
70.38  82.44  91.87  105.15 
1965  1966  1967  1968 
62.63  65.35  68.51  70.25 
2.11  2.27  2.33  2.46 
110.92  121.66  127.48.  141.45 
(87.12)  (96.34)  (100.11)  (111.20) 
(23.80)  (25.32)  (27.37)  (30.25) 
175.66  189.28  198.32  214.16 
6.14  8.38  15.40  19.52  - 1.14  2.23  2.63 
13.81  15.79  23.90  28.78  - - 0.43  0.54 
8.83  11.46  15.34  19.60 
28.78  36.77  57.30  71.07 
204.44  226.05  255.62  285.23 
28.78  36.77  57.30  71.07 
. 59.05'- 67.96  77.19  84.74 
29.53  28.52  29.36  30.87  -- -- --- ---
117.36  133.25  163.85  186.68 
~---~~-------------~- ------~~---·--~~ - -------------- ·-----~------------~--~------------~ 
(in  FF '000 million) 
1  9  6  9 
1970 
old  new 
Series  Series 
69.58  70.12  73.39 
2.53  2.53  2.49 
142.81  138.34  158.26 
(110.45)  (106.07)  (124.64) 
(32.36)  (32.27)  (33.62) 
214.92  210.99  234.14 
21.64  22.92  24.64 
2.81  2.81  6.40 
40.31  40.69  55.08 
0.56  0.55  0.59 
22.39  22.39  24.78 
87.71  89.36  111.49 
302.63  300.35  345.63 
.. 
87.71  89.36  111.49 
97.70  .  97.70  113.54 
32.92  32.92  i-13.13  -- -- _  __.. 
218.33  219.98  258.t6 
-~--------------~------·~-._;. 
00 
1\.) 
TABLE  2 
Contra~items of money  and  near~money supply 
As  at 31  December  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
---
a)  Gold and foreign exchange (net)  -o.o7  7.16  10.48  15.27  20.06  24.22  28.02  31.35 
b) Claims on the Treasury  32.71  33.40  36.03  38.29  42.29  47.22  47.79  49.82 
c)  Credits financed by the banks and the  48.39  53.30  61.91  73.47  87.97  99.55  111.59  125.48 
Bank of France 
d)  Miscellaneous  -0.73  -3.20  -2.61  -2.99  -3.13  -3.11  -3.07  -2.21 
Total  contra-items  of  the  supply  of  80.30  90.66  105.81  124.04  147.19  167.88  184.33  204.44 
money and near-money 
---
-~·-~----------
Source:  National Credit Council. 
TABLE 3 
Liquidity  of the  economy  and gross  national  product 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
---------------
1.  Gro~~ National  Product  (basis  1962)  242.00  272.60  301.60  328.30  367.20  411.90  456.70  489.80 
2.  Money supply (1)  72.46  78.62  88.99  102.23  119.55  138.90  154.43  168.12 
3.  Liquid and short-term savings  (1}  36.63  43.78  53.90  64.74  76.41  87.16  98.51  111.25 
4.  Total liquidity (l)  109.09  122.40  142.89  166.97  195.98  226.06  252.94  27.937 
Ratios (expressed as percentage) 
2: 1  28.8  29.5  31.1  32.6  33.7  33.8  34.3 
3: 1  16.1  17.9  19.7  20.8  21.2  21.6  22.7 
4: 1  44.9  47.4  50.8  53.4  54.9  55.4  57.0 
Source:  National Credit Council. 
(1)  Arithmetical average of total at the beginning and end of the period. 
(in FF 'OOO  million) 
1  9  6  9 
1966  1967  1968  old  new  1970 
Series  Series 
---------
33.18  34.36  18.64  9.29  9.29  23.00 
51'37  56.63  59.89  63.40  63.29  61.87 
l43.58  168.62  204.57  227.56  231.08  275.20 
-2.08  -3.99  2.13  2.38  -3.31  14.44 
226.05  255.62  285.23  302.63  300.35  345.63 
(in FF 'QOO  million) 
1  9  6  9 
1966  1967  1968  old  new  1970 
Series  Series 
------------------
532.50  573.20  628.50  731.70  731.70  819.60 
182.47  193.80  206.24  214.54  210.61  222.56 
125.31  148.55  175.27  202;.49  204.04  239.14 
307.78  342.35  381.51  417.03  414.84  461.70 
34.3  33.8  32.8  29.3  28.8  27.2 
23.5  25.9  27.9  27.7  27.9  29.2 
57.8  59.7  60.7  57.0  56.7  56.3 ...... 
00 
\.I,) 
Annual average (1958  =  100) 
--
I.  INDEX OF VELOCITY  OF CIRCULATION 
OF TilE COMPONENTS  OF MONEY  SUP· 
PLY 
a)  Notes and coins 
b) Sight deposits at banks 
c)  Deposits at Post Office 
II.  WEIGHTED  INDEX  OF  VELOCITY  OF 
CIRCULATION  OF  TOTAL  MONEY  SUP· 
PLY 
TABLE  4 
Velocity  of circulation  of  the  main  components  of  money  suppfy 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
100  105.8  105.9  103.6  106.9  105.9  98.4  92.1 
100  93.8  88.8  83.8  79.0  76.5  78.4  77.4 
100  95.9  90.7  87.7  85.6  82.4  75.7  70.2 
100  99.5  96.5  92.6  91.2  88.8  85.9  82.1 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
------
91.9  93.0  100.9  106.1  107.3 
77.0  77.2  83.2  95.6  117.7 
69.1  68.9  66.5  67.8  67.5 
81.6  81.9  87.4  95.6  107.5 .-
00 
~-
TABLE  5 
Liquidity of the  banking  system 
As at 31  December  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  (after end of year settlement) 
------------ ---
I.  CASH  LIQUIDITY 
Liquid balances banks (1)  1.94  1.96  2.32  2.50  2.96  3.28  3.41  3,43 
II.  POTENTIAL LIQUIDITY 
Possible recourse by banks to the bank 
2.32  6.36  5.04  3.33  3.75  2.96  3.59  4.13  of France 
of which:  1.  Margin  of  rediscount 
0.34  0.36  ceilings  still  available  0.35  0.63  0.49  0.50  0.49  0.68 
2.  Outside ceilings  1.97  5.73  4.55  2.99  3.25  2.47  2.91  3.77 
a)  Short-term credits  ;)  I  J  l  J  j  I  ) 
b)  Paper of the Nation-
(4.55)  (3.25)  (2.47)  (2.91)  al Cereals Office  (1.97)  (5.73)  (2.99)  (3.77) 
c)  Mobilizable medium-
term credits (in ex- '  l  , 
'  ' 
l 
cess of the minimum  l  l  holdings) 
Total I +II  4.26  8~32  7·.36  5.83  6.71  6.24  .7.00  7.56 
------------------------
Pro-metnoria 
II. POTENTIAL  RECOURSE  OF TilE 
SPECIALIZED INSTITUTIONS  136  2.11  3.64  3.62  2.57  2.38  3.20  4.29 
I V.  POTENTIAL  RECOURSE  OF  THE 
TREASURY  1.08  4.45  6.16  4.75  4.12  4.44  4.34  6.16 
Total potential recourse to the bank 
of France (II +III +IV)  4.76  12.92  14.84  11.70  10.44  9.78  11.13  14.58 
Source:  National Credit Council. 
(1)  Including credit balances at the Bank of France, the monthly average of which must be at least equal to a minimum requirement. 
(in  FF ,000 millwn) 
1  9  6  9 
1966  1967  1968  1970  old  new 
Series  Series  ------
3.85  6.20  8.82  9.52  6.83  8.57 
3.78  2.35  2.60  4.06  4.18  4.57 
0.41  0.82  1.06  1.93  1.93  1.~ 
3.37  1.53  1.54  2.13  2.25  2.71 
)  (0.20)  (0.29)  (1.10)  (1.10)  (1.83) 
(3.37)  (1.33)  (0.84)  (0.85)  (0.85)  (0.88) 
' 
(-)  (0.41)  (0.18)  (0.30)  (-) 
7.63  8,5.1)  11.42  13.58  11.01  13.14 
------------------
6.52  8.24  5.22  4.70  1.22  0.99 
3.53  1.21  2.39  2.16  6.95  9.11 
13.83  11.80  10.21  10.92  12.35  14.67 TABLE  6a 
Trend  of  the  /actors  determhzing  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system  (1958-1966) 
,_..a. 
00 
FACTORS ACTING  ON  THE BANKS' 
CASH  SITUATION 
----
I.  Notes in circulation 
II.  Relations with  abroad 
III.  Treasury operations 
IV.  Persons  and  Companies  (accounts,  the  Bank of 
France) 
v.  Miscellaneous 
Total  I  to  V 
Recourse  to  rediscounting 
VI.  Bank of  France 
VII.  Specialized institutions 
Total VI and VII 
Vt  Source:  National Credit Council. 
(Factors preceded by the sign  + increase bank liquidity, those 
preceded by ......:  reduce it) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
-34.39  -34.95  -39.32  -44.35  -50.08 
-0.07  +  8.50  +11.75  +18.28  +23.01 
+2022  +15.52  +12A1  +12.75  +13.68 
-0.95  -0.81  - 0~95  -0.87  - 1~08 
-0.98  -1.22  ~  0.89  -0.90  -0.74 
--- --- --- ---
-16.17  ~12.96  -17.00  -15.09  -15.21 
+15.64  +12.33  +16.31  +14.53  +14.82 
+  0.53  +  0.63  +  0.69  +  0.56  +  0.39  --- --- --- --- ---
+16.17  +12.96  ,·  +17.00  +15.09  +15.21 
'  ·.  ,, 
1963 
-55.78 
+27.15 
+14.85 
-1.30 
-0.54 
---
-15.62 
+15.25 
+  0.37  ---
+15.62 
(end~o/-year ftguru in '000 million) 
1964  1965  1966 
_;_59.54  -64.17  -67.37 
+29.62  +33.89  +35.38 
+15.16  +12.82  +14.i8 
-1.28  _;_  1.22  -1.19 
+ 0.36  . +  0.23  - 0~25 
--- --- ---
-15.68  -18.45  -19.25 
+15.31  +18.00  +18.31 
+  0.37  +  0.45  +  0.94  --- --- ---
+15.68  +18.45  +19.25 
-·----------------- -------~----~------~--~-....... 
00 
"' 
TABLE 6b 
Trend of the factors  determining  the  liquidity  of the banking system  (1967-1969) 
(Factors preceded by the sign + increase bank liquidity, those 
preceded by- reduce it) 
21.1.1967  21.1.1968  Variations  21.1.1969 
20.1.1968  20.1.1969  20.1.1970 
I.  Origin of the  banks'  liquidity requirements 
1.  Notes in  circulation  -6.752  -69.61  -2.09  -71.16 
2.  Balances  of  banks at the  Bank of  France  -3.15  -5.10  -1.95  -6.27 
3.  Foreign  exchange  operations  +33.41  +25.27  _.;..  8.14  +  9.56 
4.  Direct lending by the Bank of France to the Treasury  +12.98  +12.53  -0.45  +12.01 
5.  Lending by the Bank of France to the specialized ins- +  4.57  +  2.16  +  5.78 
titutions  +2.41 
a)  Special  loans  rediscounted  by the  Bank  of  France 
(Caisse  des  Depots et consignations)  <+  2.35)  (+ 4.51)  <+  2.16)  (+ 5.43) 
b)  Government  paper  (Caisse  des  Depots  et  consigna-
tions)  - - - -
c)  Credit  Foncier de  France  <+  0.06)  <+  0.03)  (- 0.03)  <+  0.10) 
d)  Comptoir des  entrepreneurs  - <+  0.03)  <+  0.03)  <+  0.25) 
6.  Lending by the Bank of France to the Financial estab-
lishments  +  0.09  +  0.40  +  0.31  +  1.93 
7.  Miscellaneous  +  0.40  +  0.11  -0.29  -1.14 
Total  -21.38  -31.83  -10.45  -49.29 
II. Adjustment  of  the  banks'  liquidity  positions 
Lending by the Bank of France to the banks 
(i)  At fixed  rates  +18.77  +24.31  +  5.54  +30.42 
(ii) At variable rates  +  2.61  + 7.52  +  4.91  +18.87 
Total  +21.38  +31.83  +10.45  +49.29 
Source:  National Credit Council. 
(in  annual  averages  and  FF '000 million) 
Variations  21.1.1970  Variations  20.1.1971 
-1.55  -72.03  -0.87 
-1.17  -8.32  -2.05 
-15.71  +18.00  +  8.44 
-0.52  +10.76  -1.25 
+  1.21  + 5.48  -0.30 
<+  0.92)  <+  5.09)  (- 0.34) 
- <+  0.01)  <+  0.01) 
<+  0.07)  <+  0.23)  <+ 0.13) 
(+ 0.22)  (+ 0.15)  (- 010) 
+  1.53  + 2.38  +  0.45 
-1.25  -1.40  -0.26 
-17.46  -45.13  +  4.16 
+  6.11  +29.38  -1.04 
+11.35  +15.75  -3.12 
+17.46  +45.13  -4.16 ...... 
00 
....... 
1958  1959 
Internal debt 
a)  Treasury certificates ("sur formu-
les")  11.46  14.76 
b)  Government securities on  current 
account 
(i)  Banking sector  8.94  11.46 
(ii) Others  8.27  8.47 
c)  Commitments to the Central Bank  10.85  9.14 
d)  Loans  matured  0.31  0.26  -- ---
Total  internal debt  39.83  44.09 
Treasury  correspondents  23.74  28.32 
External sight  debt  (1)  3.51  3.27 
Total  short-term  indebtedness  of 
the Treasury  67.08  75.68 
1960 
18.16 
13.08 
8.29 
7.40 
0.28 
--
47.21 
31.71 
31.7 
82.09 
TABLE  7 
Short-term  Treasury  debt 
1961  1962  1963 
21.87  25.32  27.58 
11.35  10.81  11.50 
8.74  11.66  11.84 
8 86  8.67  8.7_7 
0.38  0.33  0.22 
-- -- --
51.20  56.79  59.91 
35.36  39 71  45.42 
2.06  1.89  1.76 
88.62  98.39  107.09 
(1)  Certificates underwritten by Treasury correspondents or by International Institutions (I.M.F., I.D.A  ....  ). 
1964 
28.25 
8.61 
12.59 
9.00 
0.18 
--
58.63 
48.97 
1.45 
109.05 
(Situation  at end of  year  in  FF '000 million) 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1'970 
28.36  27.86  28.22  29.64  31.10  32.06 
9.37  ·5.51  15.02  17.85  18.43  16~97 
11.95  9.63  11.32  13.56  16.11  15.67 
7.13  8.88  8.60  8.82  8.35  7.10 
018  0.27  0.28  0.18  0.18  '(I) 
-- -- -- -- --- --
56.99  52~15  63.44  70.05  74:17  '71.80 
51.67  57.37  53 31  60.12  6L46  63:84 
0.85  1.33  1.31  3.78  4.19  6.65 
10951  110.85  118.06  133.95  139.82  142.29 
--------------
(2)  Because of the ~odifications in the method of presenting the Treasury's statistical documents, the amount of (loans) rna t  ed and not yet redeemed is added from 1970 to the outstanding capital .of the 
loans concerned  • ,_. 
00 
00 
Internal  debt 
a)  Perpetual debt 
b)  Redeemable debt 
Total internal debt 
External debt 
a)  Redeemable  debt 
b)  Credits  or advances from  foreign 
governments 
Total external debt 
Special  debt  of  the  annexed  Post 
Office  Budget 
Tofal long-term Government debt 
\ 
1958  195.9 
0.74  0.55 
25.32  25.29 
-- --
26.06  25-lH 
4.04  5.07 
6.28  5.75  -- --
10.32  10.82 
1.30  1.40 
37.68  38.06 
1960 
0 55 
23.96 
24.51 
4.80 
5.10  --
9.90 
1.28 
35.69 
TABLE 8 
Long-term  government  debt 
1961  1962  1963 
3.55  0."5  0.55 
22.97  21.62  23.24 
-.-.  -- --
23.52  22.17  23.79 
0.76  3.29  3.13 
4.74  2.12  1.19  -- -- --
8.50  5.41  4.32 
1.35  1.99  2.42 
33.37  '29.57  30.53 
(Situation  at end  of  year  in  FF '000 million) 
1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
0.55  0.55'  0.55  0.55'  0.55  0.55  0.55 
23.19  22.57  22.55  22.01  19.83  18.57  16.80 
-- -- -- -- --· 
23.74  23.12  23.10  22.56  20.38  19.12  11.35 
2.96  2.79  2.27  2.20  2.14  2.33  2.10 
1.19  1.19  1.19  1.10  1.01  1.03  0.90 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
4.15  3.98  3.46  3.30  3.15  3.36  3.00 
2.81  3.10  3.42  3.68  '3.97  4.22  4~55 
30.70  30.20  29.98  29.54  27.50  26.70  24.90 ~ 
00 
\0 
1958 
1.  Inscribed  banks 
Securities and participations  1.08 
Balance sheet total  51.76 
2.  Popular Banks · 
Securities  and participations  0.02 
Balance sheet total  2.27 
3.  Agricultural Credit  Institutions 
Securities and participations  0.01 
Balance sheet total  12.57 
TABLE  9 
Breakdown  by  categories  of institution  on  total  investments 
(long-term  public  and  private  securities o(  financial  intermediaries)  (1) 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  '1964  1965 
1.29  1.57  1.92  2.24  2.76  3.14  3.23 
64.19  79.04  92.85  105.31  115.24  126.78  139.42 
0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  Jl05  0.06  0.07 
2.83  3.20  3~89  4.62  5.42  6.10  7.30 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
15.19  18.45  22.35  27.69  33.30  40.27  47.49 
{end·of·year figures ·in  FF '000 million) 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
3.45  4.11  4.32  5.11  6.42 
158.03  184.25  211.06  231.00  292.43 
0.07  0.13  0.19  0.24  0.25 
8.53  10.3'1  12.11  13.89  16.36 
0.04  0.03  0.07  0.02  0.01 
54.55  61.45  72.38.  78.49  93;33 
(1)  The statistics available do not allow bonds or other fixed·interest securities to be singled out.  The above figures  are estimated of the investment portfolios comprising both participations and securities 
and, among the latter, both shares and bonds.  The total investment in securities remains low in relation to the balance-sheet totals. 
Source:  National Credit Council. ,...... 
\0 
0 
TABLE 10 
Central  Bank  portfolio  of rediscounts  and  advance  on  securities 
(in  FF '000  million) 
End-of-year figures  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
------------------------------------
I.  Discount portfolio of the ·Bank of France  22.22  16.39  18,85  18.68  20.60  20.01  18.60  19.06  16.14  24.60  36.62  38.82  35.43 
A. Mobilization of claims on France 
1.  Paper representing short-term credits  7.19  4.93  6.00  6.65  7.53  7.61  6.84·  7.54  8.19  11.36  14.66  13.28  9.93 
of which:  a)  Pledged bonds  (2.07)  - - - - - - - (0.92)  (2.32)  (1.11)  (2.07)  (0.10) 
b)  Paper guaranteed by the 
National Cereals office  (0.48)  (0.70)  (0.88)  (0.80)  (1.22)  (0.58)  (0.67)  (0.61)  (0.12)  (1.79)  (2.94)  (2.92)  (2.71) 
c)  Other  claims  on  France  (4.64)  (4.23)  (5.12)  (5.85)  (6.31)  (7.03)  (6.17)  (6.93)  (7.14)  (7.35)  (10.61)  (8.29)  (7.12) 
2.  Paper  mobilizing  medium-term  credits  14.42  10.80  11.73  10.53  10.91  9.87  8.72  8.12  5.25  4.52  8.96  11.04  9.06 
of which:  a)  Special housing loans  (7.27)  (6.78)  (5.69)  (6.33)  (7.37)  (7.44)  (6.82)  (6.19)  (4.85)  (2.60)  (4.72)  (4.68)  (4.77) 
b)  Other medium-term credits  (7.15)  (4.02)  (6.04)  (4.20)  (3.54)  (2.43)  (1.90)  (1.93)  (0.40)  (19.2)  (4.24)  (6.36)  (4.29) 
B. Mobilization of claims on  a~road 
Paper  representing  short-term  credits  (1)  - - - - - - - - - 4.32  7.79  7.66  8.43 
Paper mobilizing medium-term claims  0.61  0.66  1.12  1.50  2.16  2.53  3.04  3.40  2.70  4.31  5.21  6.84  8.01 
II.  Advances on securities  0.32  0.25  0.28  0.26  0.24  0.14  0.12  0.09  0.10  0.30  0.15  0.15  0,06 
of which:  a)  30-day advances  (0.22)  (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.03)  - - (0.21)  - - -
b)  Others  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.06) 
III. Pro-memoria:  Negotiable  paper  bought  in  2.61  2.83  3.55  2.88  2.41  3.22 
France (Open Market) 
4.55  6.18  8.17  3.12  10.99  21.47  16.42 
Total I +II +III  25.15  19.47  22.68  21.82  23.25  23.37  23.27  25.33  24.41  28.02  47.76  60.44  51.91 
--~-- ------
(1)  It was  in October 1967 that paper representing claims on abroad mobilized by the Bank was first listed in the disconnt portfolio.  Previously, it had been acquired, by way of operations on the money 
market and appeared under "Negotiable paper purchased in France". ~ 
\0 
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TABLE  11 
Rediscount  portfolio  of  the  intermediary  rediscounting  institutions 
End-of-year :figures  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
--- ---
"Credit Foncier de France" (medium-term)  0.03  0.01  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.08 
"Credit National" and "Caisse des Depots et Consi-
gnations"  0.27  0.26  0.47  0.34  0,30  0.31  0.31  .  0.37 
of which:  a)  Placed  "en  pension"  /short-term 
b)  Placed "en pension"  /Government 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.25)  (0.28) 
securities  - - (0.02)  - - - - -
c)  Sales  or  placings  "en  pension" 
(medium-term)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.36)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
d)  "en pension"  /bills of the  "Credit 
Fonoier  de  France"  and  of  the  - - - - "Credit National"  - - - -
Total  0.30  0.27  0.54  0.40  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.45 
Pro-memoria: 
Other bodies  0.23  0.36  0.15  0.16  0.03  - - -
Bank of France  16.29  13.14  17.25  15.46  15.81  16.09  15.96  18.34 
Source:  National Credit Council. 
(at  31  December  in  FF '000 million) 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
y  ---
0.09  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.05 
·0.85  3.19  2.81  4.71  5.72 
(0.77)  (1.92)  (2.36)  (4.18)  (5.38) 
- (0.66)  (0.26)  (0.35)  -
(0.08)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
- (0.51)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.32) 
0.94  3.26  2.86  4.77  5.77 
- 0.19  0.79  1.06  1.08 
18.46  23.12  43.25  51.12  45.88 
---------- ---........ 
\0 
tv 
Negotiable~  paper purchased in France 
a)  Treasury bills 
b)  Drafts· and bills: of  exchange 
c)  Other paper 
of  which  medium-term  bills  of 
the  Credit  Foncier de  France 
1958  1959 
2.61  2.83 
- -
1~35  1.57 
0.66  0.76 
0.60  0.50 
- -
TABLE  12 
Open  market  portfolio  of  the  Central  bank 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
3.55  2.88  2.41  3.22  4.55 
- - - -
1.45  0.61  0.23  0.16  0.60 
1.42  1.54  1.67  2.06  2.48 
0.68  0.73  0.51  1.00  y  _1.47 
- - - -·  -
(end-of..year  figures  in  FF '000 million) 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
6.18  8.17  3.12  10.99  .  21.47  16.42  - - - -- --
0.43  0.05  2.64  5.19  8.43  7.77 
3.23  3.28  -.  - - -
2.52  4.84  0.48  5.80  13.04  8.65 
--- - - (1.30)  (1.72)  (1.62) ~ 
\0 
~ 
TABLE  13 
Rates  applied  to  refinancing  operations  by  the  bank  of  issue 
End-of-year figures  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
---------------------
Bank rate  4.5  4  3.5  3.5  3.5  4  4  3.5 
Discount  rate  "en pension" A  7  5  4.5  4.5  4.5  5  5  4.5 
Discount rate  "en pension" B  10  6  6  6  .6  6  7.5  6 
SO-day  advances  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  3.5 
Purchase  of  Government  securities  of  less  than 
three months' maturity  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Fixed rate "pensions" (Regulation of 14:  December 
1967)  - - - - - - - -
Mobilization of export drafts 
a)  short-term  - - - - - - - -
b)  medium-term ("')  - - - - - - - -
Exceptional cash advances  - - - - - - - -
Advances on securities  7  5.5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
---------~---------~-~~--
Source:  Annexes to report of the National Credit Council.  Trend of interest rates on the money market. 
(*) In February 1970 the rate mobilization of medium-term drafts connected with exports to EEC countries was .raised to 8%. 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
---------------
3.5  3.5  6  8  7 
4.5  - - - -
6  - - - -
3.5  - - - -
3  3  4  4  4 
- 6  8.5  10,5  9.5 
- 3  2  4 or8  7 
- 3  2 or 3  4•  4.5• 
- - 3.5  3.5  -
5  5  7.5  9.5  8.5 TABLE  14a 
Minimum  reserve  ratios  on  banking  institutions 
LIABILITIES 
in francs  in foreign 
Date of  entry  currencies  Credit 
into force  granted 
On  sight  On  other  On  banks  On  foreign 
deposits  liabilities  and corre- correspond-
spondents  ents 
21  January  1967  1.5  %  0.5%  0.5% 
21  April  1967  2.5  %  1.-%  1.-% 
21  July  1967  3.5  %  1.5  %  1.5  % 
21  October  1967  4.5  %  2.-%  2.-% 
10 July  1968  4.5  %  2.-%  2.-%  3.5---% 
21  September  1968  4.5  %  2.-%  2.-% 
15  October  1968  4.7  %  2.1  %  2.1  % 
15 November  1968  5.5  %  2.5  %  2.5  % 
21  June  1969  5.5  %  0.5  %  0.5  % 
21  January  1970  5.5  %  0.5  % 
5  June  1970  6.5  %  1.5  % 
10  July  1970  7.5  %  2.5  % 
1  April  1971  7.25%  2.25%  0.25% 
6  May  1971  8.25%  3.25%  0.25% 
194 TABLE  14b 
Amount of the  minimum  rese.rve  requirements  on  institutions 
(in  FF '000 million) 
On other lia-
Monthly periods  On sight deposits  bilities and  Total 
correspondents 
January-February 1967  1.35  0.13  1.48 
February-March 1967  1.32  0.13  1.45 
March-April 1967  1.31  0.13  1.44 
April-May  1967  2.19  0.28  2.47 
May-June 1967  2.24  0.28  2.52 
June-July 1967  2.22  0.28  2.50 
July-August 1967  3.16  0.42  3.58 
August-September 1967  3.17  0.45  3.62 
September-October 1967  310  0.48  3.58 
October-November 1967  4.01  0.71  4.72 
November-December 1967  3.99  0.75  4.74 
December 1967-January 1968  3.90  0.76  4.66 
January-February 1968  4.17  0.79  4.96 
February-March 1968  4.02  0.82  4.84 
March-April 1968  3.98.  0.84  4.82 
April-May 1968  3.98  0.88  4.86 
May-June 1968  2.21  0.50  2.71 
June-July 1968  3.82  0.92  4.74 
July-August 1968  3.48  0.82  4.30 
August-September 1968  4.30  1.- 5.30 
September-October 1968  4.25  0.88  5.13 
October-November 1968  4.58  0.94  5.52 
November-December 1968  5.40  1.13  6.53 
December 1968-January 1969  5.31  1.12  6.43 
January-February 1969  5.68  1.11  6.79 
February-March 1969  5.47  1.14  6.61 
March-April 1969  5.48  1.14  6.62 
April..;May  1969  5.50  1.17  6.67 
May-June 1969  5.61  1.18  6.79 
June-July 1969  5.51  0.24  5.75 
July-August 1969  5.59  0.23  5.82 
August-September 1969  5.66  0.24  5.90 
September-October 1969  5.57  0.24  5.81 
October-November 1969  5.70  0.25  5.95 
November-December 1969  5.60  0.25  5.85 
December 1969-January 1970  5.54  0.25  5.79 
January-February 1970  5.63  0.25  5.88 
February-March 1970  5.49  0.26  5.75 
March-April 1970  5.46  0.26  5.72 
April-May 1970  5.42  0.28  5.70 
May-June 1970  6.06  0.56  6.62 
June-July 1970  6.86  1.01  7.87 
July-August 1970  7.67  1.42  9.09 
August-September 1970  7.70  1.46  9.16 
September-October 1970  7.67  1.48  9.15 
October-November 1970  7.89  1.51  9.40 
November-December 1970  8.21  1.55  9.76 
December 1970-January 1971  8.31  1.58  9.89 
January-February 1971  9.02  1.61  10.63 
February-March 1971  8.78  1.66  10.44 
195 TABLE  15a 
Rates  of the  various  banking  ratios 
31  December 1958 
.31  December 1959 
23 December 1960 
29 June 1961 
17  January 1962 
9  March  1962 
27  February 1963 
6  May 1963 
22  January 1964 
20 May 1964 
4  June 1964 
25 June 1964 
17  July 1964 
9  October 1964 
14 October 1964 
8  December 1964 
6  January 1965 
14 April 1965 
13 May  1965 
28 June· 1965 
31  August 1965 
30 September-30 November 1965 
27  December 1965 
13 January 1966 
31  March  1966 
30 April 1966 
31  May  1966 
30 June 1966 
31  July 1966 
31  October 1966 
30 November 1966 
31  December 1966 
· Minimum ratio of Govern-
ment paper included 
among the "minimum 
holding  of bills" (1) 
25% . 
25% 
Liquid assets ratio  (S) 
20%  30% 
17.5%  30% 
17.5%  32% 
15%  32% 
15%  35% 
15%  36% 
13%  36% 
10%  36% 
10%.  34% 
10 % (0°/o end-June maturity) 33%. 
10 % ·  (0% end-July maturity)  34% 
10%  36% 
10%  34% 
7.5%  34% 
7.5%·  33% 
7.5%  36% 
7.5%  34%  . 
7.5%  35% for end May 
7.5%.  34% for end June 
7.5%  34% for end .July 
7.5%  36% 
7.5%  34% 
5.-%  32% 
5%  35% 
5%  32% 
5%  33% 
5%  32.% 
5%  31% 
5  %  31% ·maturity 
5  %· 
5% 
5% 
34%  end-July 
32% 
32%. 
32% 
(1) The "Minimum holding" of Government paper was  abolish~d in September 1967. 
(2) Treasury bills are among the assets. eligible for the liquid assets ratio. 
196 I-A 
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TABLE  15b 
Changes  in  the  ratios  of the  minimum  portfolio  of paper  representing  medium-term  credits 
Date of publication  Date of  entry into force  Rate of the minimum  Texts  Abatement 
portfolio  (1)  on liabilities 
10 January 1967  21  January 1967  20%  (2)  B.  of  F.  Instruction  No  65  20  million 
19  May  1967  19  May  1967  19°/o  B.  of  F.  Instruction  No  67  20  million 
21  June 1967  21  June 1967  18°/o  B. of  F.  Instruction N°  68  20  million 
19 July 1967  19  July 1967  17°/o  B. of  F.  Instruction No  70  20  million 
21  November 1967  21  November  1967  16%  B.  of  F.  Instruction N°  71  20  million . 
20 June 1968  21  June 1968  14%  B. of  F. Instruction N° 73  20  million 
19  July 1968  21  July 1968  13°/o  B.  of  F.  Instruction No  75  20  million 
12 November 1968  15  November 1968  14°/o  B. of  F.  Instruction  No  79  20  million 
8  October 1969  10  October 1969  15°/o  B.  of  F.  Instruction No  81  20  million 
22  April 1970  27  April 1970  16o/o  B. of  F.  Instruction N°  84  20  million 
25  June 1970  22  April 1970  16°/o  B. of  F.  Instruction No  87  50  million 
-----------------~  ---- -
(1)  In relation to liabilities in French francs up to 22.12.1969.  In relation to liabilities in French francs  and of francs legal tender in the Overseas Departments and Territories (except Dijbouti) since 
23.12.1969  (B.  of F. Instruction N° 83). 
(2)  B.  of F. Instruction N° 66 of 31.1.67: 10%  for banks with head office  in Monaco and having no branches in French territory. ~ 
"'  00 
TABLE  16 
Range  of  money  market rates 
End-of-year figures  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963 
Yield  of  Treasury  bills  on  current  3.84  3.84 
account at  2  yeats 
3.62  3.62  3.42  3.28 
Rates for allocations of 1-year Treas- - - - - - -
ury bills (highest and lowest) 
Rates for call-money against private  4.50  3.875  3.50  3.50  3.375  3.875 
sector paper (highest and lowest for 
December)  10.5  4.75  4.25  3.875  4.25  7.00 
Rates for  call money  against  Gov- 3.00  2.500  3.500  3.375  3.375  2.750 
ernment paper  4.250  3.750  4.250  3.500  3.375 
Cost of mobilization of paper repre- 5.05  4.45  3.95  3.95  3.95  4.45 
senting medium-term credits 
Penalty interest  rates  for  shortfalls  - - - - - - in minimum reserves 
Source:  Annex to the Annual Report of the National Credit Council (Trend of interest rates on the money market). 
1964  I 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
3.28  3.28  3.28  - - - -
3.23  3.17  3.14  4.61  5.01  7.86  7.172 
3.66·  3.50  3.17  5.125  7.75  9.50  9.234 
4.00  3.750  5.625  4.625  8.125  9.750  7.125 
5.875  5.00  8.500  11.00  7.75 
5.50  4.875 
2.875  3.250  2.500  4.625  8.00  9.375  6.875 
3.875  3.500  2.875  4.875  8.250  10.750  7.625 
4.45  3.95  3.95  3.95  6.20  8.20  7.20 
equip-
ment 
- - - 5.50  9.00  11.00  10.00 ~ 
\.0 
\.0 
End-of-year figures 
A.  FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
1.  Claims 
2.  Liabilities 
3.  Net position 
B.  FRANCS 
1.  Claims 
2.  Liabilities 
3.  Net position 
C.  OVERALL NET POSITION 
-----
TABLE  17 
Banks  short-term  external  claims  and  liabilities 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
797  984  1188  1383  1572  1803  2268 
504  643  906  1133  1471  1642  1893 
+293  +341  +282  +250  +101  +161  +375 
- - - - - 20  81 
- - - - - 547  569 
-226  -292  -340  -396  -449  -527  -488 
+  67  +  49  -58  -146  --348  I  --366  I --113 
~- -~-------~-~-- ------- ~---- -- -~  ---
(in $  millions, units of  account) 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
2 883  3 489  5 008  7 305  8 744 
2483  3 268  4 761  7 582  9147 
+400  +221  +247  -277  -403 
225  292  395  221  228 
818  1075  703  570  900 
-593  -783  -308  -349  -672 
-193  -562  -61  -626  -1750 Part four 
THE MONETARY  POLICY  IN ITALY CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC FACTS  OF  MONETARY POLICY 
Section I  - Institutional framework and structural aspects 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
CIPE 
1.  The Inter-ministerial Economic Planning Committee (  Comitato Interministeriale 
per  la  Programmazione  Economica  - CIPE),  set  up  under  Law  No.  48  of  27 
February  1967, is  the body in charge  of formulating  the  country's  economic  and 
financial  policy  and  laying  down  guidelines.  It indicates  the general  lines  of the 
national  economic  programme  and  the  Government's  budget  estimates  and  the 
basic  directives  for  implementing  the  economic  programme.  It also  examines  the 
ge~eral economic  situation for  the purpose of adopting  short-term economic  mea-
sures  and  harmonizing  domestic  economic  policy  with  that  of  the  other  EEC 
countries. 
The  CIPE is  presided  over  by  the  Prime Minister  and  consists  of  the  Minister 
for  the  Budget  and  Economic  Planning,  who is  a  standing  member  of  the com-
mittee  and  Vice-President,  and  normally  of  a  further  thirteen ministers. 
The  following  may  be  invited  to  attend  CIPE  meetings:  the  Governor  of  the 
Banca  d'Italia,  the  President  of  the  General  Statistical  Office,  the  Secretary  for 
Programming. 
CICR 
2.  The Inter-ministerial Credit and Saving  Committee  (Comitato  Interministeriale 
per  il  Credito  e  il  Risparmio  - CICR)  is  concerned  with finance  in general  and 
credit in particular. It is  the body which is  responsible  for deciding  the guidelines 
of  monetary,  credit  and  exchange  policy.  In carrying  out its  functions  the CICR 
follows  "the general lines  laid down by  the  CIPE for  the overall distribution of 
monetary flows  according  to destination,  in conformity with the lines of  develop-
ment  set out in the national economic  programme"  (Presidential Decree  No.  626 
of 30  March  1968). 
The  CICR was  set  up by Decree-Law  of  the Provisional Head of  State No.  691 
of 17  July 1947 to replace the Committee of Ministers established by the Banking 
Law (Royal Decree-Law No.  375 of 12  March  1936) and  abolished in 1944. ·The 
CICR,  .whose  meetings  the  Governor  of  the  Banca  d'Italia is  entitled  ex  officio 
to attend, is  composed  of the Minister for  the Treasury, who chairs the meetings, 
and  the Ministers  for  Public Works, Agriculture  and  Forests,  Industry and Com-
merce, Foreign Trade, the Budget and Economic Programming, and State Holdings. 
The  Banking  Law  stipulates  that for  supervision  of  matters  within  its  province 
203 ITALY - BASIC  FACTS 
and  for  the  implementation  of  its  decisions  the  CICR  shall  work  through  the 
Banca  d'Italia.  Within  the  limits  of  the  guidelines  laid  down  by  the  CICR,  the 
Bank plays  a fundamental  role in the choice  of the most suitable ways  and means 
to achieve  the aims  selected;  in addition, the Governor may  take steps to promote 
measures  decided  by  the  CICR. 
Danca d
11talla 
3.  The  Banca  d'Italia,  established by  Law  No.  449  on  10  August  1893  and the 
sole  bank of issue  since  1926 (Law No.  1362  of  25  May  1926), underwent sub-
stantial changes  as  a result of the Banking Law.  It was  transformed from  a joint-
stock company  subject  to private law,  with the  right  to  carry out banking oper:-
ations even with private individuals, into a public-law institution (Article 20), with 
its  activity  almost  exclusively  limited  to  dealings  with  credit  institutions.  Its 
capital,  subdivided  into  300,000  registered  "participations"  of  Lit.  1,000  each, 
may  be  held  only  by  savings  banks,  public-law  credit  institutions,  banks  of  na-
tional  interest,  social  security  agencies  and  insurance  companies. 
The Bank is  subject  to  supervision by  the  State because it performs functions  of 
public  interest  and  administers  services  on behalf  of  the  State.  This  supervision 
is  exercised  by  a  standing  commission,  presided  over  by  the  Treasury  Minister, 
(Article  110  of  the  Consolidation  Law  on  banks  of issue  and  the  circulation  of 
bank notes), which, if  so  requested by the Minister, renders opinions on measures 
concerning bank notes (Article  111  of the Consolidation Law), on amendments  to 
the  Charter of the Banka  d'Italia and on  the  implementation of  laws  concerning 
the Bank of Issue.  Other controls are exercised by the inspectorate-general of the 
Ministry  of  the  Treasury,  which  examines  the  Bank's  annual  statement  and  is 
represented by certain officials  at the General Meeting and at the meetings  of the 
Board.  Article  123  of  the  Consolidation  Law  stipulates  that  every  three  years 
the  inspectorate  must  undertake  exira  inspections  to  examine  the  form  and 
substance of operations:  in addition, general or special inspections may be made at 
-any time. 
Besides  the practical application  of monetary policy  as  described above,  the Bank 
has  a  supervisory  function  over  all  public  and  private-law  institutions  collecting 
savings  from  the public and providing credit, whether operating in the short term 
(banks)  or the  medium  and  long  term  (special  credit institutions).  This  function, 
which  was  initially  conferred  upon  the  Bank by Royal  Decree-Law  No.  1511  of 
7 September 1926, was confirmed after the last war when the CICR was set up. 
The  main  powers  given  by  the  Law  to  the  Banka  d'Italia  are  to authorize  the 
setting  up  or merger  of  banks,  to  undertake  a  prior  vetting  of  their articles  of 
association  and  amendments  thereto from  the angle  of their conformity with the 
law, to approve the appointment of the executives of certain categories of bank and 
to issue regulations on the presentation of balance sheets. For the purpose of super-
vising  credit  operations,  the  Banca  d'Italia  is  also  empowered  to  give  instruc-
tions  on: 
a)  The  maximum deposit and lending rates and commissions on banking services; 
b)  The  ratio between various forms  of investment; 
c)  The  limits  on the size  of loans; 
d)  The  ratio  of own  funds  to deposits  and  how  deposits  in excess  of this  ratio 
should  be  employed; 
e )  Measures  to  prevent  the  increased  risk  arising  from  the  application  of  one 
borrower  to  several  banks. 
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In the exercise  of the powers  conferred on it by  the law,  the Banca  d'Italia may 
require  the  institutions  subject  to  its  supervision  to submit  their balance  sheets, 
regular  statements  and  any  other  useful  information,  and  also  may  carry  out 
inspections  on  the  spot. 
In connection with the power referred to under item e), the Bank has  a centralized 
service,  which  it set  up early  in  1964, for  obtaining information  on recourse  to 
the  credit system  (Central  Risk  Office);  this  makes  it possible  to  know  whether 
customers  have  obtained  multiple  loans  from  various  institutions  and  on various 
markets.  This  system  enables  those  responsible  for  decisions  to assess  clientele  as 
accultately  as  possible  as  regards  the potential  risk in making  the loan. 
Italian Exchange Office 
4.  The  Italian  Exchange  Qfftce;  (Ufficio  Italiano  dei  Camhi  - UIC),  set  up  by 
Decree-Law  of  the  Lieutenant  General  of  the  Realm  No.  331  of  17  May  1945, 
is  responsible for ensuring the observance of exchange control regulations, controll-
ing  the foreign  exchange market and administering  the country's foreign  exchange 
reserves. 
The Office  is  legally  separate  from  the  Banca  d'Italia but cooperates closely  with 
it both in decision-making, since the Governor directs the UIC and is the Chairman 
of its Board, and operationally. The initial endowment capital of Lit.  100 million 
was  provided by the Banca d'Italia and funds  for the purchase of foreign exchange 
are furnished by the bank through a special current account. 
The  Bank is,  moreover,  subordinate  to the UIC, as  it is  subject  to  the  exchange 
control  regulations  in its capacity  as  an  exchange  dealer~ 
Para.  II:  Structural  aspects 
Para.  II-1.  Structure  of financial  intermediaries 
The  financial  intermediaries  operating  in  Italy  may  be  subdivided  into:  credit 
institutions, treasury and "Cassa Depositi e Prestiti". social security institutions. 
Credit Institutions 
5.  Besides  the  Banca  d'Italia  and the  UIC,  which  have  already  been  dealt  with 
in· the preceding section, the credit institutions embrace:  a) banks, b) special credit 
institutions  and  c)  insurance  companies·.  The  latter are  not subject  to  control by 
the  Central  Bank. 
The Banking  law  authorizes  the  separation of ordinary credit from  credit secured 
by  personal  property,  thus  supplementing  the  rules  under  the  1926  legislation 
intended  to  safeguard  bank  solvency  and  liquidity.  The  experience  of  the  years 
following the first  world war, when the industrial conversion crisis of the twenties 
and  the  world  depression  from  1930  to  1932  led  to  the  bankruptcy  of  some 
ordinary  credit  banks  which  had  contributed  largely  to  the development  of  the 
Italian industrial apparatus, suggested that the all-purpose bank system then current 
should  be  abandoned. 
It is  the  banks  that  provide  the  working  funds,  \vhich  firms  need  to  undertake 
production, whereas the special credit institutions grant investment credit, i.e.  they 
finance  the  fixed  capital  of  such  firms. 
This  distinction  is  not so  clear in practice,  not least  because  in  certain phases  of 
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the  business  cycle  difficulty  in obtaining funds  on  the capital  market  may  induce 
firms  to have  recourse  to banks  in order to  finance  fixed  capital  too. 
In addition, there are  channels linking the short-term with the  medium  and long-
term  systems  and  many  banks  have  holdings  in  special  credit  institutions,  or 
administer  medium  and  long-term  credit  through  their  own  specialized  sections, 
which  they  supply  with  considerable  funds. 
Article 5 of the Banking ·Law lists  the various types of bank authorized to collect 
short-term  savings.  The  distinction  made  by  the  law  between  short-term  and 
medium  and  long-term  is  in  respect  of  the  collection  of  funds,  the  structure  of 
which is  reflected in that of the lending and investment operations for which these 
are used. The time limits and rates for short, medium and long-term deposits were 
laid  down  by  a decision  of  the CICR in January  1963. 
The  short-term  collection  of  saving  consists  of  time-deposits  not  exceeding  18 
months, medium-term between 18 and 60 months, and long-term above 60 months; 
banks may  not collect  savings  of a  maturity exceeding  18  months  and specialized 
credit institutions  of less  than  18  or more  than  60  months.  Exceptionally, banks 
may,  with  prior  authorization  and  within  closely  defined  limits,  accept  deposits 
for  periods of up to  60  months by issuing  interest-bearing certificates.  In practice 
the  collection  of  funds  for. periods  exceeding  60  months  takes  form  of  issuing 
bonds. 
Banks 
5 a.  At the end of 1970, there were  1,179 banks  operating in  Italy with 10,807 
branches.  From  the angle  of legal  status  the  credit establishments  are  subdivided 
into six  classes  shown in the accompanying  table. 
This picture of the Italian banking system is  completed by the Central Institutions 
for classes  of banks  (Istituti centrali di  categoria),  whose functions  are to provide 
their  members  with  technical  and  financial  assistance  and  to  coordinate  their 
activity as  far  as  possible.  They are:  the  Istituto di Credito delle Casse di Rispar-
mio  Italiane (ICCRI),  Istituto  Centrale  delle  Banche  Popolari  Italiane (Istpopol-
bank),  Istituto  Centrale  di  Banche  e  Banchieri  (Istbank)  and  Istituto di  Credito 
delle  Casse  Rurali e Artigiane (ICCREA). The first  two also  perform the function 
of centralizing  their associates'  cheque-issuing  services. 
The  classification  of  banks  adopted  by  the  Banking  Law  on  the  basis  of  legal 
status 1  does  not correspond  today  to an  equally  clear distinction as  regards  func-
tion,  except  for  savings  banks  and  the  central  institutions  for  classes  of  banks. 
With  the  exception  of  the  limitations  imposed  on certain  operations  by  law  or 
artciles  of association,  it may  be said in general that nowadays  the most important 
variable affecting a bank's activities is its size. The small banks by comparison with 
the  medium-sized,  and  the  latter  as  compared  with  the  big  ones,  are  limited  in 
their  activities  by  their  more  restricted  opportunities  for  making  large  loans: 
further,  size  is  associated  with  the  level  and  type  of  services  that  the  banks 
provide, for example, in the fields  of foreign trade. The very large banks, moreover 
operate  throughout  the  whole  national  territory,  while  the  medium-sized  and 
small ones  are confined to a regional or provincial setting. This obviously involves 
a different degree  of stability as  regards  the flow  of funds collected and of lending 
t See  the accompanying  table. 
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and  investment  transactions,  and  hence  the  adoption  of  different  management 
policies. 
Of the  1,179 banks  in operation, 339- which account  between them for  97% 
of deposits - regularly make full  returns on their operations  to the Central Bank. 
The  banks  covered  by  this  "census"  are  divided  into  five  classes  ("very  large", 
"large", "medium", "small", "very small") according  to size.  By  way of example, 
to give an idea of the degree of concentration attained by the system, the group of 
the  "largest"  banks  (i.e.  those  where  the  total  of  the  items  of resources  taken 
into  consideration  exceeds  Lit  1,000,000  million)  embraced,  at  the end of  1970, 
five  banks which accounted for 59 %  of the total liquidity of the banks furnishing 
returns,  35%  of  lending  and  investment  transactions,  over  80%  of  borrowing 
from  abroad  and  about  one~third of deposits.  The  217  "very small banks" (level 
of resources  considered  to be  under Lit.  50,000 million)  account  for  only  7% of 
total liquidity, 9 %  of lending and investment operations and 9% of deposits. 
The institutional  differences  between  savings  banks  and other banks  are  reflected 
in the different  roles  played  by  the  two categories  as  regards  the major  items  of 
lending  and  investment  operations  and  resources  of  the  banking  system.  For 
example, 73% of  medium and  long~term lending and investment, but only  12% 
of  short-term  operations,  are  accounted  for  by  the  87  savings  banks  supplying 
returns.  As  regards  deposits,  the  savings  banks  show  a distinct  preponderance  of 
savings  deposits  over current accounts,  while  for  the  other banks  the  situation is 
the  opposite.  Of funds  collected  by  savings  banks,  57 %  consists  of  savings  de-
posits,  as  against  35 %  for  the  other banks. 
Special Credit Institutions 
5 b.  The  special  credit  institutions  operate  in. the  medium  and  long~  term  credit 
sector, in which  public~law institutions and bodies of a public nature predominate; 
these have their own personality but are  subject to control by the Government, to 
which,  furthermore,  they  are  often  indebted for  their  endowment capital. 
Savings  are  collected  principally  through issues  of bonds  and,  to  a  more  limited 
extent, through time deposits  and interest-bearing certificates with maturities from 
18  months to five  years, and also through long-term funds from abroad.  The funds 
thus collected  are  used for granting long-term loans,  mostly for  periods  of five  to 
twenty years. 
According  to the sector of the economy  to which they  grant loans, the specialized 
institutions may  be subdivided into: 
1) Special institutions :financing  industrial and commercial firms.  The most  impor-
tant is  the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI), which grants five  to twenty-year loans, 
generally secured by a mortgage.  Another group of special institution (Mediobanca, 
Efibanca,  Centrobanc;a  and  Interbanca)  operates  in  the  medium  and  long-term 
credit  sector,  providing  funds  by  discounting  Italian  or foreign  bills  of exchange 
or  through  mortgage  loans.  The  task  of  certain  institutions  of  a  regional  nature 
(  ISVEIMER,  IRFIS  and  CIS),  with  endowment  capital  provided  chiefly  by  the 
public  authorities, is  to encourage  the  setting up and  strengthening  of enterprises 
in southern Italy by granting loans  on particularly favourable  terms. 
The Mediocredito  Centrale operates as  a central institution rediscounting medium-
term credits granted by the  specialized institutes  to  medium-scale  and small  enter-
prises  and/or to  exporters. 
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Banks 
Public-law banks 
Banks  of  national  importance 
Ordinary  credit  banks · 
Cooperative  banks 
Casse  di  Risparmio  (Savings 
Banks) and Monti di credito su 
pegno  di  1  a.  cat.  (1st-Class 
pledge  bal}.ks) 
Rural and craft banks 
Central  institutions  for  classes  of 
banks  (  istituti  centrali  di  cate-
goria) 
Number of banks and names 
of the principal ones 
6  banks 
Banco di Sicilia 
Monte  dei  Paschi di Siena 
Ist. Bane. S.  Paolo di Torino 
Banca Nazionale  del  Lavoro 
Banco di Sardegna 
Banco di  Napoli 
3  banks 
Banca Commerciale  Italiana 
Credito  Italiano 
Banco di Roma 
180  banks 
Banca Naz.  dell'  Agricoltura 
Banca  d'  America e  d'  Italia 
Banco di Santo Spirito 
195  banks 
Banca Popolare di Novara 
Banca Popolare di Milano 
90  banks 
Cassa di Risparmio .delle Provincie 
Lombarde 
705  banks 
4  banks 
Istpopolbank 
Istbank 
ICC REA 
ICCRI 
Legal status 
Public-law bodies 
Joint-stock  companies  belong 
ing to  IRI  (Istitute for  In 
dustrial  Reconstruction) 
Companies and individual firm 
Cooperative society with limite 
liability 
Public-law  bodies  (foundatio11 
or corporations) 
Cooperative societies (with lin 
ited or unlimited liability) c 
the nature of a  mutual bet 
efit  society 
t  Jolrit-stock companies 
Body corporate 
(1)  Percentage of deposits and utilizations of each category compared with the total volume of deposits and utilizat 
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and long-term 
-operations  and terms 
-Medium-term,  guaran-
teed by credits with the 
Government  and  other 
public authorities 
Principal features _ 
-The profits are used for charitable pur-
poses  or increasing reserves 
- Through autonomous sec- - The  top  management  is  appointed  by 
tions  for  special  credit  the  Treasury  Minister;  the  Board  of 
operations  Directors  and  the  Supervisory  Board 
by  the  Government  or  public  bodies 
- Prior authorization from 
the Banca d'Italia 
- Holding of capital in Me-
diobanca,  which  grants 
medium-term credits thr-
ough their networks 
- Prior authorization from 
the Banca d'  Italia 
- Prior authorization from 
the Banca d'  Italia 
- Medium  and  long-term 
investment  operations 
either direct or through 
autonomous  sections 
- Appointment of  directors is  subject to 
approval by the Supervisory  Board 
- Banks of national importance are those 
incorporated  as  joint  stock  companies 
with branches in at least 30  provinces 
- The establishment of new ordinary cred-
it banks is allowed only in the form of 
joint-stock companies or companies lim-
ited by shares, but having one or more 
general partners 
- The  capital  is  broken  down  among 
numerous  shareholders 
- Carry  out  all  banking  operations  for 
members  and  non-members 
- These  are  public-law  bodies  with  the 
characteristics of foundations or corpo-
rations,  set  up  for  philanthropic  pur-
poses 
-Collect savings from members and non-
members  but  must  use  at  least  60% 
of  liquid  assets  for  the  benefit  of 
members 
- Must  assign  at least 9/10ths of  profits 
to the reserves 
1f banks and central institutions for classes of banks. 
Branches 
1,557 
811 
2,586 
1,913 
3,115 
825 
deposits  I  utilizations 
(1)  (1) 
(at 31  Dec.  1970) 
21.0  22.7 
17.6  21.4 
22.4  20.7 
11.0  9.9 
26.0  20.6 
1.8  1.3 
0.2  3.4 
100.0  100.0 
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A further group of institutions and autonomous sections finances  public works; the 
most  important  among  these  is  the  CREDIOP,  which  also  grants  loans  to  the 
Treasury to implement multi-annual schemes  (Green Plan, farm building, etc.). 
2)  Special  institutions  for  credit  for  real  estate  and  housing.  These  finance  the 
purchase and formation  of rural and urban property by granting mortgage-secured 
loans. 
A feature of these institutions is  the link between the grant of loans and the issue 
of land  bonds  (cartelle fondiarie);  the  latter are  issued  continuously  as  loans  are 
granted,  and  their redemption must  coincide  with that of the  loans. 
3)  Agricultural  credit institute;  unlike the other specialized  institutions,  these are 
authorized  to  operate  in  the  short-term  credit  sector  too  in  order  to  finance 
working  capital  for  agriculture;  in  this  case  credit  is  granted  by  discontinuing 
agricultural  bills  (cambiale  agraria).  Further,  these  institutions  grant  longer  term 
funds  for  agricultural  improvement  schemes. 
Insurance Companies 
5 c.  There  are  numerous  private  insurance  companies  and  one  public  body (Isti-
tuto Nazionale  delle  Assicurazioni  - INA). Besides  operating in their own field  of 
life  assurance  and  insurance  against  other  hazards,  they  are  also  highly  active  as 
investors  of  actuarial  reserves. 
Their  investments  in financial  assets  are  concentrated  mainly  on  the  purchase  of 
fixed- and variable-interest securities and to a lesser extent on lending. The volume 
of  collecting  operations  generally  exceeds  that of lending  and investment transac-
tions  because  the  insurance  companies  invest  heavily  in  real  estate  (but  not  so 
much,  however,  as  in financial  assets). 
Treasury and Cassa Depositi e P~estiti 
6.  The Treasury  may  be looked  upon  as  having  a  double  role:  on  the  one  hand 
it acts  as  the financial operator undertaking credit transactions for the Government, 
and on the other it is  at the receiving end of such transactions;  in the former role 
it,  too,  may  be considered  a  financial  intermediary. 
Its liabilities  are  made  up mainly  of short  and  long-term  fixed  interest  securities 
and credits from  the Banka d'Italia, and also  of the notes and coin it issues.  Only 
part of the  funds  collected is  used  for financial  investments  in the  form  of loans 
and endowment capital;  the rest goes  to finance  public works and, more generally, 
the  budget  deficit. 
The Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti (Cassa  DD.PP.) is  a  Department  of  the  Treasury, 
which,  though it has  its own budget and  Board  of Directors, operates  under the 
aegis  of  the  Treasury  Ministry  (the  Board  of Directors,  for  instance,  is  presided 
over by the Minister). 
Its  main  source  of  funds  consists  of  money  collected  through  the  Post  Office 
savings  bank and the sums flowing  into Post Office  cu.rrent  accounts. 
The  most  important  lending  and  investment  operations  are  long-term  loans  to 
local  and  regional  authorities  and  purchase  of  fixed-interest  securities.  The  bulk 
of the latter  consists  of bonds  issued  by  special  credit institutions  in  which  the 
Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti  also  has  a  modest  holding. 
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Social Security Institutions 
7.  Social  Security  is  provided  in  Italy by  a  large  number  of public institutions. 
Investments of any  existing  actuarial  reserves  in financial  assets  consist  chiefly of 
fixed-interest  securities  and loans  to private individuals,  companies  and local  and 
regional  authorities. 
Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy 
8.  Only  a  small  part of  the  financing  process  takes  the form  of  direct  relations 
between the ultimate users of resources and the sectors with surplus savings;  this 
has  necessitated  ever-increasing  recourse  to  credit  institutions.  On  the  average 
about 50% of saving by the economy (i.e. household and firms) goes to the banks. 
The  remainder  is  collected  by  the  special  credit  institutions  (about  10 % ),  by 
insurance companies and social security institutions (about 7 %) and by Post Office 
savings banks  (about 5 % ).  The share of savings  collected by the Treasury is less 
stable  because  it depends  not  only  on  transactors'  preferences,  but  also  on  the 
size  of Government  security  issues,  which are  decided in the light of  the public 
authorities  needs  and monetary policy  requirements.  In 1970  the flow  of savings 
showed a different distribution, with the banks' relative share on the increase. 
In more  recent  years  the chief  method  used  by firms  for  medium  and long-term 
financing  has  been  loans  from  the  special  institutions,  often  obtained  on  easier 
terms  because  of a contribution from  the  State. 
The special credit institutions have in this way  made  available  the past few  years 
about 30% of the external financing of the economy, while the banks, mainly with 
short-term  credit, have  provided between 40 and 50%, according  to the rate  of 
expansion  of economic  activity. 
In the  60's,  bonds  issued  by  the  special  institutions  were  largely  subscribed  by 
the  banks.  The  transfer  of funds  between the  two classes  of  intermediary  made 
possible a vigorous expansion of the capital market and offered forms  of financing 
suited  to investment  requirements,  while allowing  financial  assets  consonant  with 
the  structure  of income  desired  by  savers  to be maintained. 
The  public's  preference  for  holding  its  savings  largely  in the  form  of  money  or 
near-money  (principally  bank  deposits)  influence  the  efficacy  of  monetary  policy 
in opposite ways. On the one hand, the large volume of deposits tends to reinforce 
this policy inasmuch  as  the monetary  authorities can direct the savings  channelled 
through the banking  system  towards  the various  sectors  of  the market, while on 
the other hand it tends to weaken monetary policy because this volume of savings 
may  in part neutralize  variations  in the monetary base.  In the short run a credit 
squeeze  may  be counterbalanced  by the activation of idle  balance;  conversely,  an 
expansionary  policy  requires  longer  time  to  influence  demand  for  other  financial 
assets  and hence  demand for  goods. 
The expansion of the capital market in the 60's was  reflected in the structure of 
firms'  liabilities inasmuch  as  the difference  between their investments and savings 
was  covered by long-term  indebtedness,  which took  the place  of risk capital,  and 
marginally  by  short-term  credit.  The  banks  therefore  increasingly  financed  fixed 
asset formation,  directly or indirectly  (through the special institute) thus  reducing 
their  capacity  to  adapt  to  monetary  policy  measures.  Since,  moreover,  banks 
purchase  issues  of  fixed-interest  securities  when  demand  for  commercial  credit is 
smaller than the potential expansion of bank credit, the creation of a more limited 
monetary  base  provokes  strains  on  the  capital  market  by  affecting  long-term 
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interest rates,  whereas  monetary policy  aims  at maintaining  these  fairly  stable,  at 
least  in  the  interval  between  changes  of  level. 
In the past few  years  the conduct of monetary policy has  been influenced by  the 
lack  of  a  better  organized  system  of  financial  intermediaries  operating  on  the 
capital market in accordance  with savers' preferences.  Exports of capital in recent 
years  are  in  part accounted  for  by  these  institutional  shortcomings.  As  a  result, 
monetary  policy  has  been constrained,  on the one hand,  by  the  possibility  of an 
unacceptable external disequilibrium and, on the other hand, by the need  to inter-
vene  more  widely  through  open-market  operations  in  order  to  ensure  adequate 
financing  of  economic  activities,  at  a  price  that  does  not  discourage  investment. 
Para.  II-2:  Banking system  and  capital  market 
Role of the Banking system in the issue of securities 
9.  Article  4  5  of the  Banking  Law  forbids  banks  to  belong  to syndicates  placing 
securities other than those issued or guaranteed by the State or to help place such 
securities if their issue has not received prior authorization from  the Banca d'Italia. 
The banks play  a role in the issue  of securities by making a firm  bid for  a whole 
loan or a part thereof and then placing it with the public, or by collecting investors' 
subscriptions without acquiring  the securities for  their own account.  Their role  in 
the floating of loans  is  particularly necessary on the Italian market, which is  short 
of non-banking  financial  intermediaries  and  institutional investors,  and where  the 
individual  saver  plays  an  important  part.  In the  last  few  years  the  banks  have 
helped  to maintain equilibrium between capital demand and  supply  by being very 
active in placing  securities  with the public and also  by purchasing large quantities 
of bonds for their own portfolios. 
Holding of securities by the banks 
10.  There is  no limit on the holding of fixed-interest securities by banks, including 
savings  banks (Table  1  ),  as  long  as  the issues  have  been authorized by  the Banca 
d'Italia. The holding of shares is allowed within the limits of needs connected with 
transactions  on  behalf  of  customers.  However,  the  Banca  d'Italia  may  authorize 
the  acquisition  of  holdings,  particularly  in  the  capital  of  medium  and  long-term 
credit institutions, bodies  set up or promoted by the State, and financial  consortia 
or institutions  serving  the  public  interest. 
Intervention bodies and rules on new issues 
11.  The bodies that regulate the capital market are:  the Interministerial Credit and 
Savings  Committee  (CICR),  the Ministry  of the Treasury,  the Banca  d'Italia and 
the Chambers  of Commerce. 
The CICR examines  the terms  of loans  and increases of capital in  relation to the 
general situation of the market in order to ensure its smooth working. 
The Treasury  Ministry  and  the Banca  d'Italia see  to the coordination  of security 
issues, in both the public and private sectors, so as to establish priorities and ensure 
that access  to the market is  spaced out in time,  and keep an eye on loan terms in 
order to protect savers;  the Ministry of the Treasury also takes any  steps necessary 
to ensure the  regular functioning of the official  stock exchanges.  The Chambers of 
Commerce  decide  which  securities  may  be  quoted officially,  except  in the case  of 
public  securities, which are quoted as  of right. 
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In view  of  the  contrasting  institutional  features  of  the  supply  and  demand  for 
funds- in the case  of the former,  a  relatively  small  number of large  issues,  and 
of  the  latter,  the  important  role  of  investment  by  individuals - the  monetary 
authorities  try to encourage  the participation of banks in syndicates  floating  new 
issues,  to  that they  can  then gradually  place  these  securities  on the  market.  The 
aim is  to increase  individual savers' capacity  to absorb securities;  this is  achieved 
both by varying  the features  of new loans so  as  to offer  a wider choice  and by a 
high  level  of efficiency  in the issuing  machinery,  which in practical  terms  means 
that the public must be kept well informed and that the banks  belonging  to  the 
syndicate  must be able  to make contact with investors easily. 
Relations between the money and capital market 
12.  The  links  between  the  money  market  and  the  capital  market  have  become 
very close because of the banks' role, as  described above, in the issue of securities 
and  the  increasing  volume  of  their  investments  in bonds  (Table  2).  The  banks' 
purchases,  which  are  made  partly  to  provide  funds  for  their  own  special  credit 
sections,  generally  vary  inversely  with other lending  operations  and  are  consider-
able  in periods of abundant liquidity. The acceptance of certain classes of security 
to gaurantee  advances  from  the Central Bank and the possibility,  in recent years, 
of placing long-term securities in minimum reserves to replace short-term securities, 
have made  relations  between the  money  and  capital markets even closer. 
Para  II-3:  The  public's  preferences  as  to securities  and  liquidity 
Volume and flows of financial assets 
13.  The Banca  d'Italia publishes in its annual reports,  and works out monthly,  a 
table showing a breakdown of the .  total financial  assets of the economy 
1 (Table 3) 
arising  from  the  differences  between the economy's  total savings  and investments 
(by definition equal to the net indebtedness of the public sector and to the balance 
of  the current  items  in the  balance  of  payments),  and  from  direct  indebtedness 
within it. 
The  table  also  shows  the distribution  of financial  wealth  and  savings  among  the 
various  forms  of assets. 
From the structure of the economy's financial wealth at the end of  '1969  it is  seen 
that 53 %  was  composed of liquid assets,  13  %  of :fixed-interest  securities,  about 
9% of foreign  assets  and  18% of  shares, v'alued  at market prices.  Although the 
figures  showing  the composition do  not represent  an  exact  point of equilibrium, 
they  do  roughly  reflect  the  public's  preferences.  But  from  the  financial  flows  in 
the last year or two - which can be interpreted as an effect of the balancing process 
in the wealth structure  - a  tendency  can  be seen for  the share  of foreign  assets 
to increase. 
However, this slowed down appreciably in 1970 after the noteworthy acceleration 
in  the  previous  year  ( 14%'  and  25%  respectively  of  the  economy's  gross 
financial  saving).  Investment  in Italian shares  accounted  on the  average  for  only 
4 %, confirming that the increase in foreign  securities has occurred at the expense 
of domestic securities. This process has also _affected fixed-interest securities, which, 
1 Here and  elsewhere  in discussing  sectoral  flows,  "the  economy"  means  the  private  sector  or households  and  firms. 
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after  accounting  for  about  15 %  of  the  economy's  financial  saving  in  1968, 
dropped  to  less  than  11  %  of newly-created  financial  assets ·in  1969 and to  7 ·% 
in  1970. 
In 1970 the economy continued to accumulate large quantities of liquid assets;  this 
was  encouraged  on the demand side  by  the gradual reduction in the gap  between 
the rates of yield from  fixed-interest securities and. from  bank deposits,  but it was 
also  the result of the money and capital markets. On the supply side, the expansion 
of  liquid assets  was  made  possible  by  the  financial  circuit  described  above,  by 
which  the  banking  system  transforms  into  short-term  liquid  assets  credit instru-
ments  suitable  for financing  investments.  In the past few  years  liquid assets  have 
represented on the  average  over 55 %  of total ne\v financial  assets. 
Para.  II-4:  Volume  of external  financial  transactions 
Ratio of exports to GNP 
14.  In 1970  exports of goods  and  services  accounted  for  just under a quarter of 
gross  national  resources  produced  in  the  country  and  supplied  abroad  has  been 
increasing constantly,  so  that it has  quadrupled in the twenty-year period to which 
the  table  refers. 
Degree of Hberallzation of capital movements 
Investments of foreign capital in Italy 
15 a.  The  first  liberalization  measure  adopted  in  Italy  regarding  foreign  capital 
goes  back  to  Legislative  Decree  No.  211  of 2  March  1948,  by  virtue  of which 
prior authorization from  the Treasury Ministry was  no longer required for inward 
investments  by  means  of  sale  through  official  channels  of  convertible  currencies. 
The decree  permitted the transfer  abroad,  in the same  currency  as  that originally 
imported, of up to 6 % of income from investments and also capital not exceeding 
that originally transferred, provided the operation affected less  than two years after 
the investment and  the sums  did not exceed  50 %, for  every  two-year  period, of 
the  amount  invested  in  Italy. 
The matter was  elaborated further by Law No.  43  of 7  February  1956 and  Pre-
sidential Decree  No.  758  of 6 July  1956, which  distinguish between investments 
in "productive enterprises"  and "other investments".  "Productive enterprises" are 
those  whose  object  is  the  production  of  goods  and  services  and  which  require 
investments in plant  and  machinery  in order to  operate.  For this  type of invest-
ment the following  arrangements  are permitted: 
a )  Retransfer  abroad  at  any  time  of the  original  capital; 
b)  Transfer  of  any  capital  gains; 
c )  Transfer  of income  without  any  limitation. 
For other investments  the following  are  permitted: 
a)  Retransfer abroad of original capital provided that two years  have  passed since 
the  date  of  transfer  of  the  foreign  exchange; 
b)  Transfer  of income  up  to  8 %  per annum. 
The investments  may  take  the form  of machinery  to be used in the firm  and im-
ported  in  accordance  with the  current  regulations. 
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However,  the  legal  restrictions on the  transfer abroad  of profits  and  the repatria-
tion of capital are  now outdated, since administrative rules  permit conversion into 
foreign  exchange,  after  transition  through  "capital"  and  "foreign"  accounts,  of 
income  and capital in excess  of the limits  fixed  for retransfers. 
Loans  from  abroad  must  be  authorized  by  the  Treasury  Ministry  in conjunction 
with the Foreign Trade Ministry, except for  long-term loans with the participation 
of residents in OECD countries, ECSC  loans  to  iron and steel firms  having  their 
head offices  in Italy, loans  from  residents  in EEC countries (for up  to five  years 
only and not exceeding Lit. 250 million), and lastly loans from residents in OECD 
countries  to  members of their families  in Italy (up to Lit.  10 million}. 
Italian  investments 
15 b.  A  Ministerial  Decree  of  28  July  1959  enabled  legal  persons  to  acquire 
holding  of capital  and  to buy  shares  and  bonds  of foreign  companies  having  the 
same  objects  as  Italian ones.  Further progress was  made  in 1960, when the UIC 
was  authorized  to  give  instructions,  in  connection  with  the  acceptance  by  the 
Member  States  of  directives  issued  by  the  EEC Council,  on the  liberalization  of 
some capital movements to and from  member countries. As  a result the following 
were liberalized:  direct investments, real  estate investments, capital movements of 
a  personal  nature,  short  and  medium-term  credits  for  commercial  transactions  by 
residents,  securities  and other guarantees,  liens  and related transfers. 
In pursuance of Article 2 of the first  EEC directive on the liberalization of capital 
movements, the Ministerial Decree of 22 February  1961 was issued liberalizing the 
portfolio investments of financial  institutions, companies and other bodies. 
Subsequently,  the Ministerial  Decree  of 8  March  1963  extended  liberalization  to 
all  residents. 
As  a  result  of  this  latter  measure,  residents  are  authorized  to  purchase  or  sell 
abroad,  through the agency  of a bank, shares and bonds issued or payable abroad, 
provided that they  are listed on foreign stock exchanges  or bodies connected with 
these.  Residents  are  obliged  to  deposit  in their own  names,  with the  authorized 
banks,  any  foreign  securities  of which  they have  become  the holders  by  whatever 
manner. 
The  liberalization  measures  contained  in  Articles  1  and  2  of  the  EEC  directive 
were  subsequently extended to  all OECD countries. 
Lending  to  non-residents  must  be  authorized  by  the  Foreign  Trade  Ministry  in 
conjunction  with  the  Treasury  Ministry  except  for  long-term  loans  in the  nature 
of participation in OECD countries, loans to residents in EEC countries (for up to 
five  years  and not exceeding Lit. 250 million),  and loans to family  members resid-
i11g  in  OECD countries  (the maximum  is  Lit.  10  million). 
Liberalization  of purchases  of investment  trusts  unit initially  took a  similar form 
to  that of  other portfolio  securities,  the  only  requirement  being  that closed-end 
trusts  should  be  quoted  on  official  foreign  stock  exchanges  and  that  open-end 
trusts  should  hold  in  their portfolios  securities  quoted  on  foreign  exchanges. 
In April 1969 the rules were amended to that residents may buy only units issued 
by  funds  which have invested in Italian securities at least a half of their portfolios 
and have obtained the required authorization from the Foreign Trade Ministry. 
Circular  A-232  of  the  Italian  Exchange  Office,  dated  1  Otober  1970  made  the 
purchase of shares  issued by  foreign  financial  establishments  subject to the condi-
tion  that  such  securities  should  be  quoted  on  at  least  three  leading  foreign 
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exchanges.  This  arrangement  was  rescinded  in  January  1971  by  Circular  A-237, 
laying  down  that purchase  of the abovementioned  securities  by residents  shall be 
conditional  upon  prior scrutiny  of  applications  by  the Exchange  Office. 
Section II - Liquidity 
The Danca d'Italia's method of monetary analysis 
16.  The  1nethod  of  monetary  analysis  adopted  by  the  Banca  d'Italia  (Table  5) 
shows both the external factors which act directly and immediately on the liquidity 
of the banking systems,  and hence  of the market,  and the instruments which the 
monetary  authorities  use  to  control  the  effects  of  these  factors  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  monetary  equilibrium. 
The  combined  actions  and  reactions  of exogenous  factors  and  measures  taken by 
the  monetary  authorities  bring  about  changes  in the  volume  and  composition  of 
the "monetary base", that is  of notes  and coin and the short-term financial  assets 
created by the abovementioned authorities which can be deposited without limita-
tion in minimum reserves  or freely  converted into cash  at the Central Bank. 
Demand for monetary base from  the public (chiefly notes and coin and Post Office 
savings)  is  correlated  with  the  growth  of  income,  of  which  it represents  in  the 
short-term  a  near:-stable  function.  Consequently,  given  a  certain  money  supply, 
the share accruing to the banks can be estimated fairly closely. Since the absorption 
of  money  supply  by  minimum  reserves  can  also  be  estimated  accurately  enough 
in relation to the expected growth of deposits, the monetary authorities can, given 
a certain level of demand for credit, control possibilities of expansion of credit by 
the banking system  and  interest rates. 
Taken  together,  the  pattern  of  analysis  of  monetary  base  and  the  operations  of 
credit establishments provide the "Consolidated account of liquidity-creating bodies" 
(Table  6),  which  makes  it  possible  to  examine  the  formation  of  the  total 
liquid  assets  of  the  economy,  of  non-banking  credit  institutions  (special  credit 
institutions and insurance companies),  and  of  the public sector (public  authorities 
and public  corporations)  as  the outcome  of  the operations  of the  monetary insti-
tutions  as  a  whole  (Banca  d'Italia  and  UIC, Treasury  and  Cassa  Depositi  e  Pre-
stiti,  credit  establishments). 
Para.  I:  Liquidity  of  the  economy 
Liquid assets of the economy and their counterparts 
17.  Credits granted by the monetary institutions are subdivided in the "Consolidat-
ed  account"  (Table  6)  according  to  whether  they  concern  the  economy,  special 
credit institutions  and  insurance  institutions,  the foreign  sector  (corresponding  to 
monetary  movements  in  the  balance  of  payments),  or the public  sector.1 
1 In order  to calculate  the  total  credits  granted  by  the  liquidity-creating  bodies  to  the  public  sector,  the  subsectors 
receiving  finance  are  listed rather  than  the  financing  sectors. 
The  share of the Government's  requirements  financed  by short-term funds  is  calculated by subtracting from  the  total 
deficit - the  indebtedness  of the State  includes  that of the Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  and  autonomous  corporations -
the  sum  of the  long-term  Government  securities  subscribed  by  operators outside  the  liquidity-creating bodies. 
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As  a. counterpart of credits granted, the table shows how the monetary institutions' 
liabilities  (sight  and  short-term  debts)  are  made  up.  These  liabilities,  which 
constitute  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  (and  of  the  other  sectors  referred  to 
above),  embrace  notes  and  coin,  deposit  money  (current accounts),  sight  deposits 
with  Post  Office  or  Treasury,  savings  deposits  and  other  sight  and  short-term 
assets,  readily convertible into cash  without capital loss  and without high transac-
tion  costs.  The  definition  of  liquidity  also  embraces  some  financial  instruments 
such as  "assegni  circolari"  and  "'vaglia  cambiari",l  and  some  minor  items  which, 
although they modify the volume of liquid assets, are difficult to allocate as counter-
parts  to  the  various  sectors. 
Composition of the liquidity of the economy 
18.  Between  the  end  of  1958  and  1970  gross  national  income  expanded  at  an 
average  rate  of 9·3  %  and total liquid  assets  went up by an  average  of  13·6 %. 
The  growth rate of notes  and coin in circulation, which  averaged  out at 10·2 ·%, 
was only slightly higher than that of income. The increase in savings deposits with 
the  banks  (12·3 %)  and  in  particular  current  accounts  (17·3 %)  was  distinctly 
higher.  On  the  other  hand,  the  expansion  of  Post  Office  deposits  and  interest-
bearing certificates was  less  sharp - an average of 9·8 %  over the same  period. 
Nearly  three-quarters  of the  economy's  demand  for  liquidity  is  accounted  for  by 
current accounts,  which represented  74·2 %  of liquid  assets  at  the end of  1969. 
With  regard  to  the  economy's  newly-formed  liquidity,  these  accounts  equalled 
81%  of  liquidity  accumulated  in  1967,  83·6%  in  1968,  76.-6%  in  1969  and 
88·5% in  1970. 
The expansion of notes and coin in the hands of the economy was more restrained 
than  that  of  other  means  of  payment  (current  accounts)  and was  approximately 
proportionate to the growth of income, except where fortuitous factors or consider-
able  changes  in the  distribution of income  were  registered. 
The rest of the economy's liquid assets in made up of Post Office  savings deposits, 
the  creation  of which  has  been  hit by  the  considerable  switch to bank  deposits, 
caused in part by the difference between rates of yield and in part by a drift from 
Post Office  deposits  as  a consequence  of the gradual evolution of capital markets. 
The  decision  taken  in April  1970  to  raise  the  interest  rates  on Post  Office  ac-
counts - the effects of which were not felt, however, before October - made  the 
collection  of  savings  through  these  accounts  more  competitive  in  relation  to  col-
lection through  the banks.  Postal deposits  represented  11·1 %  of liquid assets  at 
the end of 1969 and their share of newly formed liquidity went down from 9·1  % 
in  1967  to  2·7 %  in  1970. 
Liquidity income ratio 
19.  The ratios  of  primary  and secondary liquidity  to gross  national income reflect 
the  various  growth  rates  referred  to  above  (Table  7). 
The  ratio  of  the  moving  average,  at  mid-year,  of  primary  liquidity  to  gross 
1 "Assegni  circolari"  are  drafts  issued  by  certain  banks  against  payments  in cash  of their countervalue.  These  drafts 
are  payable  in  principle  at  branches  of  the  bank  that  issued  them;  in practice  they  may  be  cashed  at  any  bank. 
"Assegni  circolari"  are  peculiar  to  Italy  and  constitute  a  widely-used  means  of  payment.  As  they  form  part of  the 
banks'  sight  liabilities  they  ate counted  as  liquidity.  The  two  former  banks  of  issue- Banco  di Napoli  and  Banco 
di Sicilia- and  the Banca  d'Italia also  issue  a  similar instrument of payment,  the "vaglia cambiari",  which performs 
the  same  function  as  the  "assegni  circolari". 
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national income has shown a  tendency  to increase, which was interrupted only in 
the credit speeze period and has  become more marked in recent years.  This  trend 
was  determined by current  accounts  with banks,  since  the velocity  of circulation 
of notes  and coin remained reasonably  stable,  with a  slight  tendency to decrease, 
mainly  as  a result of the changes  in the distribution of income. 
The  rising  trend  of  the  ratio  of  current  accounts  to  gross  national  product  is 
chiefly  due  to  the  fact  that  this  means  of  payment  is  also  sought  after  by  the 
economy as  a form of financial  saving (both because of the shortage of alternative 
instruments  of investment and because  current accounts  bear interest),  so  that it 
must be considered in relation not only to gross  national product but also  to the 
wealth  of  the  sector. 
The relation between demand  for  deposit  money  on the one  hand and an index 
of total transactions, interest rates and  the  wealth  of  the economy  on the other, 
explains why it is possible in Italy to have a high, growing ratio of current accounts 
to gross  national product by comparison with other countries without this signify-
ing the existence of inflationary pressures. 
The ratio of total savings deposits (secondary liquidity) to gross  national products 
is  tending  upwards.  The  reversal  of the trend observed  over  the past two years 
is  due  to· a  transfer  of funds  towards  current  accounts  because  of  the  different 
treatment  of  these  two  sorts  of  assets. 
Optimwn level of liquidity 
20.  Any  simple  criterion,  such  as  the ratio  of the  various  forms  of liquidity  to 
gross  national  product  proves  to be  inadequate for  the purpose of assessing  the 
optimum level of the economy's liquidity, in view of what has been said regarding 
the velocity of circulation of current bank accounts in Italy. 
Another reason why simple criteria may be of little help in assessing this optimum 
level derives from the nature of the categories of assets that are classified as liquid. 
In various  situations, and with equal liquid assets  in the strict  sense,  the degree 
of liquidity of the  economy  may  differ  greatly  according  to the opportunities for 
converting  other forms  of financial  assets  into money without  capital  loss. 
It is, however, possible to establish synthetic indicators of the trend of preferences 
shown by households  and firms,  such  as  the share of liquid assets in the creation 
of total financial  assets,  the marginal level of the velocity of circulation of current 
accounts,  the ratio of the change in the various  savings deposits  to gross  national 
income. 
Para.  II:  Liquidity  of the  banking  system 
Items constituting Hquidfty of the banking system 
21.  Table 8 gives  the components of the liquidity of the 339 banks and the three 
central "category" institutions making up the statistical sample used in the surveys 
by  tho  Banca  d'Italia  (see  point  5 a.). 
Liquidity,  that is  to  say  the  share  of monetary  base  held  by  the  banks  in  free 
balances,  is  made  up of  the following  items: 
- Cash  in  hand:  Banca  d'Italia notes  and  Treasury  notes  and coin. 
- Deposits  at  the  Banca  d'Italia:  sight  or very  short-term  deposits  (8  and  15 
days),  from  which  the  Bank,  at  the  request  of  the  depositing  banks,  makes 
transfers of funds  from  one centre to another within the country. 
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Sight  deposits  attract  0·5  %  interest  and  8  and  15-day  deposits  1·5  and  2% 
respectively: 
- Deposits  with  the  Treasury  and  the  Post  Office. 
- Unused  facilities  on  ordinary  advance  accounts  at  the  Banca  d'Italia. 
- Treasury  Bills  (BOT)  freely  available  (until  April  1969,  from  which  date 
Treasury Bills  no longer  represent an item of bank liquidity for  reasons  given 
below;  see  point  41). 
- Bills and  current accounts  relating to grain storage years up to  1963/64. Their 
inclusion  in liquidity is  justified by  the fact  that the bills  in  question  can be 
unconditionally rediscounted at the Central Bank and that the current accounts 
are  mobilizable by  means  of equally discountable bills. 
- Convertible currencies.  That part of liquid assets in foreign convertible currency 
which  is  freely  available. 
Factors affecting the Uquidity of the system 
22.  As  already  pointed out, the monetary base  at a given  moment is the outcome 
of  the  interaction  of  autonomous  factors  and  measures  taken  by  the  monetary 
authorities.  The autonomous factors, i.e.  those that can be modified only indirectly 
by the policy  of the monetary  authorities after a lapse of time, consist potentially 
of  the  balance-of-payments  situation  and  the  Treasury's  total  cash  requirements. 
The  monetary  authorities'  counterbalancing  measures,  which  in  fact  transform 
these  potential  effects  into  actual  effects,  are  put  into  operjltion  through  three 
basic  channels:  foreign  transactions,  Treasury, banks. 
In the  foreign  sector  the  creation  of  absorption  of liquidity  necessitated  by  the 
balance of payments situation may be controlled by regulating the foreign operations 
of banks. 
As  regards  the Treasury,  an important instrument is  the choice of means  to cover 
its  total cash  requirements.  In fact,  the expansionary  effect  of these  requirements 
is  neutralized  to  the  extent  that  public  debt  is  sold  to  banks  and  individuals, 
whether through  market issues  effected  directly by the  Treasury or through sales 
of  securities  by  the  Banca  d'Italia  (i.e.  open  market  operation  - though  in this 
case  the  relationship  with the  Treasury  deficit  is  less  direct,  since  the  Bank  can 
also  sell  securities  at  periods  other  than  those  during  which  the  Treasury  is  in 
need of liquidity). 
As  to  the  banks,  monetary  base  is  controlled  by  regulating  the  volume  of last 
resort  credit  granted  to  the  banking  system. 
Other components of Liquidity at the level of the Banks 
23.  At  the  level  of  the  individual  banks,  in  addition  to  the  items  of  liquidity 
discussed  above  there  is  the  surplus  on  the  interbank  deposits  and  current  ac-
counts which banks  have  with each  other and with the special  institutions. 
As  regards  relations  with the latter, banks  may  only  have  credit  balances  in cor-· 
respondence accounts for services;  they are not permitted to built up deposits with 
such institutions. Normally, it is the small banks, of limited territorial range, which 
deposit  liquid  assets  with  the  larger  ones.  The  latter,  because  of  their  greater 
operating  capacity  and  their  wider  geographical  coverage,  are  able  to  carry  out 
lending  and  investment  operations  on more  advantageous· terms  and therefore  to 
offer  the smaller banks, which deal  chiefly  with the collection of funds,  attractive 
rates of yield in view of the degree of liquidity of this form of investment. 
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It should be noted that the level of free reserves varies from one bank to another 
in relation  with the  differing  degrees  of stability  of deposits  or the development 
of other sources  of funds.  The liquidity  ratio  is  rather low in savings  banks,  as 
their deposits  are more  stable than those of the other banks. But a higher ratio is 
to  be  found  in  establishments  which  administer  ·public  funds - since  they  are 
subject to sharp cash  movements - and in those which have considerable recourse 
to interbank  funds.  To  give  an  example,  the  liquidity  ratio  at the  end  of  1970, 
excluding  interbank  accounts,  was  2·0 %  for  savings  banks  and  4·2 %  for  other 
banks.  For the latter, the ratio  was  over 5·9 %  in the group of larger banks  and 
2·8 %  in that of smaller banks.  However, in order to interpret these  percentages 
correctly  for  particular  banks,  allowal1.ce  must  be  made  for  the  fact  that  both 
savings banks and the smaller banks are particularly active on the interbank market. 
If credit  balances  on  interbank  accounts  are  added  to liquid  assets  in the  strict 
sense  (sight  claims  on  the  monetary  authorities),  it is  seen  that  liquidity - for 
individual banks-is  higher for  the  small  banks  than for  the large  ones.  At the 
end of 1970 the smalles banks had in fact transferred nearly 10 %  of their deposits 
through interbank channels.  The interbank market thus enables  the whole  system 
to save  liquidity and  to increase  the deposits  coefficient. 
Para.  III:  Liquidity  and  public  finances 
Management of cash operations of the Govemement 
and local authorities; role of the Treasury 
24.  The  Treasury  looks  after  the  Government's  cash  operations;  it  does  this 
through  the  Treasury  offices  run  by  the  Banca  d'Italia's  branches  in  all  the 
provincial  capitals  and  through  the  Post  Office  for  operations  in  less  important 
centres.  Operations affected  directly  by the Treasury  through its central office  are 
on  a  smaller  scale.  The  Treasury  is  responsible  not  only  for  implementing  the 
national  budget  but  also  for  managing  the  Government's  accounts  in  the  strict 
sense,  that  is  all  operations  relating  basically  to: 
1)  The  floating  debt,  consisting  in  particular  of  Treasury  bills,  Banca  d'Italia 
advances  and  deposits  with  the  Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti,  that is  those  items 
of the  State  debt which  are  not included  among  budget receipts  (where  only 
long-term  debts  are  entered); 
2)  Current  accounts,  in  which  are  deposited  the  liquid  assets  of  autonomous 
government departments whose cash operations are carried out by the Treasury 
itself; 
3)  Special  accounts,  for  funds  which  departments  or officials  may  use  to  make 
payments; 
4)  What  are  known  as  "Treasury  credits"  which,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  are 
merely book-keeping items offset in the treasury office itself, and save for a few 
exceptions,  not representing  actual financial  assets. 
The  provincial  accounts ·of  the  State,  which  are  managed  by  the  Banca  d'Italia, 
embrace  not only  the collection,  custody and  movement of public funds,  but also 
the  actual  execution ·of  payments  and  collection of receipts  under the budget and 
all  the  management  of  State  accounts.  At  the  head  office  of  the  Banca  d'Italia 
there is  a  current account  for  State  accounts,  wnich gives  a  daily  picture of  the 
situation when all operations carried out by the provincial sections  are  taken into 
account. 
It is  in1portant  to  note that, as  there is  no  machinery  in Italy to neutralize auto-
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matically  the  effects  produced  regularly  on the  liquidity  of  the  economy  by  the 
two-monthly ·instalments  of  direct  taxes  paid  into  the  Treasury,  the  monetary 
authorities  are  obliged  to intervene from  time  to  time  to ensure  a  suitable level 
of  the  monetary  base. 
Some  distinctions  must  be  made  regarding  public  and  semi-public  bodies.  The 
local  and regional  authorities  keep  their accounts with banks, at which any  assets 
they may  have  are held. Sometimes the authorities contract the collection of taxes 
out  to  private  persons.  Their  cash  movements  therefore  do  not  influence  the 
monetary  base. 
The social  security institutions  collect  contributions  and pay  out benefits  through 
Post Office  branches  and  banks.  Only in the  latter case,  therefore, do  their cash 
operations  have  no  effect  on  the  monetary  base. 
Among  public  departments  a  special  place  is  occupied by  the Post Office  (one of 
the  autonomous  public  corporations),  which  through  its  branches: 
a )  collects  postal  savings  (in  the  form  of  savings  certificates  and  savings  book 
accounts),  to be used by a special  department of .the Treasury Ministry (Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti) for loans  to local  and regional authorities and autonomous 
State  corporations,  the  remainder  being  paid into  the Treasury; 
b)  receives and makes payments on behalf of the State, social security institutions, 
firms  and  private  individuals,  making  use  in  some  circumstances  of  funds 
advanced  by the  Treasury.  In both cases,  consequently,  movements  of funds 
through  Post  Office  branches  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  Treasury's  cash 
situation. 
It must be noted that public entities, excluding public corporations and local and 
regional  authorities,  to which  sums  are  allocated  under the central Government's 
budget,  are  required to deposit  these  sums  with the Treasury until  they  are put 
to  definitive  use. 
The Treasury's other functions 
25.  Besides  looking  after  the  State's  cash  operations,  chiefly  through  the  Banca 
d'Italia,  the  Treasury  plays  an  important  role  in  implementing  the  government 
budget and those of the public corporations.  In order to collect  the revenue bud-
get for  and, in particular, in order to put into effect  the expenditure approved,  a 
complex technical and administrative procedure is necessary, in which the individual 
departments concerned and  the Treasury  itself each  play  a  part. In the past few 
years  there  has  been  a  continual  increase  in underspending - nearly  Lit.  5,800 
million at the end of 1970-corresponding to the difference between the authorized 
revenue  and  expenditure  budgeted for  and  the  sums  actually  paid  out.  This  has 
made  it possible  to maintain  actual public expenditure and  the· resulting need for 
financial  cover  at an  appreciably  lower level  than if the expenditure budgeted for 
had been undertaken in full  immediately.  It must be noted that the existence  of 
"residui  passivi"  (outstanding  expenditure)  cannot,  however,  be  considered  the 
effect of deliberate action by the Treasury to achieve an elastic policy of expenditure, 
but is  chiefly bound up with the capacity of the administrative machinery to func-
tion in practice, for  of late it has  been more  and more overtaken by the growing 
volume  of the items  of expenditure  authorized in the budget. 
Methods of covering the Treasury's requirements 
26.  Among the Treasury's functions,  the one \vhich most influences  the economy's 
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liquidity  is  obviously  act1v1ty  to  seek  means  of  covering  Government  spending. 
Such funds  can  be  obtained  by  recourse  to  short-term  credit  from  the  Central 
Bank  or short  and  long-term  credit from  the banks  and  the economy. 
Recourse  to  the Central Bank  takes  the form  of: 
- Borrowing on the current account which the Treasury has  at the Banca d'Italia 
for  accounting  purposes.  Recourse  to  this  form  of  credit  is  automatic  and 
reflects  the  accumulation  of  deficits  in  the  day-to-day  management  of  the 
Treasury's accounts;  obviously  there  may  also  be  a  surplus, in which case  the 
current  account  shows  a  Treasury  claim  on  the  Bank.  By  law  such  Treasury 
borrowing  may  not exceed  a ceiling  equal to  14 %  of the amount of Govern-
ment expenditure  laid  down  in  the  original  estimates  and  subsequent  amend-
ments; 
- Purchase  by  the Central Bank  of  Treasury  bills,  multi-annual  Treasury  bonds 
and  other  government  or government-guaranteed  securities; 
- Rediscounting  of Storage  Agency  bills  (see  Ch.  II, Sec.  I, II); 
- Extraordinary  advances,  which have  not been granted since  the  1947 stabiliza-
tion  measures.  At  present  the  Banca  d'Italia  could  grant  them  only  on  the 
strength 'of a  special law adopted by  Parliament and fixing  their amount; 
- Foreign  currency  credits  from  the  UIC  to  finance  imports  on  Government 
account. 
Table 9 shows the movement of the Treasury's short-term debts for 1958-70. 
The banking system  and  the economy (households and firms),  in their turn, make 
a considerable  contribution  to,  the  financing  of  the  Treasury  through  government 
securities,  Post Office  deposits  and notes  and coin. 
The  banks  make  investments  in  government  securities  either  voluntarily  or  to 
comply  with  minimum  reserve  obligations. 
As  already  n1entioned,  the  total  cash  requirements  of  the  Treasury  (and  also  of 
the  Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti  and  the  public  corporations)  are  considered  an 
"autonomous factor" creating monetary base because they produce a corresponding 
expansion  of  this  base  where  they  are  not  covered  by  medium  and  long-term 
market borrowing. The instrumental variable taken as representative of intervention 
by  the  monetary  authorities  consists  of  securities  issued  on the market,  for  such 
issues  are the result of public debt policy,  through which it is  possible to regulate 
the  repercussions  of  the  requirements  of  the  sector  on  monetary  basis  and  thus 
to  make  of  the  budget  an  instrument  which  can  be  used,  inter  alia,  to  control 
liquidity in general. 
Long-term financing  of the  Government's  requirements  takes  the form  of offering 
long-term  securities  for  subscription  by  the  banks  and  the  economy  in  general. 
The  most widespread  of such  securities  are: 
a)  nine-year  Treasury  bonds  (BTN); 
b)  bonds issued on behalf of the Treasury and public corporations by CREDIOP 
(Green  Plan,  State  Railways,  other  government  action,  etc.); 
c)  credit certificates (i.e. securities  with a limited circulation issued by the Treas-
ury  to  :finance  specific  expenditure); 
d)  other redeemable  securities, at present composed chiefly  of the School-building 
Loan. 
Recourse to the issue of long-term loans has grown in the past few years, especially 
in connection with the need  to  finance  big public works programmes.  At the end 
of 1970 the volume of long-term government securities and bonds issued on behalf 
of the Treasury and held by banks, other financial  intermediaries and the economy 
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at large  totalled  Lit.  6,800,000  million.  Nearly  half  this  sum  was  held  by  the 
banks. At the end of 1970 there should be added to these amounts nearly 130,000 
million of Treasury bonds for free investment, of which about half were held by the 
banks. 
All the other means of covering the Government's requirements involve the creation 
of a monetary base. The main ones are: 
- recourse  to  Central  Bank  credit,  in  whatever  form.  As  has  been said  above, 
such recourse  is  limited by  law in so· far  as  concerns  indebtedness  on current 
account  for  financial  requirements  and extraordinary and temporary  advances, 
while it is  left to the discretion of the Central Bank for purchases of govern-
ment  or  government-guaranteed  securities; 
- issues of ordinary Treasury bills (see  point 41); 
- funds  collected  by  the  Post  Office,  and  managed  by  the  Cassa  Depositi  e 
Prestiti;  these  are  considered  monetary  base  because  a  Post  Office  deposit, 
created by  the Treasury  at the request of the depositor, is  always  convertible 
into  cash. 
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THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Section I - Refinancing policy 1 
Para.  I:  General 
Forms of refinancing with the Central Bank 
27.  The control of recourse  to Central Bank credit by banks  is  one of  the most 
important instruments  used  by  the Banca  d'Italia  to regulate  the  monetary  base. 
Its importance  increases  as  the  contribution  to  monetary  base  coming  from  the 
other two main channels (balance of payments and Treasury) diminishes. Financing 
available  to  the  banking  system  (for  further  details  see  this  section  under  II) 
takes  the  following  technical  forms: 
- rediscounting  of  ordinary  bills; 
- advances  against  securities,  on current  account  and  with  fixed  maturity; 
- deferred  payments  through  the bankers'  clearing-houses. 
Table  10  shows how their volumes  compared in 1958-70. 
The power of the Banca d'Italia to effect  such credit operations has  its legal basis 
in,  and is  regulated by, the various rules  setting the limits within which the Bank 
may  carry out credit and debit operations.  Over a  time  these  rules have  reflected 
the historical development of the Bank of Issue, which has  progressively given up 
every  characteristic  of  an  ordinary  bank  whilst  creating  a  specialized  mode  of 
operation more suited to the ends of monetary controL 
At present the Banca  d'Italia cannot carry  out real estate credit operations,  grant 
the  opening  of  credit  on  current  account,  purchase  securities  unless  issued  or 
guaranteed  by  the  State,  or real  estate,  except  for  use  by itself  as  offices  or for 
other purposes.  The Banking  Law  of  1936 also  took away  the right of  the Banca 
d'Italia  to  discount  bills  of  exchange  for  private  individuals,  but left it the pos-
sibility  of  granting  the  latter  advances  against  securities.  In practice,  the  Bank 
nowadays  does  hardly  any  business  with  private  persons  (Table  10). 
The great  bulk of  recipients  of  Central Bank credit is  therefore  made  up of  the 
banks  (" aziende  di credito") appearing  on  the  register  required by Article  29  of 
the Banking  Law,  to a very limited degree,  of specialized  medium- and long-term 
credit institutions. In the Italian system  there are  no  refinancing bodies  acting as 
intermediaries between the Central Bank  and the other banks. 
For normal financing needs the banks have  recourse chiefly  to advances  on current 
account  because  this form  offers  a high degree  of  elasticity,  so  that banks  can at 
any  time  reduce  their debt to the Banca  d'I  talia and hence  the cost  of financing, 
1 For  the  t:xact  meaning  of  this  term,  refer  to :Part  I,  point  71. 
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which  is  not  the  case  for  operations involving  the rediscounting of ordinary bills. 
It must also  be pointed out that the growth of the banks'  security portfolios  has 
helped  in recent  years  to  increase  the  relative  importance  of  this  type  of indeb-
tedness  towards  the  Central  Bank. 
Para.  II:  Refinancing 
Bank's power of discretion in lending and cost of lending 
28.  Unlike  other  countries,  where  recourse  to  Central  Bank  credit  is  automatic, 
and where  restrictive  or expansionary action is  taken by varying  the credit ceiling 
or rate of interest, the Italian system is  based chiefly on the power of discretion of 
the Banca d'Italia in dealing with requests for  finance.  Applications for credit are 
examined  case  by  case  in  the light  of  the  reasons  for  the  request  (in  particular 
day-to-day  cash  requirements)  and  the liquidity situation of the market and of the 
applicant  firm.  Even  the  listing of  the  securities  against  which  advances  may  be 
made  (Article  41  of  the  Charter  and  Article  29  of  the  Consolidation  Law  on 
Banks  of Issue)  does  not contradict  the principle of discretionary power,  since it 
lays  no  obligation  on  the  Bank  to  accept  them,  but only  indicates  the  limits  to 
one  of its  powers. 
The  official  discount  rate,  which  is  applied  to  all  the  Central  Bank's  financing 
operations,  remained  unchanged from  1958  to  1969 (3·5%  ).  Whilst keeping this 
rate unchanged  the  monetary  authorities,  as  explained below;  decided  in the first 
half  of  1969  to  introduce  supplementary  rates  (up  to  1·5  points)  for  discount 
operations  and  fixed-term  advances  taking  into  account,  respectively,  the  volume 
and  the  frequency  of requests  for  refinancing.  The basic  rate  was  raised  to  4 % 
from  14 August  1969  and to 5·5% from  9 March 1970, the supplementary rates 
referred  to  above  remaining  unchanged.  During  the  early  months  of  1971  the 
basic  rate  was  reduced  to 5 %, with effect  from  11  January  for  advances  (both 
on current account and at fixed  maturity) and from 5 April for ordinary rediscount 
operations.  The  1969  increases  in the basic  rates  were maintained. 
Ordinary rediscounting 
29 a.  Rediscounting may  be applied  to bills of exchange, domestic cheques, Treas-
ury bills,  coupons  of government  and  government-guaranteed  securities,  and  war-
rants.  Bills  presented for  rediscount  must bear at least  two  signatures  of persons 
known  to  be  solvent  (including  the  signature  of  the  bank presenting  them)  and 
may  not have  more  than  four  months  to  run. 
As  for  the rate  applied  to these  operations' from  July  1969  a  supplement of  1·5 
points  to  the  official  rate was  introduced in respect  of those banks  for  which,  in 
the  preceding  calendar  half-year,  these  operations  represented  an  average  volume 
of liquidity exceeding 1/20 of the statutory minimum reserve in the middle of that 
half-year.  The  decision  as  to  which  banks  shall  be  subject  to  the  supplement  is 
made at the beginning of each half-year in accordance with the criteria mentioned. 
At  the  end  of  1970,  bills  rediscounted  with  the  Central  Bank  amounted  to 
Lit.  59,000 million,  nearly  all  of which had been presented by banks (Table  10). 
Preferential rediscounting 
29 b.  The power of discretion which the Banca d'Italia reserves  to  it~elf in grant-
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ing  rediscount  takes  the  place  of the various  forms  of  preferential rediscount  to 
be found  in countries  where  the Central Bank is  automatically  obliged  to  allow 
credit on the  terms  it has  fixed.  The sole  cases  of preferential  treatment consist 
of  the  rediscounting  of  Storage  Agency  bills  and  current  agricultural  bills,  for 
which,  however,  the  rate  is  3·5 o/o. 
The  Storage  Agency  bills  are  bills  issued  to  finance  the  stocking  of  agricultural 
products  decided  on by  the  Government,  but  which  ceased  with  the  1963/64 
agricultural year.  The bills, which  exclusively  represent losses  incurred in storage 
management  for  which  the  State  is  financially  responsible,  can  be  rediscounted 
automatically  and. are  classed  as  credits  granted  to  the  Treasury  rather  than  to 
the  banks. 
The  requirement  that  rediscounted bills  should  bear  two  sign~tures and  the  fact 
that one of them may  be that of the firm  financed  means  that there is  no formal 
difference  between  commercial  and  financial  paper. 
Ordinary advances against securities 
30 a.  Advances  against  securities,  which at the end of 1970 totalled Lit.  841,000 
million,  fall into two categories:  ordinary and fixed-term. 
The former  may  be used  on current  account  and are granted for  a  maximum  of 
four  months  but are  renewable;  credit  opened  may  be  increased  at any  time  if 
the Bank allows additional securities to be deposited. Withdrawals and repayments 
are  recorded  in  a  single  debit  account,  for  the  technique  of  making  the  entire 
amount of the credit opened available in a current account is not used. The interest 
rate  applied  is  equal  to  the  official  discount  rate  without  any  supplement.  The 
only exception was the period between 11  January and 5 April1971, during which 
the rate of interest on advances was one half-point below Bank rate (see point 28 ). 
Fixed-tenn 
30 b.  Fixed-term  advances,  which  were  introduced  in July  1967  to cater  better 
for  the short-term financial  requirements of banks, must be used in one operation 
and  redeemed  according  to an established schedule  (7,  15  and 22  days).  In May 
1969 a  system of progressively increasing rates was introduced for banks that use 
this form of financing  more  than once in a period of six  months. The supplement 
is half a point for the second operation, one point for the third, and one-and-a-half 
for the fourth  and following  operations. At the end of 1970  the banks'  debt for 
these  advances  amounted to Lit.  87,000 million. 
The securities accepted by the Banca d'I  talia to guarantee both ordinary and fixed-
term  advances  are: 
1)  public debt certificates and Treasury bills; 
2)  government-guaranteed  securities  or  those  bearing  government-guaranteed 
interest; 
3 )  Land  bonds  (  cartelle  fondiarie)  issued  by  real  estate  credit  institutions  and 
securities  having  the  same  legal  status. 
Although  permitted by  the Charter of the  Banca  d'Italia, other  kinds  of pledge, 
such as  gold currency, warehouse receipts and silk, have now fallen into disuse. 
Securities  deposited  as  a  guarantee  are  valued  at  current  stock  exchange  prices, 
less a margin of 15 %  for ordinary Treasury bills and multi-annual Treasury bonds 
and  20 %  for  all  other  securities. 
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As  was  pointed out with reference  to the  Bank's power of discretion  in granting 
-credit,  advances  are  made  on  the  basis  of  considerations  concerning  the  general 
liquidity  conditions  of  the  market  and,  at  microeconomic  level,  in  the  light  of 
assessment of the reason for the request, which must be connected with a tempor-
ary financial imbalance and not with a financial  requirement of structural nature. 
Deferred payments 
31.  Deferred  payment  operations,  another  form  of  refinancing  available  in Italy, 
are connected wi:th  the management by  the Banca d'Italia of the bankers' clearing-
house;  they  are  used  for  the  temporary  end-of-day  balancing  of accounts  against 
the  deposit  of  securities  approved  for advances,  for  a  maximum  period  of  four 
days,  at  the official  discount  rate. 
Para.  III:  Effectiveness of refinancing  policy  and  of action  through interest rates 
Discount rate and market rates 
32.  The  effectiveness  of  adjustment  of  the  official  discount  rate  depends  on  the 
links between it and market  rates.  It is  left to the banks  to decide  freely  on the 
latter;  in the past they did this  through an  "interbank agreement",  freely  entered 
upon by them without the intervention of the Central Bank, by which they under-
took  to  observe  maximum  rates  of interest  on  deposits  and  minimum  rates  to 
borrowers.  Until  the July  1969  measures,  the minimum  rates  were  arrived at by 
adding a fixed supplement to the official discount rate. This established an automatic 
link between the rates  applied by the banks and .that of the Central Bank.  When, 
in July  1969, there ceased to be a single rate applicable  to refinancing operations, 
the  interbank  agreement  was  amended  so  as  to  abolish  the  application  of fixed 
supplements.  The  minimum  rate  of  interest  charged  to  borrowers  was  decided 
without direct  reference  to  the  official  rate. 
It must  be  pointed out that the existence  of administrative rules  governing  rates 
has  not prevented competition in the  banking  sector  and  savings  and  investment 
conditions  from  determining  the  level  of interest  rates  realistically  in  relation  to 
supply  and  demand  rather  than  to  the  provisions  of  the  interbank  agreement, 
which  in  some  cases  have  consequently  been  disregarded. 
As  regards  rates  of interest on deposits  no  agreement had been reached  between 
the banks  by  the beginning of 1970. It was  only  at the end of July that a group 
of  13  large  banks  undertook  not  to  exceed  certain  limits  in  the  rates  on  new 
savings  deposits  (  6 %) and  current  accounts  (7 %) of annual  aver~ge amount  of 
Lit.  250  million  or  more.  Twelve  other large  banks  subsequently  joined  in  this 
agreement.  Talks  between  the Banking  Association  and  the  other banks  have  led 
to  a  more  formal  agreement  accepted  by  more  than- 300  establishments  which 
collect  nearly  9  5 %  of  all  deposits.  The  new agreement  provides  for  rates  to  be 
graduated  in accordance  with  the  average  amount  of  the  deposits. 
The rates fixed have been revised downwards on several occasions. At present they 
vary between a minimum of 4 % for savings deposits of more than Lit. 20 million 
but  less  than  50  million  and  a  maximum  of  5·5%  for  deposits  on  current 
account of Lit.  250 million or over. 
As  regards  rates  to  borrowers,  14  large  banks  have  agreed  to  reduce  these  by 
one-half  per cent. 
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Adjustment of official rate 
3  3.  For the  same  reasons  as  we have  just recounted,  adjustment  of the discount 
rate has not been used in Italy as  an instrument of monetary policy for many years. 
Instead of acting on the price of lending to banks, the Banca d 'I  talia has made use 
of  its power  to  vary  the  quantity.  The  two  policies  have  substantially  the same 
effect on the economic system, for if used with a restrictive aim,  that is by increas-
ing the rate or reducing  the volume, both cause market interest rates to rise.  The 
amount of lending  necessary  to produce a  certain level of market interest rates is 
not, however, equal in the two cases.  It seems  evident that lending must be more 
severely  restricted  when  the  discount  rate  is  left  unchanged.  Adjustment  of  the 
discount rate also has a general psychological effect which variations in the quantity 
of supply do not have. 
The recent  abandonment  of  the  policy  of  a  stable  discount  rate was  not accom-
panied,  of  course,  by  renunciation  of use  of  the  other  instruments  of  monetary 
policy,  in particular power of discretion in lending. 
The increases in discount rate made in 1969 and early 1970 had various purposes. 
First of  all  they  represented  an  adjustment  of  discount  rate,  and  of  the  interest 
rates most closely connected with it, to a structure of rates which, in the preceding 
two years,  had changed considerably, both in Italy,  through the use of  the power 
of discretion  as  an instrument of monetary  policy,  and  abroad. 
Secondly, .  through their effected on demand, these increases backed up the restric-
tive  policy  pursued  by  the  Central  Bank,  which  otherwise  would  have  had  to· 
implement it wholly by using its power of discretion. The existence, at the current 
discount rate,  of a greater demand for  credit by the banks than the quantity that 
the Central Bank is  disposed to grant them is  a necessary  precondition for the use 
of  the  power of  discretion  instrument.  For  any  given  quantity  of  credits  offered 
by the Central Bank, however, the excess of demand incre~ses as  the banks' interest 
rates  to borrowers  go  up and  decreases  as  discount  rate is  raised. 
Lastly,  in  as  much  as  they  made  money  dearer  on  the  market,  increases  in  the 
discount  rate have helped to close  the gap which had become  established between 
interest  rates  abroad  and  those  current  in Italy,  thus  reducing  the incentive  for 
capital  to  flow  out of  the country.  Progress  in  the direction of external  currency 
convertibility  and  liberalization  of  capital  movements  have  made  it  necessary  to 
take  stronger  action  to  coordinate  conditions  on  the  domestic  and  international 
markets.  This means  that intervention by the monetary authorities must be wider-
ranging  and  more  flexible~ 
Section II - Control of bank liquidity 
As  pointed  out  earlier  control  of  bank  liquidity,  and  hence  of  the  possible  ex-
pansion of the banks' credits and the liquidity of the economy, is  achieved princip-
ally  by regulating the flow· of monetary base. This flow  is  influenced by the whole 
battery of measures that can be taken by the monetary authorities:  action to imple-
ment  public  debt  policy,  open-market  operations,  regulation  of  lending  of  last 
resort, control of foreign  positions.  Bank liquidity is  affected  more directly by the 
level and composition of the minimum reserves that banks are obliged to constitute 
as  their deposits increase. 
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Para.  I:  Compulsory  reserve  policy 
Para.  I-1:  Organization  of  the  system 
The first  regulations  in this field  were introduced in 1926 to protect the interests 
of  depositors.  The  banks  were  obliged,  when  customers'  deposits  rose  to  over 
twently times  the  amount of their own capital and reserves,  to place  a sum equal 
to the excess on interest-bearing deposit with the Central Bank. Alternatively, they 
could  invest  this  sum  wholly  or partly in fixed-interest  government  securities  to 
be  deposited  with the Central Bank. 
In 194  7  the  rules  were  thoroughly  overhauled.  From  then on  the  reserve  came 
to be one of the Central Bank's monetary  policy instruments.  In September  1958 
the savings banks (casse di risparmio) and first class  pledge banks (manti di credito 
su pegno di 1  a  categoria) were also subjected to special rules. 
Recent developments concerning the reserve rules have been a change in the upper 
limit  of  the  reserve,  which  in  fact  has  been  altered  once  only - from  25  to 
22·5 %, in January 1962-and permission  to deposit certain  types  of long-term 
securities  to  comply  with  the  statutory  obligation.  In a  situation  in which  such 
securities  were abundant in the  banks' portfolios this measure  was  the equivalent 
of  a  real  reduction  in  the  coefficient  and  had  the  expansionary  effects  which 
customarily  accompany  such  a  reduction. 
Legal basis 
34.  The compulsory reserve  system has its legal basis in the Banking Law (Article 
32 f),  which  obliges  banks  to  follow  instructions  relating  to  the  "ratio  of  net 
assets  to liabilities  and  to the possible  ways  of investing the deposits  collected in 
excess  of the  amount  determined  by  that 'ratio". These  instructions  are  given  by 
the  Banca  d'Italia  in  accordance  with  the  deliberations  of  the  Interministerial 
Credit and Savings Committee. All the banks described in Chapter I  are subject to 
the reserve  obligation. 
System of Calculation 
3  5.  The deposits  subject  to  reserve  are  calculated  by ·subtracting  from  the sight, 
time and savings  deposits of non-banking customers  and special credit institutions, 
and from  foreign-held  lira accounts,  any  funds  not available  for financial  purpose 
and  deposits  securing  the  issue  of  bank  cheques  with  guaranteed  cover.1  The 
banks'  capital  and  reserves  are  also  taken  into  account;  these  consist  of paid-up 
share  or  endowment  capital,  ordinary  reserves  and  reserves  not  earmarked  for 
specific  purposes. 
The amount of the  compulsory  minimum  reserve is  calculated differently,  for  the 
banks  proper, the  savings  banks and  first  class  pledge establishments respectively. 
Any necessary  adjustment to the reserve must be made in the course of the month 
following  the  reference  month. 
For the banks proper the present system  of calculation is  as  follows: 
- No  reserve  obligation  so  long  as  the ratio of deposits  to capital  and  reserves 
does  not exceed  10: 9; 
- 10% of deposits until the amount thus calculated equals 40% of the amount 
by which  deposits  exceed  ten times  capital and reserves; 
1 These  are  cheques  with  cover  guaranteed  up  to  a  certain  amount  by a  deposit  in a  special  account. 
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- 40%  of  deposits  exceeding  ten  times  capital  and  reserves  until  the  amount 
resulting  from  this  calculation  reaches  22·5 %  of  deposits; 
- 22·5%  of  deposits,  this  being  the  ceiling. 
At the end of 1970  the  reserve  stood at an  average  of 22·2%  of bank deposits. 
Savings  banks  and  first-class  pledge  establishments  must  set  aside  for  the  com-
pulsory reserve 20 %  of  the monthly increase in deposits  subject to reserve  rules, 
calculated as  for other banks.  Initially 1 it was laid down that the reserve could be 
deposited with the central credit institute of the savings banks "ICCRI" (Istituto 
di  Credito  delle  Casse  di Risparmio ),  but the latter was  obliged  to deposit 50 % 
of  it with  the  Banca  d'Italia;  the  remainder  could  be  freely  invested  by  ICCRI 
in  long-term  securities. 
For the rural and craft banks (  casse rurali e artigiane) the current rules involve the 
obligation to invest in government or government-guaranteed securities, land-bonds 
(  cartelle  fondiarie)  and  securities  having  the  same  legal  status,  to  be  deposited 
with  the  Banca  d'Italia  or  authorized  credit  institutions,  10  or  20 %  of  their 
deposits  according  to  whether  the  bank  is  a  cooperative  society  with limited  or 
unlimited  liability. 
Composition 
36.  The  rules  on  the  compos1t1on  of  reserves  are  not  the  same  for  the  savings 
banks  as  for  the others. 
In  1962  it was  laid  down  that for  banks  other  than  savings  banks  compulsory 
reserves  would  consist  of  cash  for  at least  10 %  of  the  excess  of  deposits  over 
capital  and  reserves  and  that  the  Treasury  bills  used  for  the  remainder  would 
be frozen at the time of issue and be released only on maturity, whereas previously 
the  split  between cash  and  Treasury  bills  had been  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
banks.  In October  1965, September  1967  and  early  1968  the banks were  succes-
sively authorized- though the minimum cash reserve was still required to place in 
the reserve  an increasingly wider range of longer-term  securities {land bonds - car-
telle  fondiarie,  securities  issued  by institutions  authorized  to  provide  agricultural 
improvement credit,  School-building  Loan bonds, bonds issued by  CREDIOP, the 
credit  consortium  for  public  works,  on  behalf  of  the  Treasury),  either  to  offset 
the increase in savings  deposits  or to replace long-term  securities deposited before 
1953  and  still in  the  reserve.  These  changes  were  made  in order to support the 
prices  of  certain  securities  and,  consequently,  the  sectors  of  economic  activity 
financed  by  them. 
In order to ensure an additional flow  of funds for building activity it was decided, 
in  January  1970,  that long-term  securities  to  be  used  as  a  reserve  to  offset  an 
increase in savings deposits must consist solely of cartelle fondiarie and agricultural 
improvement bonds;  the obligation  stands  that the cash  deposit  must in any  case 
be not less  than 10% of the difference between deposits  and capital and reserves. 
By  a  CICR  decision  of  16  September  1970  the  Banca  d'Italia was  given  power 
to  authorize  banks  also  to  invest  a  part  of  their  reserves  in  government  and 
government-guaranteed securities and in bonds of certain special credit institutions 
(Istituti  di  credito  mobiliare). 
Following  these  changes  the  share  of  the  banks'  reserves  made  up  of  long-term 
securities  increased  notably (from Lit.  49,000  million  at the end of  1965  to Lit. 
1 For  present  arrangements  see  below. 
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1,246,000  million  at  the  end  of  1970,  out  of  a  total  reserve  of  Lit.  6,425,000 
million)  (Table  11 ). 
Uu  to  September  1964  the  savings  banks'  reserves  which  ICCRI  was  required 
to pay into the Banca  d'Italia, had to be made up of cash  or Treasury bills;  from 
that date  ICCRI  was  authorized  to  hold  the  share  to  be paid into  the  bank  of 
issue,  and even to withdraw wholly  or in part the amount already deposited with 
it for  the purpose of investing these assets,  with the maturities and in the manner 
established case by case by the Banca d'Italia, in other government or government-
guaranteed  securities  and in land and  agricultural bonds.  The possibility of using 
such  bonds for  the  reserve  up to the proportion  due in the light  of the increase 
in savings  deposits was  made  automatic - in line with the decision  taken for  the 
banks  (other  than  savings  banks) - from  October  1965.  The  successive  instruc-
tions  regarding the share of reserves  that may be invested in School-building Loan 
bonds  and  CREDIOP  bond  issues  on  behalf  of  the  Treasury  also  apply  to  the 
savings  banks. 
In January 1970 new rules were issued on the use of the share of the reserves that 
ICCRI had originally been obliged to pay into the Banca d'Italia. Half of this share 
must  now  be  invested  in  governtnent  or government-guaranteed  securities  or  in 
bonds issued by the  special  credit institutions;  the other half must go  exclusively 
into land  and  agricultural bonds,  according  to set proportions. 
The result was  that, as  the obligation to hold a minimum percentage in cash does 
not  apply  to  the  savings  banks,  their  reserves,  which  at  the  end  of  1963  were 
entirely invested in Treasury bills (Lit. 222,000 million), were at the end of 1970 
almost  completely  composed  of  long-term  securities  (Lit.  825,000  million  out of 
Lit. 860,000 million) (Table 11 ). 
Reserve Obligation: remuneration and procedure 
37.  Since  October 1970 the balance  deposited as  a  reserve with the Treasury has 
borne  interest  at  5·5 %, equal  to  that  paid  in advance  on Treasury  bills  which 
have been deposited for this  purpose. The Banca d'Italia has  the power to invest, 
wholly or in part and generally in Treasury bills, the share of the reserves  in cash 
deposited  with it;  interest  on  Treasury  bills  thus  purchased  is  returned  by  the 
Bank to the Treasury. The bank's returns from reserves have increased appreciably 
of late  as  the  share invested in long-term  securities  has  grown. 
An  assessment  of  the  reserve  is  made  monthly  by  the  banks  on  special  forms, 
which  are  sent  to  the  Banca  d'I  talia.  The  latter  verifies  that  these  have  been 
completed  correctly  and  may  also  carry  out checks  in  the form  of inspections  at 
the banks. In the case of non-compliance  the establishment is  asked to put matters 
right  as  soon  as  possible,  otherwise  the  penalties  specified  by  the  Banking  Law 
(Articles  57  and  58)  are  applied.  These  consist  of fines,  except  in serious  cases, 
when  the  dissolution  of the  banks'  administrative  bodies  and  introduction of the 
"extraordinary  administration  procedure"  are  required.  It  must  be  noted  that 
such  penalties  are  applied  generally  in cases  of  non-compliance  with statutory or 
Banca  d'Italia  rules. 
Para.  I-2:  Functioning  of the  system 
Reserve as an instrument of monetary policy 
38.  The  fact  that only  once  since  the war has  there been  a  change  of coefficient 
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does  not mean that reserve control has been neglected as  an instrument for inter· 
vention by the monetary authorities. This instrument has been used rather for the 
specific  support of certain sectors of the capital market and economic activity than 
for  the  purpose of  a generalized  quantitative control. 
Para.  II:  Other  bank  ratios 
Cover for bank drafts 
39.  Banks are bound, in order to counterbalance the issue of bank drafts (" assegni 
circolari")/ to form  a  reserve  equal to 40 %  of these drafts in circulation at the 
end of the preceding month. If the value of the bank drafts in circulation exceeds 
that  of  the  capital  and  statutory  reserves  standing  in  the  balance  sheet  of  the 
preceding financial year, the surplus must be 100 %  covered. 
The  deposit  may  be made in cash,  in Treasury bills  for  free  investment, in other 
government securities  or in land bonds and securities of equal status. 
Section III ·  Control  of the money market and links 
with foreign  money markets 
Para.  I:  Open-market  policy 
Para.  I-1:  The  money  market 
Structural characteristics 
40.  The  Italian  system  lacks  a  money  market  in  which  private  operators  and 
financial  institutions  can  ensure  a  speedy  distribution  of  liquid  funds  between 
surplus  and  deficit  sectors  by  means  of  an  intricate  network of short-term  oper-
ations.  This  task  is  left  to  the  credit  establishments,  which  carry  it out  mainly 
through  interbank  accounts.  In  part  the  lack  of  direct  involvement  of  private 
operators  in very  short-term deals  is  linked with the fact that the  Italian system 
provides  interest  even  on  current  account  deposits  with  the  banks,  for  which 
reason  operators'  cash  surpluses  tend  to  flow  to  the  banking  system.  Another 
factor  to be borne in mind is  thepolicy of stabilizing long-term interest rates that 
has  been  pursued  by  the  monetary  authorities  in  recent  years;  this  offers  the 
public financial  instruments  essentially  on  a  par with deposits  but with a  higher 
level of return and thus reduces the demand for other shorter-term finanCial  assets. 
Such  is  the  case  of  the Treasury bill,  a  security  which in the past was  offered  at 
the official  rate and in unlimited quantities  according to demand and thus did not 
possess the features required to become an efficient monetary market instrument. 
In recent  years  the  monetary  authorities  have  made  various  attemps  to  create  a 
short-term  market  as  described  above,  since  it is  particularly  important  for  the 
pursuit  of  a  monetary  policy  to  dispose  of  an  indicator  of  the  market  liquidity 
situation, such  as  a short-term interest rate, which reacts promptly to the variable 
conditions  of  liquidity.  Consequently,  various  steps  have  been  taken  to  improve 
1 See  footnote  point 17. 
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money  market instruments in Italy (Treasury  bills  and interbank accounts)  which 
for  various  reasons  are  unsuitable  for  this  function. 
Reform measures 
41.  In 1962  the system  of issuing  Treasury  bills  was  reformed.  Up  to that time 
they  had been issued on tap  at  a  fixed  rate  for  different maturities, without any 
distinction between bills  to be placed in the compulsory reserve and others. Since 
November  1962,  bills  have  been  issued  for  a  standard  period  of  one  year,  by 
monthly tender. A clear distinction was  also  established between Treasury bills  to 
be placed in the reserve and those for free investment. Applications for the former 
type of bill had to be allotted in full at the rate of 3·5%.1 Bills for free investment 
were offered up to a predetermined amount at the lowest price offered. But while 
the  competitors  in  the  tender  which  offered  a  lower  price  received  a  pro  rata 
allotment,  those  who  offered  a higher  price  received  a full  allotment. Bills  issued 
for  reserves  could  not be  mobilized  before  maturity. 
The thinking behind  this  reform  was  to limit  the issue  of bills  to  the Treasury's 
cash  requirements,  to remove  an institutional cause  of rigid  short-term rates  and, 
lastly,  to  prevent  the  banks  from  being  able  to  change  the  composition  of  the 
minimum  reserve  by switching from  cash  to  Treasury bills  and vice  versa. 
Alongside this  reform, ceilings were placed on interest rates for interbank deposits 
in order  to  limit  the  advantage  for  the  smaller  banks  of  transferring  their own 
assets  to  the  larger  ones,  and  hence  to encourage  the direct  investment  of such 
assets. 
These  measures,  however,  did not have  the desired effects.  The rate on ordinary 
Treasury bills remained unchanged for a long time because  the undertaking by the 
Banca  d'Italia  to  negotiate  these  securities  without price  changes  encouraged  the 
banks to deal in them independently of any consideration of the liquidity situation. 
Furthermore, it proved difficult  to verify  and supervise observance of the rules  on 
interbank  accounts. 
In April  1969  two further  measures  were  taken. 
In the first place,  the procedure for the issue of Treasury bills was  again modified. 
In particular,  the  Treasury  now determines  the  amount  of bills  to  be  issued  in 
relation  to its  own  requirements.  This  amount is  broken down as  follows: 
- bills  to be placed  to reserves, on which the interest rate is fixed  at a constant 
level  of 3·75%  per annum 2  (raised  to 50% in October  1970)i 
- bills for free  investment, on which  the rates is  fixed  case by case by the same 
Ministerial  Decree  authorizing  the  issue. 
Bills  for  reserve  are  allocated  at  the  basic  rate  but  are  allotted  pro  rata  if  the 
requests  from  the  banks  exceed  the  amount  of  the current issue.  Free  Treasury 
bills  are  offered  under  the  system  already  in  force.  The  undistributed  part  is 
allocated  to  the  Banca  d'Italia,  at  the  basic  rate,  up  to  the  amount  it has  re-
quested. 
Secondly,  the  Banca  d'Italia  ceases  to  negotiate  unlimited  quantities  of  bills 
without  anly  change  of  price  and  reserves  the  right  of  discretion  in  this  con· 
nection. 
1  A  supplement  of  0.25%  is  applied  in  order  to  align  the  yield  on  tordinary  Treasury  bills  with  that  on  cash 
deposited  in the compulsory  reserve  at the rate referred  to above.  · 
2  Rate  paid  in  advance. 
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These  measures  promote  the formation  of quotations  and yields  corresponding  to 
the  market  liquidity  situation.  Since,  furthermore,  dealings  with  the  Bank  take 
place  at its discretion and at variable prices, ordinary Treasury bills  can no longer 
be  considered  monetary  base  instruments. 
The removal  of  the  link  between the  official  discount  rate  and  the basic  rate of 
Treasury  bills  offered  for  free  investment,  for  example,  confers  greater  freedom 
of  action  upon  the  Central  Bank  in  managing  discount  rate.  The  rates  for  inter-
bank accounts ceased to be regulated at the beginning of  1970. (See Table 13  for 
the  main rates  on the  money  and  capital markets.) 
Para.  I-2:  Open-market  intervention 
Features and functions of open-market operations 
42.  The particular nature and shortcomings of the money  market in Italy,  on the 
one  hand,  and  the policy  pursued by  the Government and the Treasury in :fixing 
the volume  and  methods  of financing  public  spending,  on the  other, have  deter-
mined  the  features  of  open-market  intervention  by  the  Banca  d'Italia  in  recent 
years  (Table  12). 
In recent  years  recourse  to  the  issue  of  long-term  loans  has  gained  considerable 
importance, especially in relation to the financing  requirements of big public works 
programmes. Long-term indebtedness has more  than doubled in the past five  years 
and exceeded Lit.  10,600,000 million at the end of  1970. 
The  scale  of  the  public  sector's  indebtedness  has  aggravated  the  problem  of 
choosing  the  most  suitable  times  for  issues,  thus  calling  for  greater coordination 
between Treasury  and  Central  Bank. 
On occasion the Central Bank has itself absorbed large slices of new issues, pending 
a more suitable moment to offer  them to the market.  In other cases  the Treasury 
has brought forward the dates of issues in order to absorb part of market liquidity, 
or,  in order  to increase  liquidity,  has  redeemed  securities  that have  reached  ma-
turity  rather than  renew  them.  In January  1963, for  example,  the Treasury con-
sidered  it advisable  not  to renew  Lit.  190,000  million  of multi-year  bonds  that 
had reached maturity,  while in late 1968,  as  in the preceding  year,  a large  issue 
of  securities  for  the  School-building  Loan  (Lit.  250,000  million)  was  temporarily 
absorbed by  the Banca  d'Italia with the  intention of  gradually  offering  it to the 
market. 
Central  Bank intervention  on  the  fixed-interest  market,  which  has  become  more 
frequent in recent years, forms part of an open-market and price support policy. 
Price  support  measures  are  aimed  at  reducing  short-term  fluctuations  in prices  in 
order to attract a large  share  of funds  into the capital market,  provided  that the 
other variables  are  not working in the opposite  direction. 
The  policy  of intervention  on  the  long-term  securities  market  is  pursued by  the 
Central  Bank  by  participating  in issuing  syndicates,  making  firm  bids  for  public 
loans  or portions  thereof  and  subsequently  selling  them  to  banks  or other inve-
stors,  and  also  through  open-market  transactions  in  the  strict  sense,  that is  pur-
chases  and sales  on  the  market  made  through  stockbrokers  and  banks. 
In  selecting  the  technical  form  of  intervention  the  Bank  takes  account  of  the 
situation of the money and capital markets and the need to create monetary base: 
in this  way  the prices which  should be supported and the amount of intervention 
are decided in advance case  by case. 
Since  May  1969 it has  also  been possible to undertake open-market  operations in 
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money  market  securities  (ordinary  Treasury  bills),  because,  as  has  already  been 
pointed out, the new rules  relating to these securities have deprived them of their 
character  as  monetary base.  Consequently, purchases  or sales  of  Treasury bills  on 
the  market do  not merely,  as  in the  past,  involve  changes  in the composition of 
monetary  base  (cash  and Treasury  bills)  but also  influence  its  volume. 
Regarding  the  latest  trend  of  the  Central  Bank's  dealing  in  securities,  it should 
be  pointed out  that  in the  summer  of  1969  the  growing  strains  on the  capital 
market  and  accelerating  outflow  of capital  pursuaded  the monetary  authorities  to 
encourage  a  general  raising  of  interest  rates  to  the  levels  prevailing  on  foreign 
markets.  The  adjustment  of  prices  and  rates,  though  gradual,  reduced  the  pro-
pensity of the public -long accustomed  to price  stability - to  subscribe directly 
to  security  issues.  Even  the  banks,  faced  with  reduced  liquidity,  limited  their 
purchases.  Consequently,  the Banca  d'Italia had to absorb into its own portfolio, 
with  a  corresponding  creation  of  monetary  base,  a  very  large  volume  of public 
securities.  A  judicious  mix  of other intervention measures  and,  in particular,  the 
considerable elimination of liquidity resulting from  the balance of payments, have, 
however,  made  it possible  to  contain  the  expansion  of monetary base  within the 
desired  limits. 
Total monetary  base  created in  1970 was  around Lit.  1,250,000 million (a figure 
fairly  close  to that observed  in 1968).  In  1970 the  volume  of securities  sold on 
the  market by the Banca d'I  talia  was  roughly equal to that of the preceding year 
(Lit.  300,000  million).  By  contrast,  the volume  of purchases was  well down (Lit. 
130,000 million, as  against Lit. 600,000 million in 1969), so  that, in the aggregate, 
open-market  operations  made  a  modest  contribution  to  reducing  the  liquidity  of 
the  economy. 
Para.  II:  Action aimed  at  international  flows  of short-term  capital 
After the declaration  of lira convertibility in December  1958, the rules governing 
the  Italian banks'  foreign  assets  effectively  became  an  instrument  for  controlling 
bank  liquidity. 
Extensions of the banks' operations on foreign money markets 
4  3.  In view of the considerable payments surpluses in the late fifties,  the monetary 
authorities encouraged firms  to have recourse to foreign currency for their financing, 
using for this purpose the foreign assets accumulated by the UIC (Italian Exchange 
Office).  The  banks  were  authorized,  in November  1959,  to  hold  liquid  assets  in 
foreign  currency  (by  purchasing  dollars  against  lire from  the UIC).  The  purchase 
of  spot  dollars  and  their  simultaneous  forward  selling,  with  the  possibility  of 
renewal at maturity, were as  a rule effected at the same exchange rate. The ceiling 
for  these  operations,  originally fixed  at  $  150  million,  was  gradually  raised  until 
it reached a maximum of $  2,148  million in January  1969. 
The measures  described here enabled the credit establishments to carry out lending 
and  borrowing  transactions  in  foreign  currency  with  both  residents  and  non-
residents.  In this  way,  they  began  to work in dollars  as  well  as  in lire,  and this 
helped to extend the sphere of their foreign operations and supply the internationai 
El,lrodollar  market  with funds. 
Measures to regulate the banks' foreign currency position 
44.  In August  1960, in  view  of  the  large  payments  surpluses  and  the  growing 
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strains  in  international  liquidity,  it was  decided  that by  the  end of  the year-
deadline  which  was  then  extended  for  a  month - the  Italian  banks  should  eli-
minate  their  short  foreign  currency  portions  abroad  by  drawing  on  the  UIC's 
reserves  by  means  of  swaps. 
In  1961  the  monetary  authorities,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  growing  need  of  the 
credit  establishments  for  liquidity  due  to  the  rapid  growth  of  production,  made 
dollar deposits  with the  major banks from  the UIC's reserves. 
This  form  of  supplying  bank  liquidity  was  shortlived,  however,  and  instead  the 
banks  were  again  allowed - from  October  1962  onwards - to be in a  position 
of  net  indebtedness  with  abroad.  This  measure,  which  was  preceded  by  an  ap· 
preciable  reduction  (from  $  302  to  118  million)  of UIC deposits  in foreign  cur-
rency  with  the  banks,  was  reflected  in  both increased  foreign  currency  financing 
at  home  and  greater  bank  liquidity  in  lire  because  of  the  cancellation  of  dollar 
swaps  with the UIC.  Between November  1962 and August  1963  net indebtedness 
abroad  grew  by  $  1,082  million,  to  which  must  be  added  an  increase  in  lira 
liabilities  equal  to  $  136 million,  while  the total balance of payments deficit  was 
equal to $  918  million.  The collection  of funds  which caused  the increase in the 
Italian banks' net liabilities in foreign currency was concentrated almost exclusively 
on  the  Eurodollar  market. 
The progressive expansion of bank borrowings abroad was  interrupted in Septem-
ber  1963, when a growing  inflationary pressure  built up within the country. The 
banks  were  asked  not  to increase,  and if possible  to reduce,  their debit position 
abroad as  it stood at the end of the preceding month. 
In  the  course  of  1964  these  measures  were  rendered  more  incisive  by  formal 
instructions given to the banks:  in January it was laid down that the debit position 
in  foreign  currency  and  lire  vis-a-vis  abroad  could  not  exceed  the  lowest  level 
between the end of November and the end of December 1963; in July instructions 
were  given  that net indebtedness  should be  kept below  the  lower  level  of  those 
recorded on 15  and  30  June  1964.  Between September  1963  and June  1964 the 
banks'  net foreign  liabilities were reduced by $  434  million. 
The  subsequent  favourable  payments  trend  gradually  enabled  the  banks'  foreign 
currency  positions  to become  flat  and later  to be long  (October  1965). 
In January 1966 sales  of dollars  at a ·guaranteed rate of exchange were limited to 
banks  still having net external liabilities in foreign  currency, and with the proviso 
that  the  dollars  thus  obtained  were  used  to  bring  their  external  positions  into 
balance. The aim was to prevent interest rates rising at home as  they were abroad. 
Banks  in surplus were left free  to do dollar swaps in the market within the limits 
fixed  for  each  bank,  but had themselves  to bear the cost  of the  premium on the 
forward  lira.  However,  dollars  could  be  sold  to  the  UIC  on  the  payment  of  a 
premium varying in relation either to the difference between interest rates at home 
and abroad or to  the liquidity policy  pursued by  the Italian authorities. 
These rules remained in force until March 1969 and were reflected in flows  of bank 
capital which depended on external factors,  it is  true, but were controlled by the 
monetary authorities;  the possibility cannot be excluded, however, that these flows 
may  have  been in line  with the choices  that  the  banks  would have  made  spon-
taneously.  The monetary  authorities  thus  allowed  the banks' external positions  to 
evolve without any  decisive changes occurring in the premium on the forward lira. 
At the beginning of 1969, with overall external deficits  caused by  the outflow of 
private capital, the monetary authorities required increasing premiums (up to 5 %) 
for forward dealings  with the UIC in lire against dollars, and called on  the banks 
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to reduce  their net asset  position in foreign currency and lire until a balance was 
achieved,  the  deadline  being  June  1969  except  for  special  cases. 
Consequently, current contract between the UIC and the credit establishments for 
the allocation of dollars  against lire at a guaranteed rate of exchange gradually fell 
from a peak of $ 2,148 million in January  1969 to $ 1,503 million at the end of 
1970; at the same time the banks' net external credit position went down to $ 36 
million,  the  reduction  being  $  687  million  in the  year,  equal  to  just under half 
the  deficit  on  the  balance  of  payments.  In 1970  the  banks'  net  external  assets 
continued to contract and were  down to $  17  million at year's end. However, in 
March  of the  same  year,  the credit  establishments  were  authorized  to maintain a 
net debit position  abroad of an amount not in excess  of the increase, in relation 
to the position at the end of February, of export credits in foreign currency granted 
to residents. 
This  instrument for  controlling liquidity has  facilitated  the  pursuit of other, con-
nected objectives  in the course  of  the last  few  years.  In particular, it has  helped 
to  facilitate  the  financing  of international  trade  and  to  regulate  the  cyclical  fluc-
tuations  in domestic  interest rates,  alternately  provoking inflows  and  outflows  of 
banking funds  while  respecting  the long-term links  between domestic  and foreign 
rates.  (For  the  situation  at the  end  of  the period  see  Table  14.) 
Section IV  - Direct action to Influence  credit distribution 
For a  description  of the institutions  responsible  for  credit  control  and for  info~ 
mation  on the  legal  basis  of their activity  see  the first  part of this  paper. 
Para.  I:  Quantitative  control  of credit 
Instruments and control of credit volume 
45.  In· Italy  the  policy  of  quantitative  control  of credit  is  pursued  not through 
the  imposition  of  specified  limits  or ceilings  on  bank  credit  but,  as  already  ex-
plained,  mainly  through  regulation  of  the  flow  of  monetary  base.  In  certain 
cyclical  phases,  however,  this  generalized  action  is  accompanied  by  recommen-
dations  addressed  to  the  individual  banks  regarding  their  credit  policy.  These 
instructions  are  based  on the  Banking  Law,  which  gives  the  Banca  d'Italia  the 
power to issue directives on "the ratio of the various  classes  of investment under 
consideration  either  to  liquidity  or  to  the  various  branches  of economic  activity 
to  which  the  investments  refer"  (Article  32 d).  Another  power  enjoyed  by  the 
Banca d'Italia under the Banking Law, and one which may be used for the purpose 
of ·quantitative control of credit, is  that of "establishing the ceilings  to loans  that 
may  be  granted"  (Article  35 b).  This  power,  however,  has  hitherto  been  used 
more to prevent an excessive concentration of loans in favour of certain customers 
than to control the overall  volume  of credit allocated by the different banks.  The 
banks  may  not  extend  to  the  same  client,  except  with  authorization  from  the 
Banca  d'Italia,  advances  exceeding  one  fifth  of  their  capital  and  reserves  unless 
the advances  are entirely backed  by  real  guarantees. 
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Para.  II:  Selective  credit  control 
Opportunities for selective control 
46.  The abovementioned articles  of the Banking  Law also  offer the Banca d'Italia 
the possibility  of exercising  a selective control of bank credit.  The second part of 
Article 32 d, in particular, enables it to direct the flow  of credit towards particular 
branches  of  economic  activity;  under  Article  35  selective  action  could  be  taken 
in cases  where the underlying  reasons  for  a  decision  to authorize  or prohibit the 
granting of loans  exceeding  a fifth of capital and reserves  depended more on the 
financial  requirements  of the sectors  of economic activity in which the application 
for  the loans  operated  than  on the inherent risks  in the  operations.  In fact,  the 
Banca  d'I  talia has  never  yet implemented  these  rules  for  the above  purpose. 
Instead, a selective control of the financing flow  is  achieved through the procedure 
of bond issues  and  the  institution of  subsidized  credit facilities. 
Bond issue 
47.  The setting up of companies,  increases of capital requiring payment and bond 
issues  exceeding  Lit.  500  million  must  be  authorized  by  the  Treasury  Ministry 
after  consultation with the  Interministerial  Credit  and  Savings  Committee.  It is, 
in particular, the business of the Banca d'Italia to grant the authorization, without 
which  no  public  or  private  issues  can  be  made  through  banks  subject  to  bank 
control  or  quoted  on  stock  exchanges.  In  these  provisions  the. qualitative  and 
quantitative  aspect  of credit control  overlap. 
Subsidized credit 
48.  The  second  form  of  selective  control,  which  however,  does  not come  within 
the  ambit  of  the  Central  Bank's  operations,  consists  of  the  arrangements  for 
subsidized  credit,  under  which  special  rates  are  applied  to  certain  loans.  Here, 
the State plays  a part by  providing interest rebates  and, in special  cases,  by sup-
plying  funds  to  the  special  credit  institutions  concerned.  The  particular  rules 
relating  to interest  rebates  lay  down  that these  institutions  may  carry  out credit 
operations  at special  rates  established  by  law  or by  the  decision  of  specific  ad-
ministrative  bodies. 
If need  be,  "basic  rates",  i.e.  maximum  interest  rates  considered  sufficiently  re-
munerative for  the  financing  institutions,  are established by the bodies  prescribed 
by  law (as  a  rule the  Interministerial Credit and Savings  Committee) in order to 
enable  the  institutions  in  question  to  apply  to  their  customers  the  established 
reduced rates. The difference between the basic  rates and reduced rates is covered 
by  the State. The beneficiaries of the reduced rate are defined by law on the basis 
of various  criteria.  There is  above  all  a  geographical criterion according  to which 
the easier  terms  are granted to economic activities in the south of  Italy and other 
areas considered economically depressed. In the second place, these rates are applied 
to small and medium-scale firms  having less  than a given number of employees or 
amount  of capital.  Lastly,  there  is  a  criterion  by  economic  sector,  according  to 
which  some  productive  activities,  such  as  agriculture,  enjoy  this  favourable  treat-
ment. 
The Banca d'Italia exercises only indirect control over this type of credit by super-
vision  of  the  institutions  responsible  for  granting  subsidized  credit  and by  regu-
latin  the  collection  of savings  and of market liquidity  conditions. 
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Volume  of  securities  by  groups  of  investors 
Fixed-interest 
Investors 
Bonds on  behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securities  of Treasury  authorities 
December 1955 
Banco d' Italia  126.6  5.0  -
Banks  413.7  79.6  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  76.2  25.1  -
Special institutions  5.6  1.0  -
Social  Security institutions  35.1  3.8  -
Insurance companies  23.6  2.1  1.6 
Private individuals and companies  876.8  80.4  6.7 
Total  1,557.6  197.0  8.3 
December 1956 
Banca d'  Italia  146.7  6.9  ,..._ 
Banks  507.1  75.4  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  76.1  23.9  -
Special institutions  10.5  6.1  -
Social  security institutions  38.4  3.7  -
Insurance companies  25.5  2.1  1.6 
Private individuals and companies  959.0  73.4  6.6 
Total  1,763.3  191.5  8.2 
December 1957 
Banca d'Italia  182.5  7.0  -
Banks  523.9  72.2  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  76.0  22.6  -
Special institutions  6.8  1.6  -
Social  security institutions  41.4  3.6  -
Insurance  companies  27.5  2.0  1.5 
Private individuals and companies  1,020.1  76.0  6.5 
Total  1,878.5  185.0  8.0 
December 1958 
Banca d'  Italia  191.3  6.6  -
Banks  539.3  68.2  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  75.9  21.3  -
Special institutions  7.3  1.9  -
Social  security institutions  31.8  3.5  -
Insurance companies  27.2  2.0  1.5 
Private individuals and companies  1,030.4  74.3  6.3 
Total  1,903.2  177.8  7.8 
242 (in  Lit. '000 million) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Volume 
2.6  1.2  0.4  - - 135.8 
165.2  54.5  56.5  7.8  - 77'7.3 
0.4  0.1  30.9  - - 132.7 
7.2  7.9  1.3  0.3  - 23.3 
52.6  47.3  20.1  4.2  - 162.5 
15.2  14.3  4.8  5.9  - 67.5 
267.3  139.2  87.9  200.6  - 1,658.9 
{)09.9  264.5  201.9  218.8  - 2,958.0 
3.7  2.0  0.4  - - 159.7 
166.4  71.1  59.8  12.3  - 892.1 
0.4  0.1  30.1  - - 130.6 
8.6  9.3  1.8  0.2  - 36.3 
60.8  56.0  20.6  1.8  - 181.3 
20.3  17.0  5.9  6.0  - 78.4 
338.1  172.7  132.0  227.3  - 1,909.1 
598.3  328.2  '250.6  247.6  - 3,387.7 
4.5  2.3  0.4  - - 196.7 
175.0  85.5  67.6  13.4  - 937.6 
0.4  0.1  29.3  - - 128.4 
16.7  9.9  2.6  0.1  - 37.7 
66.0  68.2  24.2  1.0  - 204.4 
25.2  20.1  6.6  6.4  - 89.3 
392.1  219.2  191.6  263.5  - 2,169.3 
679.9  405.3  322.3  284.4  - 3,763.4 
5.4  2.6  5.6  - - 211.5 
205.4  103.4  118.5  19.5  - 1,054.3 
17.3  0.1  18.5  1.0  - 134.1 
16.0  13.0  3.3  0.1  - 41.6 
62.4  76.0  33.7  3.7  - 211.1 
24.7  19.8  8.4  6.3  - 89.9 
500.3  278.2  298.8  317.2  - 2,505.5 
831.5  493.1  486.8  347.8  - 4,248.0 
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TABLE 1  (Continue-.d) 
Govt. Securities 
217.4 
612.1 
75.9 
8.3 
32.4 
29.9 
1,234.8 
2,210.8 
228.8 
594.4 
74.4 
17.0 
33.1 
36.8 
1,370.0 
2,354.5 
243.7 
599.2 
73.6 
17.5 
33.3 
38.2 
1,358.6 
2,364.1 
192.6 
622.6 
31.3 
12.1 
33.4 
40.1 
1,335.3 
2,267.4 
Fixed-interest 
Bonds on behalf  Local and regional 
of Treasury  authorities 
7.0  -
101.2  -
25.9  -
2.4  -
6.4  -
2.2  1.6 
84.8  11.1 
229.9  12.7 
6.8  -
100.2  -
27.2  -
3.2  -
5.9  -
2.4  1.6 
124.2  10.7 
269.9  12.3 
25.2  -
157.8  3.1 
30.6  -
6.9  -
8.9  -
5.3  1.6 
182.7  19.1 
417.4  23.8 
107.5  -
148.8  3.1 
133.5  -
3.2  -
11.5  -
6.9  1.6 
181.9  18.7 
593.3  23.4 (in  Lit. •ooo million) 
Fixed~  interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI.  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Volume 
7.4  2.7  6.5  - - 241.0 
259.7  127.0  172.6  19.6  - 1,292  .. 2 
26.6  0.1  17.5  4.5  - 150.5 
20.7  19.1  3.9  - - 54.4 
64.0  77.9  30.9  3.4  - 215.0 
30.9  23.6  8.6  8.8  - 105.6 
600.9  343.1  335.4  341.8  - 2,951.9 
1,010.2  593.5  575.4  378.1  - 5,010.6 
12.8  2.6  6.3  - - 257.3 
361.2  195.7  196.3  44.6  - 1,492.4 
44.9  0.1  16.6  4.9  - 168.1 
19.4  21.0  4.3  0.7  - 65.6 
76.4  74.2  27.8  6.0  - 223.2 
44.0  36.0  10.1  9.2  - 140.1 
736.8  409.3  374.1  511.2  - 3,536.3 
1,295.2  738,9  635.5  576.6  - 5,882.9 
14.8  3.0  6.3  - 2.1  295.1 
492.0  208.6  216.8  33.1  9.1  1,719.7 
61.2  0.1  15.6  4.9  - 186.0 
18.8  28.4  5.1  0.8  0.2  77.7 
92.7  88.3  26.0  6.9  - 256.1 
46.5  55.4  45.5  13.0  - 175.5 
865.3  596.5  465.6  644.5  3.6  4,135.9. 
1,591.3  980.3  750.9  703.2  15.0  6,846.0 
18.8  2.9'  11.3  0.2  19.9  353.2 
749.2  333.4  296.5  72.7  16.7  2,24·3.0 
92.8  25.2  14.5  4.8  - 302.1 
20.1  48.2  3.2  0.9  5.3  93.0 
142.3  116.4  24.2  9.9  - 337.7 
76.0  65.0  14.8  14.0  - 218.4 
958.7  687.8  446.4  810.6  3.1  4,442.5 
2;057.9  1,278.9  810.9  913.1  45.0  7,989.9 
245 TABLE  1  (Continued) 
Fixed-interest 
Investors  i 
Bonds on behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securities  of  Treasury  authorities 
December 1963 
Banco  d'  Italia  174.4  116.2  -
Banks  590.5  144.5  3.1 
Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti  21.3  283.9  -
Special institutions  11.7  3.1  -
Social  Security institutions  . 28.9  10.9  -
Insurance companies  37.8  7.2  i.5 
Private individuals  and companies  1,211.9  164.4  18.3 
Total  2,076.5  730.2  22.9 
December 1964 
Banca d'  ltalia  229.9  246.8  -
Banks  588.4  143.4  3.1 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  82.3  245.6  -
Special· institutions  11.5  2.9  -
Social security institutions  28.6  10.3  -
Insurance  companies  36.8  7.7  1.5 
Private individuals and companies  1,173.5  242.0  17.8 
Total  2,151.0  898.7  22.4 
December 1965 
Banca d'  Italia  243.1  286.2  -
Banks  724.1  441.2  3.1 
Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti  82.3  257.1  -
Special institutions  18.2  11.5  -
Social  security institutions  '28.4  13.8  -
Insurance companies  36.9  11.2  1.5 
Private individuals and companies  1,196.8  410.8  17.4 
Total  2,329.8  . 1,431.8  22.0 
December 1966 
Banca d'ltalia  384.4  337.4  -
Banks  1,054.3  849.4  3.1 
Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti  74.3  247.6  -
Special institutions  24.7  20.0  23.0 
Social security institutions  44.3  '13.6  -
Insurance  companies  43.2  15.7  1.4 
Private individuals and companies  1,441.8.  834.8  16.5 
Total  3,067.0  2,318.5  44.0 
246 (in  Lit. '000 million) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions 
ENEL 
Total 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"inobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Volume 
18.5  2.8  11.2  6.2  26.4  355.7 
973.4  439.4  352.9  91.9  20.7  2,616.4 
126.4  46.4  167.6  8.7  - 654.3 
24.0  45.7  4.0  0.5  5.8  94.8. 
180.1  145.6  23.1  16.()  - 404.6 
87.0  73.7  15.4  16.8  - 239.4 
1,145.4  860.7  527.9  869.7  13.4  4,811. 7 
2,554.8  1,614.3  1,102.1  1,009.8  66.3  9,176.9 
29.9  2.7  10.8  7.4  38.6  566.1 
1,082.2  541.6  645.1  97.7  20.5  3,122.0 
238.4  98.0  295.9  8.6  - 968.8 
27.8  49.2  6.9  6.8  5.0  110.1 
311.7  199.6  75.4  25.7  - 651.3 
96.7  74.8  17.9  16.5  - -251.9 
1,284.2  925.7  563.7  884.6  14.1  5,105.6 
3,070.9  1,891.6  1,615,7  1,047.3  78.2  10,775.8 
28.7  2.6  10.3  8.4  37.7  617.0 
1,290.5  648.9  1,035.3  139.7  23.9  4,306.7 
235.6  94.3  286.4  13.5  - 969.2 
41.2  36.4  15.9  6.8  5.0  135.0 
308.6  208.0  72.4  25.1  - 656.3 
105.7  81.0  25.7  16.8  - 278.8 
1,484.8  1,123.9  761.1  933.5  25.5  5,953.8 
3,495.1  2,195.1  2,207.1  1,143.8  92.1  12,916.8 
29.8  2.4  10.3  8.4  61.1  833.8 
1,478.0  887.5  1,190.4  146.4  59.3  5,668.4 
227.8  91.0  276.4  13.3  - 930.4 
43.2  24.0  19.9  13.7  5.0  173.5 
303.3  204.6  70.4  23.9  - 660.1 
129.6  84.0  39.2  22.2  - 335.3 
1,814.1  1,315.8  929.4  922.6  50.1  7,325.1 
-
4,025.8  2,609.3  2,536.0  1,150.5  175.5  15,926.6 
247 TABLE 1  (Continued) 
Fixed-interest 
Investors 
Bonds on  behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securities  of  Treasury  auth9rities 
December 1967 
Banco d'  Italia  694.3  193.2  --
Banks  1,198.9  1,015.8  4.1 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  66.3  237.1  -
Special institutions  34.2  22.4  31.8 
Social  Security institutions  44.1  12.7  -
Insurance  compa11~s  45.9  17.8  1.4 
Private individuals and companies  1,454.5  1,403.6  15.1 
Total  3,538.2  2,902.6  52.4 
December 1968 
Banca d'  Italia  883.0  229.4  -
Banks  1,676.6  1,409.1  14.9 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  58.3  230.1  -
Special institutions  63.1  42.3  52.0 
Social security institutions  42.1  13.8  -
Insurance companies  45.7  61.9  1.4 
Private individuals and companies  1,627.3  1,414.8  33.2 
Total  4,396.4  3,401.4  101.5 
December 1969 
Banca d'  Italia  1,274.7  1,136.4  -
Banks  1,802.0  1,504.9  21.7 
Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti  50.3  219.7  -
Special institutions  109.7  40.2  52.3 
Social  security institutions  39.2  13.0  -
Insurance  companies  45.0  51.8  5.3 
Private individuals and companies  1,645.2  1,549.6  24.9 
Total  4,966.1  4,519.6  104.2 
December 1970 
Banca d'  Italia  2,007.5  1,  779.4  -
Banks  1,790.2  1,620.3  22.7 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  42.3  208.6  -
Others  1,830.4  1,633.1'  76.3 
Total  5,670.4  5,241.4'  99.0 
248 (in  Lz't.  '000 million) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Volume 
28.5  2.2  8.3  8.4  68.0  1,002.9 
1,692.2  1,187.5  1,370.9  185.2  62.2  6,716.8 
222.2  87.3  265.8  13.1  - 891.8 
48.2  26.2  19.0  10.0  1.3  193.1 
294.1  214.7  70.7  23.7  - 660.0 
160.6  95.1  53.8  30.9  - 405.5 
2,241. 2  1,422.4  1,010.9  1,042.7  65.9  8,656.3 
4,687.0  3,035.4  2,799.4 
.·.  1,314.0  197.4  18,526.4 
27.1  2.2  8.3  8.6  68.0  1,226.6 
1,877.6  1,475.6  1,5?4.0  231.2  68.9  8,327.9 
212.6  83.4  254.5  12.8  - 851.7 
59.0  31.1  12.2  10.0  1.9  271.6 
301.2  222.4  61.7  24.2  - 665.7 
161.1  131.3  64.6  20.6  2.0  491.9 
2,828.8  1,621.6  1,248.5  1,124.0  101.6  9,999.7 
5,470.7  3,567.5  3,223.8  1,431.4  242.4  21,835.1 
45.9  12.4  8.2  7.5  64.7  2,549.8 
2,335.3  1,740.3  1,907.5  231.8  75.2  9,618. 7 
204.2  79.5  243.1  12.6  - 809.4 
59.8  51.2  10.4  7.9  7.4  338.9 
291.7  237.9  58.1  22.9  - 662.8 
383.8  137.8  74.4  20.7  2.2  521.0 
3,219.6  1,855.8  1,418.4  1,163.8  102.6  10,979.9 
6,340.3  4,114.9  3,720.1  1,467.2  252,1  25,480.5 
77.1  22.1  8.0  7.0  71.3  3,972.4 
3,000.3  1,917.8  1,976.6  229.1  77.7  10,634.7 
196.6  75.9  231.9  20.5  - 775.8 
3,926.5  2,910.9  1,615.7  1,150.4  108.5  13,251.8 
7,200.5  4,926.7  3,832.2  1,407.0  257.5  28,634.7 
249 TABLE  2 
Net  issues  of  securities  by  groups  of investors 
Fixed  -interest 
Investors 
Bonds on behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securitie$  of. Treasury  authorities 
December 1956 
Banco d'Italia  14.0  1.6  -
Banks  84.0  - 4.8  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - - 1.1  -
Special institutions  4.5  4.8  -
Social  Security institutions  3.3  ...._  0.1  -
Insurance  companies  1.9  - -
Private individuals and companies  92.2  - 5~9  -0.1 
Total  199.9  - 5.5  -:-0.1 
December 1957 
Banca d'  Italia  34.2  0.1  -
Banks  16.4  - 2.7  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 0.1  - 1.1  -
Special institutions  - 3.5  4.3  -
Social  security institutions  2.8  - 0.1  -
Insurance  companies  1.9  - 0.1  -0.1 
Private individuals and  companies  63.5  1.7  -0.1 
Total  115.2  - 6.5  -0.2 
December 1958 
Banca d'  Italia  8.7  - 0.4  -
Banks  18.9  - 2.9  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 0.1  - 1.2  -
Special institutions  0.5  0.3  -
Social  security institutions  - 9.0  - 0.2  -
Insurance  companies  - 0.3  - -
Private individuals and companies  - 6.1  - 2.8  -0.2 
Total  12.6  - 7.2  -0.2 
December 1959 
Banca d'  ltalia  25.3  0.::>  -
Banks  75.1  33.4  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 4.6  -
Special institutions  1.1  0.5  -
Social  security institutions  0.6  2.9  -
Insurance companies  2.6  0.2  0.1 
Private individuals and companies  200.3  8.9  4.6 
Total  305.0  51.0  4.7 
250 (in  Lit. '000 milium) 
Fixed-interest 
-
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
-
Net issues 
1.0  0.7  - - - 17.3 
1.9  14.4  2.6  4.2  - 102.3 
- - - 0.7 
~  - - 1.8 
1.2  1.3  0.4  - 0.1  - 12.1 
8.4  7.8  0.5  - 2.4  - 17.4 
4.8  2.5  1.5  0.1  - 10.4 
62.4  26.9  42.4  26.0  - 243.9 
------
79.7  53.5  46.3  27.8  - 401.6 
0.8  0.3  - - - 35.4 
7.7  12.5  7.0  0.9  - 41.8 
- - - 0.7  - - - 1.9 
7.6  0.4  0.8  - - 1.0 
4.8  10.5  3.4  - 0.7  - 20.7 
4.6  2.8  0.6  0.4  - 10.1 
47.7  38.5  57.3  34.6  - 243.2 
-
73.2  65.0  68.4  35.2  - 350.3 
0.9  0.2  4.4  - - 13.8 
30.0  16.1  48.8  6.0  - 116.9 
15.5  - - 9.9  1.0  - 5.3 
- 0.2  3.0  0.6  - - 4.2 
- 3.0  6.9  9.0  2.6  - 6.3 
- 0.5  - 0.3  1.6  - 0.1  - 0.4 
97.4  49.1  100.9  51.6  - 289.9 
140.1  75.0  155.4  61.1  - 436.8 
1.9  0.1  0.9  - - 28.7 
55.0  23.8  53.7  0.7  - 241.7 
9.1  - - 0.9  3.5  - 16.3 
4.7  6.1  0.6  - 0.1  - 12.9 
1.9  1.8  - 3.1  - 0.3  - 3.8 
5.8  3.5  0.2  2.4  - 14.8 
93.6  55.5  31.8  23.5  - 418.2 
172.0  90.8  83.2  29.7  - 736.4 
251 Investors 
ecember  1960 
anco d'  Italia 
anks 
D 
B 
B 
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s 
So 
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pecial institutions 
cial Security institutions 
Insurance companies 
Pr 
T 
ivate individuals and companies 
otal 
ecember 1961 
anca d'  Italia 
anks 
D 
B 
B 
c  assa  Depositi e  Prestiti 
Special institutions 
Social  security institutions 
Insurance.  companies 
Pr  ivate individuals and companies 
T otal 
December 1962 
Banca d'Italia 
Banks 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti 
Special institutions 
Social  security institutions 
Insurance companies 
Private individuals and companies 
Total 
December 1963 
Banca d' It  alia 
Banks 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti 
Special  institutions 
Social  security institutions 
Insurance  companies 
Private individuals and companies 
Total 
252 
TABLE 2  (Continued) 
Govt.  Securities 
11.8 
- 14.7 
- 0.3 
8.7 
0.3 
7.5 
130.4 
143.7 
16.4 
7.5 
- 0.8 
0.5 
0.2 
1.2 
- 15.4 
9.6 
- 47.1 
28.7 
- 42.3 
- 5.3 
0.2 
1.9 
- 32.8 
- 96.7 
- 15.6 
- 30.7 
- 10.1 
- 0.2  - 4.4 
- 2.1 
-127.8 
-190.9 
Fixed-interest 
Bonds on  behalf  Local and regional 
of Treasury  authorities 
- 0.1  -
- 0.6  -
1.5  -
0.8  -
- 0.3  -
0.2  -
37.8  - 0.4 
39.3  -0.4 
17.9  --
55.9  2.8 
3.2  -
3.7  -
2.7  -
2.6  -
57.4  8.6 
143.4  11.4 
75.6  -
- 9.1  -
97.8  -
- 3.8  -
2.5  -
1.6  -
6.0  - 0.4 
170.6  - 0.4 
6.9  -
- 5.5  -
144.0  -
- 0.2  -
- 0.6  -
0.1  -0.1 
-17.3  -0.4 
127.4  - 0.5 (in  Lit. '000 milliml) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Net issues 
5.3  - - - - . 17.0 
100.9  67.6  25.5  24.4  - 203.1 
17.3  - - 0.8  0.4  - 18.1 
- 1.2  1.9  0.4  0.7  - 11.3 
11.8  - 3.7  - 3.1  2.3  - 7.3 
12.9  11.8  1.5  0.4  - 34.3 
128  .. 7  58.7  35.8  168.2  - 559.2 
275.7  136.3  59.3  196.4  - 850.3 
2.0  0.3  - - 2.1  38.7 
127.4  14.3  21.2  -10.8  9.5  227.8 
15.4  - - 0.9  - - 16.9  - 0.6  7.2  0.8  0.1  0.2  11.9 
16.0  12.7  - 1.7  0.9  - 30.8 
2.4  18.0  5.2  3.6  - 33.0 
121.3  177.1  90.8  132.2  3.0  575.0 
283.9  229.6  115.4  126.0  14.8  934.1 
3.6  - 0.1  4.8  0.2  16.2  53.2 
250.0  177.4  75.2  36.7  7.1  506.0 
31.2  23.8  0.4  - 0.1  - 110.8 
1.2  19.3  - 1.9  0.1  5.0  14.6 
47.5  25.4  - 1.8  2.7  - 76.5 
28.1  8.9  - 0.7  1.0  - 40.8 
84.3  83.9  - 17.0  165.3  1.3  290.6 
445.9  278.6  59.0  205.9  29.6  1,092.5 
- 0.4  - 0.1  - 0.3  5.3  6.4  2.2 
212.3  95.2  49.4  17.5  3.5  341.7 
30.4  19.1  145.7  3.9  - 333.0 
3.5  - 3.3  0.8  - 0.4  - 0.2  -
35.8  27.3  - 1.0  5.6  - 62.7. 
10.5  8.1  0.5  2.7  - 19.7 
177.7  158.6  79.6  59.8  11.2  341.4 
469.8  304.9  274.7  94.4  20.9  1,100.7 
253 TABLE  2  (Continued) 
Fixed-interest 
Investors 
Bonds on behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securities  of.  Treasury  authorities 
December 1964 
Banco  d'  Italia  56.8  111.6  -
Banks  - 1.4  - 1.7  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  59.0  - 36.1  -
Special institutions  - 0.4  - 0.2  -
Social  Security institutions  - 0.3  - 0.4  -
Insurance companies  - 1.1  0.5  -
Private individuals and companies  - 43.8  85.1  - 0.5 
Total  68.8  158.8  -0.5 
December 1965 
Banca d'  Italia  13.8  37.9  -
Banks  136.7  282.2  -
Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti  - 9.9  -
Special institutions  6.8  8.2  -
Social  security institutions  0.1  3.2  -
Insurance  companies  0.1  3.2  -
Private individuals and companies  20.3  156.1  - 0.4 
Total  177.8  500.7  - 0.4 
December 1966 
Banca d'ltalia  139.7  57.8  -
Banks  329.4  384.6  -
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 8.0  - 8.5  -
Special institutions  6.3  8.1  21.5 
social security institutions  15.6  - 0.1  -
Insurance  companies  6.3  4,8  -0.1 
Private individuals and companies  246.1  385.6  -0.3 
Total  735.4  832.3  21.1 
December 1967 
Banca d'Italia  303.0  - 134.0  -
Banks  140.1  163.5  1.0 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 8.0  - 10.1  -
Special institutions  9.4  2.4  8.3 
Social  security institutions  - 0.1  - 1.0  -
Insurance  companies  2.4  1.9  -
Private individuals and companies  10.3  531.7  - 1.3 
Total  457.1  554.4  8.0 
254 (in  Lit. '000 million) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Net issues 
10.4  - - 0.5  1.2  12.1  191.6 
95.0  88.5  274.7  3.9  - 0.8  438.2 
106.1  45.8  108.9  - 0.1  - 283.6 
2.7  2.4  2.6  6.0  - 0.1  13.0 
124.9  48.1  48.4  9.0  - 229.7 
9.1  0.8  2.3  - 0.2  - 11.4 
131.4  55.5  32.4  13.2  0.7  274.0 
479.6  241.1  468.8  33.0  11.9  1,461.5 
- 0.8  - 0.1  - 0.3  1.0  -1.0  50.5 
195.3  94.4  373.0  40.9  3.3  1,125.8 
- 0.6  - 3.3  - 8.6  4.9  - 2.3 
12.8  - 12.4  8.0  - - 23.4 
- 3.4  7.5  - 2.5  - 0.6  - 4.3 
8.5  5.9  7.6  0.2  - 25.5 
176.1  166.5  180.2  43.1  11.0  752.9 
387.9  258.5  557.4  89.5  13.3  1,984.7 
1.2  - 0.2  - - 22.9  221.4 
183.0  222.4  151.2  6.6  33.7  1,340.9 
- 6.7  - 3.1  - 9.1  - 0.2  - - 35.6 
1.7  -10.7  3.9  6.2  - 37.0 
- 5.1  - 3.8  - 1.8  - 1.1  - 3.7 
22.7  2.4  12.4  5.2  - 53.7 
305.1  151.8  157.3  - 13.8  24.0  1,255.8 
501.9  358.8  313.9  2.9  80.6  2,846.9 
- 1.3  - - 1.5  - 6.9  173.1 
205.1  279.8  173.7  36.7  3.0  1,002.9 
- 5.9  - 3.4  - 9.6  - 0.2  - - 37.2 
5.3  2.1  - 0.7  - 3.5  - 3.7  19.6 
- 8.8  9.1  0.1  - 0.2  - - 0.9 
29.5  10.2  14.1  8.3  - 66.4 
396.4  68.5  70.3  115.4  15.3  1,206.6 
620.3  366.3  246.4  156.5  21.5  2,430.5 
255 TABLE 2  (Continued) 
-
Fixed-interest 
Investors 
Bonds on behalf  Local and regional 
Govt.  Securities  of Treasury  authorities 
December 1955 
Banco d'  Italia  183.5  36.1  -
Banks  472.3  377.9  10.2 
Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti  - 8.0  - 10.1  -
Special institutions  27.4  18.7  18.6 
Social  Security institutions  - 1.7  - 0.9  -
Insurance companies  0.2  19.4  -
Private individuals  and companies  156.9  26.1  18.1 
Total  830.6  466.2  46.9 
December 1956 
Banca d'Italia  366.4  833.6  -
Banks  111.8  77.6  6.2 
Cassa  Depositi  e  Prestiti  - 8.0  -10.3  -
Special institutions  39.4  - 2.9  -2.7 
Social  security institutions  - 3.0  - 0.8  -
Insurance companies  - 2.8  - 0.1  0.4 
Private individuals and companies  34.2  125.1  - 1.7 
Total  538.0  1,022.2  2.2 
December 1957 
Banca d'Italia  696.3  567.2  -
Banks  - 37.8  75.7  0.5 
Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti  - 8.0  - 11.1  -
Others  15.0  - 0.2  - 5.7 
Total  665.5  631.6  - 5.2 
256 (in Lit, '000 million) 
Fixed-interest 
Special institutions  Total 
ENEL 
ENI  Enterprises  Foreign 
"mobiliari"  "immobiliari"  IRI 
Net issues 
- 1.3  - - 0.2  - 0.1  218.1 
179.0  256.0  198.7  44.4  5.9  1,541.4 
- 6.3  - 3.5  -10.1  - 0.3  - - 38.3 
9.8  4.3  - 6.1  0.1  0.6  73.4 
4.9  9.7  - 3.7  0.9  - 9.2 
20.2  27.3  13.1  2.0  0.2  81.1 
521.9  166.6  211.3  65.7  37.1  1,203.7 
723.2  460.1  403.2  113.0  43,7  3,092.2 
17.4  9.2  - 0.1  - 0.8  - 3.8  1,221. 9 
414.3  230.9  295.3  - 1.9  2.5  1,136.7 
- 7.4  - 3.5  -- 10.7  - 0.2  - - 40.1 
0.3  17.9  - 1.7  2.0  5.5  53.8 
- 10.5  15.0  - 1.8  - 0.2.  - 0.3 
10.2  13.9  11.7  - 0.3  - 33.0 
391.0  185.5  172.8  34.0  4.7  945.6 
815.3  468.9  465.5  28.8  9.1  3,350.0 
24.5  8.9  - 0.1  - 0.6  7.0  1,303.2 
687.5  125.2  49.5  2.6  - 1.4  801.8 
- 7.6  - 3.6  - 11.2  7.7  - - 33.8 
195.3  553.6  56.0  - 69.9  -0.2  743.9 
799.7  684.1  94.2  - 60.2  5.4  2,815.1 
257 TABLE 3  Economy's  financi< 
Volume at 
Items  31  Dec.  1958  1959  1960  1961 
1968 
FINANCIAL ASSETS 
Domestic 
1.  Liquid  assets  45,048  1,295.0  1,749.8  1,739.2  2,304.2 
a)  notes and coin  (2)  5,896  152.8  183.8  197.0  359.9 
b)  sight  deposits  (2)  17,281  366.5  749.7  664.7  762.5 
c)  savings deposits and short-term securities  21,871  775.7  816.3  878.5  1,181.8 
2.  Other  deposits  and  interest-bearing certifi-
cates  1,434  26.8  61.5  43.1  76.4 
3.  Fixed-interest securities  10,802  284.0  415.9  565.4  563.7 
a)  Government  securities  3,173  - 12.3  209.4  166.0  39.7 
b)  bonds-special institutions  5,075  145.7  149.1  196.4  298.7 
c)  bonds-industrial and other  2,554  150.6  57.4  203.0  225.3 
4.  Shares and participations  15,134  89.4  - 9.1  165.0  152.0 
5.  Other  5,139  168.0  197.2  157.9  221.4 
Total domestic  77,557  1,863.2  2,415.3  2,670.6  3,317.7 
Foreign 
6.  Short-term !endings (net)  729  - 13.7  - 4.8  4.3  83.4 
7.  Loans  715  4.3  - 2.2  - 2.2  30.6 
8.  Fixed-interest  securities and shares  2,148  - 4.0  13.0  73.9  53.4 
9.  Other  4,310  4.3  39.0  115.8  195.6 
Total foreign  7,902  - 9.1  45.0  19.18  363.0 
Total  85,459  1,854.1  2,4.60.3  2,862.4  3,680.7 
BEING COUNTERPARTS OF LENDING TO: 
ECONOMY (1)  ' 
From  domestic  sources  I 
10.  Short-term indebtedness  19,856  131.1  615.7  1,164.0  1,242.6 
11.  Medium  and long-term indebtedness  20,946  658.0  602.9  948.4  1,040.3 
a)  loans  15,812  443.1  492.5  693.4  805.0 
b)  bonds  5,134  214.9  110.4  255.0  235.3 
12.  Shares  and participations  17,658  124.9  76.9  258.1  282.4 
Total domestic  58,460  914.0  1,295.5  2,370.5  2,565.3 
From  foreign  sources 
13.  Medium and long-term indebtedness  1,000  - 8.3  - 3.4  - 19.6  72.3 
14.  Shares and participations  4,095  117.1  182.8  287.2  294.2 
Total foreign  5,095  108.8  179.4  267.6  366.5 
Total  63,555  1,022.8  1,474.9  2,638.1  2,931.8 
FOREIGN SECTOR  (3)  5,577  347.1  465.7  176.9  296.4 
PUBLIC SECTOR  17,731  520.0  575.7  360.3  303.4 
Treasury  (4)  9,763  249.7  248.3  73.9  26.0 
Local  and  regional  authorities  and  social  in-
surance institutions  7,968  270.3  327.4  286.4  277.4 
UNCLASSIFIABLE  (")  - 1,404  - 35.8  - 56.0  -312.9  149.1 
Total  85,459  1,854.1  2,460.3  2,862.4  3,6807 
Economy's  financial  surplus  ( +) f deficit  (-) 
Liquidity. surplus (6)  (26,626  1,190.7  1,195.6  618.3  1,138.0 
Medium  and  long-term  surplus  - 4,722  - 359.4  - 210.2  - 394.0  - 389.1 
Total surplus  /deficit  21,904  831.3  985.4  224.3  748.9 
'  (1)  Households and firms. 
(2)  Figures adjusted to discount fortuitous movements in late  1967. 
(3)  Current surplus or deficit in the balance of payments on a  transaction basis. 
258 1ssets and their counterparts(') 
1962 
2,943.5 
390.0 
1,125.0 
1,428.5 
75.0 
287.8 
- 25.2 
172.7 
140.3 
216.7 
253.8 
3,776.8 
14.3 
83.5 
131.1 
461.3 
690.2 
4,467.0 
1,  741.5 
1,346.1 
1,089.0 
257.1 
323.2 
3,410.8 
59.5 
465.0 
524.5 
3,935.3 
147.2 
516.2 
180.6 
335.6 
- 131.7 
4,467.0 
1,277.0 
- 745.3 
531.7 
OJ 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
2,420.7  1,986.8  3,707.6  3,887.3  3,811.4 
440.8  270.6  343.1  378.1  328.2 
745.2  590.6  1,506.4  1,453.7  1,570.1 
1,234.7  1,125.6  1,858.1  2,055.5  1,913.1 
135.0  45.6  88.8  160.2  185.0 
332.9  268.8  729.4  1,235.0  12,04.6 
-144.5  34.3  172.6  630.9  517.1 
340.6  191.9  345.1  461.1  474.5 
136.8  42.6  211.7  143.0  212.9 
-141.5  236.9  105.7  305.6  35.3 
310.5  344.7  346.2  471.1  509.5 
3,057.6  2,882.8  4,977.7  6,059.2  5,745.8 
- 26.3  106.1  256.2  158.4  - 49.1 
60.2  60.0  60.4  129.5  76.9 
118.4  96.1  117.7  154.6  185.6 
906.9  348.6  177.9  332.8  489.7 
1,059.2  610.8  612.2  775.3  703.1 
4,116.8  3,493.6  5,589.9  6,834.5  6,448.9 
2,056.5  65.9  657.2  1,675.0  20,47.6 
1,529.6  1,630.6  1,480.8  1,530.7  19,70.2 
1,162.3  1,132.5  844.3  1,216.8  15,55.8 
367.3  498.1  636.5  313.9  414.4 
- 57.7  282.3  300.8  375.2  249.5 
3,528.4  1,978.8  2,438.8  3,580.9  4,267.3 
162.1  217.3  164.5  - 15.4  - 32.0 
581.3  333.0  148.6  132.4  213.1 
743.4  550.3  313.1  . 
117.0  181.1 
4,271.8  2,529.1  2,751.9  3,697.9  4,448.4 
-465.9  387.3  1,380.7  1,323.3  999.5 
362.8  583.8  1,  713.6  2,112.0  1,556.1 
145.4  141.9  820.9  1,068.4  396.4 
217.4  441.9  892.7  1,043 6  1,159.7 
- 51.9  - 6.6  -256.3  -298 7  -555.1 
4,116.8  3,493.6  5,589.9  6,834.5  6,448.9 
499.2  1,966.5  3,129.2  2,372.5  1,948.8 
- 654.2  -1,002.0  - 301.2  764.1  51.7 
-155.0  964.5  2,838.0  3,136.6  2,000.5 
(4)  Including Treasury, Cassa DD. PP. and public corporations. 
(5)  Including discrepancies. 
(6)  Excluding (net) foreign short-term commercial credit. 
(Changes  in  Lit. '000 million) 
1968  1969  1970 
4,592.5  4,675.4  6,305.1 
359.4  694.2  488.0 
2,220.8  2,549.4  6,166.8 
2,012.3  1,431.8  -349.7 
285.9  119.0  163.8 
1,156.0  944.2  646.6 
193.4  155.1  - 15.1 
683.3  585.7  678.6 
279.3  203.4  - 16.9 
176.7  323.7  539.6 
525.1  548.6  552.2 
6,736.2  6,610.9  8,207.3 
226.2  245.5  283.9 
- 50.8  78.5  57.3 
366.5  461.5  359.5 
704.5  1,411.0  596.1 
1,246.4  2,196.5  1,296.8 
7,982.6  8,807.4  9,504.1 
1,450.9  2,539.4  2,410.8 
2,333.2  2,446.8  2,  131.0 
1,832.6  1,953.9  2,100.9 
500.6  492.9  30.1 
535.7  591.6  710.3 
4,319.8  5,577.8  5,252.1 
85.0  -106.8  497.5 
222.5  243.8  377.6 
307.5  137.0  875.1 
4,627.3  5,714.8  6,127.2 
1 ,641. 8  1,462.3  508.5 
1,996.2  1,570.7  3,640.5 
798.2  766.2  2,308.0 
1,198.0  804.5  1,332.5 
-282.7  596  -772.1 
7,982.6  8,807.4  9,504.1 
3,427.5  2,255.0  4,058.1 
- 72.2  837.6  -681.2 
3,355.3  3,092.6  3,376.9 
259 TABLE 4 
Gross  national  product  and  exports  of goods  and  services 
(in  Lit. '000 milium at constant prices) 
Gross  national product  Exports  Exports expressed 
as percentage of GNP 
1951  15,816  1,012  6.4 
1952  16,523  999  6.0 
1953  17,769  1,227  6.9 
1954  18,408  1,337  7.3 
1955  19,633  1,489  7.6 
1956  20,565  1,750  8.5 
1957  2,1677  2,142  9.9 
1958  22,734  2,418  10.6 
1959  24,241  2,864  11.8 
1960  25,763  3,404  13.2 
1961  27,911  3,957  14.2 
1962  29,662  4,445  15.0 
1963  31,261  4,753  15.2 
1964  32,164  5,306  16.5 
1965  33,335  6,371  19.1 
1966  35,304  7,211  20.4 
1967  37,709  7,696  20.4 
1968  40,117  8,879  22.1 
1969  42,495  10,105  23.8 
1970  44,671  10,714  24.0 
260 IV 
0'-
.~ 
Items 
I.  SOURCES 
1.  Foreign sector 
autonomous factors 
action by monetary author-
ities 
2.  Treasury 
autonomous factors 
action by monetary author-
ities 
3.  Banks: financing by Bauca 
d'Italia (UIC) 
4.  Other sectors 
Total 
autonomous factors 
action by monetary 'author-
ities 
II. USES (Liquidity absorbed  by) 
1.  Public and non-bank inter-
mediaries 
-Public 
•  Notes and coin 
•  Treasury bills  and  de-
posits at Treasury 
•  Liquid  assets  at  Post 
Oftlce 
- Special credit institutions 
2.  Banks 
- Compulsory  reserve and 
backing for drafts 
•  Cash 
•  Treasury bills 
•  Special reserve in bonds 
- Bank liquidity 
----- ------------
1959 
629.9 
536.1 
93.8 
216.0 
512.9 
-296.9 
- 0.2 
- 41.3 
804.4 
1,049.0 
-244.6 
327.4 
365.2 
183.8 
- 17.5 
198.9 
- 37.8 
477.0 
221.3 
- 57.1 
278.4 
-
255.7 
TABLE  5 
Principal factors  determining bank liquidity:  "Monetary base" 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
- 38.4  389.9  607.4  -718.0  293.6  627.0  234.7 
269.6  365.5  43.5  -780.6  483.9  994.0  416.9 
-308.0  24.4  563.9  62.6  -190.3  -367.0  -182.2 
221.0  240.3  582.3  978.7  794.9  932.4  480.5 
382.4  357.1  570.3  768.3  816.5  1, 544.6  1,823.0 
-161.4  -116.8  12.0  210.4  - 21.6  -612.2  -1,342.5 
26.6  261.0  71.6  474.7  -164.2  -165.4  562.3 
18.6  - 31.9  - 8.4  - 6.6  6.6  -55.1  - 38.8 
227.8  859.3  1,252.9  728.8  930.9  1,338.9  1,238.7 
652.0  722•6  613.8  - 12.3  1,300.4  2,538.6  2,239.9 
-424.2  136.7  639.1  741.1  -369.5  -1,199.7  -1,001.2 
405.7  641.8  698.2  751.8  545.6  802.1  831.2 
408.2  642.2  673.5  767.1  ~  549.0  780.3  811.4 
197,0  359.9  390.0  440.81  270.6  343.1  377.3  .. 
1.0  13.7  - 87.2  - 93.2  - 40.8  30.0  - 0.3 
210.2  268.6  370.7  419.5  319.2  407.2  434.4 
- 2.5  - 0.4  24.7  - 15.3  - 3.4  21.8  19.8 
-177.9  217.5  554.7  - 23.0  385.3  536.8  407.5 
295.7  295.1  192.3  307.6  126.3  463.3  314.4 
- 99.7  103.4  149.9  322.1  151.9  276.6  217.6 
395.4  191.7  42.4  - 14.5  - 25.6  -186.7  - 96.8 
- - - - - - -
-473.6  - 77.6  362.4  -330.6  259.0  73.5 
~ 
93.1 
i>! 
(changes  in  Lie. '000 million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970 
242.9  122.6  -648.4  319.1 
202.4  393.3  -869.7  222.9 
40.5  -270.7  221.3  96.2 
404.6  921.8  1,500.3  2,992.2 
1,226.4  2,021.5  1,692.2  3,230.5 
-821.8  -1,099.7  -191.9  -238.3 
626.6  220.5  475.9  -1,274.9 
- 57.9  - 23.7  - 82.5  118.1 
1,216.2  1,241.2  1,245.3  2,154.5 
1,428.8  2,414.8  822.5  3,453.4 
-212.6  -1,173.6  422.8  -1,298.9 
1,017.6  576.9  1,153.1  985.6 
951.0  518.5  1,095.7  770.0 
486.2  207.2  706.9  504.8 
18.3  - 43.5  15.4  27.0 
446.5  354.8  373.4  238.2 
li>ll-
66.6  58.4  57.4  215.6 
198.6  664.3  92.2  1,168.9 
249.6  402.9  415.5  782.1 
217.5  273.6  346.3  529.2 
- 30.4  109.3  69.2  - 16.6 
•  ·-1!11 
62.5  20.0  - 21;\9.5 
Ill 
- 51.0  261.4  -323.3  386.8  .. TABLE 6  Consolidated  accoum 
Items 
Volume at 
31  Dec. 
1969 
1958  1959  1960  1961 
-----------------------------------------l--------l---------1:---------l--------l--------
LIQUID ASSETS 
Economy  (households  and firms) 
Notes and coin 
Current accounts at:  banks  (1) 
Post Office 
Treasury 
The economy's primary liquidity 
Bank savings  deposits 
Post  Office  savings  accounts  and  certificates 
Short-term securities 
The  economy's secondary liquidity (a) 
Non-banking  financial  intermediaries: 
Current accounts  at:  banks 
Treasury 
Other bank deposits  (b) 
Public  sector  (2): 
Current  accounts at:  banks 
Treasury 
U  nclassifiable: 
Other current accounts at Treasury 
Bank drafts ("assegni circolari" and  "vaglia cam-
biari"), less net balance of coupons to be paid and 
cashed 
Total liquidity:  primary 
secondary (a)+(b) 
Total liquid assets 
BEING  COUNTER-ITEMS  TO  FINANCE  TO: 
Economy  (households  and firms) 
Banca d'Italia - UIC 
Banks 
Treasury and Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti 
Non-banking  financial  intermediaries: 
Banca d'Italia - UIC 
Banks 
Treasury and Cassa Depositi e  Prestiti 
Foreign  sector: 
Banca d' It  alia 
Banks 
Public  sector: 
Net  indebtedness  of  Treasury,  Cassa  Depositi  e 
Prestiti  and  public  corporations 
Minor  Treasury  items  (increase  in  deposits  +) 
Government  securities  with public  (--) 
Loans to local  and regional authorities, social se-
curity institutes and other Central Government 
bodies 
Discrepancies  or  unclassifiable  items 
Total 
45,048 
5,896 
16,606 
589 
86 
23,177 
16,841 
5,018 
12 
21,871 
1,247 
793 
138 
316 
2,338 
1,115 
1,223 
-- 17 
89 
-- 106 
26,429 
22,187 
48,616 
26,487 
70 
23,756 
2,661 
6,433 
101 
4,895 
1,437 
3,353 
3,331 
22 
14,873 
9,762 
1,827 
3,264 
6,548 
-2,530 
48,616 
12,95.0 
152.8 
359.9 
9.8 
-- 3.2 
519.3 
684.6 
131.2 
- 40.1 
775.7 
76.6 
39.7 
16.9 
20.0 
- 23.6 
-- 22.5 
-- 1.1 
6.9 
6.9 
559.2 
795.7 
1,354.9 
326.3 
2.4 
259.0 
64.9 
177.8 
7.5 
124.7 
45.6 
680.2 
594.9 
85.3 
403.0 
249.7 
-- 19.4 
- 12.5 
160.2 
-232.4 
1,354.9 
1,749.8 
183.8 
719.9 
23.31 
6.5. 
933.5 
666.1 
175.6 
~  25.4 
816.3 
32.7 
22.0 
.0 
16.7 
- 55.0 
-105.5 
50.5 
0.6 
0.6 
895.1 
833.0 
1,728.1 
889.5 
- 0.6 
781.5 
108.6 
115.3 
2.0 
89.1 
24.2 
595.3 
565.7 
29.6 
266.8 
248.3 
42.9 
88.3 
163.9 
-138.8 
1,728.1 
1,739.2 
197.0 
647.6 
13.9 
2.2 
860.7 
685.8 
196.3 
-- 3.6 
878.5 
64.2 
-- 67.3 
- 5.8 
137.3 
92.6 
14.6 
78.0 
1.1 
- 1.1 
879.1 
1.015.8 
1,894.9 
1,405.6 
- 0.5 
1,271. 7 
134.4 
204.2 
4.5 
187.1 
12.6 
- 65.6 
102.0 
--167.6 
79.1 
73.9 
- 22.1 
176.8 
204.1 
271.6 
1,894.9 
(1)  Including residents' foreign currency accounts and current accounts with Storage Agencies. 
2)  Bank current  accounts of the public corporations are taken into account in calculating the net indebtedness of the 
c~Treasury, Cassa  Depositi e  Prestiti and  Public corporations"  sector. 
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2,304.2 
359.9 
727.2 
25.6 
9.7 
1,122.4 
932.7 
243.0 
6.1 
1,181.8 
- 13.2 
99.3 
- 16.3 
- 96.2 
202.4 
71.7 
130.7 
- 33.8 
- 33.8 
1,374.0 
1,085.6 
2,459.6 
1,546.9 
5.7 
1,394.0 
147.2 
239.2 
0.3 
215.4 
23.5 
415.1 
390.3 
24.8 
286.5 
26.0 
98.2 
53.5 
215.8 
-- 28.1 
2,459.6  ! ~1 liqu;dity-creating  bodies 
(Changes  in  Lit. '000 million) 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  (*)  1968 (*)  1969  1970 
2,943.5  2,420.7  1,986.8  3,707.6  3,887.3  3,811.4  4,592.5  4,675.4  6,305.1 
390.0  440.8  270.6  343.1  378.1  328.2  359.4  694.2  488.0 
1,037.6  684.9  586.3  1,464.3  1,391.2  1,519.3  2,163.5  2,472.8  6,101.2 
68.0  79.8  18.6  31.0  51.3  49.7  65.3  52.5  70.6 
19.4  - 19.5  - 14.3  11.1  11.2  1.1  - 8.0  24.1  - 5.0 
1,515.0  1,186.0  861.2  1,849.5  1,831.8  1,898.3  2,580,2  3,243.6  6,654.8 
1,135.4  1,012.6  837.6  1,484.1  1,667.6  1,566.4  1,674.6  1,107.6  -518.6 
302.7  339.7  300.6  376.2  383.1  346.8  339.5  320.9  167.6 
- 9.6  -117.6  - 12.6  - 2.2  4.8  - 0·1  - 1.8  3.3  1.3 
1,428.5  1,234.7  1,125.6  1,858.1  2,055.5  1,913.1  2,012,3  1,431.8  -349.7 
96.7  117.5  92.0  232.7  176.5  82.8  60,4  3.0  606.2 
7.2  - 11.0  71.2  73.4  105.9  89.7  65.5  159.3  222.3 
10.0  30.7  20.0  59.5  2.9  26.3  - 27.6  0.1  66.2 
79.5  97.8  0.8  99.8  67.7  - 33.2  22.5  -156.4  317.2 
49.5  206.8  7.6  370.8  143.8  271.0  221.9  199.5  -260.5 
80.9  156.1  8.8  109.4  100.3  107.5  129.8  91.9  - 2.8 
- 31.4  50.7  - 1.2  261.4  43.5  163.5  92.1  107.6  -257.7 
- 8.3  35.8  72.7  - 48.8  0.4  -153.4  77.0  - 9.8  -156.3 
- - 46.1  3.5  5.1  5.4  1.6  27.0  -46.9 
- 8.3  35.8  26.6  - 52.3  - 4.7  -158.8  75.4  - 36.8  -109.4 
1,573.4  1,448.3  1,032.7  2,304.4  2,084.8  2,  131.9  2,917.0  3,592.7  6,527.0 
1,508.0  1,332.5  1,126.4  1,957.9  2,123.2  1,879.9  2,034.8  1,275.4  - 32.5 
----
8,081.4  2,780.8  2,159.1  4,262.3  4,208.0  4,011. 8  4,951.8  4,868.1  6,494.5 
2,051. 7  2,511.1  704.8  1,354.5  2,236.8  2,537.5  2,196.0  3,372.1  3,112.2 
5.9  14.5  6.8  1.4  13.4  5.3  7.2  - 1.9  2.7 
1,974.0  2,224.8  473.4  1,161.5  2,075.4  2,353.4  1,863.3  3,161.6  2,882.5 
71.8  271.8  224.6  191.6  148.0  178.8  325.5  212.4  227.0 
554.5  376.7  414.7  511.5  538.7  761.3  945.0  990.2  836.9 
3.1  17.9  11.9  - 7.7  6.3  - 12.5  11.4  50.2  29.6 
486.9  293.4  238.2  391.4  433.8  656.1  630.2  778.3  677.7 
64.5  65.4  164.6  127.8  98.6  117.7  303.4  161.7  129.6 
581.9  31.6  - 68.9  200.8  194.5  202.4  393.3  -869.5  222.4 
312.9  -374.5  207.5  597.4  161.7  324.5  - 36.7  -440.4  234.5 
269.0  406.1  -276.4  -396.6  32.8  -122.1  430.0  -429.1  - 12.1 
575.5  776.9  754.1  1'616.4  1,182.9  1,000.4  1,748.8  1,665.5  2,878.7 
180.6  145.4  141.9  820.9  1,068.4  396.4  798.2  766.2  2,308.0 
29.6  61.3  134.3  384.9  64.5  265.5  192.5  271.2  -401.2 
- 31.6  -174.1  24.8  194.7  636.0  541.2  248.6  189.3  12.3 
333.7  396.1  502.7  605.3  686.0  879.7  1,006.7  817.4  984.2 
-682.2  -915.5  354.4  579.1  55.1  -489.8  -331.3  -290.2  -555.7 
3,081.4  2,780.8  2,159.1  4,232.3  4,208.0  4,011.8  4,951.8  4,868.1  6,494.5 
(*) Figures adjusted to discount fortuitous movements in late 1967. 
263 TABLE 7 
Primary  and  secondary  liquidity as  a percentage  of gross  national  product 
Primary  Secondary  Bank current  Notes and coin  liquidity  liquidity  accounts 
1958  25.07  28.86  14.23  9.40 
1959  27.39  31.02  16.25  9.65 
1960  29.07  32.31  17.83  9.64 
1961  29.78  33.14  18.60  9.59 
1962  31.12  33.86  19.78  9.74 
1963  31.81  34.11  20.11  10.10 
1964  31.26  34.32  19.66  10.00 
1965  32.71  35.75  21.18  9.95 
1966  34.85  38.00  23.08  10.09 
1967  35.91  39.07  24.28  9.86 
1968  37.77  40.28  25.96  9.94 
1969  39.51  39.87  27.83  9.82 
1970  43.15  36.46  31.35  9.95 
N.B. The ratios are calculated on the basis of moving averages for  13  periods. 
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Ci' 
Vl 
Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Cash  in hand 
105.3 
109.6 
116.3 
121.7 
193.5 
225.8 
181.6 
217.3 
196.1 
252.7 
323.3 
337.7 
364.0 
Deposits at 
Banca d'Italia 
86.7 
61.2 
55.5 
63.6 
110.1 
75.1 
113.8 
102.7 
109.8 
129.0 
140.0 
149.3 
224.8 
Deposits  at 
Treasury and 
Cassa  Depositi 
e  Prestiti 
17.1 
10.7 
32.1 
16.4 
11.6 
13.6 
24.1 
15.3 
15.0 
24.3 
16.0 
22.0 
23.2 
TABLE 8 
Bank  liquidity 
Unused credit 
facilities  at 
Banca d' ltalia 
242.8 
236.6 
249.2 
263.1 
283.7 
349.5 
461.3 
505.2 
514.0 
503.0 
511.1 
486.7 
698.7 
(in  Lil. '000  milium) 
Storage Agency  Free holdings of 
bills and  Convertible  Total  Treasury bills  current accounts  currency 
371.2  98.4  125.2  1,046.7 
580.2  114.7  189.4  1,302.4 
221.4  105.3  49.0  828.8 
131.3  106.5  48.6  751.2 
32.3  138.9  343.5  1,113.6 
55.9  63.1  - 783.0 
123.3  51.8  86.1  1,042.0 
113.6  45.7  115.7  1,115.5 
139.8  45.6  188.3  1,208.6 
89.8  52.1  106.7  1,157.6 
108.0  54.0  266.0  1,418.4 
- 42.0  58.0  1,095.7 
- 29.4  142.4  1,482.5 "-.) 
a-.  a-. 
Banca d' Italia 
Treasury 
Treasury  bills  and 
Year  bills  (Banca  Long- interest- Treasury 
d'Italia)  term  se- bearing  current 
excluded)  curitics  certificates  account 
Cassa  Depo- (1) 
siti  e  Prestiti 
1958  1,225.7  182.8  325.5  136.8 
1959  1,697.6  208.6  131.3  -162'4 
1960  1,741.6  220.9  27.6  -159.0 
1961  1,840.2  256.2  3.1  -262.9 
1962  1,968.8  283.3  136.2  -320.3 
1963  1,737.3  274.5  81.6  506.1 
1964  1,809.4  442.9  241.6  558.5 
1965  2,018.0  494.5  108.0  912.6 
1966  2,109.2  692.0  141.5  537.2 
1967  2,097.2  861.0  153.5  165.9 
1968  2,170.7  1,080.3  254.8  286.7 
1969  2,024.2  2,280.3  512.0  -112.7 
1970  2,023.3  3,543.5  175.0  1 ,591. 6 
(1)  Figures preceded by minus sign indicate a  Treasury credit, 
TABLE  9 
Analysis  of Treasury's  short-term  debts  (in  Lit, '000 million) 
Post  Office  (collection) 
Transactions 
with credit  Treasury 
Interest- and social  notes  Grand 
Other  Total  bearing  Savings  Current  security  and coins  Total 
certificates  accounts  accounts  institutions 
1,071.7  1,716.8  1,439.7  254.0  116.4  215.8  49.6  5,018.0 
1,070.1  1,247.6  1,573.6  295.7  140.2  217.5  61.8  5,234.0 
1,098.3  1,187.8  1,723.0  342.6  154.5  227.1  78.5  5,455.0 
1,067.3  1,063.7  1,903.4  405.2  183.1  211.1  83.6  5,695.3 
1,154.6  1,253.8  2,103.8  502.5  251.3  196.1  96.3  6,277.6 
1,157.5  2,019.7  2,327.7  623.3  333.4  110.1  104.7  7,256.2 
1,202.1  2,445.1  2,529.7  721.9  353.2  75.9  115.8  8,051.0 
1,223.4  2,738.5  2,796.9  830.9  382.9  89.0  125.7  8, 981.9 
1,289.3  2,668.0  3,070.7  940.5  435.2  71.3  168.2  9,455.1 
1,337.5  2,517.9  3,325.1  1,032.6  543.6  138.1  182.0  9,836.5 
1,395.9  3,017.7  3,560.5  1,136.5  552.2  126.0  195.4  10,759.0 
1,455.0  4,134.6  3,762.8  1,255.1  606.7  93.3  207.3  12,084.0 
1,566.9  6,877.0  3,783.0  1,402.5  680.3  178.9  219.8  15,164.8 N 
(]'. 
-._J 
TABLE  10 
Banca  d'Italia- UIC  Lending  to  banks,  special  institutions  and  private  individuals 
Ordinary rediscounts (1) 
Year 
Banks 
------
1 
1958  0.9 
1959  0.9 
1960  2.9 
1961  16.1 
1962  24.2 
1963  321.2 
1964  112.3 
1965  36.2 
1966  205.9 
1967  461.4 
1968  497.2 
1969  734.5 
1970  54.3 
(1)  Including rediscounts of Treasury bills. 
(2)  Ordinary and fixed-term. 
Special 
institutions 
2 
2.7 
2.2 
2.2 
1.9 
3.3 
4.6 
8.7 
4.2 
4.5 
5.5 
5.5 
12.8 
4.4 
Total 
3 
3.6 
3.1 
5.1 
18.0 
27.5 
325.8 
121.0 
40.4 
210.4 
466.9 
502.7 
747.3 
58.7 
Advances  (2)  and deferred payments 
Banks  Special  Individuals  Total  institutions 
---------
4  5  6  7 
28.2  0.9  4.8  33.9 
42.3  0.7  3.2  46.2 
68.2  0.6  2.8  71.6 
109.1  0.9  3.3  113.3 
267.4  1.1  3.8  272.3 
376.0  0.5  2.1  378.6 
333.0  1.0  1.9  335.9 
401.2  1.4  1.4  404.0 
756.9  0.8  1.4  759.1 
1,207.6  1.0  0.9  1,209.5 
1,331.6  2.7  3.2  1,337.5 
1,623.9  16.9  2.0  1,642.8 
817.2  21.3  2.6  841.1 
(in  Lit. '000  million) 
Other lending  Total 
------
8  9 
18.7  56.2 
14.7  64.0 
10.8  87.5 
194.2  325.5 
177.2  477.0 
183.0  887.4 
190.9  647.8 
24.7  469.1 
25.7  995.2 
23.6  1. 700,0 
36.7  1,876.9 
37.4  2,427.5 
37.5  937.3 N 
o-
00 
TABLE  11 
Compulsory  reserves  and  backing  for  bank  drafts 
In  monetary base instruments  In long-term  securities 
Year 
Deposit  (1)  Government  Special 
at Banca d'  Italia  Treasury  bills  Total  securities  institutions  Other bonds 
bonds 
1958  856.6  614.1  1,470.7  80.8  0.3  -
1959  799.5  892.5  1,692.0  77.4  0.2  -
1960  699.8  1,287.9  1,987.7  75.7  ...  -
1961  803.2  1,479.6  2,282.8  74.4  ...  -
1962  953.1  1,522.0  2,475.1  62.3  ...  -
1963  1,275.2  1,507.5  2,782.7  60.7  126.2  -
1964  1,427.1  1,481.9  2,909.0  54.4  141.5  .119.0 
1965  1,703.7  1,668.6  3,372.3  66.0  145.9  233.9 
1966  1'  921.3  1,765.4  3,686.7  80.5  329.3  339.2 
1967  2,138.8  1,735.0  3,873.8  151.5  532.4  475.4 
1968  2,412.4  1,844.3  4,256.7  318.7  607.7  589.3 
1969  2,758.7  1,912.5  4,671.2  453.0  646.4  712.5 
1970  3,287.8  1,896.1  5,183.9  465.3  983.7  803.5 
--
(1)  Up to December 1961,  including the special "M" accounts in which were deposited the compulsory reserves  against lira deposits of non-residents. 
(in  Lit, '000  million) 
Total 
Total 
81.1  1,551.8 
77.6  1,769.6 
75.7  2,063.4 
74.4  2,357.2 
62.3  2,537.4 
186.9  2,969.6 
314.9  3,223.9 
445.8  3,818.1 
749.0  4,435.7 
1,159.3  5,033.1 
1,515.7  5,772.4 
1,811. 9  6,483.1 
2,252.5  7,436.4 TABLE  12 
Banca  d'Italia- UIC:  securities  held  (*) 
Government securities or Government 
guaranteed securities 
Year 
Purchased  Open-market 
on issue  (l)  operations 
1958  15.4  - 5.8 
1959  13.2  12.6 
1960  0.7  11.6 
1961  18.8  16.5 
1962  14.2  12.9 
1963  - 1.3  - 7.5 
1964  158.4  10.0 
1965  60.6  - 9.0 
1966  436.9  -239.4 
1967  475.4  -306.4 
1968  643.0  -423.7 
1969  1,229.8  267.8 
1970  1,098.4  -172.2 
(*)  Excluding Treasury bills up to 1968. 
(i) Net of redemption. 
Total 
9.6 
25.8 
12-3 
35.3 
27.1 
- 8.8 
168.4 
51.6 
197.5 
169.0 
219.3 
1,497.6 
926.2 
(Changes  in Lit. '000 milli<m  balance-shut prices) 
Other bonds 
open-market  Total 
operations 
5.6  15.2 
2.0  27.8 
5.3  17.6 
5.8  41.1 
6.0  33.1 
5.5  - 3.3 
10.1  178.5 
- 51.6 
1.9  199.4 
- 1.1  167.9 
- 219.3 
- 1,497.6 
- 926.2 
269 IV 
-...! 
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TABLE  13 
Money  and  capital  market  rates  in  Italy 
(average  for  the  period-jJerctntage) 
Commercial Banks' rates (5)  Bonds 
Basic  He  discount  Fixed  -ter.m  Interbank  Multi-year  of certain credit 
Period  official rate  ordinary  advances  Treasury  accounts  Treasury  institutions 
(1)  portfolio  (2)  (3)  bills (4)  (5)  (6)  bonds  (Istituti credito 
Borrowers  Creditors  mobiliare) 
--------
1958  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - - 6.19  6.74 
1959  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - - 5.42  5.79 
1960  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - - 5.26  5.56 
1961  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - - 4.97  5.53 
1962  3.50  3.50  - 3.35  - - 3.47  5.05  5.92 
1963  3.50  3.50  - 3.46  - - 3.59  5.19  6.21 
1964  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - 3.63  5.74  7.26 
1965  3.50  3.50  - 3.50  - - 3.63  5.39  6.86 
1966  3.50  3.50  - 3.45  - - 3.58  5.49  6.55 
1967  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.45  - - 3.58  5.59  6.66 
1968  3.5()  3.50  3.50  3.43  - - 3.56  5.61  6.78 
1969  3.50-4.00  4.34  4.58  3.77  - - 4.41  5.80  7.06 
1970  4.00-5.50  6.57  6.26  6.50  - - 6.85  7.73  9.05 
1970  - January  4.00  5.18  5.34  - - - - 6.59  7.79 
February  4.00  5.41  5.37  6.50  - - - 7.07  8.09 
March  4.00-5.50  6.96  6.56  6.50  8.22  - 6.54  7.52  8.58 
April  5.50  6.85  6.65  - - - - 7.55  8  54 
May  5.50  6.97  6.27  - - - - 7.76  9.07 
June  5.50  6.98  6.62  - 9.15  6.71  7.36  8.01  9.78 
July  5.50  6.90  6.79  - - - - 8.10  10.19 
August  5.50  6.50  6.95  - - - - 8.13  9.77 
September  5.50  6.95  6.99  - 9.58  6.49  7.78  8.03  9.22 
October  5.50  6.88  6.50  - - - - 8.06  9.38 
November  5.50  7.00  5.50  - - - - 8.08  9.28 
December  5.50  6.25  5.59  - 9.54  5.54  5.72  7.90  8.92 
-----
(1)  Valid for  all rediscounting operations with the Banca d'Italia.  Since 9 January 1971  the basic rate for ordinary advances has been 5%.  The increase in August 1969 did not apply to the rediscounting 
of Storage Agency bills or agricultural bills of exchange, for which the 3.5% rate continues to be applied. 
(2)  From I  J\lly 1969 average rate weighted in relation to the 1.5% supplement applied to: 
(a)  the rediscounting of ordinary bills of exchange for the banks wherever the average total discounted under the ordinary portfolio in the preceding calendar half-year equalled 5% or more of the 
minimum reserves  at 31  March or 30  September; 
(b)  all redisconnting for  the central institutions for  classes of banks  (istiiuti centrali  di categoria). 
(3)  From 24 March  1969,  average rate weighted in relation to the supplement of 0.5%  for  each new operation in the course of the calendar half-year up to a  maximum of 1.5~~ of the official rate. 
(4)  Discount rate  applicable to Treasury bills for  free  investment.  Issues since May  1969  have been subject to separate maxima for bills to be placed to reserves and for those intended for free  investment. 
The discount rate applicable to the first has been raised from 3. 75%  to 5.50%; the public tender rate applies for  the second, 
(5)  Indicative rates reported by the Central Risk  Office. 
(6)  For amounts of at least 40  millions. N 
-...J  ...... 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Assets  and 
short-term 
investments 
140.0 
125.2 
189.4 
212.1 
254.4 
343.5 
392.1 
369.0 
324.2 
482.4 
528.4 
530.4 
555.1 
583.5 
Sight liquid 
Total 
Blocked 
In  by the 
liquidity  monetary 
authorities 
140.0  -
125.2  -
189.4  -
49.0  163.1 
48.6  205.8 
343.5  -
- 392.1 
86.1  282.9 
115.7  208.5 
188.4  294.0 
106.7  421.7 
266.0  264.4 
58.0  497.1 
142.4  441.1 
TABLE  14 
Banks'  external  position 
Assets 
Non-liquid  assets 
Foreign  Lire  Total 
currency 
-
13.5  13.4  26.9 
34.1  15.7  49.8 
71.1  22.6  93.7 
232.9  26.6  259.5 
330.8  26.7  357.5 
523.5  43.8  567.3 
354.3  56.0  410.3 
452.5  77.6  530.1 
1,125.5  96.1  1 ,221. 6 
1,460.5  124.2  1,584.7 
1,589.2  130.1  1,719.3 
2,499.2  195.3  2,694.5 
3,683.0  286.8  3,969.8 
5,513.4  226.7  5,740.1 
(end-of-year  situation in Lit, '000 million) 
Liabilities 
Foreign  currency 
Net 
Total  Short- Lire  Total  position 
Deposits  term 
debts 
166.9  188.5  72.7  42.5  303.7  -136.8 
175.0  276.0  52.5  68.6  397.1  -222.1 
283.1  358.4  77.5  98.9  534.8  -251.7 
471.6  391.3  52.8  111.6  555.7  - 84.1 
611.9  498.5  45.8  176.5  720.8  -108.9 
910.8  981.2  112.4  195.1  1,288.7  -377.9 
802.4  1,214.4  134.3  237.7  1,586.4  -784.0 
899.1  1,076.4  139.4  190.9  1,406.7  -507.6 
1,545.8  1,214.4  168.6  273.8  1,656.8  -111.0 
2,067.1  1,505.4  115.2  302.7  1,923.3  143.8 
2,247.7  1,734.4  144.8  346.8  2,226.0  21.7 
3,224.9  2,215.6  154.4  403.2  2,773.2  451.7 
4,524.9  3,775.5  239.1  487.9  4,502.5  22.4 
6,323.6  5,688.6  253.5  370.7  6,313.0  10.6 
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MONETARY POLICY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC  FACTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Section  I  - Institutional framework  and  structural aspects 
Para. I -Institutional framework 
Policy machinery 
1.  In  the  Netherlands,  monetary  policy  (in  the  narrow  sense,  that  is  to  say 
excluding  budgetary  and  tax  policy)  is  a  matter,  in  the  first  instance,  for  the 
Central  Bank,  which  has  responsibilities  under  Dutch Law  ensuring it a  conside-
rable  degree  of  independence  from  the  Government.  Ultimate  responsibility  lies 
with the Government- the Bank Law of  1948  gives  the Finance Minister condi· 
tiona!  power  to give  instructions  to  the  Central  Bank  if he  feels  that  they  are 
necessary  to coordinate  the Government's  monetary  and  financial  policy  with the 
policy of  the Bank. However, the accepted view is that this provision is  to be used 
only in the last resort and no such instructions have ever been issued. 
Task and activities of the Central Bank 
2.  The Bank  Law of  1948  was  enacted when the Central  Bank  was  nationalized 
and  governs  its  objectives,  working  methods  and organization.  The  task  of  the 
Central Bank is  to  regulate  the value  of  the Netherlands monetary  unit in such  a 
way as is deemed most conducive to the welfare of the country and to keep its value 
as  stable as  possible (Article 9 (1)  ).  Maintenance of the domestic purchasing power 
of  the  currency  and  balance  of  payments  equilibrium  have  thus  been laid  down 
as  the specific purposes of the monetary policy. 
In the monetary policy framework,  the Central Bank is  responsible for supervising 
the credit system. Apart from  the scope  for  engaging in discount and open market 
policy, the powers available to it in this connection are laid down in a specific law, 
the law on supervision of the credit system which instructs the Central Bank to en-
deavour, in the first instance, to work out an agreed approach, in consultation with 
the representative organizations of the credit system, on the action which it should 
take when it discerns signs that the sitution is shaping in such a way as  to constitute 
an  actual  or potential  threat  to  its  task  of  maintaining  the  value  of  the  Dutch 
currency.  This  provision  is  a  further  development  of  the  traditional  method  -
already  in  existence  before  the  war - of  implementing  policy  on  the  basis  of 
gentlemens'  agreements  between  the  Central Bank  and  the  banking  system.  This 
·method  had always  worked  satisfactorily but the law  nevertheless  provides  scope 
- subject  to  restrictions  as  regards  duration  of  validity  and  ratification  by 
Parliament - for  the  issue  of  general  directives  if  consultation  should  prove 
abortive.  Such  directives  can  impose  minimum  reserve  or  liquidity  ratios  and 
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quantitative or selective  credit  restrictions.  This  statutory power  has  never  been 
used. 
Apart from its activities in the credit field -where it acts as  lender of last resort 
among  other functions - the  Central Bank  is  the  holder  of  the official  gold  and 
foreign exchange reserves 1 the issuer of bank notes, the sole fiscal agent and banker 
to  the Government and the banker for the banking system (commercial banks and 
agricultural  credit  institutions).  Relationships  between  local  authorities  and  the 
Central Bank  are, in  general,  of lesser  significance  although the Bank for  Nether-
lands  Municipalities  (Bank  voor  Nederlandsche Gemeenten), which  is  included  in 
this  sector  and  also  the  municipalities  themselves,  have  access  to  Central  Bank 
facilities;  they hold most of their cash resources with the banking system, however. 
The  private  sector -including the  savings  banks  and other financial  institutions 
- has  virtually no direct contact with the Central Bank. 
Relations between the Central Bank and the Government 
3.  As  regards  relations  between  the Central  Bank and  the Government,  the law 
sets  a  low  ceiling  of  Fl.  150  million  on  the  interest-free  advances  which  the 
Treasury is  entitled to take up from  the Bank. These  advances  may  only be used 
to cover  temporary  requirements (1948  Bank 'Law,  Article  20).  Above  this limit, 
the Bank  can decide  freely  and is  not obliged  to .:make  advances  to the Treasury. 
Since the enactment of the Bank Law, the idea has gained ground in the Netherlands 
that  the  monetary  influence  of  the  authorities  is  not  solely  a  function. of  the 
extent  to  which  the Treasury  resorts  to  Central  Bank  advances  for  its financing 
requirements but is  also  determined by  the extent  to which all public  authorities 
- the  Government  and  local  authorities  together - place  floating  debt  with  the 
money-creating  institutions  or the public  to meet  their financing  requirements.  In 
the  Dutch  view,  it follows  that  all  responsibility  for  the  monetary  behaviour  of 
public  authorities  should  lie  with  the  Government,  as  regards  the  influence 
exerted by  the finances  of both the  Government and  the local  authorities, which 
the  Government  is  empowered  to  supervise  by  the  Public  Institutions'  Capital 
Expenditure  Law  of  1963.  The  Central  Bank  can  exercise  only  a  limited  direct 
influence  on  the  behaviour  of  the  authorities  in  this  area.  But  it can-and 
considers  this  to be its duty as  the  main  monetary  adviser of the Government -
issue warnings if it feels  that the  monet~ry behaviour of the authorities is  not on 
the appropriate lines. 
Impact and scope of monetary policy 
4.  As  Chapter II will show in more detail, the purpose of monetary policy in the 
Netherlands  is  to influence  the  liquidity of  the economy  by  influencing  domestic 
sources  of  new  liquidity:  the  money-creating  institutions  and  the  authorities.  In 
practice,  all  financial institutions classed as  'money-creating' because their liabilities 
constitute liquidity (partly or wholly) can  be controlled by monetary policy under 
the relevant legislation. These institutions are  the two giro transfer services, which 
are formally under public surveillance (de facto  the Postal Cheque Office and Giro 
Transfer Service has been subject to the general economic surveillance of the Central 
Bank since September 1970), and the credit institutions (commercial banks, agricul-
1  The  Central  Bank  is  also  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  foreign  exchange  legislation. 
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tural credit institutions, security  credit institutions and savings  institutions) which 
have been brought under the supervision of the Central Bank by the Law on Super-
vision of the Credit System. The Central Bank also  monitors the business manage-
ment  of  the  institutions  and  has  issued  liquidity  and  solvency  directives  in  this 
connection} 
Para. II - Structural aspects 
Para. II  -1:  Structure of the financial  institutions 
Relative  importance of financial  institutions 
5.  The last decade has seen some changes in the relative importance of the various 
categories  of  financial  institutions.  The  Central  Bank's  share  in  the  combined 
balance-sheet  total  of  these  institutions  has  declined;  that  of  the  other  money-
creating institutions has  increased, mainly  owing to the relatively large increase in 
the  foreign  business  of the commercial  banks.  Similarly,  and  more  particularly  in 
recent years, the activities of the money-creating institutions (excluding the Central 
Bank)  have  been  expanding  faster  than  those  of  the  "funds" (see  Table  below) 
and savings banks. There has been no net change in the share of the other financial 
institutions. 
It should  be  remembered  that there  is  some  double  counting here,  since  a large 
proportion of  these  other institutions, more  particularly  the Bank for  Netherlands 
Municipalities, are financed  to a considerable extent by long-term borrowings from 
"funds" savings  institutions  and  money-creating  institutions. 
Money-creating institutions 
a) Commercial banks 
6.  In terms of size,  the commercial banks  are by  far  the most important category 
of  money-creating  institution (excluding  the Central Bank).  The commercial banks 
account  for  75  to 80 %  of the combined  balance-sheet total of these institutions, 
while  the  giro  transfer  services  represent  10  to  15 %  and  the  agricultural credit 
institutions  account  roughly  for  the  remainder.2  From  the outset,  the commercial 
banks  mainly  concerned  themselves  with providing  short-term loans  to  commerce 
and industry. Since the mid-fifties they have also  gone in for medium-term lending, 
for which most other financial institutions showed little if any interest. At the same 
time  they  have actively  sought  to attract public  savings  to finance  these  loans  as 
well  as  their investments  on the capital  market  and  debt-certificate loans.  At the 
end of 1970 long-term investments accounted  for  18% of the commercial  banks' 
balance-sheet total and balances on savings accounts just under 10 %  (Table 2). 
Since  the  end  of  the  fifties,  particularly  after  the  guilder  was  restored  to  con-
vertibility  at the end of  19.58,  the  commercial  banks  have  built up  a substantial 
foreign  business - not only  as  an  investment  outlet for funds  from  surpluses  on 
the balance of payments but also  as  international credit intermediaries, reinvesting 
1  Its general  economic  supervisory  powers  ar-e  extended  to  the  Postal  Savings  Bank  and  giro  transfer  services  by 
the  new  draft  version  - tabled  in  the  Second  (Lower)  Chamber  in December  1970  - of  the  current  Law  on 
SupervisioJ>  of .the  Credit  System. 
,-Apa~tf;:o:-;thr:""af;;';emeJ>ti;;n;:j groups  there  ate  a  number-of";mall.inStitutions  suc~the seeuritrcredit 
institutions (etfectenkredietinstellingen),  but they  are not  large  enough  to be of  any  great  significance. 
277 THE NETHERLANDS  - BASIC  FACTS 
in other countries funds raised abroad. At the end of  1970 claims  on non-residents 
made  up  38 ~  %  of  the balance-sheet  total,  and  liabilities  37 %. 
Finally  in  recent  years  the  commercial  banks  have  also  engaged  extensively  in 
«family  bank"  activities,  by  providing  personal  loans,  hire-purchase  credits,  gua-
ranteed-payment  cheques  and  so  forth.  They  are  tending  to  develop  as  multi-
purpose  institutions. 
b) Giro transfer services 
7. The  Postal  Cheque  Office  and  Giro  Transfer  Service,  accounting  for  about 
90 %  of  the balance-sheet  total of  the giro  transfer system holds its liquid funds 
-which, in  accordance  with  the  regulations,  must  amount  to at least  10 %  of 
the sight deposits entrusted to it-at the Treasury. It places the rest on the capital 
market.  Amsterdam's  municipal  giro  transfer  service  pays  all  funds  it receives 
from  account  holders  into  the  municipal  account. 
c) Agricultural credit institutions 
8.  Finally,  the agricultural credit institutions, a group which accounts for virtually 
all  the  other  money-creating  institutions,  are  included  among  both  the  money-
creating  and  the  savings  institutions,  on  the  basis  of  the  overall  ratio  between 
liquid liabilities  and other long-term  resources.  Their business  is  mainly local,  and 
on  a  cooperative  basis,  and  virtually  all  of  them  are  affiliated  to  two  central 
institutions,  which  act  as  central  policy-making  bodies.  The  volume  of  savings 
bank operations  is  four  to  five  times  as  large  as  that of short-term business,  the 
latter mainly  comprising  short-term  advances  to the private sector.  Such  advances 
Relative  importance  of financial  institutions 
(%  share  in combined  balance-sheet  total) 
1960  1963  1966 
1.  Central Bank  11  9  8 
2.  Other  money-creating  institut-
ions  23  22  24 
3.  Funds  (1)  and  savings  banks  48  50  50 
4.  Bank  for  Netherlands  Munici-
palities  10  10  10 
5.  Other  financial  institutions  (2)  8  9  8 
6.  Total  100  100  100 
(Total, in Fl. '000 million)  (64. 7)  (87. 8)  (118. 5) 
(Total, as  %  of  GNP)  (151)  (166)  (157) 
(1)  Funds:  Life insurance  companies,  pension funds,. social  security funds. 
(2)  Mcortgagec \>ank~ and investment companies account c  for  about two-thirds of this item. 
(3)  Estimate.  c 
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1968  1970 
6  6 
26  30 
49  46 
11  10 
8  8 (3) 
100  100 
(151. 7)  (197. 2) 
(166)  (174) Institutional  framework 
account  fairly  constantly  for  17  to  18 %  of  short-term  advances  by  commercial 
banks  to  the private  sector. 
Non-money-creating institutions 
9.  Like the bulk of the other non-money-creating institutions, "funds" and savings 
institutions are typical capital market institutions by their very nature. Apart from 
recent developments in the case of the General Savings Banks {see item 10 below), 
they  accept  only  long-term  funds,  of which  about  90 %  (savings  institutions)  to 
95 %  ("funds") are  reinvested  on a  long-term  basis.  The  short-term  investments 
are  mainly liquid (balances with banks and investments  in short-term Government 
and  local-authority  securities);  short-term  investments  in  the  private  sector  (cash 
loans,  often used  as  bridging  credits  pending  the  grant  of  long-term  loans)  have 
always remained limited to a maximum of 1 ~  %  of the balance-sheel total. They 
have  never  exceeded  9 %  of  short-term  advances  made  by  the  money-creating 
institutions  to  the  private  sector.  With  one  exception,  the  non-money-creating 
institutions provide  little  or no  medium-term  credit to the  private  sector. 
Of  the  non-money-creating  institutions,  the  Bank  for  Netherlands  Municipalities 
(B.N.M.),  which  acts  as  the  central  money-collecting  institution  for  the  munici-
palities,  takes  up a  limited  amount  of  short-term  money -including temporarily 
available  municipality  funds- and  makes  it  available  to  other  munipalities.  In 
Dutch  monetary  and financial  analyses,  however,  the  B.N.M.  is  not  treated  as  a 
money-creating  institution  but  as  the  arm  of  the  local  authorities  which  it in 
fact  is. 
The group "other financial  institutions"  includes  those  hire-purchase  finance  com-
panies  which  are  not  subsidiaries  of  money-creating  institutions.  The  lending  of 
subsidiaries  is included in the short·term advances of the parent institutions to  the 
private  sector.  The  latter  accounts  for  more  than  half  of  hire  purchase  loans, 
which in general  are  fairly  short-term.  The total amount  of hire  purchase  credit 
in the  Netherlands  has  always  been limited.  At the end of 1970 it amounted to 
about Fl.  1,300  million,  or approximately  1 %  of  GNP. 
Change in the character of the general savings banks 
10.  The  savings  institutions  were  not  classed  as  money-creating  institutions  till 
1969, because  their liabilities  coud  not be regarded  as  liquid  resources.  Like  the 
other  non-money-creating  financial  institutions,  in  principle  they  merely  chan-
nelled  savings,  that  is  to  say  they  transferred  purchasing  power  from  one  eco-
nomic group  (savers)  to another (investors).  But recent years  have  seen  a  change 
in the character of the general  savings  banks, which  account for about a  third of 
the  combined  balance-sheet  total  of  the  savings  institutions,  in  that  they  have 
sought to develop into family  banks, by opening wage and pension accounts which 
can be drawn on by  cheque and used for  transfers, by issuing-guaranteed-payment 
cheques  and  so  forth.  Owing  to the  resultant increasing  monetary  significance  of 
these institutions, they were brought within the scope of monetary policy in 1969. 
Para.  II-2:  Banking  system;  the  money  and  capital  markets 
Issuing operations - placing po~ibilities 
11.  In the Netherlands bonds and shares are generally issued through banks, which 
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provide their counters for this purpose (counter issues) or take issues firm;  in the 
latter case they retain any unsubscribed part of the issue in their own portfolios. 
There is no  general quantitative limitation on the size  of the investment portfolio 
of banks  (commercial  banks  and  agricultural  credit institutions),  apart  from  any 
stemming from  the Central Bank's  solvency  rules for investments in securities not 
issued for  the account  of  Dutch public authorities. Monetary  policy  can  influence 
the investment trend during a credit squeeze, when the expansion of all long-term 
assets has  to be  limited to the increase of long-term funds (see Chapter II, Section 
IV).  The  capital market investments  of  commercial banks-including an  increas-
ing  proportion  of  debt  certificate  loans  to  local  authorities  in  the  sixties- ac-
counted for 6 ;1 %  of their assets at the end of 1970 (Table 2). 
The general savings  banks, like the other savings institutions, invest most of  their 
funds  on  the  capital  market.  They  are  subject,  as  regards  the  quality  of  these 
investments,  to guidelines  issued by  the Central Bank.  The issuing  of such guide-
lines'  for the savings  bank business of the agricultural credit institutions has  been 
delegated  by  the  Central  Bank  to  the  central  institutions.  The  Postal  Savings 
Bank  (Rijkspostspaarbank),  finally,  operates  within  the  framework  of  rules  and 
regulations,  issued  by  the  authorities.  Annex  3 surveys  the capital  market invest-
ments  of  the  financial  institutions. 
Capital market policy 
12.  In  19.54  the  Central  Bank  and  the  Nederlandse  Bankiersvereniging  (Nether-
land' Bankers'  Association),  acting  as  the representative  of the commercial banks, 
concluded a gentlemen's agreement whereby  the banks undertook to approach  the 
Central Bank before making public issues  of Fl.  10  million or more.  On the basis 
of this  agreement,  designed  to maintain order on the capital  market,  the  Central 
Bank has  regularly acted to postpone issues temporarily - especially in recent years 
when the capital market has  been under fairly  severe pressure. There is  no  regula-
tion of the debt-certificate loan market, where the danger of congestion is  generally 
smaller,  partly because  issue  dates  are  usually  staggered. 
As  noted  in Para.  II-4,  major  capital  flows  into  or out of  the  Netherlands  can 
give rise  to capital market intervention on monetary grounds, the instrument being 
the  authorization  of  non-residents'  issues  in the  Netherlands  and of residents'  is-
sues  abroad.  No other action is  taken on  the capital market - interest rate policy 
implemented through open market transactions is  unknown in the Netherlands. 
Relations between money and capital markets 
13.  The capital and money markets are fairly clearly separated in the Netherlands, 
mainly  because  there is  virtually no paper that is  transferred from  one  market to 
the other as  it mover towards maturity,  owing to  the  practice of redeeming bond 
loans  by annual  drawings.  The  remaining life  of paper  is  therefore uncertain,  so 
that even paper fairly close to maturity can hardly fulfil a specific liquidity function, 
as  is  the case  with Treasury paper and cash  and call-money  loans  to the Govern-
ment  and  local  authorities,  for  instance.  In practice  bonds  are  generally  bought 
as  a  long-term  investment,  considered  as  such  and  held  till  they  mature.  The 
picture might  change as  a result of the recent  development of medium-term bond 
issues  which  are  not  redeemable  in advance.  There  is  narrow  but lively  dealing 
in  debt-certificate  loans  (  onderhandse  leningen),  which  have  accounted  for  more 
than half the calls  on  the  capital  market in recent years. 
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The character of those operating on the market also  leads to a fairly sharp division 
between  the  money  and capital markets.  Normally,  the authorities  only  resort to 
the money  market in order to cover  seasonal fluctuations  in their finances.  Banks 
and  undertakings  operate  primarily  on  the money  market  while  the  "funds"  and 
savings  banks  are  typical capital market institutions, which  only  switch from  one 
market  to the other if marked interest rate  differences  arise  or are expected. 
Money market investments versus lending 
14.  The  tie  up between  money  market  and  lending  activities  is  also  fairly  loose, 
owing to differences between operators and rate formation on the two markets. 
As  regards  market  operators,  private enterprise  resorts  to  only  a  relatively  small 
extent to the non-banking section of the money market in order to cover its current 
financing  needs,  while  the  non-money-creating  financial  institutions  which  supply 
this  market - "funds"  and savings  institutions in particular - make  very  limited 
advances  to the private sector  (as  has  already  been seen).  The upshot is  that the 
domestic money  market is  tapped mainly by the Government and local authorities, 
and  supplied by the banks and to  a smaller  extent  the other financial  institutions 
and  business  concerns.  In addition,  in  recent  years  business  concerns  have  lent 
not inconsiderable  amounts  to each  other when circumstances  have  been unusual, 
for instance when credit has been very tight as  a result of credit squeezes or when 
lending and  money-market  rates have  differed  sharply. 
As  regards  the  formation  of  rates,  the  interest  on  short-term  bank  loans  to  the 
private  sector  is  generally  about  1·5 %  above  the  promissory  note  discount  rate 
of  the  Central  Bank.  On the money  market short-term Treasury  paper is  not,  in 
practice,  sold  at a  rate  higher  than Bank  rate  since  it can  be  rediscounted  if it 
has  not  more  than  105  days  to  run  to  maturity.1  The  Central  Bank's  rate  for 
advances,  usually  half  a  percent - but since  August  1969  one  percent - above 
Bank  rate,  normally  more  or less  establishes  a  ceiling  for  call  money.  Cash  loans 
to  local  authorities,  which  have  a  smaller  liquidity  value  because  they  are  not 
rediscountable  or eligible  as  collateral at the Central Bank, carry a rate of interest 
which  is  fairly  closely  linked  with  the  net  yield  obtainable  on  the  Eurodollar 
market. 
Tendencies for funds  to be shifted between the money and credit markets emerge 
if  the  difference  between  the  Central  Bank's rates- to which  interest  rates  for 
short-term advances  to the private sector  are  thus  related- and the net yield on 
the Eurodollar market exceeds a certain margin. This occurred, for instance, in the 
closing  months  of 1970 and the first  quarter of  1971, when the net yield on the 
Eurodollar  market  plunged  but  Central  Bank  rates  were  not  lowered  owing  to 
persisting  cyclical  stresses  and  a  current  external  payments  deficit.  As  a  result, 
the  interest  rate  on  the  money  market dropped  so  far  below  that on short-term 
bank loans that business  concerns began to borrow heavily  on the money  market, 
to a large extent from  each other, at rates based on those obtained on this market 
(near  banking). 
Relationship between lending and the capital market 
15.  There  is  admittedly  a  fairly  dose  relationship  between bank  lending  to the 
1 Cf.  items  28  and  29  below,  and  Chapter  II, Section  I, item  42. 
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private sector and  the capital market, in the sense  that relative interest rate levels, 
actual and expected, will often influence the private sector when choosing between 
these  two  sources  of  finance.  The  link  is  very  marked  during  a  credit  squeeze, 
when  the capital market,  which  falls  outside the scope  of monetary policy,  forms 
the main alternative form  of finance  (business concerns also  use  the money market 
to a limited extent; borrowing abroad has  to be authorized). The trend of. interest 
rates  on the capital  market is  therefore in general fairly  closely  in line with that 
of  liquidity  strains  in  the  economy.  The  trend  of  interest  rates  on  the  money 
market  is  not  always  a  reliable  guide  here,  owing  to  the  relationship  described 
above. 
Para.  II-3:  The investment habits of the general  public 
16.  To a considerable extent, personal savings  are held with "funds" or deposited 
in  savings  accounts  with  savings  and  commercial  banks.  Individuals  also  invest 
directly  in stocks  and  shares,  to  an  increasing  extent in recent  years  through  in-
vestment  institutions. 
Individuals  hold  their  liquid  funds  mainly  in  sight  deposits  with  banks  or  giro 
transfer  institutions.  Business  concerns  hold  theirs  primarily  in  sight  and  time 
deposits  with money-creating  institutions.  In addition,  cash loans  are  made  to  the 
Government  and  local  authorities;  Treasury  paper  is  only  bought  to  a  limited 
extent, owing to the size  of the denominations used (minimum Fl.  100,000). 
1958 
Through life  insurance 
companies  15 
Through pension funds  21 
Through savings banks  27 
Through commercial 
banks  4 
Sundry  33 
Total  100 
(idem, in Fl. '000 mill.)  (3,294) 
(idem,  as  %  of  GNP)  (9.2) 
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Personal  saving 
(percentage breakdown) 
1960  1963 
15  18 
19  28 
28  40 
10  6 
28  8 
100  100 
(4,047)  (4,303) 
(9.5)  (8.1) 
1966  1968  1969 
14  10  11 
33  35  31 
25  24  24 
4  7  11 
24  24  23 
-
100  100  100 
(7'  184)  (9,500)  (11,240) 
(9.5)  (10.3)  (11. 0) Institutional  framework 
Para.  II-4:  Foreign  payments 
Openness of the economy 
17.  Relatively  speaking  visible  and  invisible  exports  and  imports  are  very  sub-
stantial in the Netherlands,  being equal to 40-50% of GNP. On the export side, 
invisibles  are  undergoing  a  structural  decline  which  is  not  being  offset  by  an 
increase  in  visible  exports. 
The Dutch economy is  very  open and is  therefore extremely sensitive to economic 
trends  abroad,  and  the  prospects  for  its  international  competitive  position  have 
always  been a  major  factor  in the  determination of  policy.  A wage  and price  rise 
which  is  excessive  when  measured  by  foreign  standards  is  liable  to  impair  the 
balance  of  payments  seriously  in  the  short-term  and employment  just as  much  in 
the medium-term.  This has  two implications for monetary policy.  Firstly, is  under-
lines  the  need  to  establish  monetary  conditions  which  preclude  inflationary  deve-
lopments  as  far  as  possible.  Secondly,  it  makes  it easier  to  re-establish  external 
equilibrium,  since  excessive  domestic  spending  normally  tends  to  build up  a rela-
tively  large  deficit  on  the  balance  of  payments  and  thereby  sharply  reduces  the 
liquidity  of both the  banking  system  and  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
1958 
Visible  35 
Invisible  13 
Total  48 
Visible  and  invisible  exports 
(as  percentage  of GNP) 
1960  1963  1966  1968  1970 
37  35  34  34  38 
13  11  10  9  10 
50  46  44  43  48 
Regulation of capital transactions with other countries 
·  for monetary reasons 
18.  To meet  the  requirements  of  monetary  policy,  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  uses 
certain  powers-provided  by  the  Foreign  Exchange  Decree  of  1945-control 
capital  transactions  with other  countries: 
a)  Borrowing abroad by Dutch residents  and by  other than authorized banks has 
to be authorized by the Central Bank;  this enables the Central Bank to counter 
any undesired inflow of foreign  capital which is  liable to frustrate a restrictive 
credit policy.  No  authorization is  required for  suppliers' and buyers' credits or 
for loans below a certain ceiling (since  196  7, Fl.  100,000 per foreign  lender). 
b)  Issues  by  residents  abroad  and  by  non-residents  in  the  Netherlands  have  to 
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he  approved  by  the  Central  Bank,  whose  policy  in  this  respect  is  always 
concerted  with  the  Finance  Minister. 
c)  A  regulation  issued  in  July  1964  specifies  that  the  foreign  liabilities  of  an 
authorized  bank may  not exceed  its  realizable  foreign  assets.  The  regulation 
covers  assets  and liabilities  in both foreign currencies and guilders;  each  bank 
has  an  allowance  of Fl.  5  million.1 
The regulation is intended to limit the sums which Dutch banks can obtain abroad 
to finance  a deficit on the balance of payments.  The argument is  that it would be 
undesirable if a chronic deficit on the· balance  of payments  were to have  virtually 
no impact on  the liquidity of the banking system, since  this would hamper forces 
making for a  re-establishment  of equilibrium.  For psychological  reasons,  too, it is 
desirable  that such a deficit should be reflected in official gold and foreign currency 
reserves  in  the  long  run. 
As  a result  of  the regulation mentioned  above,  since  1964  the net foreign  assets 
of the banking system  have reflected  the  maximum sum which  the banks can  add 
to  their domestic  liquidity  by  borrowing abroad  or disposing  of foreign  assets  as 
the case may  be.  This is why  the annual reports of the Nederlandsche Bank, when 
calculating  the banking system's liquidity, have  in recent years  consistently shown 
net foreign  assets  as  a  separate item. 
Section II ·  Liquidity 
Para.  I:  The  liquidity  of the  economy 
The concept of the liquidity of the economy 
19.  Since  1951  the  Central  Bank,  in  its  periodic  surveys,  has  been  applying  a 
concept of liquidity that is partly at variance with that of the other EEC countries. 
By  liquid  assets  of the economy  the Bank understands not only the money supply 
(primary liquidity) but also certain other claims  on money-creating institutions and 
public authorities  in so  far  as  they can be converted in large amounts into money 
at relatively short notice without much expense or heavy losses on the transaction 
(secondary liquidity).2  In line with the internationally accepted definition of money 
supply,  such  claims  are  not  included  in  secondary  liquids  assets  if they  are  held 
by money-creating institutions or the Government. 
For  the  purposes  of  the  Bank's  periodic  surveys,  the  components  of  secondary 
liquidity  are  the  following: 
Time  deposits  and  foreign  currency  balances,  and  any  money  lent  at  call  to 
money-creating  institutions  by  intitutional  investors  and  others; 
Short-term claims on the Government,  mainly  in the form of Treasury papers, 
cash  loans  and freely  available balances  at the Treasury; 
1 Following a  substantial  increase  in the net foreign  assets  of the  banks under  the influence  of  the  trend of interest 
rates  on  the  international  money  market,  a  supplementary  ceiling  was  laid  down  in July  1%9 for  ~striation of 
these  assets.  This new  arrangement  has  been  amended  several  times. 
1  Definition  given  in the Annual  Reports  of the Nederlandsche Bank,  which  add.:  •or which  can  be  used  at their 
par  value  to  make  payments  in  satisfaction  of  current  tax  assessments".  The  latter  phrase  was  relevant  in  the 
fifties  but has  now  lost  all  practical  significance,  though it remains  correct  in principle. 
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Short-term claims  on local  authorities  (provincial  and municipal  governments) 
and the Bank for  Netherlands Municipalities mainly in the form of cash loans, 
day-to-day  loans and to a smaller extent credits on current account. 
Personal savings  balances at commercial banks  technically  satisfy  the definition of 
secondary  liquidity,  but from  the  holder's point of view  they  frequently  do not 
<lifter  materially  from  savings  balances  held at the traditional  savings  institutions, 
which  are  not counted among  total  liquid  assets.  So  the Central  Bank  does  not 
consider  these  savings  balances  as  liquidity but as  long-term  liabilities,  provided 
they can be deemed "true" savings. The rate of turnover 1 has been selected as  the 
criterion here. If this rate is  0.5 or less (average period held two years) the savings 
balances  are  counted in full  as  "true"  savings.  As  the  rate of turnover rises,  an 
increasing  part is  counted  as  "titular" savings  and  therefore  included  among  se-
condary  liquidity.  This  part  is  determined  by  interpolation,  the  principle  being 
that if the  rate  of  turnover  is  about  two (average  period  held  six  months)  the 
balances are wholly "titular" savings.2 According to this calculation method, at the 
end of  1970 14% of savings  balances  at commercial bank were "titular". 
Annex  4  divides  total domestic liquid assets  into primary and secondary liquidity, 
and  gives  the distribution of liquidity over the  most important sectors. 
Sources of liquidity 
20.  The  Dutch  monetary  survey  distinghuishes  between  the  domestic  causes  of 
changes  in the  liquidity  of  the  economy  (total domestic  liquid  assets)  and  those 
lying  in foreign payment transactions (Table 5). Domestic causes  include advances 
to  the  Government  (including  drawing  on  balances  at  the  Central  Bank),  local 
authorities 3  and  the  private  sector,  and  the  placing ·of  floating  debt  by  public 
authorities  outside  the  money-creating  institutions.  In  addition  (net),  purchases 
of capital  market  securities  by the money-creating  institutions  are  deemed  to ge-
nerate new liquidity unless financed  by an increase in capital and reserves or other 
long-term funds  of "true" savings. 
Method of analysis 
21.  As  explained in more detail in Chapter II, the Central Bank's monetary policy 
is designed to influence the relationship between the liquidity of the economy  and 
the national income,  that is  to say  the liquidity ratio (total domestic liquid assets 
as  a percentage of the national income at market prices).  To be able to determine 
how far  the creation  of liquidity  for  the  various  sectors  has  conformed  to what 
must be regarded as desirable in this respect, the monetary survey expresses changes 
in total liquid assets by sector as a percentage of total liquid assets at the beginning 
of the year, and compares this with the liquidity absorption due to the percentage 
increases  due  to  production growth and increases  due  to higher prices  (Table 6). 
Here,  liquidity  absorption  is  equated with the  increase  in liquidity  requirements 
resulting  from  the increase  in national  income  where  the  liquidity  ratio  remains 
constant. In terms of  relative increase, it is  thus exactly  the same  as  the increase 
~  .....  i!.~;··~  ~-~····  • 
1 The  rate  of  turnover  is  defined  as  repayments  on  savings  balances  during  the previous  four  quarters  divided by 
the average  level  of savings  balances  at  the  end  of each  of  the previous  five  quarters. 
1 This criterion was  introduced at the  beginning of 1%9,  it replaced  the figure  of 2.4, which  had been provisionally 
treated as  the limit. 
•  Including  the Bank for  Netherlands  Municipalities  and  the  Netherlands  Polder  Boards  Bank. 
2S'5 THE NETHERLANDS- BASIC  FACTS 
in national income.  The difference between the actual increase in liquidity and the 
increase  that would  have  resulted from  the  liquidity  absorption  occasioned  by  a 
growth of national income is  reflected in changes  in the liquidity ratio-a reduc-
tion  indicating  liquidity  activation  and  an increase  the converse. 
Structure of total liquid assets 
22.  Since  the  war  the  liquidity  ratio has  tended  to  decline.  This  tendency  was 
very  pronounced  in  the  early  years  but  persisted  in  the  first  half  of  the  fifties 
although  economic  conditions  had  reverted  to  approximately  normal  conditions. 
From  1958-when  ratio  showed  a  strong  freak  increase  owing  to  a  very  sub-
stantial influx of liquidity from abroad-the contraction of primary and secondary 
liquidity  ran  virtually  parallel,  the  net  trend  in  the  second  case  being  entirely 
caused by changes in the secondary liquidity of public authorities (Table 4). Greater 
liquidity of the economy between the end of  1966  and the end of 1968, after the 
authorities  abandoned  in  the  first  half  of  1967  the  restrictive  monetary  policy 
which  had  been  pursued for  more  than  3 Yz  years,  was  reflected  entirely  in  the 
secondary  liquidity  ratio.  The  money  supply  continued  to contract,  owing  to  the 
trend  of  notes  and  coin;  apart  from  short-term  economic  factors,  this  trend was 
affected  by  the introduction by  the banking system  of new giro  transfer  payment 
methods  and  bank  facilities  which  provided  an  additional  incentive  to  participa-
tion in the giro  transfer system by individuals. As  a result, the proportion of total 
money  supply  accounted  for  by  notes  and  coins - which  had  always  been  fairly 
stable-declined  markedly  after  1967  (Table  7). 
Optimum  liquidity ratio 
23.  The  optimum  liquidity  ratio  is  the  ratio  at which  holders  of liquidity  seek 
neither to increase  nor to  decrease  their liquidity holdings. When this is  the case, 
monetary  factors  exert  no  inflationary  or  deflationary  influence  on the  economic 
trend (See  Chapter II - Introduction).  The optimum liquidity  ratio is  apparently 
partly a function. of alterations  in interest rates  and  payment habits. 
Para.  II:  Bank  liquidity 
Institutions concerned 
24.  The  following  discussion  of  bank  liquidity  relates  primarily  to  commercial 
bank  liquidity. 
The liquidity held by  the agricultural credit institutions,  mainly with their central 
institutions, has  the same  structure. As  already noted, the giro transfer institutions 
hold their liquidity mainly in the form  of claims on public authorities;  the security 
credit  institutions  (  effectenkredietinstellingen)  hold  theirs  principally  in  the  form 
of claims  on other money-creating institutions (  exluding the Central Bank). 
Structure of bank liquidity 
25.  Bank  liquidity  (Table  8) can  be divided  into: 
a)  "Cash liquidity", that is  to say  their cash balances with the Central Bank; 
b)  Potential  cash  liquidity,  that  is  to  say: 
- Assets  which  can  be  rediscounted  or  easily  borrowed  on  at  the  Central 
Bank,  such  as  Treasury  paper,  money  lent  at call  to  discount  brokers  on 
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the  security  of  Treasury  paper  and  commercial  bills  that  can  be  redis-
counted at the  Central  Bank;1 
- Cash  loans  to  the  Government  {mainly  for  periods  of  1  to  .3  months). 
These  claims  are  not  rediscountable  or  eligible  as  collateral  as  such  but 
since the Treasury holds all its balance at the Central Bank, their repayment 
automatically  increases  bank cash  liquidity; 
- For individual  banks:  claims  on  other  money-creating  institutions. 
c )  Foreign  liquid  assets. 
Foreign  liquidity  is  equated  with  the  net  balance  of  bank  foreign  assets.  This 
method  of  calculating  arises  from  the  Central  Bank's  1964  instruction  banning 
banks  from  having  a  net foreign  debt.  The net foreign  assets  thus  represent  the 
maximum  sum  to which  the banks  can increase  their domestic liquidity by  taking 
up short-term foreign  loans  or disposing  of  their foreign  assets. 
Governing factors 
26.  Autonomous factors  governing the  trend of bank liquidity- and in a broader 
sense  that of  the  money-creating  institutions -are {Table  9): 
a)  Changes  in  notes  and  coin  in  circulation; 
b)  Changes  in  the  domestic  floating  debt  position  (the  liquidity  deficit)  of  the 
Government; 
c)  The  balance-of-payments  results  of  the  non-monetary  sectors,  as  expressed  in 
changes  in  total  official  gold  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  in  the  net 
foreign  assets  of  the  banking  system. 
Bank  liquidity  can  be  influenced  by  the  following  policies: 
- Open-market  policy.  The  sole  instrument used  in  the Netherlands  for  this  is 
Treasury paper,  of which the banks are holding  a larger and larger proportion 
(Table  11 ).  The result is  that the policy  affects  the relationship  between cash 
and other liquid assets  rather  than the level of liquidity as  a whole; 
- Minimum  reserve policy; 
- Requirements  imposed  upon  the  banks  to  maintain  non  interest-earning  de-
posits  as  part  of  a  credit  ceiling  policy; 
- Any liquidity  regulations  and provisions which  may  exist as  to  the discounta-
bility and the eligibility for collateral of certain banks  assets,  such  as  Treasury 
certificates  and  export  bills. 
Finally, liquidity is influenced by Central Bank lending to local authorities and the 
private sector and by changes  in the public's holdings  of  short-term claims  on the 
Government (secondary liquidity). The first  factor is generally of small significance. 
The  Central  Bank  publishes  in  its  annual  report  a  table  headed  "Easing  and 
tightening  of  the  money  market",  giving  the  factors  determining  bank  cash  li-
quidity  (Table  10). 
Para.  III:  Liquidity  and  finance 
Para.  III-1:  Government 
Relations with the Central Bank 
27.  Article  19(2)  of  the  1948  Bank  Law (Bankwet) makes  the Central Bank the 
Treasury's  fiscal  agent  and  banker. 
1 The amount  involved  is  small.  The graphs published by  the Central Bank  in its annual  reports  do  not include such 
securities  in bank liquid assets. 
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The  Treasury's  current-account  balance  fluctuates  considerably,  owing  to  the irre-
gu1Mity of expenditure and  tax  receipts  and  other factors.  These fluctuations  are 
often offset  by  borrowing and debt redemption on the money market. 
Article  20  of  the  1948  Bank  Law  authorizes  the  Finance  Minister  to  obtain  an 
interest-free  advance  of up to Fl.  150  million  (d. Sect.  I, point 3) whenever  he 
consider  that  the  Treasury's  cash  position  needs  temporary  strengthening;  this 
advance  is  recorded  separately  in  the  Bank's  weekly  balance-sheet. 
There  is  an  understanding  between  the  Central  Bank  and  the  Treasury  that  in 
general,  apart  from  seasonal  factors,  the  Bank  will  not  grant  credit  for  current 
budget  expenditure.  However,  the  Bank  may  review  its  position if cash  deficits 
arise from inability to renew short-term debt on  the money  market. For instance, 
it gave  considerable help to the Treasury in 1951, when difficulty was encountered 
in  placing  new  Treasury  paper  as  old  issues  natured  (the  concept  of  secondary 
liquidity stems incidentally from the experience of this time). The credit in question 
was  recorded  in  the  weekly  returns  under  the  head  "Domestic  bills,  Treasury 
paper and bonds discounted", and amplified by the note "including Treasury paper 
directly  discounted  by  the  Bank".  There  has  been  no  such  operation  since  the 
redemption in January  1952. 
In the summer months or thereabouts-up  to  1 October-from  1968  to  1970, 
the  Treasury  was  authorized  to  place  a  specific  quantity  of Treasury  bills  with 
the  Central  Bank  in  anticipation  of  temporary  difficulties  in covering  part  of its 
seasonal  deficits  by  recourse  to the  money  market. 
The  bills - which  had  to  be redeemed  by  1 November  at  the  latest - acquired 
under  this  arrangement  were  recorded in the balance-sheet  under the  above  men-
tioned  head  "Domestic  bills,  Treasury  paper  and  bonds  purchased  by  the  Bank 
(Article  15(4),  1948  Bank  Law)".  Together  with  Treasury  paper  obtained  as  a 
result  of  IMF  transactions,!  this  paper  forms  part of  the  open-market  holdings, 
which  also  include  the Treasury paper  taken  over from  the State to finance  early 
repayment of consolidated foreign  debt. The Central Bank retains the right to sell 
this  Treasury  paper on  the  money  market. 
A  calculation  from  the  weekly  returns  of the  Treasury's  net  position  with  the 
Central  Bank,  even  disregarding  the  Treasury paper  acquired on  the  basis of the 
aforementioned  foreign  transactions,  does  not provide  a full  picture of the  deve-
lopment of the Government's finances  since  it does  not show the extent to which 
fluctuations  are  caused  by  ordinary  income  or expenditure  or are  attributable  to 
financing  transactions.  The  figures  for  outstanding  Treasury  paper  are  published 
weekly  and changes  in consolidated  outstanding Government debt are  known ap-
proximately, but no  weekly data are  available on the extent to which the Govern-
ment obtainsmoney temporarily from other sources. As regards the latter, reference 
should be made inter alia to the cash loans and the moneys accruing to the Treasury 
as  a result of its function as  fiscal  agent  and Treasurer for the State corporations. 
Here, the cash  resources  of the Postal Cheque and Giro Transfer Service  (part of 
the State post-office corporation) in particular can vary considerably. 
1 Claims  on the  International  Monetary  Fund  are  held  by  the  State  (while  special  drawing  rights  [SDRs]  are  held 
by  the  Central  Bank).  These  claims  are  increased  by  gold  payments  to  and  guilder  drawings  by  the  Fund,  this 
being  matched  by a  decrease  in the reserves  of the Central  Bank.  oq the  other hand,  the Central Bank  takes  over 
Treasury  paper for  an  equivalent  amount  from  the  State;  this  is entered  under  the  balance-sheet  heading  "Domestic 
bills,  Treasury  paper  and  bonds  purchased by the Bank  (Article  15(4),  1948  Bank Law)".  Treasury  paper  tluctuations 
resulting  from  IMP  transactions  are  dealt with in a  special  commentary  in the weekly  return. 
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Significance of the Treasury for the money market 
28.  The centralization  of  the Treasury's cash  resources  at the  Central Bank is  an 
important  factor  determining the short-term movement  of liquidity on the money 
market, particularly as  the Treasury is  by far  the biggest receiver of tax proceeds. 
Apart  from  local  taxes  of  minor  yield,  the  Finance  Ministry  is  the only  collector 
of  taxes.  Since  fairly  regular  expenditure contrasts  with a  considerable  bunching 
of  tax  payments -mainly from  mid-September  to  the  end  of October-bank 
liquidity is  severely  squeezed in the autumn  as  a  result  of payments  by  business 
concerns  to  the  Treasury.  For  a number of years  the  Central  Bank  took  account 
of  the  resultant  trend  on the  money  market  by  pursuing  a  flexible  open-market 
policy.  In  1962  the  Treasury  tailored  the  maturity  dates  of  Treasury  bills  to 
coincide with this period of tightness  on the money  market.  In more recent  years 
it has  also  covered its seasonal liquidity requirements  to  a  considerable  extent by 
cash  loans. 
Treasury paper forms and placing methods 
29.  In  the  Netherlands,  Treasury  paper  is  issued  in  the  form  of  Treasury  bills 
(schatkistpromessen)  and Treasury  bonds  (biljetten).  The  former  are  order instru-
ments  with a life of up to a year issued on a discount basic.  The latter are bearer 
instruments with a  maturity of  one  to five  years.  Half-yearly interest coupons  are 
attached to these bonds. Apart from open-market transactions by the Central Bank, 
Treasury  paper  is  placed  exclusively  by  the  Agent  of  the  Finance  Ministry.  In 
recent years it has been nearly entirely placed over the counter, the Agent determin-
ing  the current  rate  at which  applicants  can buy. 
In  the  second  quarter  of  1971  the  Agent  sold  Treasury  bills  by  public  tender. 
This  had  not been done  for  some  considerable  time,  though in the  past,  in par-
ticular  from  1957  up to  and including  1963, the Agent  had  often sold  Treasury 
bills  by  this  method.  When selling  by public tender,  the Agent  offers  the market 
Treasury  bills  with  fixed  periods  to  maturity  without  specifying  an  amount  in 
advance:  the dealers on the market announce the rates at which they are prepared 
to  take  up  given  amounts;  the  Treasury  determines  the  rate  in  the light  of the 
tenders received. All  applicants who tender at a lower rate receive a full  allocation 
at the  higher  rate  which has  been fixed;  those who  tender at  the  rate  agreed by 
the Treasury have  their applications  allotted in full  or in part, as  appropriate. 
Before  1962  Treasury  bills  were  usually  dated  3,  6,  9  and  12  months.  Since 
then  the  Treasury has  hatched  maturity dates mainly  with the  seasonal pattern of 
its  tax  receipts  (these being  heaviest  in the autumn) so  that other currencies  are 
now  common. 
Treasury bills  are  dealt  in by  telephone  through  discount brokers, who give  quo-
tations for  the various periods to maturity. The function of these brokers can  best 
be  understood from  historical  developments. Before  1926  they  functioned  only as 
intermediaries  in  money  market  and  exchange  business.  They were  brokers  who 
held no  stocks  of money-market  paper for  their own  account.  In 1926, however, 
the  Central  Bank  recognized  them  as  discount  brokers  and  also  accorded  them 
special  facilities  for  borrowing  against  securities.  Since  then the discount  brokers 
have  held their own stocks of bills  and Treasury paper. They finance  stocks, which 
since 1945 have consisted mainly of Treasury bills, by taking up call-money (mainly 
at  the  banks). If liquidity  difficulties  oblige  the  lenders  to call  in their loans  the 
discount  brokers  can  obtain cash  from  the Central Bank by  discounting Treasury 
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bills  or  Treasury  bonds  with  it  or by  taking  up  an  advance  in  current  account 
from  it.  The  Central  Bank  has  given  the discount  brokers  the  special  facility  of 
discounting  a  given  proportion  of  their  bill  holdings  at  the  old  rate  on  the  day 
of  any  increase  in Bank  rate. 
The brokers  act  on a modest  scale  as  a buffer between the banks  and the Central 
Bank. But they have nothing like the importance of the discount houses in England, 
which  are  the  only  institutions  in  that country having  access  to  rediscount credit 
at  the  Bank of England. 
Placing of short-term securities with the banking system 
and the public: monetary behaviour 
30.  From  the  table  in  Annex  11 -"Short- and  medium-term  Treasury  paper 
outstanding"  it will  be  seen  that by  far  the  greater  part of  money-market  paper 
consists  of Treasury  bonds  with original  currencies  of  one  to five  years.  Treasury 
paper  is  bought  not  only  by  banks  but also  by  official  and  semi-official  bodies, 
institutional  investors  and  business  concerns.  The  share  of  the  latter  sectors  has 
declined  considerably  since  1956,  when it reached  a  peak  of  50 %. There is  no 
obligation  on  the  banks  or  the  public  to  hold  Treasury  paper. 
For  a  number  of  years  prior  to  1964  and  more  recently  in  1970  Treasury  bor-
rowing  was  designed  to  reduce  the  liquidity  of  the  economy,  which  had  been 
increased  considerably  by  substantial  balance  of payments  surpluses.  To  this  end, 
it floated  long-term  loans  beyond  its  current need  for funds  and applied  the pro-
ceeds  to  redeeming  foreign  debt  or consolidating  the  floating  debt  at  home,  or 
deposited  them  with  the  Central  Bank. 
But  from  1964  to  the  end  of  1969  Treasury  financing  tended  to  increase  the 
liquidity of the economy,  since the Treasury  covered part of its financing  require-
ment  at  short  term.  This  was  done  partly  by  drawing  down  its  balances  at the 
Central  Bank,  to  the  benefit  of  the  cash  liquidity  of  the  banks.  The  Treasury 
balance at the Central Bank increased  appreciably  in  1970.  The aggregate  debt of 
public  authorities  is  analysed  in the  table  12. 
Para.  III-2:  Supervision  of the  monetary  behaviour  of  local  authorities 
Basis in law 
31.  It has already been seen that the liquidity of the economy can also be influenced 
by  the  financing  transactions  of  local  authorities:  an  increase  in  the  net floating 
debt of  this  sector held by  the public leads to a rise in total liquid assets and vice 
versa. Mainly in order to ensure  sound financing  by local authorities, policy in the 
Netherlands,  since  even  before  the  war,  has  been  to  minimize  their  short-term 
borrowing.  The  Government,  which  had  already  brought  out  ad  hoc  financing 
provisions  affecting  the  municipalities,  decided in 1952 that the net floating  debt 
of a  municipality  should not exceed  25 %  of ordinary  revenue  ("Short-term bor-
rowing standard"). An  increase  in the floating debt proportional to the expansion 
of the  budget  was  thus  allowed.  This  principle  was  retained in later schemes  of 
regulation.  The  1963  Public  Bodies'  Capital  Expenditure  law  stipulates  that  the 
total net floating debt of any municipality or province, plus that part of prospective 
capital  expenditure  in  the  next  twelve  months  for  which  no  definite  financing 
arrangement has  yet  been made,  is  not to  exceed  25% of ordinary  revenue.  The 
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Minister is  entitled to take measures  to cancel out any excess of more than 50 % 
over  this ceiling.  · 
Trend of the Boating debt 
32.  Since  1963,  the  floating  debt  of  local  authorities  has  often  risen  far  faster 
than  the  short-term  borrowing  standard  and  thus  made  a  major  contribution  to 
increases  in the  liquidity of  the economy.  Initially,  this  trend was  mainly  due  to 
incomplete  control  of  investment  activity  by  local  authorities  owing  to  the  dif-
ficulties  encountered initially in implementing  the new Public Bodies  Expenditure 
law ( 1963 ).  This  law specifies,  as  regards  the financing  of new capital expenditure 
projects  to  be  put  through  in  the  first  fifteen  months  (twelve  months  prior  to 
1 April  1971 ),  that such  projects cannot be  begun till  their financing  is  definitely 
covered.  If the economy  is  overheated  or  liable  to  become  so,  the Government 
can  limit  the available  long-term  funds  by  imposing  a  ceiling on loans.  Similarly, 
if  the capital  market is  under  excessive  strain,  the Government can  specify  that 
capital borrowing by local  authorities  is  to be channelled exclusively  through  the 
Bank  for  Netherlands  Municipalities,  which  takes  advantage  of  the opportunities 
afforded  by  the  capital market.' 
The municipalities' floating debt rose very sharply in 1969 and 1970, mainly owing 
to a decline in their ordinary revenue and in their borrowing on the capital market 
(Table  12). 
1 The aim  here  is  to prevent  the  municipalities  and  other  authorities  from  forcing  interest  rates  up  further  under 
such  circumstances,  by  bidding  against  each  other  on  the  capital  market.  Under  the  central  financing  system  the 
polder  boards  and  similar  bodies  obtain  their  capital  market  loans  from  the  relatively  small  Netherlands  P~lder 
Board  Bank. 
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THE INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Introduction 
Para.  I:  General 
33.  In their  endeavours  to  influence  the  liquidity of  the  economy,  the monetary 
authorities  are  faced  with  domestic  and  foreign  causes  of liquidity  changes.  The 
balance of payments outturn is  beyond the control of authorities to a large extent; 
the instruments available  for  this  purpose have  already  been  discussed in the last 
chapter  (item  18).  The  responsibility  of  the  public  authorities  for  their  own 
recourse  to  liquidity  creation  and  the  scope  they  have  for  pursuing  their  own 
monetary policy have  also  been dealt with (item  3  and  30-32). This chapter con-
siders  the  instruments  used  by  the  Central  Bank  to  influence  domestic  liquidity 
creation  by  money-creating  institutions other  than for  the  Treasury,  which  is  the 
pivot of monetary policy.  By  way  of introduction, we begin with a survey of the 
basics  of monetary policy. 
Para.  II:  Development of instruments and the basis  of the policy  pursued 
The instruments in the fifties 
34.  In the early post-war  years  the Central Bank  applied  selective  credit controls 
to a considerable extent, but as  conditions returned to normal this method became 
more and  more  unsatisfactory.  The regulations  giving  the  Central  Bank  extensive 
control over advances  made  by the commercial  bank were  dropped at  the end of 
1950  and  temporarily  replaced  by  general  quantitative  credit  controls  (in  force 
till  the end of  March  1952). 
In the rest of the fifties,  the emphasis of the Central Bank's monetary management 
was  mainly  on  discount  rate  policy,  backed  up  by  the  open-market  and  the  mi-
nimum  reserve  instruments.  The  last  two instruments  had  to  be  used  to  streng-
then discount  rate  policy,  the  banking  system  being liquid. 
As  a  consequence  of extensive  short-term  borrowing by  the  Treasury  during  the 
war  period  and  the  years  immediately  after,  the  banks  had  considerable  liquid 
assets,  which consisted  almost  entirely of Treasury  paper to begin  with.  In 1952 
and  1953, furthermore,  cash  liquidity was  swollen by heavy  balance of payments 
surpluses.  To prevent the banks  being forced  to step up their  lending actively  to 
dispose of a surplus of cash holdings which they were unable to invest, the Central 
Bank  offered  Treasury  paper  from  its  open-market  holdings.  But  this  was  not 
enoough on its  own. And since,  furthermore,  the Central Bank possessed no long-
292 Introduction 
term securities,  cash  liquidity  could be transformed into another form of liquidity 
but not neutralized permanently.  An extensive  consolidation operation was  there-
fore  undertaken in 1954. The Treasury placed Fl.  1,200 million  of 8,  10  and 12 
years  Treasury certificates  with  the banks, while  the Central Bank  reached  agree-
ment  with  the  banks  on  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  reserve  system,  also 
designed  to  absorb  liquid  assets.  This  operation  mopped  up  the  infra-liquidity 
of the banks,  but their liquidity position  remained  easy. 
But the Bank could still not be certain that the existing instruments would always 
suffice  to drain off  enough bank liquidity to force  the banks to limit their lending 
to  business  concerns.  The  maximum  level  of  the  minimum  reserve  ratio  (which 
was  10 %  and could be increased  to  15 %  under  certain circumstances)  was  too 
low  for  this.  A  quantitative  credit  restriction  was  therefore  drafted  in  1954  as 
an additional instrument, but did not have to be applied. But a quantitative credit 
limitation  was  imposed,  from  September  1957  to  April  1958,  in  the  over-cone 
sumption  period  of  1956/1957. 
The banks began to build up substantial net foreign assets when substantial balance-
of-payments  surpluses reappeared after 1958 and differences between domestic and 
foreign interest rates made this  an attractive proposition. But this meant that they 
could hence-forward frustrate limitations imposed on their cash liquidity by trans-
ferring  to the Central Bank foreign currency  yielded  by  these  assets.  In the early 
sixties  the  Central  Bank  decided  that it  would be  desirable,  mainly  for  interna-
tional reasons,  to  reduce  this  inflow  to  a minimum.  The result  was  that the  mi-
nimum  reserves  system  lost much  of  its value  as  a  monetary  instrument,  so  that 
the  authorities  came  to  rely  exclusively  on  quantitative  methods. 
Basis of policy and instruments since 1960 
35.  The  set  of  instruments  for  influencing  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  which 
has  been gradually  built up  since  1960  has  been  developed  in  close  conjunction 
with the  method used  by  the  Central  Bank  to  calculate  the  admissible  liquidity 
supply  of the economy  in  a  given  practical situation.  The basis  of  the  system  is 
the existence in the short term, except in special circumstances, of a fairly constant 
correlation  between  the  size  of  total  domestic  liquid  assets  and  the net national 
income.  The  liquidity  requirements  resulting  from  a  given  growth  of  national 
income will  thus  normally  be satisfied if the  total domestic liquid assets  increase, 
overall, by the same  percentage as  the national income in monetary terms,  that is 
to say, if there is  no  change in the liquidity  ratio (total domestic liquid  assets  as 
a  percentage  of  the  net national income). 
In normal circumstances monetary policy in the Netherlands is  directed to creating 
and  maintaining  more  or  less  normal  liquidity  conditions,  so  as  to  ensure  that 
monetary factors  do  not  have  an  inflationary  or deflationary  impact  on  spending. 
In periods  of  over-consumption  such  as  the years  from  1964  to  1966  and  1970, 
when relatively  sharp  increases  in costs  and prices  are  associated  with a current-
account  payments  deficits,  monetary policy  seeks  to check the growth of expendi-
ture  by  letting  the  tightening  effect  of an  outflow  of liquidity  to  other countries 
work through  the economy and by  allowing  the supply of new  domestic liquidity 
to  lag  behind  the  liquidity  requirements  entailed  by  the  growth  of  income  (in 
monetary  terms). To be specific,  the standard adopted for domestic liquidity crea-
tion  in  the  years  from  1964  to  1966  was  that which  could  overall,  satisfy  the 
liquidity  requirements  of the  expected  increase  in production  (the  liquidity  ratio 
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remaining unchanged), that is  to say  the real growth of the national income.1  With 
the situation  as  it was,  both the price  increases  and the deficit  on the balance  of 
payments  led  to  a tighter money situation and  this  effect  had to be offset, in the 
first  instance,  by  activating  existing  liquidity  reserves  (i.e.  putting  money  back 
into circulation, engendering an increase in rate of turnover). These liquidity reser-
ves  can  be  considered  as  a  cushion  in  the  adjustment  process  which  expenditure 
must eventually undergo under the  influence  of a  monetary policy directed  to the 
re-establishment of balance. If the strains resulting from the tighter monetary situa-
tion increased  too  sharply,  the standards for  domestic  liquidity creation  were  ex-
ceeded and there was  an  inflow of hot money  from abroad in so  far as  it was  not 
precluded  by  the foreign  exchange  controls  still in force.  But these reactions  did 
not induce  the Central Bank  to put more  bite into the monetary policy, provided 
they  did  not  prevent  a  continuing  tightening  of  the  monetary  situation;  in this 
case  they  are  to  be considered  as  secondary  cushions  in  the  adjustment  process, 
which  reduce  the  danger  of irregular movements  in  the  economic  trend.  In May 
1971, however, the Netherlands suspended their official  intervention rates, in com-
pany  with  Federal  Germany,  and  floated  the  guilder.  This  was  done  after  the 
inflow  of foreign  capital reached an excessive  level (in  1970 and the early months 
of  1971  it  had  already  been  large  enough  to  present  a  serious  threat  to  the 
restrictive  monetary  policy). 
The way  in  which what was  considered  to be  admissible  domestic liquidity crea-
tion  could  take  place  was  nearly  always  determined  on  the  basis  that  public 
authorities  as  a  whole,  in  accordance  with  what  had  been  decided,  should  have 
only  limited  recourse  to liquidity  creation:  since  1952  the  Treasury's  policy  has 
been  to  limit  the  issue  of  Treasury  paper  basically  to  the  replacement  of  paper 
maturing.  So  it has  been  possible  to  assign  to  the  banks  the  bulk  of  what  is 
deemed the acceptable creation of new liquidity, for lending to the  private sector. 
Originally,  the  Central  Bank  had  limited  the  quantitative  controls  to  short-term 
lending  to  the  private  sector - on  the  implicit  assumption  that  on  balance  the 
other activities of the banking system would not make for an  increase in liquidity. 
After  some  time  had  elapsed,  medium-term  lending  to  the  private  sector  turned 
out to  be  rising  sharply,  faster  than countervailing  long-term  funds,  and in 1965 
the Central Bank  made  another (informal)  arrangement with the banks  regulating 
long-term  credits.  In July  1967  the  two  schemes  of regulation  were  terminateq 
because  the domestic  economy  had emerged from  the period of  strain. 
There  was  intensive  consultation  in  1968  between  the  Central  Bank  and  the 
organizations  representing the banking system on the appropriate credit restriction 
method  to be  adopted if the  economic  trend  should  call  for  reintroduction of  a 
restrictive  monetary  policy.  A  possible  changeover  to  indirect  credit  restriction, 
based on manipulation  of bank liquidity,  was  considered  in detail.  The feasibility 
of  this  had been  improved  by  the  substantial  reduction since  the early  sixties  in 
bank liquidity as  a ratio of the banks' domestic liabilities. This decline was reflected 
in full  in net foreign  assets,  which  at  the end of  1967  left  hardly  any  room  for 
an increase  in domestic liquidity.  What was  envisaged was  a  system  of minimum 
cash  or  liquidity  reserve  balances,  yielding  the  same  results  as  a  direct  credit 
1 S_ince  early  1969  there  have  been  signs  of  a  shift  in  emphasis.  In the light of experience  in 1964  to 1966,  when a 
ratto of  less  than 35%  was  found  to have  a  markedly  restrictive  influence,  policy  has  since  been  directed  primarily 
to  reducing  the  liquidity  ratio  to  a  level  approaching  35 %,  the  figure  which  is  deemed  restrictive.  But  the 
correlation  between  the  domestic  supply  of liquidity  and  real  production  growth  continues  to. Introduction 
restt1ct10n.  The final  outcome  of  the  discussions  was  a  preference  for  the direct 
method  because:  a)  the  individual  banks  operate  with  very  different  liquidity 
ratios  owing  to  the  differing  character  of  their  business;  b)  the overall  liquidity 
of the banking system is  constantly,  and often strongly influenced by seasonal and 
fortuitous  changes  in  public  finances,  notes  and  coin  in  circulation  and  foreign 
exchange  transactions. 
Attention was also paid to the aspects of the direct credit restriction policy which 
had been criticized by the banks. The main issue here was  the combination of the 
policy  directive  for  short-term lending to the private sector with the arrangement 
regulating  long-term  business,  allowing  the  banks .  to  use,  as  they  saw  fit,  an 
increase  in their  long-term  funds  to  increase  their  long-term  assets  or for  short-
term advances.  From the monetary angle it does  not matter which choice is  made, 
since  all that is  relevant is  the ultimate creation of liquidity. After considering the 
possible  consequences,  the  banks  finally  found  that  the  combination  of  the  two 
systems  was  not necessary.  It was  feared  that competition for  long-term business 
might  increase  unduly  and  also  that the  conditions  of competition might be dis-
rupted  by  the  wide  discrepancies  in  the  relative  scale  of  short  and  long-term 
business as  between groups of banks and individual banks. When over-consumption 
threatened to reappear  towards  the end of  1968, the previous  system of  separate 
arrangements was reintroduced with hardly any  change, with effect from  1 January 
1969. 
Early  in  1969  the Central Bank consulted  the Netherlands Association of Savings 
Banks (Nederlandse Spaarbankbond) on an extension of the scope of the restrictive 
monetary  policy  to cover  the  general  savings  banks.  The reason  for  this  was  the 
fact  that these banks were increasingly operating as  money-creating institutions by 
channelling wage,  salary and pension payments of their customers through accounts 
having the character of current accounts but still included in the figures for savings 
balances. The consultation led to the introduction, on 1 July 1969, of rules govern-
ing  long-term  operations  in  line  with  those  applicable  to  commercial  banks  and 
agricultural  credit  institutions. 
In 1970  a  monetary  restrictions  agreement  was  reached  with  the  Postal Cheque 
and Giro Transfer Service,  involving  periodic establishment of a  standard for  the 
admissible  growth of  its  long-term  assets  and  short-term  lending  to  the  domestic 
private  sector. 
Early in 1967  a ceiling  was  introduced for  short-term lending  to the local  autho-
rities,  which  had  substantially  exceeded  the  short-term  debts  deemed  acceptable 
by  the  law,  more  especially  by  resorting  more  heavily  to  short-term bank credit. 
This measure was intended to support the government drive to improve the financ-
ing behaviour of local  authorities,  which  the Government had been authorised to 
conduct  by  the  1963  Public  Bodies  Capital  Expenditure  law.  Initially  the ceiling 
likewise only  applied to commercial and agricultural credit banks. It was  extended 
to  general  savings  banks  in  1969  and  to  the  Postal  Cheque  and  Giro  Transfer 
Service  in  1970. 
Money-market policy 
36.  The  changeover  to direct credit restriction  reduced the monetary relevance of 
the liquidity of the banking system (and of the other money-creating institutions). 
The instruments used in the fifties,  which had served both to regulate the money 
market  and  to  manipulate  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  indirectly,  were  subse-
quently  employed  exclusively  to  control  money  market  behaviour. 
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In recent  years  the Central  Bank  has  begun,  as  part of its  money-market  policy, 
to intervene on the foreign exchange market, which has been considerable enlarged 
by the substantial increase in international money and capital transactions. 
Section I  - Discount policy 
Para.  I:  General 
Forms of recourses, legal foundations 
37.  When banks, brokers and others 1  wish to have recourse to the Central Bank, 
they can do so  by discounting short-term money-market securities (Treasury paper, 
commercial bills of exchange and bank acceptances) or by  taking up credits in cur-
rent  account  agains  the  collateral  of  Treasury  paper or-to  a  small  extent-
other  security. 
Within the framework of its credit policy on lending to the Treasury,2  the Central 
Bank  is  free  to decide  whether  or not  to  discount  suitable paper or to  accept it 
as  security for an advance.  It regards  access  to its credit as  a privilege and not as 
a right, and considers that its facilities  should only be used to tide over temporary 
difficulties. 
Discounting and Advances 
38.  The  Central Banks  discount  rate for  promissory  notes 3  and  the rate charged 
to banks for credits in current account against pledging of securities or other paper 
is  normally  t2  %  above  the discount rate for bills of exchange, also collected Bank 
rate.  Since  August  1969, however,  it has  been  1 %  above  this  rate.  In the case 
of discounting, a rates for at least ten days is charged while interest on advances is 
calculated day  by  day. 
As  the banks often have recourse  to the Central Bank for only very short periods, 
advances  against  securities  are  asked  for  more  often  than  rediscount  credits 
(Table  13 ). 
Para.  II:  Technical  data 
Eligible paper 
39.  The Central Bank provides discounting facilities  or advances  mainly for Treas-
ury  paper,  which  is  fully  discountable  (provided  it has  no  more  than  105  days 
to run to maturity)  and  eligible  as  collateral  (apart from  a  small  marginal value). 
Short-term  paper  issued  by  local  authorities  can also  be  declared  discountable 
or eligible as  security at the application of the Bank for Netherlands Municipalities 
1 In practice,  in  recent  years  the  Bank  for  Netherlands  Municipalities,  in  particular,  has  also  had  recourse  to  the 
Central  Bank  fairly  regularly. 
2 See  Ch.  1,  Items 3  and  27. 
' The  discount  rate  for  promissory  notes  is  charged  for  promissory  notes  other  than  Treasury  bills,  which  are 
discounted  at  the  official  discount  rate.  In  practice,  no  discounting  is  done  on  the  basis  of .the  discount  rate  for 
promissory  notes.  The  rate  is,  however,  relevant  to  the  establishment  of  charged  to borrowers  interest  rates  by  the 
banks  (see  item 42  below). 
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or the  issuing  authority.  In this  connection  the  Central Bank  has  adopted,  since 
before  the  war,  the practice  of  establishing  a limit as  well  as  certain conditions: 
promissory  notes  of  a  province  or  municipality  can  be declared  discountable  up 
to  a  ceiling  of  15 %  of the  ordinary  revenue  shown  in the last  budget of  these 
authorities. At the beginning of  1964  the conditions laid down were brought into 
line  with  the  provisions  of  the  Public  Bodies  Capital  Expenditure  law,  which 
came  into  force  on  1  November  1963.  They  specified  that  the  borrowing  body 
must  have  a  balanced  budget  and  that  its  net floating  debt,  plus  the  capital  ex-
penditure  of the  next  twelve  months  for  which  no  firm  financing  coverage  is  as 
yet available,  may  not  exceed  25 %  of ordinary  revenue. 
In the Netherlands, in contract to Germany,  France  and Belgium,  the discounting 
of bank acceptances is  of minor importance and commercial bills are virtually never 
discounted. Under an  agreement concluded between the  Central Bank and a num-
ber  of  other  banks  as  far  back  as  1922,  however,  certain  bills  used  to  finance 
foreign  trade  are  automatically  declared  discountable  if  they  satisfy  certain  con-
ditions  (initial  currency  of  no  more  than  four  months,  etc.)  and  are  notified  to 
the  Central  Bank.  Furthermore,  in  March  1967  the  Central  Bank  entered  into 
an  export  financing  arrangement  with  the  banks  to meet  the  high  interest  costs 
of  the  credits  with a  total  period  to maturity of five  years  or  more  granted by 
Dutch  exporters.  Under this  arrangement,  the  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory 
notes  relating  to  these  credits  can  in  principle,  under  certain  conditions,  be  de-
clared  eligible  as  collateral  and  discountable  by  the  Central  Bank  (this  enables 
the  banks  to  apply  a  lower  interest  rate  for  the  bills  and  promissory  notes  in 
question).  The discountability  of bills  increases  the  liquid  assets  of banks;  at the 
same time it increases the scope for negotiating them on the money market, though 
this is  hardly ever done. 
The Royal Decree  of 25 June  1968 extended the discount policy powers available 
to the Central Bank,  under the Bank Law  of 23  April  1948, by authorising it to 
provide advance against the collateral of debt certificates. The banks have consider-
ably  increased  their  holdings  of  such  certificates.  The new power  is  intended  to 
enable the Central Bank to increase liquidity in special cases  where this is desirable 
in the  general interest but the  bank in  need  of credit does  not possess  sufficient 
other securities  acceptable  to  the Central  Bank  as  eligible  collateral. 
40.  In September 1957, when credit expansion was particularly strong, the Central 
Bank  announced  the introduction of a  penal interest rate,  at  least  1 %  above  its 
normal  rates,  to  be paid  by  banks  having  recourse  to it when  they  had  not,  in 
its  view,  exercised  sufficient  restraint  in granting credit.  In actual fact  this  penal 
interest  rate never  had  to  be charged,  and  the  rule  was  scrapped in  April  1958, 
in  view  of  the  economic  trend. 
Restriction of recourse to the Central Bank 
41.  There  has  never  been  any  clearly  defined  limit  to the extent of recourse  by 
the  banking  system  to the Central Bank.  But in  1969, when  a sharp  increase  in 
the net foreign assets  of the banks was coupled with purchase of foreign exchange 
from  the  Central  Bank  and  much  greater  recourse  to  it,  the  Central  Bank  has 
nevertheless repeatedly considered it necessary to remind the banks that its facilities 
must be used  only  to remedy  temporary  difficulties  and,  in particular, should not 
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be  used for  interest arbitrage.  The assessment of what is  admissible  and what not 
is  a  matter for  the Central Bank.  In September  1969  the Central Bank  accepted 
that - over and  above the amount deemed admissible - the banks should be able 
to  meet  "temporary  peak  financing"  needs  by  obtaining  accomodation  it up  to 
the  amount  of  the  non-interest-earning  deposits  they  are  required  to  hold under 
the  credit  restrictions.  This  concession  has  never been  allowed  to  lapse. 
Para.  III:  The  functioning  of discount  policy 
Connection between discount rate and interest rate structure 
42.  Any  change  in  the  discount  rate  of  the  Central  Bank  generally  affects  the 
debtor and creditor interest  rates  fixed  by  the banks.  Although  the banks have  a 
free  hand in fixing  their interest rates (the law on supervision of the credit system 
is  silent  on  this  matter)  the rates  they  charge  to borrowers  are  usually  1 ;.2  % 
higher  than  the  discount  rate for  promissory  notes. 
In the  Netherlands  the money  market  interest  rate level  does  not always  follow 
Bank  rate.  The  very  substantial bank liquidity  in  the first  half  of  the  fifties,  for 
instance,  completely  or almost  completely  insulated  money  market  interest  rates 
from  increases in the official  discount rate. To prevent money-market  funds, cheap 
under these circumstances,  from  finding  their way  to the capital  market and thus 
frustrating  the  attempts  to  check  the expansion  of credit by  discount  policy,  the 
Central Bank used open-market  policy  and the  minimum  reserve  system  to  ensure 
that Bank  rate  effectively  influenced  the money  market. 
The  money-market  interest  rate,  level  now  determined  mainly  by  the  net  yield 
obtainable  on foreign  money  markets,  was  nearly  always  higher  than  Bank  rate 
from  1966  or thereabouts  to  the end of  1970.1  The fact  that during  this period 
the banks did not go in to any great extent for interest arbitrage with funds  taken 
up from  the Central  Bank  is  attributable  to  the  refusal  of  the  Central  Bank  to 
allow permanent recourse to its credit facilities.  The difference between the money-
market interest rate level  and  the discount  rate made it difficult  for  the Treasury 
to  place  short-term Treasury paper discountable  at the Bank,  which was  carrying 
a  lower  rate  than  Bank rate.  One of the results  was  that in the  summer months 
the Treasury was forced to cover its  h~avy liquidity needs in this season by taking 
up  cash  loans  (which  are  not rediscountable or eligible  as  collateral) at rates  well 
above Bank rate. 
Effectiveness of discount policy 
43.  In general,  it is  fair  to  say  that  changes  in  the  cost  of  credit  have  only  a 
limited  impact  on credit  supply  and  demand.  Furthermore, it is  true  to  say  that 
from the end of the war till recently the Dutch banking system always had enough 
liquid  assets  to ensure  that it had little  if  any  need  to fall  back  on the Central 
Bank.2 
The result was  that as  far back as  the early fifties  the emphasis of monetary policy 
shifted  from  manipulating  the  cost  of credit  to  limiting  its  availability.  In  this 
1 The  interest  rate  level  on the  domestic  money  market  dropped  below  Bank  rate  again  early  in  1971,  owing  to  a 
marked  decline  in the  net  yield  on  the  Eurodollar  market  which  was  coupled  with  heavy  selling  of  dollars  to  the 
Central  Bank. 
'  See  items  33  and 34  of this chapter. 
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connection  use  was  mainly  made  to  begin  with  of  instruments  affecting  bank 
liquidity, and later of direct credit ceilings.  Since  then, the main  monetary signifi-
cance  of changes in the discount rate has  been their value as  a possible pointer to 
an impending tightening or easing of monetary policy. 
Section II - Minimum reserve policy 
Para.  I:  Description  of  the  minimum  reserve  system 
Genesis of the system 
44.  The  Central  Bank pursued an  active  minimum  reserve  policy  from  1954  till 
the end of 1963. The basis for this was established in early 1954 when the Central 
Bank concluded a  "gentlemen's  agreement"  with the main commercial banks  and 
the two central institutions of the agricultural credit banks, by which these banks 
under-took to  maintain minimum non-interest-earning balances at the Central Bank 
at a  level  to be determined by  the Central Bank. The  agreement was  needed to 
provide  a  means  for  absorbing  some  of  the  banks'  cash  liquidity,  which  had 
increased  sharply  as  a  result  of  the  substantial  balance-of-payments  surpluses  of 
the  previous  years.  The  open-market  holdings  of  the  Central  Bank  had  turned 
out to be too small to absorb all this liquidity-despite total sales by the Central 
Bank and the Treasury of Fl.  2,500 million of Treasury paper in 1952 and 1953, 
the  market discount rate for  one-year bills  had dropped to  0-4  %  in 19  53. 
With  the  introduction  of  the  minimum  reserve  system,  the banking  system  par-
ticipated in financing the Central Bank's gold and foreign exchange reserves, which 
had increased to a level appreciably above  the note and coin circulation. This was 
stated in the explanatory  memorandum, which also  specified  that at the monthly 
fixing  of the minimum reserve ratio allowance should be made for the trend of the 
gold  and foreign  exchange  reserves  and  its  causes.  This  wording  made  it  clean 
that  the  Central  Bank would  not  regard  itself  as  obliged  to  fix  the  ratio  solely 
in  the  light  of the  trend  of its  foreign  exchange  reserves  but was  also  to  allow 
for  other  considerations. 
The banks' were all  the more ready to accept a voluntary minimum reserve obliga-
tion  since  they  were  allowed  to  convert  some  of  their  short  and  medium-term 
Treasury  paper  into  longer-dated,  higher-yelding  Government  bonds.  The  banks 
that were party to the agreement  coud  take 8,  10, or  12 year  certificates (schat-
kistcertificaten)  yielding  interest  at  2 5/8 %,  2 3/4 %  or  2 7/8 %  respectively  in 
return for their very low-yielding Treasury paper. They had to undertake, however, 
not to  sell  or pledge  these  certificates  other  than to  the  Central Bank  or  banks 
participating  in  the  agreement.  The  restriction  on  the  sale  or pledging  of  these 
securities  ceased if the Central Bank  acquired and re-sold  them. 
The Central Bank declared its readiness to grant advances, if needed, to the parties 
to  the  agreement  against  the  collateral  of  Treasury  certificates  under certain cir-
cumstances  and up  to  certain  limits.  When  the loans  taken  up  in  this  way  run 
without  interruption  for  more  than  a  year,  the  borrowing  bank  could  sell  the 
paper  to  the  Central  Bank. 
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Subsequent developments 
45.  When they fell  due,  the  8  and  10  year certificates  were renewed for  10 years 
(with adjustment of their interest rate) on the same  conditions.  On 1 March  1966 
the  12  year certificates  were converted into  eight  tranches of 3, 4, 5,  6,  7,  8, 9 
and  10  years.  It was  decided  that  the  restrictions  on  negotiability  and  eligibility 
as  collateral,  together  with  the  right  to  pledge  with  the  Central  Bank,  were  to 
remain in force  for tranches with more  than six years  to run. The restrictions have 
been  dropped for  tranches  with less  than  six  years  to  run. 
In 1963, the minimum  reserve  agreement was  amended by  dropping participation 
in financing  the Central Bank's foreign exchange  reserves (which now only slightly 
exceeded  total  notes  and  coin  in circulation  and dropped below  this  aggregate  in 
the following years)  as  the reason for  holding minimum reserves  and by scrapping 
the requirement that adjustment of the reserve ratio should be related, in principle, 
to  these  reserves.  Since  1963  there  has  been  a  right  to  terminate  the  agreement 
if the Central Bank  and  the banking system  no longer agree  on the desirability of 
retaining  this  instrument  or on  its  handling.  This  right of termination has  not so 
far  been invoked. 
The legal basis 
46.  Article  10, paragraph 5 a.  of  the law  of  18  January  1952  on the supervision 
of  the  credit  system-passed  to  implement  Article  9  of  the  Bank  Law  of  23 
April  1948 - gives  the  Central  Bank  the  right  to  require  the  banks  registered 
with it to hold  balances  on current account  with it in a  given proportion  to  the 
deposits  accepted  by  them. 
The Central  Bank  could  have  imposed  a  minimum  reserve  system  on this  basis, 
but  would  then  have  been  obliged  to  respect  the  conditions  of  the  law  as  to 
duration of validity and  the need  for ratification by parliament. The Central Bank 
therefore  preferred  to  conclude  with the  banks  a  gentlemen's  agreement  of inde-
finite  duration  on  the  holding  of minimum  reserves. 
The right to impose a reserve  system is  retained (in Article  10, paragraph 7 a.) in 
the law as  amended on 21  June  1956. The new version explicitly states, however, 
(Article  10,  paragraph  1)  that  the  Central  Bank  should  first  seek  to  achieve 
agreement on measures  affecting  the  credit  system by consultation  with the banks 
if it discerns  signs  of  an  actual  or potential  threat  to  the  accomplishment  of its 
task. 
The participating institutions 
47.  The agreement  on the maintenance  of  minimum  reserves  was  concluded  with 
39  commercial  banks  and  the  two  central  institutions  of  the  agricultural  credit 
banks. Deposits  at these  39  banks at the end of  1954 accounted for  97 %  of all 
deposits  held  at  commercial  banks,  while  the  other  80  or  so  commercial  banks 
shared  the remaining  3 %. The  Postal Cheque  and  Giro Transfer  Service  became 
a  party to the  agreement  on 1  July  1957. 
The agricultural credit banks affiliated  to the two central institutions participating 
in  the  agreement  are  indirectly  involved  in  the  minimum  reserve  system  via  the 
reserves  kept by the central institutions. The  security credit institutions were not 
included  in the  system  because  of  their relatively low total deposits.  As  they  ac-
cept only  savings  deposits,  the savings  banks  were left outside  the system  . 
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Calculation of minimum reserves 
48.  The  basis  for  the calculation  of  the  required  minimum  reserves  is  the  total 
of "funds  of  third  parties" held with the  participating institutions,  namely: 
- customers'  sight  and  time  deposits; 
- sight and time deposits of credit institutions not participating in the agreement; 
- other short  term liabilities  in  the nature of deposits. 
Foreign currency  liabilities  and  savings  deposits  do  not come  under the minimum 
reserve  obligation. 
In calculating  the minimum reserves  of the two central institutions of  the agricul-
tural credit banks, the balances held with them by their member banks are reduced 
by an  amount corresponding  to the proportion of savings  deposits  in the total de-
posits  held  by  those  banks.  The  savings  deposits  of  the  agricultural  credit  banks 
are  thus  excluded  from  all  minimum  reserve  obligations,  direct  or indirect. 
The  minimum  reserve  to  be  held  is  computed  on  the  basis  of  the  end-month 
balances  subject  to  the  system. 
The  minimum  reserve  commitment  thus  calculated  must  be  discharged  by  the 
commercial banks over a period beginning on the first  business day  after the 21st 
of the month and ending on the 21st of  the following  month (if, for instance,  the 
volume  of  deposits  subject  to  minimum  reserve  obligation  is  determined  at  the 
end  of  March,  average  minimum  reserve  balances  calculated  on  this  basis  must 
be  held  at  the  Central  Bank  from  22  March  to  21  April).  The  corresponding 
period for  the central institutions of the agricultural credit banks  is  the following 
calendar  month (April  in  the  example  just  given). 
For the  benefit  of institutions  with relatively  low  total deposits,  the first  Fl.  15 
million  of  liabilities  subject  to  the minimum  reserve obligation are  exempted and 
a  further  Fl.  50  million  are  subject  to  only  half  the  current  minimum  reserve 
ratio. 
Minimum  reserves  have  to  be  held  on  a monthly  average  basis.  This  enables  the 
banks  to  compensate  for  falling  short  of  the  minimum  reserve  requirements  on 
some days  by exceeding  them on others. The minimum  reserves  can thus be  used 
to  some  extent  to  cover  short-term  liquidity  requirements  within  the  monthly 
period. 
The  size of the  ratio 
49.  The  agreement  lays  down a  ceiling  of 15% for  the  m1mmum  reserve  ratio. 
The  Central Bank  announced,  when  the  agreement  was  concluded,  that it would 
not raise the ratio above 10 %  without first selling a considerable part of its open-
market  l)oldings  and  consulting  the  banks.  The  question  of such  an  increase  to 
above  10 %  has  never  arisen. 
Remuneration of balances; penal interest rates 
50.  The  balances  held  as  minimum  reserves  on  current  account  at  the  Central 
Bank -like other  balances  held  at  this  institution-bear  no  interest.  On  the 
other hand there is no  provision in the Dutch minimum reserve  regulations for  a 
penalty  interest rate for failing  to  meet minimum  reserve  obligations. 
Para.  II:  The  functioning  of the  minimum  reserve  policy. 
Structural factors 
51.  The operation of the minimum reserve policy in the Netherlands in the fifti.es 
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must  mainly  be  seen  in the  light  of  the  relatively  large  amount  of  national  ex-
penditure  which  goes  abroad.  As  a  result,. any  excessive  credit  expansion  in the 
Netherlands  soon  led  to a deficit  on the balance of payments and consequently to 
an  outflow  of domestic  liquid  assets  from  the  country.  This was  coupled with a 
relatively  sharp  reduction  in the liquidity of  the banks,  whose  deposits  increased 
less  than their !endings (in 1956 an  11  %  increase in lending was actually coupled 
with  an  8 %  reduction  in deposits.  This  situation  enabled  the  Central  Bank  to 
reduce  the  minimum  reserve  ratio  in  periods  when  there  was  a  deficit  on  the 
balance  of payments,  as  in  1956-1957,  to  raise  it again  in periods  of  balance  of 
payments  surplus  (which increased  the liquidity of the banks  and also  that of the 
economy)  and  to  maintain it at  a  high level  in periods  of more  or less  balanced 
development. 
Development in the sixties 
52.  After mid-1961,  which  saw  the  end of a  period of heavy balance-of-payments 
surpluses,  the  minimum reserve  was  gradually lowered  to  offset  the  tightening of 
the money  market caused  by the steady  increase in notes  and coin  in circulation. 
This  was  mainly  done  to  prevent  the  tightening  of  liquidity  from  inducing  the 
banks  to  transfer foreign  exchange  to  the Central Bank and  thus  force  the  latter 
to convert dollars into gold-which was  deemed  undesirable in the international 
context. The minimum  reserve  ratio  was  lowered  to zero  in September  1963  and 
has  remained unchanged  ever since. 
On balance,  since  1963  the  banks  have  financed  the  increase  in  notes  and  coin 
in circulation  mainly  by  drawing  on  their  net foreign  assets.  In 1969  and  1970 
they also financed  this increase by transferring to the Central Bank foreign exchange 
accruing  from  the substantial inflow  of foreign  liquidity in those years (cf.  Tables 
5  and  8). 
Application in practice 
53.  As  can  be  seen  from  Annex  14, the  Central Bank in every case  but one  has 
increased  the minimum reserve  ratio by 1 %  only,  hut often reduced it by larger 
percentages.  As,  for  technical  reasons,  the  minimum  reserve  ratio  can  only  be 
altered  once  a  month,  this  device  is not suitable for  evening out short-term fluc-
tuations.  But it can be  used  to  skim  off  or inject  a  certain  amount of liquidity, 
beyond  which  more  flexible  instruments,  such  as  open  market policy  or forward 
interventions in the foreign  exchange  market, can be used. 
Section III - Money-market  policy and relations with 
foreign money markets 
Para.  I:  Open-market  policy 
Para.  I-1:  Money  market 
54.  It is  impossible  to  give  a  clear-cut  definition  of  the  money  market  in  the 
Netherlands.  In the narrower sense,  this is  the market in cash  assets  held at the 
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Central  Bank,  dealings  being  between  the  banks  (and brokers)  on the  one  hand 
and  the  Treasury  on  the  other,  and  also  between  banks.  In the  broader  sense, 
the  money  market  also  includes  other  short-term  transactions  such  as  cash  loans 
to  local  authorities  and between business  concerns. 
The  working  and  main  features  of the money  market  are  described  in Chapter  I 
(items  13-14  and 28-30).  The law does  not limit the number of market members, 
and  this  can  vary  with the  circumstances. It thus  happens  that  private  concerns 
toke up cash loans from  non-money-creating institutions, sometimes in competition 
with local authorities, in periods of credit restriction or when the interest rate on 
the money  market  is  significantly  below  that  for  short-term  bank loans. 
Para.  I-2:  Intervention  in  the  open  market 
The application of the instrument 
55.  The  Central  Bank  used  the  open-market  instrument  from  1952-1964 1  to 
stengthen  Bank-rate  policy  and  in conjunction  with  the  minimum  reserve  policy. 
For  the  purposes  of  its  open-market  transactions  it  used  Treasury  paper.  The 
Bank  Law  of  1948  also  authorizes  the purchase  and  sale  of  Government or Go-
vernment-guaranteed  bonds  quoted  on  the  stock  exchange,  but  this  facility  has 
never been used.  The Central Bank has  no  stock of such securities  anyway. 
Legal foundations 
56.  The  right  of  the  Central  Bank  to  conduct  open-market  business  is  governed 
by  the Bank  Law  of  23  April  1948, in which the bank is  authorized to buy and 
sell  the  following  securities: 
- Bills  accepted  by  banks  and  bankers  established  in the  Netherlands  provided 
they  do  not  exceed  the  customary  time  limits; 
- Treasury  paper; 
- Dutch  Government  bonds,  or  bonds  for  which  the  Dutch  Government  has 
guaranteed  payment  of  interest  and  redemption,  provided  that  they  are  offi-
cially  quoted  on the  Amsterdam  stock  exchange. 
Although  the  Central  Bank  has  been  empowered  to  conduct  open-market  trans· 
actions  since  1937  (on  the  basis  of  the  earlier  Bank Law),  it has  to  apply  this 
policy  itself  only  since  1952.  Previously  the  Treasury,  acting  through  its  agent 
in  Amsterdam,  automatically  took up all  the funds  offered on the  money  market 
even  when the Government's cash  balances  did not fall  short of current financial 
needs. 
In the 1952 agreement between the Treasury and the Central Bank,  responsibility 
for  open-market  policy  was  transferred  to the Central Bank.  Since  then Treasury 
policy  has  been  to  limit  the  issue  of  Treasury  paper  basically  to  replacement  of 
paper  falling  due,  at  least  in so  far  as  the  need  to  maintain  a  reasonable  credit 
balance  at  the Central Bank  allows. 
Composition and replenisment of open-market portfolio 
57.  At the  time when the 1952  agreement  was  concluded,  the Central Bank had 
1  The Central  Bank  operated on the  market  again  in the  summer  of  1971,  when  the guilder was  floating. 
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claims  totalling Fl.  2,100  million  on the Treasury, arising from  the transfer of its 
old Reichsmark balances-built up in the war- to  the Treasury, Fl. 800 million 
of  which  was  in  the  form  of Treasury  paper while  the  rest  was  a  book  claim. 
In the  course  of  its  first  open-market  operations,  the  Central  Bank  had  already 
sold a  large  part of its  stock of Treasury paper; it was  able to continue its open-
market operations  thanks  to the Government's readiness  to convert the remaining 
book debt  into  Treasury paper as  and when the Central  Bank  needed  it. But in 
1956  the  Treasury  discharged  the rest  of its debt  to  the Central  Bank by  using 
counterpart funds from Marshall Aid. The Central Bank's operating stock of paper 
was  supplemented  in  subsequent  years  by  the transfer  of its consolidated  claims 
on  the  EPU and  Argentina  to  the  State  (cf.  Table  15). 
Since  1962  the  new  paper  in  the  open-market  holdings  owes  its  origin  to  the 
financing  of  international  monetary  transactions  by  the  State.  In August  1962  it 
was  agreed  that  the  State  can,  when  necessary,  place  Treasury  paper  with  the 
Central  Bank  to  the  amount  of non-interest  bearing notes  encashed for  the  IMP. 
This  paper is  to be bought back if repayments  in  guilders  are  received  from  the 
IMP or if a  drawing  is  compensated by a  Dutch drawing  on  the  IMP. 
On the basis  of such  agreements,  the State financed,  by placing Treasury paper at 
the Central Bank:  a) part of debt repayment made ahead of schedule to the United 
States  and  Canada;  b)  a  gold  payments  to  the  IMP,  resulting  from  increases  in 
the  Netherlands  quota;  c)  guilder  drawings  by  the United  Kingdom  and  France, 
under the  General  Arrangements  to  Borrow (GAB). 
The  Central  Bank  is  entitled  to  use  paper  obtained  under  these  agreements  for 
open-market  transactions. 
Functioning of open-market policy 
58.  The  Central  Bank  has.  mostly  pursued  a  passive  open-market  policy,  in  the 
sense  that it has  aligned  its  issue  rates  for  money-market  paper  on free  market 
rates.  From  1952  to  1955 and in  1958, for  instance,  it mopped  up much  of the 
cash  liquidity  resulting  from  its  purchases  of  foreign  exchange.  Such  temporary 
shortages  on  the  money  market  as  arose  during  these  long  periods  of  abundant 
liquidity were covered by the Central Bank's purchase of short-term securities. 
In order to alleviate short-term liquidity difficulties on the money market-result-
ing, for instance, from seasonal :fluctuations in tax movements and payments falling 
due  at the end of the accounting year- the  Central  Bank  has  also,  since  1956, 
taken  up  money-market  securities  under  "repurchase  agreements"  whereby  banks 
sell  securities  to it with the commitment to buy them back at the same  rate after 
a  predetermined  period. 
In the early sixties the Central Bank did its utmost to keep money-market interest 
rates  low  by  international  standards,  so  as  to  minimize  the  need  to  buy foreign 
exchange.  In this  connection,  the  open-market  policy  was  directed  to cushioning 
short-term  disturbances  on  the  market.  From  mid-1961  to  the  end  1963,  the 
tightening  influence  of the  generally  rising  level  of notes  and  coin  in  circulation 
was  offset,  on balance,  by  a  gradual  reduction in  the  minimum  reserve  ratio ( cf. 
item  20). 
After 1963, when the minimum reserve ratio had been reduced to zero,  the banks 
had  to  cushion  the reduction  in their  cash  liquidity  caused  by  the upward  trend 
of notes  and coin  in circulation mainly by selling  foreign  exchange  to the Central 
Bank.  As  the net yield obtainable on the international money market - which had 
expanded  considerably  in  the  meantime - was  higher  than  that  obtainable  from 
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domestic investments, up to  1970, the money market became increasingly  tight as 
a result  and its interest rate level  rose  to  above  Bank rate. 
This  development  sharply  reduced  activity  on  the  Treasury  paper  market,  and 
thus made it difficult to fix at a satisfactory level the rates for repurchase agreements 
to tide  over periods of short-term tightness.  In combination with the fact  that the 
banks added to liquid assets by selling foreign exchange, this led the Central Bank, 
after  1964, to intervene on the  appreciably  more  active  foreign  exchange  market 
- by  buying  spot dollars  and  simultaneously  selling  in the  forward  market - at 
times of  temporary  shortage.  The  Central Bank again  sold Treasury  paper on the 
open market in the  summer  of 1971, when  the  guilder  was  floating,  to  skim  off 
excessive  bank liquidity. 
Para.  II:  Intervention  on  the  forward  foreign  exchange  market 
Intemational activities of the banking system 
59.  Although  under  the  1954  gentlemen's  agreement  the  banks  had  been  autho-
rized  to  invest  freely  abroad,  they  largely  confined  themselves  until  about  1957 
- partly owing to the limited capacity of the forward foreign  exchange market ~ 
to  holding  working  balances,  mainly  to finance  foreign  trade.  The Dutch  banks 
expanded  their foreign  operations sharply  when,  after the return to convertibility 
at  the end of 1958, the international money market began to grow at a rapid rate. 
The  investment  of liquid  assets  abroad  increased  rapidly,  above  all  in the  early 
years  of  increasing  national  foreign  exchange  reserves.  The  policy  of the Central 
Bank  in  these  years  was  aimed  at ensuring  that  the  relationship  of  domestic  to 
foreign  interest rates encouraged such investment.  Furthermore, the banks steadily 
expanded,  on  the  sharply  growing  international  money  market,  the  build-up  of 
foreign  business by which funds  obtained abroad are  reinvested in other countries 
(Table 16). These developments led to emergence of a fairly large and busy foreign 
exchange  market,  on  which  it is  easy  to  transfer  short-term  funds  to  and  from 
abroad.  The Central Bank intervenes on  this market  to prevent major fluctuations 
in parity rates,  which can be caused,  among other factors,  by developments on the 
domestic  money  market. 
Intervention by the Central Bank 
60.  The  post-1963  tightening  of  the  money  market,  which  persisted  till  1970, 
induced  the  banks,  which  held  much  of  their  liquidity  abroad,  to  sell  dollars  to 
the Central Bank.  The intervention of  the Central Bank on the forward  exchange 
market  often  had  the  purpose  of  facilitating  these  spot sales. 
In periods  of sharp  temporary  strains  on  the  domestic  money  market  and  heavy 
spot  sales  of  dollars,  the  banks  have  often  increased  their  demand  for  forward 
dollars  so  as  to  keep  their  dollar  risk  in balance.  The  resultant  decrease  in the 
discount  or increase  in  the  premium  on  the  forward  market  for  dollars  has  led 
to  an increase  in the  net yield (gross  yield less  costs of forward cover) obtainable 
abroad, which in turn has  resulted in a tendency for domestic money  rates to rise. 
In this  connection  the  Central Bank,  between  1965  and  the  end of  196  7, apart 
from  making  spot sales  and purchases, intervened in times  of  temporary  tightness 
on  the  money  market  by swaps  (resale  for  up  to  three  months forward  delivery 
to  the  banks  by  the  Central  Bank  of  dollars  bought from  the  banks)  and  thus 
averted the aforementioned impact on the money rate of the domestic free  market. 
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The  Central Bank  again  made  such  swaps  in October  1970  and  the  early  months 
of  1971,  partly  in  order  to  obtain  exchange  rate  cover  for  the  dollars  in  its 
possession. 
In  the  sixties,  too,  the  Central  Bank  intervened  on  the  forward  foreign  ex-
change  market  in order  to  reduce  liquidity  on  the  domestic  money  market,  by 
making  spot sales  of dollars  and simultaneous  forward repurchases.  These  transac-
tions were carried out in periods of foreign exchange  speculation when the guilder 
was in demand and  the associated heavy  spot sales  of dollars  to the Central Bank 
led to an excessive increase of liquidity on  the domestic money market. A number 
of  times  the  Central  Bank  also  made  outright  purchases  of  dollars  for  forward 
delivery  so  as  to  prevent spot dollar sales  and the  associated  easing of the money 
market. 
Regulation of banks net foreign assets 
61.  In July 1964 the Central Bank, for monetary reasons,  directed that authorized 
banks were not - apart from an allowance of Fl. 5 million - to have a net foreign 
debt. This regulation has  already been discussed in item 18. 
In 1969  conditions  on the money  market  induced  the  Central Bank  to  impose  a 
temporary ceiling on the expansion of the net foreign assets of  the banking system. 
The reason  for  this was a sharp increase in rates on the Eurodollar market, which 
induced the banks to buy funds for investment abroad from the Central Bank  and 
thus  increase  their  recourse  to  the Central  Bank.  A  maximum  figure  was  agreed 
in  early July,  and  in  September it was  agreed  to reduce  the net foreign  assets  to 
the  average  figure  for  the first  nine months of 1968, in order to reverse  through 
repatriation  the  increase  in  the  net foreign  assets  of  the banks  which  had  taken 
place  in  the  first  half  of  1969  at  the  expense  of  central  reserves.  After  a  few 
adjustments,  the  arrangements  were  suspended  in  April  1970  when  the  special 
situation resulting  from  the exceptionally high - and to some  extent artificial -
level of interest rates on the Eurodollar market had disappeared. The Central Bank 
has  retained  the  right  to  reactivate  the  arrangements  as  soon  as  it  feels  this 
advisable. 
Section IV ·  Direct credit restrictions 
Introduction 
General survey 
62.  In May  1960  the  Central Bank  concluded  an agreement with the banks  on a 
system  of  quantitative  restrictions  for  short-term  lending  to  the  private  sector. 
This  agreement  has  been  in force  since  the  summer  of  1961, with a brief inter-
ruption in 1963  and  a longer  break from  mid-1967  to  1  January  1969. In 1965 
the system was  supplemented by an  (informal) agreement  governing the long-term 
domestic  operations  of the banks.  Quantitative restrictions have  also  been  applied 
since  mid-1969  to  general  savings  banks  and since  September  1970  to  the  Postal 
Cheque  and  Giro  Transfer  Service. 
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Short-term  lending  to  local  authorities  has  been  subject  to  a  ceiling  since  early 
1967. The  criteria differ  somewhat  from  those  for  the private sector. 
As  regards  selective  restrictions,  in  February  1969  the  Central  Bank  asked  the 
agricultural  credit  institutions  and  banks  to  limit  their personal  loans. 
The legal basis 
63.  The agreements with the banking system and the savings banks on quantitative 
credit  restrictions were concluded pursuant to the Law on the Supervision of the 
Credit  System  (Article  10).  As  already  stated,  this  law  assumes  that  the  Central 
Bank  will  first  attempt to  reach  agreement directly  with  the  representative  orga-
nisations  of  the  banks  on the  course  to be  adopted by  latter.  Only if  agreement 
proves  impossible  can  the  Central  Bank  issue  general  directives,  and  they  must 
have ·the  approval  of  the  Finance  Minister  and  be  presented  to  Parliament  for 
ratification  within three  months.  Their maximum validity is  limited  to  a year and 
the may  be  extended once  only by  the Central Bank for the same  period as  their 
original validity. Further extensions, each time for a maximum of one year,  always 
have  to be approved by the Minister and ratified by Parliament. It has never been 
necessary  to issue  such  general  directives. 
As  the law on selective  credit restrictions  now  stands, the Central Bank can issue 
instructions with regard  to  major  categories  or forms  of  credit only (for  example 
lending  to the private sector or local  authorities). 
Para.  I:  Quantitative  credit  restrictions 
Participating institutions 
64. The agreements  mentioned  in item 62  apply  to  commercial banks  and  agricul-
tural credit institutions which,  together,  account  for  nearly  all  short-term lending 
to  the  private  sector.  Among  the  other  money-creating  institutions,  the  security 
credit  institutions  are  not  covered  by  the  restriction  agreements  because  of  the 
relatively limited extent of their business.  The savings institutions were left out of 
account  till  1969, because  of  their neutral monetary  impact. 
The Postal Cheque  and Giro Transfer  Services,  which  does  not  come  under  the 
control  of  the  Central  Bank,  remained  outside  the  scope  of  the  agreements  till 
September  1970.1 
Para.  I-1:  The policy  directive  for  short-term lending 
Scope of the provisions 
65.  The  Central Bank, acting  under the agreement,  can  decide  that during a spe-
cific  period commercial  and  agricultural credit banks  are  not to allow their short-
term  !endings  to  rise  by  more  than  a  given  percentage  above  the  figure  for  a 
reference  period. 
Short-term  advances  are  defined  as  loans  with an average  initial  term of less  than 
two years  (counting from  the date of the first  taking up). 
A bank remains within the standard established by the Central Bank if the average 
1 The  new  draft  Law  on  Supervision  of  the  Credit  System  brings  the  Postal  Cheque  and  Giro  Transfer  Service 
under  the  general  economic  control  of  the Central  Bank. 
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total  of  its  outstanding  short-term  loans,  calculated  from  the  last  three  monthly 
balance sheets submitted to the Central Bank, does  not rise by more  than a given 
percentage  above  the  corresponding  figure  for  the  reference  period.  Under  the 
restrictions  applied  till  mid-1967,  it was  held  that  the  standard  had also  been 
complied with if the relevant lending did not rise by more than a given percentage 
above the average outstanding !endings of the corresponding months of a reference 
year. 
The  arrangements  in force  since  1 January  1969  replace  the alternative  standard 
by  the  right  to deduct  from  any  excess: 
a )  The  amount  by  which  lending  fell  short  of  the standard  in  one  or more  of 
the  three immediately preceding monthly balance  sheets, with the proviso  that 
once  such  an  amount  has  been  deducted  it cannot  be  used  again  for  this 
purpose; 
b)  A  sum,  fixed  by  the  institution  which  has  exceeded  the  standard,  which  is 
then  added  to  average  lending  in  one  or more  of  the  three-month  periods 
terminating at the end of each  of the next three months, with the proviso that 
once  this has been done  any  excess  recorded at the end of the aforementioned 
months-including  the sum  carried over-cannot  be  "rolled  over"  again  to 
the  end of  a  subsequent  month. 
Penalties 
66.  If the banks that are  parties  to  the agreement do  not as  a whole keep  to the 
standards, the Central Bank can require those of them which have failed to observe 
the  standard  to hold with  itself  a non-interest-bearing  balance  in  addition to  any 
minimum  reserve  which  may  have  to  be  held.  Like  the  minimum  reserve,  this 
balance  is  elastic,  that  is  to  say  the  obligation  to  hold  a  deposit  need  only  be 
satisfied  on  the  average  over  the  deposit  period.  The  amount  of  the  balance  is 
fixed  as  a percentage of the sum  by which the standard is  exceeded, after allowing 
for  any  offset (till mid-1967  the balance was  a percentage of  the smallest amount 
by which one of the standards had been exceeded);  the percentage has never been 
more  than  100. 
How the non-interest-bearing balance is calculated: allowances 
67.  The  way  in which  the  non-interest-bearing  balance  is  calculated has  been  re-
vised repeatedly.  Since  the beginning of 1969, the amount to be deposited for the 
first  Fl.  500,000  in excess  has  been nil.  A  50 %  balance  has  to be held for  the 
next  Fl.  500,000  and  a  100 %  balance  for  the excess  amount  thereafter.1  These 
reduced or zero  rates for limited overstepping are  mainly designed as  a concession 
for  the small banks;  more generally,  they  ensure that relatively  small  excesses  are 
penalised  to  only  a limited extent, if at  all. 
With effect from September 1969 an  amendment was introduced in order to reduce 
the  balance  requirement in the running-in  period. A  maximum reduction of 50% 
in  the balance was conceded,  with the proviso  that the  total reduction granted  to 
an  individual  credit  institution,  calculated  over  the  entire  period  in  which  the 
credit restriction was in force, was  not more than 4 % of the reference amount. 
1 Like  the  minimum  reserve. system,  the  policy  directive  makes  no  provision  for  a  penalty  interest rate  for  failure 
to  keep  the  non-interest-bearing  balance  at  the  required  leveL 
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It was  agreed  in September  1969  that in view of the current state of the money 
market,  Central Bank  credit facilities  could be obtained  to  finance  a non-interest-
bearing balance.  This  agreement  has  never been allowed to lapse. 
As  a  measure  against  protracted overstepping  of  the standards,  it was  decided  in 
1966 to limit  the allowances  of any  banks which were required to hold a balance 
for  three  successive  months  or for  four  months  in  any  period of  six  months,  if 
the  bank  in question  had  overstepped  the  standards  by  more  than  in  the  cor-
responding  months  of  the  previous  year.  Furthermore,  in such  cases  the  Central 
Bank could withdraw the element  of flexibility  whereby  a deposit  obligation was 
held to be  satisfied as  long as  the required balance was maintained on the average 
during  a  month.  These  provisions  were  suspended  halfway  through  1967. 
Under special circumstances, the policy  directive allows  the Central Bank to adjust 
the reference  period of  individual banks. Furthermore, it can  reduce  the required 
balance  in  the event of  freak  fluctuations  in  lending  by  a  bank. 
Adjustment for increase in capital resources 
68.  On the grounds that the credit restriction bore relatively hard on banks which 
were  in  a  phase  of rapid  development  and  which  in view  of  this  had increased 
their  capital  resources  in the  previous  years,  in  1965  the Central  Bank  granted 
individual  banks  an  additional  margin  for  lending  to  the  extent  of  2 ~ times 
the amount  which,  between  1961  and  the  end  of  1964,  their  surplus  solvency 1 
had  increased  owing  to  growth  of  capital  r~sources.  The  maximum  amount  of 
such  additional  margin  for  lending was  fixed,  for  each  individual bank, at Fl.  20 
million. 
Under  the  arrangements  in  force  since  1  January  1969, it was  decided-at  the 
request  of  the  Nederlandse  Bankiersvereniging  (Netherlands  Bankers  Association) 
-that in  1970 part of the admissible increase in commercial bank lending should 
be divided between the individual commercial  banks, in proportion to the growth 
of their capital resources in the period from  the end of 1965 to  the end of  1969. 
This  special lending margin was  not granted to banks which had failed  to  comply 
with  the  current  solvency  directives  at  the  end  of  both  1969  and  April  1970. 
For  each  bank,  the  special  lending  margin  was  limited  to  2 %  of  its  average 
short-term lending in the reference  period.  The total amount of this special credit 
margin  was  deducted  from  the  increase  in  commercial  bank lending  allowed  by 
the policy  directive in 1970, bringing this  increase  down from  9·5% to  9-15 %. 
In  1971,  provision  was  again  made  for  part  of  the  admissible  increase  in  com-
mercial  bank lending  to  the divided between the commercial banks  in  proportion 
to  the  growth  of  their capital  resources. 
Tennination 
69.  In the policy  directive agreement,  the Central Bank has undertaken to  discuss 
with the banks  the possibility of terminating its application if total lending within 
a  period of three months  does  not exceed  the standards  established. 
1 The  surplus  over  and  above  the  solvency  required  by  the  Central  Bank  in  connection  with  supervision  of credit 
to  enterprises. 
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Para.  I-2:  Scheme of regulation  for  long-term  business 
Reasons for introduction 
70.  In the second half of 1964 and in 1965 the long-term domestic operations of 
the banks  did  much  to  increase  the liquidity of the economy,  since long-term do-
mestic  investments  increased  significantly  more  than  long-term  resources.  This 
induced  the  Central  Bank,  after  consulting  the.  representative  organizations,  to 
ask  the  banks  to try to  stop their long-term assets  from  increasing by  more than 
their  long-term  liabilities.  This  was  to  be  done  with  effect  from  30  April  1965 
or from  31  December  1964,  the  choice  being left to the discretion  of each  indi-
vidual  bank. It was  agreed  that penalties  would  not be  envisaged  unless  it was 
found that the request had been disregarded. The scheme was therefore considered 
informal. Like the policy directive for  short-term lending,  it was not applied from 
the summer of  1967  to  1 January  1969.  When it was  reintroduced on the latter 
date,  the  individual  banks  were  left  free  to  choose,  as  the  reference  sum,  the 
ayerage figure for long-term liabilities  less. long-term  assets  at the end of  the last 
four  months  of  1968,  or at the  end of November  1968. 
The informal scheme  is  based on the view that the banking system can be deemed 
neutral  in the  monetary  sense in so  far  as  it -like the  traditional savings  insti-
tutions- merely  channels  savings  to  other  destinations. 
Scope 
71.  Long-term  assets  are  deemed  to  comprise: 
- Debt-certificate  loans  grated  to  the  Government; 
- Domestic  securities  and  foreign  guilder  bonds  quoted in .Amsterdam;, 
- Lendings  to  local  authorities  with.  an  original .  term  of  more  than  one  year; 
- Lendings  to  the  private .  sector  with an average  original  term of at  least  two 
years; 
- Participations,  syndicate  holdings  and  real  property. 
Long-term  liabilities  comprise: 
- Capital,  reserves  and. time deposits with three years  or more  to run; 
---:  True  savings  balances  ("true"  savings  are  defined  in  chapter  I, item  19); 
- Time deposits with an original term of two years or more (in certain cases one 
year)  and  less  than three  years  to run;  1  .  . 
- Borrowings  with an  original  term of  at least  two years,  provided  they  cannot 
be  called  in earlier. 
In principle  the schemes  of regulation for short. and long-term domestic operations 
are kept completely separate, but since  1966 the Central Bank has  been prepared, 
when assessing overstepping in the long-term business of individual banks, to allow 
for. any  margin  which a  bank may  have on the short-term  side. 
Para.  I-3:  Functioning  of the two credit  control schemes 
~·._,.,.~ 
Application of the schemes 
72.  The  policy  directive  for  short-term lending  to the private  sector  was  applied 
for  the first  time  in  the  summer  of  1961  in  view  of  a  sharp  increase  in  bank 
advances.  It is  now in force  again,  after breaks  from  January to September 1963 
1 Up  to  the  end  of 1969,  the  banks  did not 'have  to  include. these  items  if they  did not  wish  to. 
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and from  June  1967  to January  1969.  The reference  figure  for  the  establishment 
of the standard in the first  period was  the total lendings of  the fourth quarter of 
1960; for  the  second period it was  the average  level of short-term lending in the 
first  half  of  1963;  for  the current period it is  the average  of  short-term loans  at 
the  end  of  the  last  four  months  of  1968.  When  establishing  the  level  of  the 
standard,  allowance  is  made  for  reasonal flutuations  in lending.  The · table  of  An-
nex  17  gives  the  changes  in  the principal  standard,  the  alternative  standard and 
actual lending  according  to the definition in the policy  directive;  it also  indicates 
the amount of obligatory balances. The  table shows  that lending initially exceeded 
the  standard in 1964  but did not outstrip in any  further  in the period ending in 
June  1967.  On balance,  the  standard  was  also  respected  in  1969  and  in  1970, 
after being overstepped for a time. It  was not exceeded in the first half of 1971. 
In  principle,  a  new  lending  policy  directive  is  agreed  for  each  period  of  four 
months.  When  fixing  standards  in  the period  to  June 1967,  the  Central  Bank 
always  worked on the principle that total liquidity creation from domestic sources 
should  not exceed  the  increase  in liquidity  requirements corresponding  to the ex-
pected real growth in production; The primary aim in the current period - in the 
light  of  experience  in  1963-1967  of the practical scope  for  reducing  the liquidity 
ratio- is  to  bring  down  the  liquidity  ratio  to  a  level  which  can  be considered 
relatively  low  and· consequently  restrictive.  The  Central  Bank  does  not  seek  to 
compensate any liquidity flows  to or from abroad. It always  works on the principle 
that the public authorities, in line with existing plans, will not on balance put more 
than a limited quantity of liquidity into circulation.  This, incidentally, is only part 
of  the reason  why  the  authorised  percentage  increases  for  short-term  lending  to 
the  private  sector  have  normally  been  about  twice  as  large  as  the  percentage 
increases  deemed  desirable  for  total  liquid assets,  which have  coincided  with the 
expected  rates. of  increase .in production.  The  additional  and  relatively  important 
factor. is  that in recent years official gold and foreign. exchange reserves and the. net 
foreign  assets of  banks have  accounted for  30 to  40 %  of the counterpart of total 
domestic liquid assets (the rest being represented by domestic lending to the public 
authorities and the private sector.1 The policy directive was tightened up somewhat 
1  This  can  be  illustrated  from the consolidated balance sheet figures of the money-creating institutions for the end o 
1965  and 1970: 
Fl.  '000 million  % 
1965  1970  1965  1970 
Loans to ·public authorities (net)  6,000  11,070  25  28.5 
Short·term loans  to  the  private sector  (policy  direc' 
tive)  7,040  14,190  29.5  36 
Other loans to private sector, Capital market invest-
ments less long-term liabilities and miscellaneous (net)  1,240  .2,030  5  5 
Official  gold  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  net 
foreign assets of banks  9,670  11,950  40.5  30.5 
Total =  ~ounterpart of total domestic liquid assets  23,950  39,240  100  100 
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when  it  was  found,  in  1966,  that  public  authorities  were  resorting  heavily  to 
inflationary financing  (cf. Table  6). 
In view  of the  increasingly  slack  economic  trend,  the  policy  directive  provisions 
were gradually eased  in the first  half of 1967 and finally-in June-completely 
suspended.  Towards  the  end  of  1968  the  banking  system  was  consulted  on rein-
troduction  of  the  credit  restriction  arrangements,  given  the  renewed  threat  of 
economic overheating in a period when: the performance of the balance of payments 
on current account was  still unsatisfactory.  This consultation led to reintroduction 
of the  policy  directive  for  short-term  lending  to  the private  sector  on  1 January 
1969.  Since  this  date,  the Central Bank has  mainly  sought  to  gear  the  admissible 
increase  in  lending  to what is  held  to  be  the  desirable  reduction in the  liquidity 
ratio.  In this  connection,  the  desirable  increase  in  total  liquid  assets  no  longer 
necessarily  coincides  with  the  foreseeable  growth  of  production.  The · two  did 
coincide  in  1969,  but  there  was  a  certain  difference  in  1970. 
The  standard  laid  down  in  the  scheme  of regulation  for  long-term  business  was 
exceeded fairly  considerably  to begin with, partly owing to the honouring of long-
term loan undertakings entered into before the date of application. The commercial 
and agricultural credit banks as  a group eliminated this excess in 1966. The scheme 
of regulation for long-term business  was  also  suspended in June  1967  and reintro-
duced  at the  beginning  of 1969.  The  standard  was  exceeded  to  a  limited extent 
for  a  time  at the end of  1969 and at the end of  1970. 
Results 
73.  The reduction in liquidity brought about by the quantitative credit restrictions 
of  the  Central  Bank is reflected  inter  alia  in  the  changes  of  the  liquidity  ratio 
(total  national  liquid  assets  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  net  national  income), 
which indicate  a virtually  unbroken tightening of liquidity from  1961  till the end 
of  1966.  The increasing pressures  associated with this  greater tightness  led  inter 
alia  to a sharp rise in interest rates. As  a result, and partly owing to  the measures 
to  restrict  the  inflow  of  capital  taken  or envisaged  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany and Switzerland, the second half of 1964 saw an inflow of foreign capital 
onto the capital market- an inflow which persisted in 1965 and 1966. The inflow 
cushioned  the  impact  of  the  domestic  restrictive  monetary  policy.  As  noted  in 
Chapter  I, item  18,  direct  borrowing  by  the  private  sector  abroad  is  subject  to 
exchange  controls. 
The increased  liquidity strains  are  seen  as  one of  the causes  of  the  swing  in the 
economic  trend which began half way through  1966 and led to the  easing  of the 
restrictions  and  then  to  their suspension in the first half of 1967. The subsequent 
endeavours  by  business  concerns  to  re-establish  more  normal  liquidity  conditions 
partly  accounted  for  the  very  sharp  increase  in  lending  in  1967  and  1968.  In 
1969  and  1970  the liquidity ratio dropped significantly  less  than intended, owing 
to  substantial  balance-of-payments  surpluses  resulting  from  capital  imports  and 
inflationary  financing  by  public  authorities. 
Para  I-4:  Control  of lending  to  local  authorities 
Scope 
74.  A request by the Central Bank to the commercial banks and agricultural credit 
institutions not to allow  short-term lending to local authorities - which had risen 
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sharply in 1966-to exceed a given ceiling has been in effect since  1966, to back 
up the Government's policy of improving the financial  management of this  sector. 
A  ceiling  was  agreed  with the  savings  banks  in  mid-1969,  and with  the  Postal 
Cheque  and  Giro Transfer  Service  in September  1970. 
The arrangement cannot prevent local  authorities  from  taking up cash loans  from 
the  private  sector.  But it does  shut  them off  from  a  significant  financing  source 
and  this  can help  to ensure  that the  local authorities-mainly  the municipalities 
- resort  for  their  further  short-term  financing  needs,  primarily  to  the  Bank  for 
Netherlands  Municipalities,  which  then  at its  turn will  have  to fall  back  on the 
Government.  This  makes  it possible  to  increase  central  supervision  of  short-term 
borrowing. 
Seasonally  adjusted  liquidity  ratios (  1) 
End of month  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
--------------------
March  43.5  42.8  4i.2  40.8  38.6  37.8  34.8  35.8  36.4  37.5  36.9 
June  42.9  42.6  41.8  40.6  37.2  37.1  35.0  35.5  36.6  36.7  36.8 
September  43.1  42.4  41.3  40.9  37.3  37.0  34.8  35.9  37.2  36.8  36.7 
December  42.6  41.9  41.6  40.3  37.8  36.2  35.6  36.2  37.4  36.8  36.3 
(1)  Data also corrected  for  fluctuations  in items in transit. 
Application 
75.  The  initial  ceiling  for  commercial  hanks  and  agricultural  credit  institutions 
was  105 %  of the figure  at the end of July  1966 of 95 %  of average  short-term 
lending  to  local  authorities  in the  first  half  of  1966.  To make  some  allowance 
for  the  seasonal  pattern of individual banks,  two  alternative  standards were later 
added.  Each credit institution is  free  to choose  the most favourable  of these four 
standards  each  month.  The  various  percentages  have  been  raised  a  number  of 
times over the years. The standards and the successive increases in percentages are 
given  in Table  20. 
In mid-1969  it  was  agreed  that  short-term  lending  to  the  local  authorities  by 
savings  banks should not exceed 2 %  of  the balance-sheet  total at the end of the 
previous  year.  Savings banks which were had already above this ceiling at the end 
of September 1969 were requested to make no further increase in the total amount 
of such loans.  In September  1970 agreement was reached with the Postal Cheque 
and Giro Transfer Service  on a ceiling for  short-term lending  to local  authorities. 
This ceiling was fixed  at  105% of the figure  at the end of 1969. In March 1971 
a  10 %  increase  was  made  in the ceiling of all institutions. 
The banks  and the Postal Cheque  and Giro  Transfer  Service  have  complied with 
this  arrangement. 
313 THE NETHERLANDS  - THE INSTRUMENTS 
Para.  I-5:  The  restriction  agreement  with  the  general  savings  banks 
Reason for restrictions 
76. In early 1969 the Central Bank entered into consultations with the organization 
representing the general savings banks on an extension of the scope of the monetary 
restrictions  to cover  these  institutions.  The reason  was  the increasing  activity  of 
these  savings  banks  in  the  field  of  wage,  salary  and  pension  payments  through 
accounts  which  the  customers  can  draw  on  by  transfers  or by  writing cheques. 
The character of these accounts hardly differs from that of current account at com-
mercial banks and agricultural credit institutions; they are  (still) not given separat-
ely  in  the balance  sheets,  but are  included  in  the  savings  balance  figures.  Their 
growth is revealed by the sharp increase in the rate of turnover of savings balances, 
which rose between the end of 1963  and the end of 1970 from 0·52 to 0-96  after 
marking  time in the previous five  years  (Table  19). 
Scope 
77.  The agreement came  into effect on 1 July 1969. In principle, it is the same as 
that governing  for  long-term  domestic  business  of commercial  banks  and  agricul-
tural credit institutions. Long-term assets may  thus not increase more quickly than 
long-term  liabilities,  the  latter including only "true" savings  deposits.  The savings 
banks can choose between one of two reference figures:  long-term liabilities minus 
long-term assets  at the end of June 1969 or the average at the end of March and 
the  end  of June  1969.  The  sum  calculated  for  "titular"  savings  is  likely  to  be 
overestimated (and consequently the "true" savings underestimated), since the rate 
of turnover of wage,  salary  and pension payments is  generally substantially larger 
than  two.  A  transitional  arrangement  was  therefore  worked  out for  establishing 
the  amounts  of  "true"  savings.  Under  this  arrangement,  the  rate  of  turnover  is 
calculated  after  deducting: 
1)  90 %  of monthly  wage,  salary  and  pension  payments  from  sums  withdrawn 
from  savings  balances,  and 
2)  35% of these  monthly sums  from  savings  balances  at the end of the quarter 
(only  quarterly  figures  are  notified). 
These adjustments are based on a  random survey indicating that ori average about 
90 %  of transfers  to wage,  salary and pension accounts  are withdrawn within 30 
days  of the  end of the month. The general  savings  banks are  to reorganize  their 
administrative methods  as  soori  as  possible  to allow  separate recording of savings 
and  other  accounts.  So  far,  the  savings  banks  have  complied  with  the  standard 
laid  down  by  the  Central Bank. 
The agreement  with the general  savings  banks  specifies  that,  as  has  always  been 
customary,  short-term  lending  to  the  private  sector  is  not  to  increase  by  more 
than  a  modest  amount.  As  stated  in  item  74;  a  ceiling  has  been  laid  down for 
their  short-term lending  to  local  authorities. 
Para.  I-6:  The  restriction  agreement  with  the  Postal  Cheque  and  Giro  Transfer 
Service 
Reason for restrictions 
78 a.  After  the  credit  control  arrangements  for  banks  had  come  into ·effect  in 
January  1969,  the  Central Bank drew  the  attention of the Ministers for Finance 
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and  for  Transport  and  Waterways 1  to  the  advisability  of  subjecting  the  Postal 
Cheque  and  Giro Transfer Service  to  such  regulation  as  well.  The argument was 
that in principle investments by this body have  the same monetary impact at bank 
lending  and  investment,  so  that  regulation  seemed  necessary  in order  to  ensure 
the  maximum  effectiveness  of monetary policy  in the broadest sense  of the term; 
and also because the banks were entitled to expect a public body with the character 
of a money-creating institution to comply  with requirements identical for all prac-
tical purposes  to  those  which they  had accepted  in the public interest. 
As  a result,  the Director General of the State Postal corporation and the Central 
Bank  began  negotiations  on a  monetary  regulation  scheme  for  the Postal Cheque 
and  Giro Transfer Service.  Agreement was  reached in September  1970. As  stated 
in  item  74,  it was  also  agreed  to impose  a ceiling  on short-term lending  to  local 
authorities by  the Postal Cheque  and  Giro Transfer Service. 
Scope 
78 b.  Under  the agreement,  a  standard is  established  periodically  for  the permis-
sible  growth  of  long-term  assets  and  short-term  lending  to  the  domestic  private 
sector (in terms  of the sums involved,  the latter is of little importance). As  in the 
case  of  the banks,  this  standard relates  to  the average  level  of relevant  assets  in 
a three-month period. For the remaining months of 1970, the standard for the ad-
missible  growth  of  items  covered  by  the agreement was  fixed  at 7 1/s %  of their 
average  level  in the  first  quarter of  1970.  In annual  terms  this  is  equivalent  to 
9 1/z  %, that is  to say,  the percentage  agreed with the commercial and agricultural 
credit banks  for short-term lending to the private sector in  1970. 
In line with the restriction arrangements for the banks, the standard for the period 
from  January  to  the  end  of  August  1971  was  fixed  at  5 %  of the  average  ad-
missible  figure  in  the  last  quarter  of  1970. 
Para.  II:  Selective  credit  restrictions 
79.  As  regards  selective credit restrictions, itis considered in the Netherlands that 
the  complete  agreement  on  general  policy  aims  needed  to make  selective  restric-
tions  acceptable  exists  only  under  special  conditions,  for  instance  in  wartime  or 
in a period of reconstruction.  Such complete agreement rarely exists  under normal 
conditions. 
As  the law now stands,  the Central Bank can issue  selective  restriction  directives 
only for the major categories or forms  of credit (for example for the private sector 
or local  authorities). The Central Bank has nevertheless asked the banks on several 
occasions to exercise moderation with regard to hire purchase financing and personal 
loans.  It did so  at the end of 1955 and again in February 1969, when it called on 
the commercial  banks  and  agricultural credit  institutions  to  limit  the  increase  in 
personal loans  to 112 %  of the figure  for the previous calendar year.  The Central 
Bank  did  not  do  this  on  its  own  initiative  but at  the  request  of  the  Finance 
Minister in order to help  avert distortions of competitions between the banks and 
financial  institutions subject to the loans law, after the latter institutions had been 
subjected in January  1969 by  the  public authorities to restrictions  with regard to 
1 Article  7  of  the  1954  Post  Law  empowers  these  two  ministers  to  lay  down  rules  for  the  monetary  policy  of  the 
Postal  Cheque  and  Giro Transfer  Service. 
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hire  purchase  transactions  and  personal  loans.  The  Central  Bank  repeated  its 
request in 1970. 
In early  1971, it asked  the banks  to  restrict personal loans  in  1971  to  108% of 
the admissible  total of  personal loans in  1970. 
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1-'" 
'-.0 
1958 
1.  Commercial banks  24 
(of  which: domestic 
assets)  (21) 
2.  Other  money-crea· 
ting institutions  7 
3.  Savings banks  23 
4.  "Funds"  46 
5.  Total  100 
(total in millions of 
guilders)  (37, 140) 
TABLE  1 
Relative  importance  of the  money-creating  institutions  (I)  "funds"  and  saving  banks 
(in  percentage  of  the  sum  of  the balances  of  all  institutions) 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
25  26  25  24  24  24  25  26  26 
(18)  (18)  (18)  (18)  (17)  (19)  (19)  (19)  (20) 
7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
23  23  24  24  24  24  24  23  23 
45  44  44  45  45  45  44  44  44 
100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
(41, 490)  (46,050)  (50, 910)  (56,410)  (63, 710)  (70, 620)  (79,220)  (87,950)  1  (99,020) 
1968  1969  1970 
28  30  32 
(21)  (20)  (20) 
7  7  7 
22  22  21 
43  41  40 
- --------
100  100  100 
(113, 110)  (130, 650)  (150,460) 
Short-term. investments by  "funds" and savings institutions  (2) in private sector,  as percentage of short-term loans to  private sector by all money-creating institutions (3) 
3 
e)  Excluding Nederlandsche Bank. 
(2)  Excluding agricultural credit institutions. 
(3)  Including Nederlandsche Bank. 
8  6 
Figures calculated from data compiled by Nederlandsche Bank. 
6  9  8  51  61  6l  5  4  4}  5! \.» 
N 
0 
ASSETS 
1.  Cash and  claims  on  money  creating institutions 
2.  Claims  on  public authorities 
3.  Short-term loans to private sector 
4.  Medium-term loans to private sector 
5.  Investments on  the domestic capital market 
6.  Foreign assets 
7.  Sundry domestic assets 
Total 
LIABILITIES 
8.  Liabilities counting as liquidity 
9.  True savings  balances 
10.  Debts to money-creating institutions 
11.  Capital and reserves  + long-term funds 
12.  Foreign liabilities 
13.  Sundry domestic liabilities 
Total 
(Total in million  of guilders) 
(Total as  %  of  GNP) 
------····-·--···--- - - -··  ---------· ···-·-· --
Figures calculated from  data compiled by the Nederlandsche Bank. 
TABLE  2 
Commercial  banks balance-sheet  Structure 
(as  a  percentage  of the  total) 
1958  1960 
8j2  8 
38j2  24 
30  32% 
1  1 
5  4Yz 
14%  28 
2%  2 
100  100 
66  61 
3j2  7% 
2  2% 
13%  11j2 
8%  11 
6Yz  6% 
100  100 
1963 
5 
18 
35 
4% 
8j2 
27 
2 
100 
56 
9Yz 
3 
12 
14% 
5 
100 
(8, 977)  (11 ,684)  (15, 163) 
(25)  (27%)  (28%) 
1966  1968  1970 
-
3j2  3  3% 
17j2  15j2  11 
31%  34%  26% 
9Yz  8j2  11% 
7%  10  6Yz 
27%  26  38% 
3  2%  2% 
100  100  100 
46%  48  35 
9  10%  9% 
3  3%  3 
12j2  10  12% 
25  24  37 
4  4  3 
100  100  100 
(22, 706)  (31,612)  (48,568) 
(30)  (34~9  (43) ..... 
N 
~ 
1958 
1.  Claims  on  public 
authorities  15,861 
- Commercial banks  245 
- Other  money-orea-
ting institutions  898 
- Savings banks  4 665 
- uFunds"  10:053 
2.  Claims  on  private 
sector  10,180 
- Commercial banks  169 
- Othermoney-orea-
ting institutions  94 
- Savings banks  2,494 
- "Funds"  7,423 
3.  Foreign claims  1,162 
Total  capital  market 
investments  27,203 
of  which  debt-certiii-
cate loans: 
- to public author-
ities  (8, 764) 
- to private sector  (8,701) 
-·-··---··---
TABLE  J 
Capital  market  investments  by  money-creating  institutions  "funds"  and  savings  banks 
(End-of-year  figures,  in  millions  of  guilders) 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
17,209  18,688  20,243  21,428  23,086  24,905  27,165 
276  286  554  608  788  870  1,197 
945  1,145  1,252  1,309  1,458  1,742  1,869 
5  198 
10:790 
5  725 
u;5o5 
6122 
12:315 
6  256 
13:255 
6  878 
13:962 
7  206 
15:087 
7 770 
16:329 
11,828  13,369  15,677  18,713  21,899  25,474  28,897 
201  231  328  493  432  547  442 
108  109  157  219  266  366  452 
2,985  3,498  4 249  5 303  6  501  7  791  9  099 
8,534  9,531  10:943  12:698  14:700  16:770  18:904 
1,333  1.536  1,917  2,172  2,370  2,407  2,484 
30,370  33_593  37,837  42,313  47,355  52,786  58,546 
(9,459)  (10, 122)  (11,316)  (12,270)  (13,292)  (15, 147)  (17,325) 
(10, 041)  (11,475)  (13,623)  (16, 181)  (19, 099)  (22,457)  (25,578) 
1966  1967  1968 
28,914  31,596  34,131 
1,071  1,547  2,428 
1,980  2,063  2,159 
8  154 
17:709 
8  606 
19:380 
8  956 
20:588 
33,059  37,715  43,477 
466  441  573 
596  699  748 
10  434  12,059  14,158 
21:563  24,516  27,998 
2,509  2,427  2,693 
64,482  71,738 
80,301 
(19, 129)  (21,485)  (23,540) 
(29, 417)  (33,365)  {38,644) 
Note: The figures for money-creating institutions are calculated from data compiled by  the Nederlandsche Bank.] The savings bank and "funds" figures are, unlike those in Table I, taken from data pub-
lished by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
·~ V> 
IV 
IV 
TABLE  4 
Domestic liquid  assets  (amounts  at end of  year) 
(in millions of guilders) 
Description 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  ------------------
COMPOSITION (1) 
1.  Domestic money supply (primary liquid assets)  4,580 
Notes and coin 
4,680  5,090  5,470  5,950  6,420  7,170  7,870  8,460  8,720  8,840  9,430  9,950 
Sight deposits  4,090  4,390  4,400  4  680  4,850  5,280  5,620  6,260  6,390  6,970  8,580  9,200  10,840 
-at banks  1,470  1,520  1,810  2:020  2,290  2,590  2,650  2,860  3,310  3,600  4,060  4,590  5,160 
- at giro transfer institutions  ------
Total  10,140  10,590  11,300  12,170  13,090  14,290  15,440  16,990  18,160  19,290  21,480  23,220  25,950 
2.  Secondary liquid assets  ill 
Claims on the Government  1,350  1,440  1,370  1,490  1,340  1,410  1,260  1,110  980  1,220  1,250  1,210  1,150 
Claims on the local authorities  1,330  910  530  360  460  600  990  910  1,230  1,320  1,520  1,950  2,580 
Claims on money-creating institutions 
- Time  deposits and day-to-day loans  2,300  2,830  3,300  3,150  3,530  3,790  4,150  4,020  4,090  5,420  6,410  7,320  7,840 
- Foreign currency balances of residents  230  280  240  220  260  280  320  470  420  510  770  950  990 
- "Titular" liquid savings balances at commer- 20  30  50  170  170  210  400  450  500  540  690  860  730 
cia! banks  ------------------------------
Total  5,230  5  490  5  490  5 390  5  760  6  290  7  120  6  960  7  220  9  010  10,640  12,290  13,290 
3.  Total domestic liquid assets  (1 +  2)  15,370  16;o8o  16:790  17:560  18!850  20:580  22:560  23:950  25:380  28:300  32,120  35,510  39,240  ------------------
HOLDERS OF  (2): 
1.  Primary liquid assets 
- Personal and business sector  9,840  10,320  10,930  11,790  12,710  13,920  14,950  16,470  17,580  18,580  20,840  22,520  25,100 
- "Funds't  150  130  140  150  150  120  190  18)  230  300  260  290  410 
- Savings banks  60  70  90  110  130  120  180  190  210  230  200  240  260 
- Local authorities  90  70  140  120  100  130  120  150  140  180  180  170  180  ------- --- ---
Total  10,140  10,590  11,300  12,170  13,090  14,290  15,440  16,990  18,160  19,290  21,480  23,220  25,950 
2.  Secondary liquid assets  (quasi-money) 
- Personal and business sector  3,460  3,570  3,700  3,380  3,690  4,120  5,090  4,800  5,010  6,240  7,840  8,790  9,110 
- •'Funds"  740  770  710  790  780  930  830  830  690  910  1,100  1,520  2,020 
- Savings banks  850  930  910  880  1,120  1,010  1,040  1,grz  1,180  1,430  1,240  1,570  1,630 
- Local authorities  180  220  230  340  170  230  160  340  430  460  410  530 
--------------- ----------------
'l'otal  5,230  5,490  5,550  5,390  5,760  6,290  7,120  6,960  7,220  9,010  10,640  12,290  13,290 
3.  Domestic liquid assets  (1 +2) 
- Personal and business sector  13,300  13,890  14,630  15,170  16,400  18,040  20,040  21,270  22,590  24,820  28,680  31,310  34,210 
- "Funds"  890  900  850  940  930  1,050  1,020  1,010  920  1,210  1,360  1,810  2  430 
- l'avings banks  910  1,000  1,000  990  1,250  1,130  1,220  1,210  1,390  1,660  1,440  1,810  1:890 
- Local authorities  270  290  370  460  270  360  280  460  480  610  640  580  710 
------------ ------ ---
Total  15,370  16,080  16,850  17,560  18,850  20,580  22,560  23,950  23,380  28,300  32,120  35,510  39,240 
--- --- ---------
Not included above: 
Savings balances at savings banks 
"True" savings balances at money-creating instit. 
7,680 
310 
8,800 
470 
9,930 
810 
11,190 
1,050 
12,630 
1,250 
14,360 
1,470 
15,990 
1,640 
17,780 
1,810 
19,560 
2,030 
21,880 
2,770 
24,140 
3,290 
26,890 
3,710 
29,610 
4,610 
Balances and money-market investments held di-
reetly abroad by the private sector  150  390  200  230  340  290  130  290  350  330  430  600  870 
---
(1 )a The domestic money supply includes the notes and coin held by non-residents. 
(2)  The "funds" group includes: the General Civil Pension Fund, the private pension funds,  the life insurance companies, the Old Age Pension Fund, the Widows and Orphans Pension Fund and other 
social funds.  The saving bank are the Postal Savings Bank, the general savings banks and the savings department of agricultural credit banks. 
.~ \.>.) 
N 
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Description 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
-------------- COMPOSITION (1) 
1.  Domestic money supply (primary liquid assets) 
Notes and coin  12.7  12.2  11.9  12.1  12.3 
Sight deposits 
-at banks  11.4  11.4  10,3  to.3  10.0 
- at giro transfer institutions  4.1  3.9  4.5  4·2  4.7  ---
2.  Secondary liquid assets 
•rota!  28.2  27.5  26.4  26.9  27.0 
Claims on the Government  3.8  3.8  3.2  3,3  2.7 
Claims on the local authorities  3.7  2.4  1.3  o.8  1.0 
Claims on money·oreating institutions 
- Time deposits and day-to-day loans  6.4  7.3  7.7  6.9  7.3 
- Foreign currency balances of residents  0.7  0.7  0.6  o.5  0.5 
- "Titular" liquid savings balances at commer- - 0.1  0.1  o.4  0.3 
cial banks  ---
Total  14.6  14.3  12.9  11.9  11.8 
3.  Total domestic liquid assets  (1 +2)  42.8  41.8  39.3  38.8  38.8 
------- HOLDERS OF  (2):  -----------
1.  Primary liquid assets 
- Personal and business sector  27.4  26.8  25.6  26.0  26.2 
- "Funds"  0.4  0.3  0.3  o.3  0.3 
- Savings banks  0.2  0.2  0.2  o.3  0.3 
- Local authorities  0.2  0.2  0.3  o.3  0.2  ----------------
Total  28.  27.5  26.4  26.9  27.0 
2.  Secondary liquid assets  (quasi·money) 
- Personal and business sector  9.7  9.3  8.5  7.5  7.5 
- "Funds,.  2.1  2.1  1.7  t.8  1.6 
- Savings banks  2.3  2.4  2.1  1.9  2.3 
- Local authorities  0.5  0.5  0.6  o.7  0.4  ---
'l'otal 
3.  Domestic liquid assets  (1 + 2) 
14.6  14.3  12.9  11.9  11.8 
- Personal and business sector  37.1  36.1  34.1  33.5  33.7 
- "Funds"  2.5  2.4  2.0  2.1  1.9 
- Savings banks  2.5  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.6 
- Local authorities  0.7  0,7  0.9  1.0  0.6 
---------
Total  42.8  41.8  39.3  38.8  38.8  ------ Not included above: 
Savings balances at savings banks  21.4  22.9  23.2  24.7  26.0 
"True" savings balances at money-creating instit,  0.9  1.2  2.0  2.3  2.6 
Balances and money-market investments held di· 
rectly abroad by the private sector  0.4  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.7 
The liquid assets  of the personal and business sector are calculated as  residual items. 
Figures calculated from data compiled by the Nederlandsche Bank.  In some cases  they are based on estimates. 
(as percent of gross  national product) 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
----------------
12.1  11.5  11.4  11.2  10.5  9.6  9.2  8.8 
10.0  9.0  9.0  8.5  8.4  9.4  9.0  9.6 
4.9  4.3  4.1  4.4  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.5 
-------------
27.0  24.8  24.5  24.1  23.2  23.4  22.7  22.9 
2.7  2.0  1.6  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.0 
1.1  1.6  1.3  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.9  2.3 
7.2  6.7  5.8  5.4  6.5  7.0  7.2  6.9 
0.5  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.9 
0,4  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.6  -------------
11.9  11.5  10.0  9.6  10.9  11.6  12.0  11.7 
38.9  36.3  34.5  33.7  34.1  3.3.0  34.7  34.6  ------------------------
26.4  24.0  23.7  23.3  22.4  22.7  22.0  22.1 
0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4 
0.2  0,3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  -------------------------
27.0  24.8  24.5  24.1  23.2  23.4  22.7  22.9 
7.7  8.2  6.9  6.7  7.5  8,5  8.6  8.0 
1.8  1.3  1.2  0.9  1.2  1.2  1.5  1.8 
1.9  1.7  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.4  1.5  1.4 
0.5  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.5 
-------------------------
11.9  11.5  10.0  9.6  10.9  11.6  12.0  11.7 
34.1  32.2  30.6  30.0  29.9  31.2  30.6  30.1 
2.0  1.6  1,5  1.2  1.5  1.5  1.8  2.2 
2.1  2.0  1.8  1.9  2.0  1.6  1.7  1.6 
0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  ---- ------------
38.9  36.3  34.5  33.7  34.1  35.0  34.7  34.7  --- ------------
27.2  25.7  25.6  25.9  26.4  26.3  26.3  26.1 
2.8  2.6  2.6  2.7  3.3  3.6  3.6  4.1 
0.5  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.8 
----
~ I..N 
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TABLE  5 
Causes  of changes  in  total  domestic  liquid  assets  (in  millions of guilders) 
Description  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  J_::~ 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
1.  Creation of liquidity for the Government  --- ---
a)  Money creation 
(1) Net  recourse  ( +)  to  the  Nederlandsche 
Bank (1) 
(of  which  as  the  result  of  open  market  -878  537  -1 000  235  409  -340  44  636  500  -695  1,107  -470  -197 
transactions)  (607)  (-44)  '(174)  (-178)  (34)  (-79)  (-207)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-> 
(2) Net  recourse  ( +)  to  the  other  money-
creating institutions (1)  1,045  -944  145  99  -73  40  371  261  459  739  757  509  61 
(3) Special  transactions  mentioned in  6.a  -557  -421  107  -664  55  -241  -217  -331  -197  222  -762  207  -361 
---
Total  -390  -828  -748  -330  391  -541  198  566  762  266  1,102  246  -497 
b)  Placing ( +) of floating debt counting as sec-
ondary liquidity  309  93  -69  71  -149  59  -150  -165  127  240  35  -113  -65 
Total  -81  -735  -817  -259  242  -482  48  401  635  506  1,137  133  -562 
2.  Creation  of  liquidity  for  the  local  authorities 
a)  Lending ( +) by: 
(1) Nederlandsche Bank  -77  29  -46  - 58  -58  8  -4  - -4  4  19  -22 
(2) Other money-creating institutions  103  46  -62  -120  242  272  29  328  419  146  -46  211  597 
------ ---------
Total  26  75  -108  -120  300  214  37  324  419  142  -42  230  575 
b) Pladng ( +) of floating debt counting as sec-
ondary liquidity  254  -418  -378  -166  102  133  387  -106  323  91  197  432  630 
--- --------- ---------
Total  280  -343  -486  -286  402  347  424  218  742  233  155  662  1,205 
3,  Creation of money for the private sector 
Lending(+) by: 
(1) Nederlandsche Bank  -14  -2  2  9  -13  3  -3  7  -1  91  -69  15  -34 
(2) Commercial banks  -210  483  614  720  615  768  947  1,090  1,011  1,917  2,279  2,377  2,343 
(3) Agricultural credit institutions  -4  97  45  68  98  84  132  14  120  354  216  140  349 
(4) Other money·creating institutions  37  14  12  -15  29  51  3  33  -48  -11  -25  -12  -7 
---~ 
Total  -191  592  673  782  729  906  1,079  1,144  1,082  2,351  2,401  2,520  2,651 
(of  which at medium term)  - - (25)  (147)  (353)  (105)  (310)  (486)  (5:J5)  (268)  (282)  (1, 395)  (1,286) 
4,  1\Iiscellaneous sources of money creation 
a)  Net transactions  of  money-creating institut-
ions  on  the  capital  market  (purchases  +) 
(1) Public market  18  67  90  208  254  129  52  60  -107  -21  288  21  -463 
(2) Debt certificate loans market  34  48  141  293  78  247  481  435  202  586  850  241  513 
b)  Increase (-) of  "true"  savings  balances at 
money-creating institutions  -121  -163  -400  -212  -198  -221  -178  -162  -226  -738  -520  -414  -900 
""  ------------- -
X1)  Includes drawing  down  of credit balances. 
(2)  Otherwise than through issues of shares, bonds, etc., which are included in item 4a)  (I) as sales; the capital and reserves have been reduced bv the amounts at which the real estate is  valne<L \JJ 
N 
\.it 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  --------- ---
c)  Increase (-) of  capital,  reserves  and  other 
long-term  funds  (2)  of  the  money-creating  -52  -96  -105  -138  -141  -84  -72  -179  -349  -166 
institutions 
d)  Transitory items and statistical  discrepancies  -163  -39  -82  25  -214  12  35  -108  -281  -141  --- ---
Total  -284  -183  -356  176  -221  83  318  46  -761  -480 
(of which money creation by giro transfer 
institutions,  so  far  as included  under a)  (34)  (53)  (194)  (162)  (120)  (185)  (393)  (205)  (272)  (191)  --- ---------- 5.  Domestic  creation  of liquidity  (totals  of  items 
1  to 4)  -276  -669  -986  413  1,152  854  1,869  1,809  1,698  2,610 
6.  Net purchase of foreign exchange by the money-
creating institutions from the private sector and 
public authorities - used for: 
a)  Special transactions of the Government 
(1) Transactions with  the  IMF  261  131  67  420 
(2) Increase  ( +)  of  net  consolidated  claims 
-145  - 226  338  198  -222 
arising from payment agreements  296  119  -174  39  -18  -12  -9  -7  -1  -
(3) Accelerated repayment of external Govern· 
ment debt  - 171  - 205  108  253  - - - - ------------
Total  557  421  -107  664  -55  241  217  331  197  -222 
b)  Increase  ( +)  of  gold  and  foreign  exchange 
holdings  of: 
(1) Nederlandsche Bank  1,595  -497  1,514  -199  94  616  678  -71  -46  839 
(2) authorised banks  52  893  -303  -661  38  -91  -627  -898  -382  -457 
c)  Lending  ( +)  by  authorised  banks  to  non· 
residents  20  445  552  538  46  157  -35  542  28  -5 
d)  Increase  ( +)  of  other  net  claims  on  non· 
residents  (3)  60  119  45  -76  14  -45  -118  179  -66  153 
------
Total  2,284  1,381  1,701  266  137  878  115  83  -269  308 
------
7.  Changes  in  domestic  liquid  assets  (Total  of  5 
and 6) 
a)  Domestic money supply  1,087  451  715  865  918  1,201  1,154  1,701  1,166  1,130 
b)  Secondary liquid assets  (quasi-money) 
(1) Claims on money-creating institutions 
(of which "titular" (liquid) savings balan· 
358  586  447  -91  415  322  593  462  67  1,457 
ces at co=ercial banks)  (6)  (9)  (21)  (102)  (2)  (34)  (191)  (53)  (51)  (40) 
(2) Claims on the public authorities  563  -325  -447  -95  -47  192  237  -271  196  331  ---------
Total  2,008  712  715  679  1,289  1,73'a  1,984  1,892  1,429  2,918 
~-~ 
(3)  Including foreign bonds in foreign currency,  and statistical discrepancies,  The figures  have been calculated (from data compiled by the Nederlandsche Bank. 
1968  1969  1970  ------
-165  -586  -648 
-242  -103  240  ------
211  -841  -1,258 
(142)  (312)  (464) 
3,904  2,474  2,036 
---
f>25  -207  361 
- - -
237  - --
762  -207  361 
-1,133  437  1,882 
130  382  -1,408 
275  -67  1,209 
-107  318  -355  -------
-73  863  1,689 
2,198  1,726  2,729 
1,401  1,292  431 
(150) 
232 
(162) 
319 
(-128) 
565 
I 3,831  3,337  3,725 
- -- ---·-~ VJ 
N  a-
1.  Flow of liquidity from  abroad 
2.  Domestic liquidity creation  for  or by 
a)  Public sector 
b)  Private sector 
(of which, medium-term) 
c)  Capital-market  transactions  by  money-crea-
ting institutions and sundry items 
Total 
3.  Increase  in  total  domestic  liquid  assets  (1 +  2) 
4,  Liquidity absorption through rise of national in-
come  in the course  of the year due to: 
a)  Rise of production 
b)  Rise of prices 
5,  Liquidity activation (4-3) 
TABLE  6 
Monetary  survey 
(Percentages  of total  domestic  liquid  assets  at  the  beginning of the year) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
17.1  9.0  10,6  1.6  0.8  4.7  0.6 
1.5  -7.0  -8.1  -3.2  3.7  -0.7  2.3 
-1.5  3.8  4.1  4.6  4.2  4.8  5.2 
(-)  (-)  (0.2)  (0.9)  (2.0)  (0.6)  (1.5) 
-2.1  -1.2  -2.2  1.1  -1.3  0.4  1.6 
---------- ---
-2.1  -4.4  -6.2  2.5  6.6  4.5  9.1 
15.0  4.6  4.4  4.1  7.4  9.2  9.7 
3.5  10.5  9.3  5.1  9.1  11.8  16.0 
1.5  7.5  6.8  2.1  4.3  6.2  6.8 
1.9  2.7  2.4  2.9  4.6  5.3  8.6 
l  -11.5  5.9  4.9  1.0  1.7  2.6  6.3 
--- ---- ----------------------
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
iii 
0.4  -1.1  1.2  -0.3  2.7  4.8 
2.7  5.8  2.9  4.6  2.5  1.8 
5.1  4.5  9,3  8.4  7.8  7.4 
(2.2)  (2.2)  (1.0)  (1.0)  (4.3)  (3.6) 
0.2  -3.2  -1.9  0.8  -2.6  -3.5 
------ ----
8.0  7.1  10.3  13.8  7.7  5.7 
8.4  6.0  11.5  13.5  10.4  10.5 
11.5  8.8  9.6  10.5  12.0  10.9 
5.3  3.3  5.1  6.3  5.5  5.0 
5.8  5.3  4.3  4.0  6.2  5.7 
3.1  2.8  -1.9  -3.0  1.6  0.4 TABLE  7 
Percentage  breakdown  of the  money  supply 
(in%) 
Notes and coin  Sight deposits at banks  Sight deposits at giro 
transfer institutions 
1958  45.2  40.3  14.5 
1959  44.2  41.4  14.4 
1960  45.0  39.0  16.0 
1961  45.0  38.4  16.6 
1962  45.4  37.1  17.5 
1963  44.9  37.0  18.1 
1964  46.4  36.4  17.2 
1965  46.3  36.8  16.9 
1966  46.6  35.2  18.2 
1967  45.2  36.1  18.7 
1968  41.2  39.9  18.9 
1969  40.6  39.6  19.8 
1970  38.3  41.8  19.9 
Source:  N ederlandsche Bank. 
327 TABLE 8  Liquidity holdings  of the money-creat 
1958  1959  1960 
1.  Oammercial banks 
80  185  123 
a)  Cash liquidity 
563  543  597 
1.  Notes and coin and balances at Nederlandsche Bank 
Compulsory balances (-) (2) 
-525  -415  -519 
2. 
-2  -3  -
3.  Recourse (-) to Nederlandsche Bank 
44  60  45 
4.  Net claims on other money-creating institutions 
b)  Net liquid claims on  Government  (3) 
2,114  1,241  1,304 
536  1,750  2,019 
c)  Net foreign assets 
d)  (Idem,  according  to  "5  million  guilder  regulation")  (395)  (1,530)  (1, 834) 
-- -- --
Total  2,730  3,176  3,446 
Idem (a +b +d)  -amounts  (2,589)  (2, 956)  (3,261) 
- as percentage of domestic liabilities  (37. 9)  (37 .5)  (37 .2) 
2.  Other  money-creating institutions 
a)  Cash liquidity  -14  -4  -24 
1.  Notes and coin and balances at Neder!andsche Bank  186  161  187 
2.  Compulsory balances (-) (2)  -151  -119  -145 
3.  Recourse (-) to Nederlandsche Bank  -1  - -1 
4.  Net claims on other money-creating institutions  -48  -46  -65 
b)  Net liquid claims on Government  (3)  417  346  410 
c)  Net foreign assets  -33  -17  30 
d)  (Idem,  according  to  "5  million  guilder  regulation")  (-24)  (-7)  (39) 
-- -- --
Total  370  325  416 
Idem (a+  b +d)  -amounts  (379)  (335)  (425) 
- as percentage of domestic liabilities  (18.2)  (14.9)  (16.8) 
3.  Total for money-creating institutions (1 +2)  3,100  3,501  3,862 
(1)  Commercial banks, security credit institutions, giro  transfer services and agricultural  credit institutions, in so far  as 
they are not investors of savings. 
(2)  Minimum reserve and non  .. interest-bearing  balances. 
(3)  Including net claims on brokers and after deduction of Government  balances, included solely under 2. 
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1961 
1 
388 
-394 
-15 
136 
1,1 
1,7 
(1,6S 
--
3,0i 
(2, 96 
(32. 
-1 
149 
-123 
-4 
-38 
51 
2 
(4~ 
--
51 
(54C 
(19.'j 
3,57. institutions  (1)  (figures  at end of year  in million  guilders) 
1962 
171 
340 
-276 
- 12 
119 
1,017 
1,833 
(1, 781) 
--
3,021 
(2, 969) 
(30.2) 
-3 
167 
-110 
- 2 
-58 
623 
64 
(96) 
--
684 
(716) 
(22. 7) 
3,705 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
377  370  188  4  38  -195  -704  413 
250  316  247  230  195  233  226  477 
- -208  -107  - 76  - - -107  -
- 32  - 4  - 79  -165  -101  -444  -546  - 39 
159  266  127  15  - 56  16  -277  - 25 
1,024  1,527  1,556  1,923  2,565  2,822  2,745  2,786 
1,865  1,136  1,009  631  304  669  1,168  739 
(1' 891)  (1,207)  (1, 131)  (958)  (569)  (979)  (1,537)  (1,410) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
3,266  3,033  2,753  2,558  2,907  3,296  3,209  3,938 
(3,292)  (3, 104)  (2,875)  (2,885)  (3, 172)  (3, 606)  (3,578)  (4,609) 
(30.6)  (26.3)  (22 .1)  (21.1)  (19.5)  (18.2)  (16.2)  (18.4) 
-23  -3  104  144  191  201  329  348 
41  55  102  113  134  148  165  191 
- - 12  - - - - - -
- 1  - 2  - 18  - 7  - 12  - 18  - 26  - 12 
- 63  - 44  20  38  69  71  190  169 
620  455  508  700  745'  1,186  1,460  1,893 
56  6  -43  -83  -60  -47  4  -109 
(89)  (52)  (18)  (-25)  (-11)  (7)  (18)  (-92) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
653  458  569  761  876  1,340  1,793  2,132 
(686)  (504)  (630)  (819)  (925)  (1,394)  (18,07)  (2,149) 
(19.8)  (13. 7)  (15.5)  (17. 7)  (17.7)  (22.8)  (25. 7)  (25. 9) 
3,919  3,491  3,322  3,319  3,783  4,636  5,002  6,070 
Note: The 5 million guilder regulation provides that a bank may not hold net foreign liabilities without approval of the 
Nederlandsche apart from an allowance of fl. 5 million.  The domestic liabilities are debts to domestic custcmers and sun  .. 
dry domestic liabilities. 
Source:  Nederlandsche Bank. 
329 TABLE 9 
Causes  of changes  in  liquidity  holdings  of money-creating  institutions  (1) 
(yearly  changes  in million guilders) 
1959  1960  1961  1962  1963 
Autonomous  factors 
1.  Increase (-) of money supply 
in form of notes and coins  -102  -405  -381  -477  -474 
2.  Liquidity deficit ( +) of Govern-
ment  -735  -817  -259  242  -482 
3.  National  liquidity  surplus  ( +)  1,381  1,701  266  137  878 
Factors associated with monetary policy 
4.  Increase (-) in minimum cash 
reserves and non-interest-bearing 
balances (2)  142  -130  147  131  386 
5.  Deblocking  (+)  of  Treasury 
certificates  (3)  - - - - -
Other  causes 
6.  Increase (-) of Treasury paper 
in hands of public and statistical 
differences  -285  12  -60  97  -94 
7.  Total  401  361  -287  130  214 
1964 
-753 
48 
l15 
-220 
-
382 
-428 
(1)  The differences between the figures of  item 7 and the change in the totals of Table 8 are due to renewals of the series 
at the end of 1965, in September 1967 and in October 1969. 
(2)  Held end of 1963: minimum reserve; from 1964: non-interest-bearing balances to be held under quantitative credit 
restrictions . 
.330 TABLE 9  (continued) 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
Autonomous  factors 
1. Increase (-) of money  supply 
in form of notes and coins  -770  -592  -254  -129  -590  -517 
2.  Liquidity deficit ( +) of Govern-
ment  401  635  506  1,137  133  -562 
3. National liquidity  surplus  ( +)  83  -269  308  -73  863  1,689 
Factors associated with monetary policy 
4.  Increase (-) in minimum cash 
reserves and non-interest-bearing 
balances  (2)  113  31  76  - -107  107 
5. Deblocking  (+)  of  Treasury 
certificates  (3)  - 200  50  50  50  50 
Other  causes 
6.  Increase (-) of Treasury paper 
in hands of public and statistical 
differences  134  - 8  -195  -132  88  301 
7.  Total  -39  - 3  491  853  437  1,068 
(3)  Ch. II, item 45. 
331 TABLE  10  Easing  and  tightening  G 
Comparison between monthly periods ending on the 21st 
Causes of change in the average (1) ease or tightness  (till end of 1963)  or 14th (after 1963)  of each month 
of the money market 
1956  1957  1958  1959  1960 
easing ( +) I tightening (-)  Jan. 1957  Jan. 1958  Jan. 1959  Jan. 1960  Jan. 1961 
compared  compared  compared  compared  compared 
with  with  with  with  with 
Jan. 1956  Jan. 1957  Jan. 1958  Jan. 1959  Jan. 1960 
1.  Autonomous factors 
a)  Excess of expenditure of the  Government  ( +) (2)  +  70  -160  +450  -640  -970 
b)  Expansion  (-) of  notes  and  coin  in  circulation  -90  -110  -220  -90  -360 
c)  Rise (-) in  compulsory  cash  reserves  because  of 
rise in deposits  +  50  +  20  -80  -80  -50 
d)  Compulsory  deposit  pursuant  to  policy  directive 
concerning credit restriction 
e)  Sundry causes  -20  +470  -490  -20  +  10 
Total  +  10  +220  -340  -830  -1,370 
2.  Purchase  ( +}  · of gold  and foreign  exchange  by  the 
Nederlandsche Bank (3)  -760  -350  +2,120  +150  +1,360 
3.  Government  transactions  in  the  money  market  (4)  +470  +270  -750  +790  +180 
4.  Minimum reserve policy  +150  +  90  -370  +  10(')  -80 
5.  Open·market policy  -10  -60  -560  -80  -60 
6.  Easing/tightening  of  the  money market  ( = 1  to  5) 
rellected in:  -140  +170  +100  +  40  +  30 
a)  Increase ( +) of the banks' average freely available 
balances  - -10  - +  50  +  10 
b)  Decrease ( +) in the average extent of recourse to 
the Nederlandsche Bank by: 
(1) banks  -40  +170  +  10  -10  +  10 
(2)  others  -100  +  10  +  90  - +  10 
Monthly periods ending on 21st (till end 1963) or 14th 
(after 1963) of month 
Average ease or tightness of the money market 
January  January  January  January  January 
1957  1958  1959  1960  1961 
Average  level  of  the  surplus  ( +) I deficit  (-) on  the 
money market rellected in:  -280  -110  -10  30  60 
a)  The banks' average freely available balances  10  - - 50  60 
b)  Average extent of recourse (-)  to the N ederlandsche 
Bank by: 
(1) banks':  discounts  -180  -10  - -10  -
advances  -180  -10  - - -
(2)  others:  discounts  -110  -100  - - -
advances  -110  -100  -10  -10  -
Calendar year 
Supplementary data 
1956  1957  1958  1959  1960 
A. National liquidity surplus  ( +)  -990  -280  +2,280  +1,380  +1, 700 
B. Increase  ( +) in net foreign assets of banking system  -160  +140  +120  +1,440  +320 
c.  Purchase ( +) of gold and foreign exchange by Neder· 
landscbe Bank ( = A- B)  -830  -420  +2,160  -60  +1,380 
(1)  The averages are daily averages for the obligatory-deposit period. 
(2)  Excluding expenditure and receipts arising from  transactions with IMF, special government transactions with other 
countries  and  money-market transactions. 
(3)  Excluding the changes in gold and foreign exchange reserves due to the special external transactions (including those 
332 the  money  market  (in million guilders) 
1961 
.Jan. 1962 
compared 
with 
Jan. 1961 
-370 
-350 
-60 
-10 
-790 
+510 
-130 
+210 
+110 
-90 
-30 
-50 
-10 
January 
1962 
-30 
30 
-40 
-10 
-
-10 
1961 
+270 
-190 
+460 
Comparison between monthly periods ending on the 21st (till end of 1963) 
or 14th (after 1963) of each month 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
.Jan. 1963  .Jan. 1964  Jan. 1965  .Jan. 1966  .Jan. 1967  Jan. 1968  Jan. 1969  Jan. 1970 
compared  compared  compared  compared  compared  compared  compared  compared 
With  with  with  with  with  with  with  With 
Jan. 1962  Jan. 1963  Jan. 1964  Jan. 1965  Jan. 1966  Jan. 1967  Jan. 1968  Jan. 1969 
+250  -680  +370  +500  +490  +570  +830  +110 
-520  -480  -660  -730  -530  -300  -270  -520 
-60  -40  - - - - - -
-10  -220  +110  +  40  +  70  - -110 
- -10  - -10  -40  -50  +  10  -30 
330- -1,220  -510  -130  -40  +290  +570  -550 
+  20  +770  +860  +210  +170  +560  -340  +190 
+140  +230  -280  -210  -200  -940  -550  -240 
+190  +430  - - - - - -
-30  -70  -100  - - - - -
-10  +140  -30  -130  -70  -90  -320  -600 
-10  +100  -30  -50  -10  +  20  -30  -
+  30  - +  10  -40  -80  -so  -190  -500 
-30  +  40  -10  -40  +  20  -30  -100  -100 
Monthly periods ending on 21st (till end 1963) or 14th (after 1963) of month 
January  January  January  January  January  January  January  January 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
-40  100  70  -60  -130  -220  -540  -1.140 
20  120  90  40  30  50  20  20 
- - - -10  -50  -130  -110  -340 
-20  -20  -10  -40  -80  -80  -290  -.560 
- - - - -10  - -70  -30 
-40  - -10  -50  -20  -60  -90  -230 
Calendar year 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
+140  +880  +120  +  80  -270  +310  -70  +860 
+100  +  20  -780  -180  --420  -300  +290  +640 
+  40  +860  +900  +260  +150  +610  -360  +229 
1970 
Jan. 1971 
compared 
with 
Jan. 1970 
-760 
--480 
-
+110 
-40 
-1,170 
+2,090 
-240 
-
-
+680 
+  20 
+510 
+150 
January 
1971 
--460 
40 
-150 
-240 
-10 
-100 
1970 
+1,690 
-540 
+2,230 
with the International Monetary Fund) mentioned in footnotes 2 and 5. 
(4)  Transactions in Treasury paper and cash loans. 
(6)  Purchase by the banking system of  bonds of  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Fl. 210 mil• 
lion), coupled with a  three point reduction in the minimum reserve ratio (Fl.  220 million). 
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VJ 
..j:. 
---
Treasury bills (Schatkistpromessen - dated 
one year) 
Treasury bonds (Schatkistbiljettcn - dated 
one to five  years)  (1) 
Total 
Held by: 
Commercial banks 
.Agricultural credit .  banks 
Nederlandscho  Bank, 
agreements" (2) 
under  "repurchase 
Banks 
Public and semi-public bodies 
Institutional investors 
Others 
'l'otal 
Treasury certificates (dated more than five 
years)  (3) 
Held by: 
Commercial banks 
.Agricultural Credit Institutions 
1958 
2,031 
1,609  --
3,640 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
3,640 
1,200 
1,129 
71 
TABLE  11 
Short  and  medium-term  Treasury  Paper  outstanding 
1959  1960  1961 
446  228  434 
2,657  2,666  2,439  -- --
3,103  2,894  2,873 
.  ..  1,142  39%  1,115  39% 
...  537  19%  568  20% 
.  ..  64  2%  -
...  1,743  60%  1,683  59% 
...  282  10%  362  12% 
...  276  10%  230  8% 
.  ..  593  20%  598  21% 
3,103  2,894  100%  2,873  100% 
1,200  1,200  1,200 
94%  1,127  94%  1,125  94%  1,125  94% 
6%  73  6%  75  6%  75  6% 
---~-------~--------~ 
(figures  at end of  year  in millions of guilders) 
1962  1963  1964 
132  92  455 
2, 701  2,585  2,405 
2,833  2,677  2,860 
-
993  35%  1,076  40%  1,450  51% 
561  20%  605  22%  576  20% 
281  10%  203  8% 
1,835  65%  1,884  70%  2,026  71% 
357  13%  330  12%  304  11% 
182  6%  241  9%  196  7% 
459  16%  222  9%  334  11% 
2,833  100%  2,677  100%  2,860  100% 
1,200  1,200  1,200 
1,131  94%  1,131  94%  1,134  95% 
69  6%  69  6%  66  5% \.» 
\.» 
VI 
1965  1966  1967  1968 
Treasury bills (Schatkistpromessen - dated 
one year) 
Treasury bonds (Sohatkistbiljetten - dated 
one to five  years)  (1) 
Total 
Held by: 
Commercial banks 
.Agricultural credit banks 
Nederlandsche  Bank,  under  "repurchase 
agreements"  (2) 
Banks 
Public and semi-public bodies 
Institutional investors 
Others 
'l'otal 
Treasury certificates  (dated more than five 
years)  (3) 
Held by: 
Commercial banks 
Agricultural Credit Institutions 
(1)  Generally 2,  3 and 5  years. 
(2)  See item 27. 
295  355 
2,656  2,772  -- -- 2,951  3,127 
1,512  51%  1,634 
673  23%  729 
- - -
2,185  74%  2,363 
358  12%  303 
188  6%  193 
220  8%  268 
2,951  100°/1  31,27 
1,200  1,200 
1,134  95%  1,140 
66  5%  60 
240  308 
3,819  4,312  -- --
4,059  4,620 
52%  2,258  56%  2,757 
23%  808  20%  1,002 
- - - -
75%  3,066  76%  3,759 
10%  313  8%  384 
6%  186  4%  106 
9%  494  12%  371 
100°/1  4,059  100%  4,620 
1,200  1,200 (') 
95%  1,140  95%  1,117 
5%  60  5%  60 
-- -
(3)  Subscribed by the banks  under the gentlemen's  agreement  of 1954;  dated 8,  10  or 12  years. 
(4)  Including Fl. 23  million (1968),  Fl. 42  million (1969)  and Fl.  44 million  (1970)  in discount  portfolio of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
Source:  N ederlandsche Bank. 
60% 
21% 
-
81% 
9% 
2% 
8% 
100% 
93% 
5% 
--
1969  1970 
68  6 
4,741  5,043  --
4,809  5,049 
2,768  58%  2,836  56% 
1,110  23%  1,629  32% 
- - - -
3,878  81%  4,465  88% 
347  7%  314  7% 
86  2%  116  2% 
498  10%  154  3%  -
4,809  100%  5,049  100% 
1,150 (')  1,100 (') 
1,043  91%  994  90% 
65  9%  62  10% 
-~-TABLE 12  Public  debt  (End-of-ye 
Description  1950  1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  1956 
-----------------
GOVERNMENT DEBT 
L  Consolidated debt 
a)  Consolidated internal debt 
(1)  Bonded loans  8,393  8,246  7,876  8,302  8,534  9,237  9,431 
(2)  Debt-certificate loans  25  347  347  347  416  414  41: 
(3)  Treasury certificates  - - - - 1,200  1,200  1,20( 
(  4) Tax certificates  - 170  137  136  136  136  s: 
b) Pre-subscription accounts  286  134  249  323  388  321  35' 
c)  Consolidated external debt  3,089  3,023  2,961  2,790  2,286  2,013  1,94~ 
--- ------ ------ -----
Total  11,793  11,920  11,570  11,898  12,960  13,321  13,401 
2. Floating debt 
a)  To the Nededandsche Bank 
(1)  Resulting from agreement of 26 February 1947  3,150  3,000  1,451  1,217  660  522  66fj 
(2)  Treasury paper bought by the Bank  - 214  - - - - -
b)  Other domestic Treasury paper  5,317  4,097  5,400  4,583  3,169  3,086  2,694 
c)  Treasury paper placed  abroad  and other foreign 
debt  304  629  354  25  17  34  122 
d)  Currency notes in circulation  137  143  146  151  159  171  141 
e)  Short-term debt to local authorities  (1)  - 463  245  267  227  97  115 
f)  Other short-term domestic debts  1,291  1,314  1,756  1,796  1,497  1,213  576 
------ --- --- --- ------
Total  10,199  9,860  9,352  8,039  5,729  5,123  4,308 
------------------
3. Gross government debt (1+2)  21,992  21,780  20,922  19,937  18,689  18,444  17,709 
4. Floating claims 
a)  Liquid assets  511  521  1,360  1,167  714  669  458 
b) Claims on local authorities  11  67  46  8  12  7  3 
c)  Claims on others  596  232  329  337  371  125  108 
------ --------- ------
Total  1,118  820  1,735  1,512  1,097  801  569 
------ ---------
5. Net government debt (3-4)  20,874  20,960  19,187  18,425  17,592  17,643  17,140 
DEBT OF THE PROVINCES AND MUNICIPALITIES 
6. Consolidated debt 
a)  Bonded loans  545  527  531  1,051  1,126  1,104  1244 
b)  Debt-certificate loans  3,211  3,700  3,758  4,616  5,263  6,046  6;619 
c)  Loans  made  by  the  Government  and  provinces  871  869  859  848  774  660  614 
------ ---------------
Total  4,627  5,096  5,148  6,515  7,163  7,810  8,477 
7. Floating debt 
a)  Provinces and municipalities  615  1,107  359  282  330  399  809 
b)  Balances  of  the  private  sector  at  Amsterdam's 
municipal giro transfer service  51  51  56  64  76  89  95 
------ --- --- --- --- ---
Total  666  1.158  415  346  406  488  904 
---------------------
8. Gross debt (6 +7)  5,293  6,254  5,563  6,861  7,569  8,298  9,381 
9. Floating claims  119  173  578  337  316  281  181  ---------------------
10. Net debt (8-9)  5,174  6,081  4,985  6,524  7,253  8,017  9,200 
-------------------
DEBT  OF ALL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
11. Consolidated debt  (1 +6-6c)  15,549  16,147  15,859  17,565  19c349  20<7471  21,264 
(Idem  as  % of national income)  (84.6)  (80.5)  (76.5)  (76.1)  74.0)  1.8)  (68.5) 
12. Floating debt (2-2c+7)  to 865  10,555  9,522  8  118  5,908  5,514  5,097 
(Idem  as  % of national income)  (59.1)  (52.6)  (45.9)  (35.2)  (22.6)  (19.3)  (16.4) 
13. Floating claims (4·4b +9)  1.226  926  2.267  1.841  1.401  1.075  747 
14. Total net debt (11 +12·13)  25 188  25,776  23,114  23,842  23(!856  246910  25,614 
(Idem  as  %  of national income)  (137.1)  (128.4)  (111.4).  (103.3)  91.2) .  87.4)  (82.5) 
NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE FIGURES 
15. Coins in circulation and at the Nederlandsche Bank  58  69  67  67  73  104  146 
16. Taken over by the Nederlandsche Bank under pay-
ment agreements: 
a)  Consolidated debts  - - - - - - -
b)  Consolidated claims  - - - - - - -
(1)  Items 2e and 4b are not included in the floating claims or floating debt, as  the case may be, of the provinces and mun cpa  {f. 
336 gures  in millions  of  guilders) 
1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
------------------------------------------
1,204  9,472  9,988  10,516  10,143  9,965  10,557  10,751  10'716  10,686  11,002  11,256  12,115  12,780 
411  409  408  806  1,401  1  784  2,331  2,455  3,098  4,217  5,826  7,329  7,989  9,582 
l,200  1,200  1,2og  1,2og  1,20~  1:200  1,2og  1,20~  1,20~  1,20~  1,200  1,200  1,150  1,100 
11  6  4  - - - -
631  609  823  537  990  1,218  986  1,465  1,663  1,628  1,330  836  1,429  1,072 
l,823  1,721  1,426  1,321  974  770  463  419  367  345  345  108  108  98  ---- -----------------------
~,280  13,417  13,850  14,385  14,712  14,941  15,539  16,291  17,045  18,077  19,703  20,729  22,791  24,632 
560  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
68  181  355  184  519  311  523  346  704  1,139  894  1,613  1,043  1,388 
~,414  3,640  3,103  2,894  2,873  2,833  2,677  2,860  2,951  3,126  4,059  4,620  4,809  5,049 
561  - - - 36  - - - - - - - - -
127  110  105  109  68  63  62  65  71  71  34  24  18  16 
211  250  208  220  114  353  310  239  99  - 10  13  11  2 
441  572  531  808  922  1,054  1,083  916  1,070  1,114  1,342  1,529  2,052  1,861  ----------------------------
<l,382  4,753  4,302  4,215  4,532  4,614  4,655  4,426  4,895  5,450  6,339  7,799  7,933  8,316 
---------------------------------------
7,662  18,170  18,152  18,600  19,244  19,555  20,194  20,717  21,940  23,527  26,042  28,528  30,724  32,948 
494  935  763  1,473  1,296  939  1,353  914  712  669  1,160  732  759  1,247 
10  16  17  25  21  29  29  41  25  47  364  456  704  623 
- 27  22  3  - - - - - - - - - 7  ----------------------------
504  978  802  1,501  1,317  968  1,382  955  737  716  1,524  1,188  1,463  1,877  -------- ------------------------------
7,158  17,192  17,350  17,099  17,927  18,587  18,812  19,762  21,203  22,811  24,518  27,340  29,261  31,071  -----------------------------------------
1,278  1,273  1,391  1  461  1  447  1  443  1  429  1  432  1  406  1  352  1  264  1  202  1,146  1  088 
6,772  8,819  9,892  11:288  12:101  12:622  13:610  15:287  16:990  18:018  19:814  21:646  22,746  24:555 
599  749  1,256  1,830  2,351  2,908  3,584  4,591  6,005  7,723  9,721  11,729  13,624  15,079  ---- ------------- ----
8,649  10,841  12,539  14,579  15,899  16,973  18,623  21,310  24,401  27,093  30,799  34,577  37,516  40,722 
2,216  1,491  1,135  545  417  687  1,061  1,355  1,575  2,299  2,485  2,657  3,290  4,183 
101  112  124  140  166  196  190  228  263  316  352  377  431  509 
-----------------------------
2,317  1,603  1,259  685  583  883  1,251  1,583  1,838  2,615  2,837  3,034  3,721  4,692  --- --- --- ---
0,966  12,444  13,798  15,264  -16,482  17,856  19,874  22,893  26,239  29,708  33,636  37,611  41,237  45,414 
204  282  276  384  470  367  375  340  429  431  510  577  533  743 
------------------------------------------
0,762  12,162  13,522  14,880  16,012  17,489  19,499  22,553  25,810  29,277  33,126  37,034  40,704  44,671 
n,330  23(509  25,133  27,134  28,260  29,006  30,578  33,010  35,441  37,447  40,781  43,577  46,683  50(.275 
(66.3)  70.7)  (68.4)  (67,6)  (67,0)  (63,0)  (59.4)  (55,3)  (53 2)  (51.7)  (51.4)  (49.7)  (47.4)  48.5) 
6,488  6  106  5,353  4,680  5,001  5,144  5  596  5,770  6,634  8,065  9,166  10(820  11,643  13,006 
(20.2)  (18.3)  (14,6)  (11.6)  (11.8)  (11.2)  (to.9)  (9.7)  (10,0)  (11.1)  (11.5)  12.3)  (11.8)  (12.6) 
698  1,244  1,061  1,860  1,766  1,306  1,728  1,254  1,141  1,100  1,670  1,309  1,292  1,997 
!7,120 
(84.4) 
28(1371 
85,3) 
29,425 
(80.1) 
2,9954 
(74.6) 
31,495 
(74.6) 
32,844 
(71.4) 
34,446 
(66.9) 
37,526 
(62.9) 
40(1934 
61.5) 
44,412 
(61.3) 
48,277 
(60.8) 
53,088 
(60,5) 
57(:034 
57.9) 
61,284 
(59.2)  ------------------------------------------
178  214  235  260  306  326  351  378  412  441  458  531  580  646 
- - 236  207  - - - - - - - - - -
67  63  418  215  47  29  17  8  1  - - - - -
The figures are mainly taken or calculated from data of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
337 TABLE 13 
Recourse  by  banks to  the Nederlandsche  Bank  (1) 
(quarterly  aV<rages  in  millions  of gllilders) 
Current 
Discounting  account  advances  Total 
1958  1st  quarter  2  3  5 
2nd quarter  2  11  13 
3rd quarter  6  4  10 
4th quarter  2  4  6 
1959  1st  quarter  - 3  3 
2nd quarter  - 3  3 
3rd quarter  - 2  2 
4th quarter  2  16  18 
1960  1st  quarter  1  3  4 
2nd quarter  - 7  7 
3rd quarter  - 3  3 
4th quarter  - 2  2 
1961  1st  quarter  - 1  1 
2nd quarter  - 1  1 
3rd quarter  - 4  4 
4th  quarter  9  8  17 
1962  1st  quarter  19  12  31 
2nd quarter  27  15  42 
3rd  quarter  2  7  9 
4th quarter  - 21  21 
1963  1st  quarter  4  8  12 
2nd quarter  7  9  16 
3rd quarter  10  16  26 
4th  quarter  - 10  10 
1964  1st  quarter  - 16  16 
2nd quarter  11  26  37 
3rd  quarter  36  22  58 
4th  quarter  1  21  22 
1965  1st  quarter  - 24  24 
2nd quarter  4  34  38 
3rd quarter  19  21  40 
4th  quarter  1  50  51 
1966  1st  quarter  19  58  77 
2nd quarter  86  108  194 
3rd  quarter  82  60  142 
4th  quarter  43  104  147 
1967  1st  quarter  26  119  145 
2nd quarter  28  180  208 
3rd  quarter  108  136  244 
4th  quarter  107  97  204 
1968  1st  quarter  45  57  102 
2nd quarter  29  113  142 
3rd  quarter  46  124  170 
4th  quarter  78  253  331 
1969  1st  quarter  59  299  358 
2nd quarter  28  279  307 
3rd quarter  128  446  574 
4th quarter  372  318  690 
1970  1st  quarter  221  290  511 
2nd quarter  213  263  476 
3rd  quarter  219  213  432 
4th  quarter  140  202  342 
(1)  Commercial banks, central institutions of agricultural credit institutions, security credit institutions. Since 1967  also 
the agricultural loan banks affiliated in the central institutions and the general saving banks. 
Transactions in Treasury concluded under sale-and-repurchase agreements with the object of accommodating the money 
market are not included in these figures. 
Souree:  Annual reports of the Neder!andsche Bank . 
.338 TABLE  14 
Minimum  reserve  ratio  and  balances 
(in millions of guilders) 
Deposits  Minimum  Minimum  Reserve 
reserve ratio  balances as %  End of  month  at banks  (as  %)  reserve  balances  of  deposits 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4  =  3: 1)  -
1954  February  5,259  - - -
March  5,330  5  222  4.2 
April  5,388  6  270  5.0 
May  5,517  7  319  5.8 
June  5,720  8  373  6.5 
July  5,806  9  439  7.6 
August  5,683  10  493  8.7 
September  5,642  10  481  8.5 
October  5,688  10  478  8.4 
November  5,761  10  41!7  8.5 
December  5,641  10  495  8.8 
1955  January  5,651  8  387  6.8 
February  5,612  10  483  8.6 
March  5,677  10  481  8•5 
April  5,659  10  485  8.6 
May  5,689  10  482  8.5 
June  5,845  10  485  8.3 
July  5,975  10  500  8.4 
August  5,885  10  514  8.7 
September  5,931  10  505  8.5 
October  6,079  10  508  8.4 
November  6,186  10  526  8.5 
December  6,066  10  537  8.9 
1956  January  5,975  10  525  8.8 
February  5,975  10  516  8.6 
March  6,014  10  516  8.6 
April  5,914  8  415  7.0 
May  6,066  9  459  7.6 
June  5,947  9  460  7.7 
July  5,951  9  461  7.7 
August  5,935  9  457  7.7 
September  5,783  9  446  7.7 
October  5,652  7  338  6.0 
November  5,622  7  334  5.9 
December  5,664  7  338  6.0 
1957  January  5,650  7  337  6.0 
February  5,671  7  339  6.0 
March  5,707  6  294  5.2 
April  5,712  6  292  5.1 
May  5,785  6  297  5.1 
June  5,777  6  295  5.1 
July  5,860  6  300  5.1 
August  5,543  6  282  5.1 
September  5,296  6  270  5.1 
October  5,168  4  174  3.4 
November  5,213  4  176  3.4 
December  5,303  4  180  3.4 
1958  January  5,487  4  187  3.4 
February  5,744  5  247  4.3 
March  5,832  6  302  5.2 
April  5,797  6  301  5.2 
May  5,892  7  353  6.0 
June  5,837  8  402  6.9 
July  6,040  9  467  7.7 
August  6,143  10  534  8.7 
September  6,030  10  522  8.7 
October  5,880  10  506  8.6 
November  6,200  10  537  8.7 
December  6,303  10  547  8.7 
339 TABLE  14  (continued) 
Deposits  Minimum 
reserve ratio ,  End  of  month  at banks  (as  %) 
~ 
(1)  (2) 
1959  January  6,68:J  10 
February  6,739  10 
March  6,890  10 
April  6,989  7 
May  6,983  7 
June  6,845  6 
July  6,998  7 
August  6,930  7 
September  6,788  7 
October  7,042  7 
November  7,106  7 
December  7,332  7 
1960  January  7,290  7 
February  7,455  7 
March  7,482  7 
April  7,460  7 
May  7,506  7 
June  7,686  7 
July  7,920  8 
August  7,790  8 
September  7,680  8 
October  7,659  8 
November  7,630  8 
December  8,111  8 
1961  January  7,087  9 
February  8,246  9 
March  8,284  9 
April  8,259  10 
May  8,.193  10 
June  8,268  10 
July  8,282  10 
August  8,421  8 
September  8,209  8 
October  7,640  6 
November  7,731  6 
December  7,718  6 
1962  January  8,154  8 
February  8,446  8 
March  8,139  6 
April  8,084  8 
May  8,113  8 
June  8,374  8 
July  8,548  8 
August  8,806  7 
September  8,421:>  6 
October  .7' 971  6 
November  8,223  5 
December  8,127  4 
1963  January  8,438  5 
February  8,615  5 
March  8,636  4 
April  8,720  4 
May  8,714  3 
June  8,777  3 
July  9,000  3 
August  9,300  3 
September  9,169  0(1) 
(1)  The minimum reserve  ratio has been zero since  September 1963. 
Source:  Annual  reports  of the Nederlandsche. Bank. 
340 
(in  millions of giu/ders) 
Minimum  Reserve 
balances as  %  reserve  balances  of  deposits 
(3)  (4  =  3 : 1) 
586  8.8 
594  8.8 
607  8.8 
433  6.2 
432  6.2 
360  5.3 
429  6.1 
435  6.1 
426  6.1 
416  6.1 
430  6.1 
435  6.1 
451  6.2 
450  6.2 
463  6.2 
464  6.2 
45.8  6.1 
463  6.2 
543  7.0 
561  7.1 
550  7.1 
543  7.1 
549  7.1 
540  7.1 
650  8.0 
660  8.0 
664  8.0 
736  8.9 
727  8.9 
733  8.9 
736  8.9 
601  7.1 
583  7.1 
405  5.3 
413  5.3 
410  5.3 
582  7.1 
602  7.1 
434  5.3 
576  7.1 
578  7.1 
599  7.2 
610  7.1 
552  6.3 
452  5.4 
424  5.3 
363  4.4 
289  3.6 
376  4.5 
382  4.4 
307  3.6 
311  3.6 
232  2.7 
233  2.7 
241  2.7 
249  2.7 
- -TABLE  15 
Movements of the open-market  portfolio  of the Nederlandsche  Bank (l) 
Treasury bills and bonds 
Bought  Redeemed  Bought 
from  by Treas- on open 
Treasury  (2)  ury (-)  market 
1952  - - 700  -
1953  +  600  - -
1954  - - +  98 
1955  - - + 141 
1956  +  275  - -
1957  +  68  - -
1958  +  156  - 52  + 348 (3) 
1959  +  402  - 290  + 296 
1960  +  146  - 246  +  55 
1961  +  451  - 343  + 425 
1962  +  332  - 732  + 155 
1963  +  413  - 202  -
1964  +  420  - 498  +  13 
1965  +  460  - 102  -
1966  +  927  - 493  -
1967  +  ~45  - 1,089  -
1968  + 2,054  - 1,335  -
1969  + 3,341  - 3,911  -
1970  + 3,565  - 3,220  -
(1)  Excluding movements  under repurchase agreements. 
(2)  Bank's purchases from Treasury: 
Sold 
on open 
market 
-649 
-235 
-255 
- 179 
- 135 
-
-799 
-234 
- 126 
- 161 
-
-
-112 
-
-
-
-
-
-
(in millions of guilders) 
Holdings 
of Treasury 
bills and 
Total  bonds at 
Changes  end of year 
- 1,349  151 
+ 366  517 
- 157  360 
- 38  322 
+  138  460 
+  68  528 
- 347  181 
+  174  355 
- 171  184 
+  336 (4)  520 
- 208 (4)  311 
+  211  523 
- 177  346 
+  358  704 
+  435  1,139 
- 244  895 
+  719  1,613 
+  570  1,043 
+  345  1,388 
(a)  in pursuance of the agreement as to the taking-over by the Government of the consolidated claim on Argentina: 
1957 Fl. 68 million,  1958:  F1.  56 million, 1959: Fl. 40 million, 1960:  Fl. 20 million; 
(b)  the exchange of State books debt for Treasury bills in accordance with agreement of 26 February 1947;  1958: 
Fl.  I 00 million ; 
(c)  the taking-over of  consolidated net claims on EPU countries in accordance with an agreement: 1959: .Fl. 362 mil-
lion, 1960: Fl. 126 million, 1961: Fl. 161 million; the 1960 and 1961  figures refer to paper redeemed on maturity 
by the Treasury which the Central Bank had sold on the open-market from its own portfolio; 
(d)  for the partial financing of IMF drawing by Great Britain in guiders in 1961; 
(e)  since 1961: Treasury paper for financing the early redemption of external  consolidated debt  (in October 1962: 
F1.  105 million, in Jnly 1963:  Fl. 250 million and in December 1968:  Fl. 235 million);. guilder drawings  on the 
IMF by various countries and  CAB  drawings by  the  United  Kingdom  and  France;  replacing  of matured 
Treasury paper. 
(3)  Including F1.  100 million bought abroad. 
(4) Included F1.  36 millions worth of Treasury paper bought by foreign central banks for investment of guilder balances 
held with the Nederlandsche Bank in 1961  and redeemed by the Bank in 1962. 
S.uttt: Annual and quarterly reports of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
341 \.IJ 
..J::,. 
N 
TABLE  16 
Net  foreign  assets  of  the  commercial  banks 
(in millions •f  guilders) 
> 
,,j_ 
Assets  Idem,  according 
End of  year  Liabilities  (1)  Net foreign  assets  to regulation 
I 
of  July 1964  (2) 
In  foreign  currency  Other assets  Total assets 
1958  731  579  1,310  774  536  395 
1959  1,845  825  2,670  920  1,750  1,530 
1960  1,823  1,478  3,301  1,282  2,019  1,834 
1961  1,444  1,937  3,381  1,606  1,775  1,680 
1962  1,669  1,974  3,643  1,810  1,833  1,781 
1963  1,991  2,071  4,062  2,197  1,865  1,891 
1964  2,024  2,046  4,070  2,934  1,136  1,207 
1965  2,518  2,782  5,300  4,291  1,009  1,131 
1966  3,647  2,642  6,289  5,658  631  958 
1967  3,522  2,713  6,235  5,931  304  569 
1968  5,260  2,915  8,175  7,506  669  979 
1969  9,876  3,200  13,076  11,908  1,168  1,537 
1970  14,792  3,936  18,728  17,989  739  1,410 
(1)  Mainly shprt-term liabilities. 
(2)  According to this regulation an authorized bank may not have a  net foreign liability without the consent of  the Nederlandsche Bank.  When the foreign position is calculated for  the purposes of this 
provision, all export bills are included in foreign  assets; this is only the case in the monetary analysis if they are drawn by non-residents.  As against this, permanent assets are disregarded for the purposes of 
the regulation. 
Source:  Nederlandsche llank. At end of 
1961  August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1962  January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1963  October 
November 
December 
1964  January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1965  January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
TABLE  17 
Outstanding loans  accorviing  to  the definition  in  the  policy  directive 
for  short-term lending to  the private  sector 
Average  As  % of average figure for  As  % of average corresponding  figure  4th qu.  1960  figure,  1  year earlier 
at end  (Fl.  3,981  million} 
of last 
three 
months  Standard  Actual  Excess  Standard  Actual  Excess 
4,254.6  111  106.9  -4.1  115  118.0  3.0 
4,298.7  112  108.0  - 4.0  115  117.4  2.4 
4,362.3  113  109.6  -3.4  115  116.7  1.7 
4,425.2  114  111.2  -2.8  115  115.1  0.1 
4,523.9  115  113.6  -1.4  115  113.6  -1.4 
As  % of average corresponding 
figure, 2 years earlier 
4,603.8  115.5  115.7  0.2  121  132.5  11.5 
4,726.0  116  118.7  2.7  121  133.6  12.6 
4,776.1  116.5  120.0  3.5  121  134.4  13.4 
4,831.2  117  121.4  4.4  121  134.9  13.9 
4,812.1  117.5  120.9  3.4  121  134.4  13.4 
4,789.6  118  120.3  2.3  121  134.1  13.1 
4,727.5  118.5  118.8  0.3  121  132.1  11.1 
4,696.9  119  118.0  -1.0  121  130.2  9.2 
4,684.0  119.5  117.7  -1.8  122  127.9  5.9 
4,724.5  120  118.7  -1.3  122  126.4  4.4 
4,740.7  121  119.1  -1.9  122  123.3  1.3 
4,825.4  122  121.2  -0.8  122  121.2  -{),8 
No credit restriction measures from January 1963 to October 1963 
As  % of average figure for  As  % of average corresponding 
1st half 1963  figure, 1  year earlier 
(Fl. 5,132.8 million) 
5,412.7  106  105.5  -0.5  112  114.6  2.6 
5,506.6  107  107.3  0.3  112  116.2  4,2 
5,593.7  108  109.0  1.0  112  115.9  3.9 
5,661,1  109.5  110.3  0.8  112  116.4  4.4 
5,736.8  111  111.8  0.8  112  115.4  3.4 
5,819.1  112  113.4  1.4  112  115.4  3.4 
5,  913.5  113  115.2  2.2  112  114.8  2.8 
5,982.6  113.5  116.6  3.1  111.5  115.2  3.7 
6,021.2  114  117.3  3.3  111  115.3  4.3 
6,027.5  113.5  117.4  3.9  110.5  115.3  4.8 
6,045.2  113  117.8  4.8  110  114.6  4.6 
As  % of average corresponding 
figure, 2 years earlier 
6,090.7  114  118.7  4 •. 7  122  130.0  8.0 
6,147.3  115  119.8  4.8  122  130.1  8,1 
6,181.4  116.5  120.4  3.9  122  130.4  8.4 
6,  191.7  118  120.6  2.6  122  128.3  6.3 
6,233.4  119  121.4  2..4  122  128.1  6.1 
6,312.1  120  123.0  3.0  121.5  127.0  5.5 
6,407.3  121  124.8  3.8  121  127.0  6,0 
6,485.2  122  126.3  4.3  121  125.9  4.9 
6,528.8  122.5  127.2  4.7  121  125.7  4.7 
6,503.7  123  126.7  3.7  121  124.6  3.6 
6,458.8  12:3  125.8  2.8  121  123.5  2.5 
6,426.1  123  125.2  2.2  121  121.9  0.9 
As  % of average corresponding 
figure, 3 years earlier 
6,469.6  124.5  126.0  1.5  132  138.1  6.1 
6,549.1  126  127.6  1.6  132  138.6  6,6 
6,650.2  127.5  129.6  2.1  133  140.3  7.3 
6, 744.1  129  131.4  2.4  133  139.8  6.8 
(1)  These minimum balances had to be held from the 15th of the next month: but one to the 14th of the next month but 
two inclusive.  For instance, the minimum balance for the average figure at the and of November, December and January 
had to be held from the 15th of the following March to the 14th of the following April inclusive. 
(2)  Deposit requirement halved since the banks, taken together, had exceeded the standard by less than 2%. 
• 
Minimum 
balance (1) 
- - - - -
73.8 
105.2 
143.8 
179.6 
146.6 
111.3 
81.5 
- - - - -
-
42.2 
106.1 
87.2 
95.6 
102.0 
.108.4 
165.1 
176.4 
209.2 
162.8 
230.2 
219.6 
192.7 
133.8 
67.3 
78.5 
130.6 
169.2 
202.4 
151.0 
110.8 
70.0 
97.8 
107.1 
122.2 
112.9 
343 TABLE  17  (continued) 
Average  As  %  of  1.29  x  av.  figure  As  % of average corresponding  figure  for let half 1965 
at end  (Fl.  6,867.4  million)  figure, 3 years earlier 
At end of  of last· 
three 
I 
months  Standard  Actual  Excess  Standard  Actual  Excess 
(incl. mergers) 
1965  December  6,967.7  100  101.5  1.5  133  139.0  6.0 
1966  January  7,048.8  101.5  102.6  1.1  133  139.5  6.5  February  7,204.3  103  104.9  1.9  133  139.7  6.7  March  7,395.7  104  107.7  3.7  133  141.4  8.4  April  7,582.6  105  110.4  5.4  133  142.1  9.1  May  7,611.0  105  110.8  5.8  132  141.5  9.5  June  7,521.5  104.5  109.5  5.0  132  139.2  7.2  July  7,387.5  104  107.6  3.6  132  135.9  3.9  August  7,328.0  104  106.7  2.7  132  133.7  1.7 
As  % of average corresponding 
figure, 4 years earlier 
September  7,329.3  104.5  106.7  2.2  142  149.2  7.2 
October  7,406.5  105.5  107.6  2.4  142  149.4  7.4 
November  7,425.1  106.5  108.1  1.6  143  149.3  6.3 
December  7,438.2  108  108.3  0.3  143  147.1  4.1 
1967  January  7,447.6  109  108.4  -0.6  143  146.2  3.2  February  7,576.0  110  110.3  0.3  143  145.9  2.9  March  1 7, 756.4  111  112.9  1.9  142  147.4  5.4  April  7)900.8  112  115.0  3.0  142  147.2  5.2 
No credit restriction measures from June 1967  to 
Deeember 1968 
As  % of average figure, 
last four months of 1968 
(Fl. 11,414.1  million) 
1968  December  11,559.8  101.0  101.0  0.0 
1969  January  11,627.5  102.5  101.6  -0.9 
Februa.t·y  11,745.7  104.0  102.6  -1.4 
March  11,703.9  105.5  102.3  -3.2 
April  11,804.5  107.0  103.1  -3.9 
May  11,972.6  107.0  104.6  -2.4 
June  12,135.9  107.0  106.0  -1.0 
July  12,313.9  107.0  107.6  0.6 
August  12,418.4  107.0  108.5  1.5 
September  12,528.4  108.0  109.5  1.5 
October  12,669.7  109.0  109.7 (')  0.7 
November  12 687.3  110.0  109.8  -0.2 
December  12:754.5  111.0  110.4  -0.6 
As  %  of  1.11  x  av.  figure 
for September/December 1968 
(Fl. 12,843 million) 
1970  January  12,923  101.5  100.6  -0.9 
February  13,174  103.0  102.6  -0.4 
March  13 439  104.0  104.6  0.6 
April  13:625  105.0  106.1  1.1 
:May  13,725  106.0  106.9  0.9 
June  13,722  106.0  106.8  0.8 
July  13,704  106.0  106.7  0.7 
August  13 683  106.0  106.5  0.5 
September  13:650  107.0  106.3  -0.7 
October  13 768  108.0  107.2  -0.8 
November  13:880  109.0  108.1  -0.9 
December  14,055  109.5  109.4  - 0.1 
(3)  In connection with consolidation as a result of mergers, at the end of October the outstanding loans were increased 
by Fl. 75  million and the reference amount by Fl.  107 million (to Fl.  11,551  million). 
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Minimum 
balance (1) 
112.9 
58.1 
57.1 
129.2 
157.6 
211.1 
147.9 
89.8 
40.2 
73.8 
75.6 
14,6(') 
2.  2{1) 
- - - -
-
- - - - - -
144 
256 
282 
107  - -
130 
236 
231 
301 
269 
153  - -...., 
"""  VI 
Call  money  loans 
Treasury  paper  with  a  remaining 
life  of: 
3 mouths 
1 year 
2  years 
3 years 
5 years 
Three  month  cash  loans  to  local 
authorities 
Three  month  Eurodollar  deposits: 
Gross  yield 
Discount (-) of  forward  dollar 
Net  yield 
Nederlaudsche  Bank rates: 
Discount  of  bills  of  exchange 
Discount of  promissory  notes 
Advances  in  current account 
1958  1959 
1.50  2.18 
2.26  2.57 
2.83  2.75 
3.01  2.97 
3.29  2.88 
3.39  -
3.06  2.75 
- -
- -
-- -
3.:00  3.50 
3.50  4.00. 
4.00  4.50 
TABLE  18 
Money  market  rates 
(December  figures:  monthly  averages  in  per  cent) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
1.13  1.32  1.88  1.61  2.09 
1.54  -1.34  2.02  --2.29  3.77 
2.07  1.58  2.11  2.34  3.98 
2.45  1.82  2.55  2.84  4.19 
2.72  2.15  2.86  2.98  4.31 
3.17  2.73  3.25  3.10  4.54 
2.06  2.21  3.14  3.65  4.99 
- - 4.00  4.44  4.77 
- - -0.43  -0.48  -0.17 
- - 3.57  3.96  4.60 
3.50  3.50  4.00  3.50  4.50 
4.00  4.00  4.50  4.00  5.00 
4.50  4.50  5.00  4.50  5.50 
~---------------
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
3.47  3.68  4.05  4.96  7.13  6.73 
4.40  5.06  4.63  4.77  6.18  6.08 
4.55  5.48  4.92  5.01  6.54  6.62 
4.59  5.71  5.06  5.09  6.72  6.66 
4.53  5.74  5.18  5.24  6.74  6.89 
4.90  6.06  5.45  5.49  7.01  6.85 
5.34  6.75  5.48  6.26  9.03  7.13 
5.46  6.75  6.43  7.19  11.22  7.30 
-0.18  -0.19  -1.50  -0.80  -1.98  -0.44 
5.28  6.56  4.93  6.39  9.24  6.86 
4.50  5.00  4.50  5.00  6.00  5.50 
5.00  5.50  5.00  5.50  7.00  6.50 
5.50  6.00  5.50  6.00  7.50  7.00 
-- -----------------0.90 
0.80 
0.70-
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
TABLE  19 
Rate of turnover of savings  balances 
(Repayments  during  a  year  divided  by  the average  balance  in that  year) 
Comm·erclal 
banks  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ·.  .  ·  ...... . 
General  savings 
banks 
··········.  ..  .  ..  ·.  .  .  .  :  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
,-----·~. 
Agricultural  credit 
banks  .  '·  I  -....__.  .,  .  ---·  ·"  ·- ./  '  /'  .'-____ ........  ·--../  ·,  ........ 
"'"'  ....  _,-'  ,  Postal  Savings Bank 
"'  ....... 
__ ,.  '--......  -------- ...................... -'-..... ... -~- ---- ............  ------
---........ --
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0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
039 Effective  from  (month) 
January  1967 
April  1967 
January  1969 
December  1969 
November  1970 
March  1971  (1) 
TABLE  20 
Short-term  lending  to  local  authorities  by commercial  banks  and  agricultural  credit  institutions: 
standards since  January  1967 
Changes  in percentage standards 
Percentage of  figure  at end 
Percentage of  figure  Percentage of  average  figure  of  the corresponding month 
at end of July 1966  in  first  half of  1966  in period from  July 1965 
to  end  of  June 1966 
105  95  -
105  95  105 
110  100  110 
Percentage of figure at end of 
July, Aug. or Sept. 1966 
110  100  110 
120  110  120 
Percentage of  average  figure 
for corresponding three-month 
periods  terminating,  succes-
sively, at the end of the months 
from Sept. 1965 to Aug. 1966 
130  120  130 
Perce:: tage of monthly 
balance-sheet total at end 
of previous year 
-
-
2 
2 
Percentage of monthly balance-
sheet total 
at end of  1969  at end of  1970 
2.2  2 
2.4  2.2 
----- - -·  ··-----------·-··-
~  (1)  Since March average  lending  at the  end  of the  previous  three  months  has been the reference figure for  the standard, instead of lending at the end of the month. 
"'-1 Part six 
THE MONETARY POLICY 
"IN BELGIUM CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC FACTS  OF MONETARY  POLICY 
Section I  ·  Institutional framework and structural aspects 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
Distribution of power and relationship between monetary authorities 
1.  Monetary  policy  is  one  of the instruments  of general  economic  policy,  which 
is  a  Government responsibility,  therefore  has  to conform  with the  general views 
set  by  the  Government. 
Moreover,  while monetary policy  is  primarily  the central bank's preserve,  it does 
not have  exclusive  powers  though it is  the  main  institution responsible. 
The Banque Nationale, under Government supervision,  is  responsible  for  interest 
rate  policy,  the fixing  of rediscount terms  and  the control of bank credit. Banking 
ratios,  as  monetary policy  instruments,  are fixed  jointly  by the Banque  Nationale 
and  the  Banking  Commission,  subject  to  Government  approval.  Open  market 
operations  and  exchange  control  are  handled  by  the  Securities  Stabilization Fund 
and the Belgo-Luxembourg Foreign Exchange Institute, institutions where the State 
and  the  National Bank are  represented.  The Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute 
exercises  control  over  the monetary market, as  do  the Banque Nationale  and the 
Securities  Stabilization  Fund, with  which  it cooperates  closely. 
The decentralization  of monetary policy powers  is  coupled with the fact  that the 
Banque  Nationale  is  represented  in  the  various  bodies  controlling  or  acting  as 
trustees for financial bodies (Banking Commission,  Council of Public Credit Insti-
tutions,  Central  Office  for  Small  Savings  and  in  the  governing  bodies  of  public 
institutions,  such  as  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund,  the  Rediscount  and  Gua-
rantee  Institute and  the General  Savings  and Pension Fund).  The Government is 
also  represented  in these  institutions.  There  are  moreover  a  large  number and a 
wide variety of links between the Central Government and the Banque Nationale. 
The  general  set-up  thus  ensures  that  the  principles  of  the  Banque  Nationale's 
monetary policy  are  applied over  a whide area  and  that the measures  adopted by 
the institutions assuming  responsibilities in this  field  are  properly coordinated. 
In addition  to  its  budgetary  responsibilities,  the government  has  wide powers  in 
the field  of monetary policy.  These it exerts through its  participation in the work 
of institutions  operating in  this  area,  through  its  role  as  trustee  in public credit 
institutions  and  in  certain  classes  of  private  financial  intermediary,  through  the 
requirement  that  it must  approve  banking  ratios  and  through  its  influence  over 
certain classes  of credit,  notably hire purchase credit. 
There are organizational links between the Govemment and the Banque Nationale 
reflected in the fact  that the State owns half of the Bank's capital, although some 
of its rights  as  shareholder  are  limited. The law incorporation of the Banque Na-
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tionale  also  invests  specific  powers  of  appointment - discussed  below - in  the 
King. Lastly the Minister of Finance has  power to review all the Bank's operations 
through a government commissioner, who  has  the right of suspensive veto on any 
measure conflicting with the law or with the "interests of the State" and who may 
attend,  though not vote at,  the meetings  of the  various  committees  of the Bank. 
Where the commissioner uses his veto, the Minister of Finance must make a ruling 
within eight  days,  failing  which the veto lapses. 
This  sharing  of the  responsibility for  monetary  policy  between the State and  the 
Bank  resulted  from  a  deliberate  choice:  the  legislature  did not want  to  see  the 
policy  escape  Government control  altogether  nor  did it want  the  government  to 
have  the  sole  responsibility  for  it. 
The Banque Natlonale de Belgique 
2.  The  Banque  Nationale  is  a  special  kind  of  limited  company  incorporated,  in 
1850, under a specific law;  half its capital belongs  to the State. It  administers the 
exchange  reserves  of  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union,  Belgium  and· the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  having  formed  an  economic  union  in  1921.  It is 
presided over by  a governor - appointed by the  King for five  years - who  takes 
the  chair  at  meetings  of  the  board  of  directors,  Regency  Council  and  general 
council,  and  at  the  annual  general  meeting  of  shareholders. 
In addition to the governor, the board of directors has from three to six members, 
appointed by the King  on proposals from  the  Council of Regency,  for a period of 
six years. It considers  and decides  on all  questions  not explicitly  reserved for the 
Regency  Council.  In emergencies,  it has  power to  change  rates  for  discounts  and 
advances, but must refer the matter to the Recency Council at its next meeting. 
The Regency  Council· comprises  the  governor,  the  directors  and ten regents.  The 
regents  are  elected  for  three  years  by  the  General  Meeting  of the  shareholders. 
Two of them are chosen on proposals from  the most representative workers' orga-
nizations, three on proposals from the most representative organizations of industry, 
trade  and agriculture.  Two regents  are chosen from  among  persons  having senior 
positions in certain institutions classified as  "financial institutions of public interest". 
The  three  other  regents  are  presented  by  the Minister  of  Finance.  The Regency 
Council deliberates on general matters affecting the Banque Nationale, the currency, 
credit and the  economic development of the  country.  It fixes  rates  and  terms  for 
discounting,  advances  and loans. 
The college  of censors  has  eight to  ten members, elected  by  the general meeting, 
and has review powers only,  except in so  far as  it participates in deliberations by 
the  general  council. 
The  general  council  comprises  the  governor,  the  directors,  the  regents  and  the 
censors; it is  mainly  concerned with questions of general organization of the Bank 
and  of the remuneration  of  the  governor  and of  the  directors.  The governor has 
power to suspend  the execution of  a Regency Council decision for reference  to be 
general  council. 
As  a  limited company,  the Bank has  a general  meeting of shareholders. However, 
its  role  as  a  public  institution  having  gained  in  importance,  the  powers  of  the 
general  meeting have  been  scaled  down;  in addition,  since  half of  the capital has 
been  owned  by  the  State  since  1948,  the  powers  of  the  latter  in  the  general 
meeting have been curbed, e.g.  with regard to the amendment of the memorandum 
and articles  of association,  by special  voting rules.  The general meeting elects  the 
regents  and  the  censors,  discusses  matters  placed on the  agenda,  hears  the  report 
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on the operations of the past year and approves or rejects the balance sheet when 
this  has  not been approved by  a  majority of at least  six  votes  by  the  college  of 
censors. 
A  full  list  of  the  operations which  the  Bank  has  power  to carry  out is  included 
in the  organic law. The parity of the currency unit can be changed only by statute 
of parliament. 
The Bank has  the  monopoly  right to issue  banknotes  of Bfrs.  100  and  over  and 
acts as  State cashier. In this latter capacity, it is subject to supervision of the Cour 
des  Comptes  (State  Auditors). 
With  regard  to  the  implementation  of  banking  law,  the  Banque  Nationale  also 
has  powers  to  make  proposals  and  submit  opinions  and  the  banks  are  required 
to file  with it detailed balance sheets once  a year and profit and loss  accounts and 
assets  and  liabilities  statements  each  month,  as  well  as  information  concerning 
loans  made  and  taken up.  The Bank itself  checks  that its rules  for  the banks  are 
properly complied  with. 
The Bank's information on credit  matters has  been increased  through the Central 
Risks  Office,  which was  set up by agreement in 1965 and whose operations were 
approved  and  extended  by  a  Royal  Decree  of  9  October  1967.  The  banks  are 
required  to  report  credits  granted,  increases,  reductions  and  deletions  of  credits 
where the individual sums  involved exceed  Bfrs.  1 million, with details  of utiliza-
tion.  The Risks  Office,  which  is  now  one of  the  departments  of  the Banque  Na-
tionale,  pools  this information with the information on the Bank's own operations 
and  makes  it  available  directly  to  participants  on specific  request.  The  same  ar-
rangement ·may  be  followed  for  comparable  information which  the  Bank  obtains 
from certain public credit institutions, private savings  banks and other institutions 
accepting deposits. 
Other public organizations 
3.  The Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute, a  semi-public  institution, was  set up 
in 1935  to mobilize  at short or medium-term bank assets, which, because of their 
form or term, were not rediscountable with the Banque Nationale.  The Institute's 
capital,  which  is  Bfrs.  1,000  million,  was  subscribed  by  the  Belgian  banks.  The 
Government  guarantees  the  Institute's  liabilities,  which  may  not  exceed  Bfrs. 
27,500  million.  The  Institute  offers  rediscount  facilities,  for  use  as  and  when 
occasion  arises  and on  a  strictly  temporary basis.  It also  operates  on the  ex-bank 
market  as  purchaser,  seller  and  broker  of  bank or  commercial  acceptances,  thus 
assuming  an important role in the financing  of foreign  trade. Normally,  a director 
of  the Banque  Nationale  is  chairman of  the Institute. 
The control of the securities market and open market policy are the responsibilities 
of the  Securities Stabilization Fund, a semi-public  institution created in 1945. The 
Fund's  liabilities  are  guaranteed by  the State.  It is  entitled to  intervene  both on 
the  money  market and on the  capital market. It is  administered by a board com-
prising  three  representatives  of the  Minister  of Finance,  including  the  chairman, 
and  three  representatives  of  the Banque Nationale. 
Small  denomination currency-notes  of less  than Bfrs.  100  in value  and coin-
are  issued  on  behalf  of  the  Treasury  through  the  Monetary  Fund.  The  present 
ceiling  for  this issue  is  Bfrs.  9,000  million,  save  in  respect  of  the  smallest  deno-
mination  (25  centimes)  the issue  of which  is  limited  only  by  actual  needs. 
The  Belgo-Luxembourg  Foreign Exchange  Institute is  responsible  for  establishing 
and implementing exchange control. It was set up in  1944 and is  administered by 
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a  board  comprising  representatives  of  the  Banque  Nationale,  the  Banking  Com-
mission  and  the Belgian  and  Luxembourg  Governments. 
The Banking Commission is  an independent agency  set up by  the Banking Law of 
1935  to  supervise  the  implementation  of  banking  legislation,  certain  types  of 
borrowing of savings  and investment companies. It has  a  chairman  and six  other 
members  appointed  by  Royal  Decree  for  periods  of  office  of  six  years.  Two  of 
the  members  are  appointed  from  a  list  of  three  names  of  representatives  of  the 
banks,  and  two others  from  a  list  of  three  names  submitted by  the  Banque  Na-
tionale  and  the  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute. 
Para.  II:  Structural  aspects 
Para.  Il-l:  Structure  of financial  institutions 
4.  Under  the banking  law  (Royal Decree  185  of 9  July  1935),  the  term "bank" 
is  used  only  for firms  "habitually receiving  deposits of funds  reimbursable  on de-
mand or within periods  not exceeding  two  years,  for  use,  on their own account, 
for  banking,  credit  or  investment  operations".  This  definition  excludes  private 
savings  banks,  which  are  controlled  by  other legislation.  The  banks  accept  sight 
deposits, fixed  deposits, savings deposits in "deposit savings books"; they also issue 
medium-term  notes. Their main business  is  short and medium-term credit. At the 
end of  1970,  their  assets  totalled  Bfrs.  776,300  million. 
The banks are  usually classified  by  size.  The liabilities of the three main banks-
the Societe Generale de Banque,  the Banque  de Bruxelles and the Kredietbank-
accounted  for  64·3 %  of the liabilities of all  the banks  at the end of 1970, com-
pared  with 75%  at  the  end  of  1965. In general,  only  a  very  small  number  of 
banks  specialize  to  a  substantial extent.  There are,  however, banks specializing  in 
credit to certain industries, in hire purchase financing  or, and to a growing extent, 
in  international  financial  transactions.  It  should  be  stressed,  none  the  less,  that 
credit establishments  are  tending to specialize  less  and less.  Arrangements  for col-
lecting funds  are  becoming more  and  general  and,  since  the adoption of the " eco-
nomic growth" laws of 1959 the banks, under this incentive, have moved  strongly 
into the medium  and long-term credit  sector while  at the same  time  stepping up 
the proportion of  time  deposits in overall liabilities. 
The private  savings  banks,  which  legally  are  not banks  at all,  may  accept  funds 
in various forms,  but they  are  mainly  concerned with savings  deposits,  and  most 
of their lending goes  into mortgages  or Government stocks;  at  the end of  1970, 
their total assets were Bfrs.  17  4,800 million. 
However, it is  a public credit institution, the General Savings  and Pensions Fund, 
which  handles  the  largest  volume  of  savings  deposits  in  the  legal  sense  of  the 
term.'  This  semi-public  institution,  whose  resources  are  mainly  savings  deposits, 
has  also  been issuing savings  bonds since  1968. By  the yardstick  of total lending, 
the Fund is  the  main  medium  and  long-term  credit  institution in Belgium.  Most 
of the funds  go  to building loans,  to  purchases  of Government stock,  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, to loans  to industry and agriculture;  it also  contributes to the financ-
ing  of .exports  and,  recently,  has  begun  granting  hirecpurchase  credit.  It is  also 
very  active  on the  money  market,  through  subscriptions  to  Treasury  certificates, 
1 By  law  only  the  General  Savings  and  Pensions  Fund,  the  private  savings  banks  and  the  municipal  savings  banks 
are  allowed  to  use  the  term  "savings". 
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through purchases of acceptances and through loans on the call market. At the end 
of 1970, its total assets  were Bfrs.  253,600 million. 
Other semi-public  specialized  institutions  grant  medium  and  long-term  credit  to 
industry,  agriculture,  small  business,  home  ownership  and  the  local  authorities. 
This  assistance  is  generally  financed  through  their  own  issues  of  medium-term 
notes  and bonds and,  to a  far  lesser  extent,  through  deposits. 
At the  end of 1970,  their assets  totalled Bfrs.  473,400 million.1 The special  role 
of the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute has been noted above. 
There is  also  (as  we have  seen) a control agency,  the Securities Stabilization Fund, 
and a  semi-public institution specializing in investments in companies, the National 
Investment  Corporation,  and  there  are  also  insurance  institutions,  ordinary  pen-
sion  funds,  mortgage  companies,  management companies, capitalization companies, 
hire-purchase  credit companies,  and unit trusts. 
The Postal Cheque  Office  is  State owned;  the  deposits it accepts  become  a  State 
debt payable  on demand.  The Office is  none the less  regarded as  a financial  inter-
mediary,  since  it acts  as  if  it were granting  credit  to  the  Treasury.  At the  end 
of  1970, its deposits  totalled Bfrs.  49,600  million. 
The Treasury is  not regarded  as  a financial  intermediary, since it devotes virtually 
all  its borrowings  to  the financing  of investment in the public sector. 
Characteristics of the evolution of financial intermediaries 
5.  There  have  been  two  major  trends  in  the  activity  of  financial  intermediaries 
during  the last  ten years.  The first  is  a  trend towards  internationalization, led by 
the  banks.  The  most  obvious  evidence  of  this  is  the relative  size  of  the  banks' 
assets  and  liabilities  in  foreign  currencies:  in  1970,  the  proportion  of  foreign 
exchange  assets  to  total assets  was  34·3 %  on average at the end of each month, 
compared  with  11·5 %  in  1960;  for  liabilities,  the  two  percentages  were  33-4 
and  9·3.  The  second  important  tendency,  already  mentioned,  is  for  public  and 
private financial  intermediaries  to  abandon specialization;  though  already  substan-
tial,  this  trend  seems  to  be gathering  momentum.  It entails  an  extension  of  the 
monetary  activities  of the  "non-banks". 
The  growth  of  international  banking  has  strongly  reduced  the  influence  of  the 
normal  instruments  of  traditional  monetary  policy  and  made  necessary  a  greater 
international coordination. By  way  of example one can point out that the payment 
of interests on more than half of the total of term deposits denominated in Belgian 
francs  is  aligned  with  rates  on  the  international  money  market.  As  regards  the 
tendency  for  the  financial  intermediaries  to  abandon  specialization  this  involves 
the  extension  of  the  field  of  application  of  monetary  policy  outside  the  strictly 
banking  sector. 
Para.  II-2:  The banking  system  and  the  financial  markets 
6.  The Banking  Law of 1935 confirmed the ban on mixed  banks  promulgated in 
1934:  the banks were not allowed to hold  the shares or bonds of a  trading com-
I  This total  is  accounted  for  by  the  following  institutions,  in declining  order of size:  the Belgian  Municipal Credit 
Institution,  the  National  Industrial  Credit  Corporation,  the  National  Housing  Corporation,  the  National  Fund  for 
Credit  to  Trade  and  Industry,  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute,  the  National  Smallholders'  Corporation,  the 
National  Institute  for  Agricultural  Credit  and  the  Central  Office  for  Mortgage  Credit. 
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pany  other  than  a  bank,  except  for  a period  of  six  months  with a  view  to  par-
ticipating in a public placing. But the law of 3 May 1967 gave  the banks complete 
liberty  to  purchase  and  hold  company  debentures.  The  same  law  raises  the  six-
month limit to one year in respect  of the holding of shares  in the issue  of which 
the  banks  have  participated;  the  Banking  Commission  has  authority  to  extend 
this  limit  twice  by  one  year. 
The banks  therefore hold shares  only long  enough to place  them with the public; 
their  holdings  of  debentures  of private  companies  are,  however,  also  very  small. 
None ·the  less,  they  play  a  leading  role  in  the  underwriting  and  the  placing  of 
Government loans  with  the public.  At the  end  of  1970,  their holdings  of  public 
and private  securities  with more  than a year  to  run accounted for  24 %  of their 
total  assets. 
The  legally  authorized  "definitive  investments"  of  private  savings  banks  consist 
in bonds  of the Belgian State (and bonds  having  the same  status)  and  of  Belgian 
companies,  and in shares  in private savings banks, ordinary banks, insurance com-
panies,  mortgage  credit  companies,  and  institutions  incorporated  under  specific 
laws; the Minister of Finance and the Central Office for Small Savings (a trusteeship 
agency)  have  power  to  authorize  other  investments;  the  relative  scale  of  these 
categories  of investment  is  subject  to  control. 
Control  of  the  capital  market  is  exercised  by  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund, 
which deals,  however, only in public-sector securities (see  Chapter II, Section III, 
para.  1  ).  The Banking Commission  and the Minister of Finance have -admittedly 
limited-powers  of  control over  use  of  the capital  market by public  authorities 
and  agencies. 
Para.  II-3:  Habits  of the  public  with regard  to  investment and  liquidity 
Other structural characteristics 
7.  The  constitution  of  financial  assets  by  firms  and  individuals  in  the  form  of 
monetary  cash  holdings,  fixed  income  non-monetary  assets  and  shares  reached 
Bfrs.  146,000  million  in  1970,  or  about  11·5%  of  the  gross  national  product 
(see  Table  3 ).  This  proportion  is  tending  to  grow,  particularly  during  periods  in 
which  the  growth  rate  of economic  activity  is  slower. 
The  constitution of  short-term  non-monetary  financial  assets  is  considered  below 
(Section  II, para.  I  of this  Chapter). 
The  share  of notes  and  coin  in  the  total  money  supply  and  in  total  liquidity  is 
relatively  high  in  Belgium  (see  Table  4 ).  The  scale  of the  flight  into  banknotes 
following  money  creation  tends  to  limit  the  efficiency  of  the  monetary  reserve 
ratio.  The  monetary  authorities  are  attempting  to  encourage  the  use  of sight  de-
posits,  in order to bring about  a  liquidity pattern matching more  closely  the pat-
terns prevailing in other countries at a comparable stage of financial  development.1 
Para.  IIA:  Scale  of financial  transactions  with non-residents 
The value of Belgian exports of goods and services  was about 64·8 %  of the gross 
1 A  Royal  Decree  of  10  November  1967  requires  all  persons  engaged  in  commerce  to  maintain  a  postal  or  bank 
account  and  confers  legal  tender  statns  on  all  payments  through  these  accounts  between  such  persons  in  sums· of 
:Bfrs.  50,000  and  over  . 
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national  product  in  1970.  This  is  an  aggregate  which  is  steadily  increasing:  in 
1960, it was  only  34·9 %. 
The  growing  influence  of  external  relations  and  exchange  control  are  considered 
below  (Chapter II, Section III, para.  II). 
Section II - Liquidity 
Para.  I:  The  liquidity  of the  economy 
Composition, volume and source of the liquidity of the economy 
8.  The components of the  liquidity of the economy  are  the money  supply and all 
the  non-monetary  short-term  financial  assets  held by  individuals  and firms  (other 
than financial  intermediaries). 
The money  supply, as  shown in the "Statistics" part of the Bulletin of the Banque 
Nationale,  comprises: 
- Notes  and coin,  viz.  notes issued by  the Banque Nationale  and notes  and coin 
issued  by  the  Treasury;  1 
- Sight  deposits  held  by  firms  and  individuals  in  the  form  of  current  accounts 
with  the  Banque  Nationale,  balances  with the  Postal  Cheque  Office  and  de-
posits  at sight  and at  terms  of  up to  one  month at most  with the banks and 
certain  semi-official  establishments; 
- Sight deposits held by the Treasury and the subordinate public authorities. 
Secondary  liquidity  held  by  firms  and  individuals  comprises  deposits  in  foreign 
currencies  with  the  Belgian  banks,  ordinary  bank book deposits  with  the banks, 
savings  banks  and financial  intermediaries in the public  sector plus other deposits 
for  terms  not exceeding  one  year  with the  same  institutions. 
The total liquidity of the  economy  thus defined was  Bfrs.  835,000 million  at the 
end of 1970, i.e.  66·5 %  of the  gross  national product. Cash holdings represented 
50·1  %  of  total liquidity,  foreign  currency  1·4 %, bank book  deposits  and  other 
deposits not exceeding one year 48·5 %  (see Table 4 ).  The share of notes and coin 
in the money  supply  was  45·6%  at the  end of  1970,  compared with 54-4% at 
the end of  1965  and 57·5%  at the  end of  1960. 
Published data on velocity of turnover are  available  only for  sight bank deposits, 
balances with the Postal Cheque Office  and deposits with the General Savings  and 
Pensions Fund (see Table 5). In the last ten years, there has been a fairly consistent 
tendency  for the turnover of these classes  of liquidity to  accelerate.  This  tendency 
has  been most pronounced in the last two years, particularly in respect of deposits 
with the General  Savings  and  Pensions  Fund. 
As  for the source of liquidity, integrated figures  are available only for the counter-
part of the money supply and near-money liquidity with the banks. In the last ten 
years,  credit to firms  and individuals has been the main counterpart to the increase 
in monetary and  quasi-monetary liquidity,  followed  by the short-term financing  of 
the  public  authorities  and  of  external  transactions.  According  to  the  definitions 
used  in  determining  the  counterparts  of  monetary  and  quasi-monetary  liquidity, 
I  Not  including  notes  and  coin  held by monetary  institutions. 
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the external capital operations of the authorities are treated as "short-term, financing 
of those authorities" and not as  "external transactions". The latter therefore com-
prises the current balance and capital transactions of firms  and individuals only. 
In Belgium,  the  monetary  authorities  have  never  set  a  quantitative  limit  to  the 
increase  in liquidity.  On the  other hand,  the  Banque  Nationale  has  stated, in its 
Annual Report for 1970 and elsewhere, that it wishes the terms for which financial 
assets are constituted to be related fairly  closely, to those for loans made by finan-
cial intermediaries.1 
As  for  the structure of total liquidity, the authorities have  taken certain measures 
to  encourage  bank  deposits  and  the constitution  of balances  in savings  books.  In 
1969,  they  took  steps  to  discourage  Belgian  residents  from  building  up  liquid 
assets  abroad. 
Para.  II:  Ban.k  liquidity 
Composition and sources of Bank liquidity 
9.  Bank liquidity  may  be defined  as  the sum  of  available  assets or assets  deemed 
easily  realizable,  minus  certain liabilities  which  the banks  are  entitled to contract 
in  order  to put themselves  temporarily  in  funds  (see  Table  6).  The  assets  and 
liabilities of the banks concerned are the following:  notes of the Banque Nationale, 
current accounts with the  Banque Nationale, balances with the Postal Cheque Of-
fice,  net lending at  call  in Belgian francs,  commercial bills  rediscountable with the 
Banque  Nationale,  Treasury  certificates  with  a  year  or  less  to  run,  in  Belgian 
francs,  certificates  of the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund,  and  net  foreign  exchange 
position spot (not including participations),  less  advances  against securities  by the 
Banque  Nationale. 
The Banque Nationale does not publish specific  statistics on the variations in bank 
liquidity  and  their  causes.  An  overall  view  can,  however,  be  obtained  through 
information  published  periodically  by  the  Banking  Commission  and  the  Banque 
Nationale  on the  overall  situation  of  the  banks  and  on  the  causes  of  variations 
in the  supply  of money  and  near-money. 
Apart  from  the  application  of instruments  of monetary  policy,  the  main  factors 
originating  in  the  Banque  Nationale  and  influencing  bank  liquidity  are  the  net 
variations in foreign  exchange  reserves,  in claims  on firms  and  individuals,  in net 
transactions by the Government and the Securities  Stabilization Fund and in notes 
and coin  in circulation (see  Table 7).  Bank credit  refinancing by institutions other 
than the Banque Nationale, with which such institutions may, incidentally, refinance 
their lending,  is  on a  considerable  scale  (see  Table  11) and  is  therefore liable  to 
affect  bank  liquidity  very  appreciably. 
Certain  monetary  policy  instruments,  viz.  the  rediscount  and  certification  ceiling 
fixed  by the Banque Nationale, the monetary reserve ratio, open market policy, and 
the limits on the external debt position, have a direct impact on bank liquidity. 
'See  Annual  Report,  1970,  page  XIV:  "The  requirements  of  funds,  mainly  for  capital  investtnent  purposes,  must 
be  adequately  covered,  that  is  by contributions  of  stable financial  savings,  placed  at sufficiently  long  term;  if these 
contributions  were  to  be  insufficient,  borrowing  requirements  would  inevitably  be  covered,  automatically,  by  money 
creation  achieved  by recourse  to  the money  market,  using  either funds  obtained  from  abroad,  or direct  bank credit, 
backed,  as  far as necessary,  by the lender of last resort"  . 
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Para.  III:  Liquidity and  the  public  finances 
Public finances: size and nature of the Treasury's role 
10.  From  1960 to 1970 inclusive,  the Treasury's  total budget revenues rose  from 
Bfrs.  108,400 million to Bfrs.  299,900 million and the corresponding expenditures 
from  Bfrs.  134,900  million  to  Bfrs.  331,700  million.  In  the  same  period,  the 
public debt rose from Bfrs.  396,100 million  to Bfrs.  621,700 million, these figures 
representing  69·2 %  and  49·5 %  of  the  gross  national  product  respectively;  in 
these  sums,  the proportion of short-term debt (not exceeding  one  year)  fell  from 
31·9%  to  26·5 %. 
In a narrow practical sense,  the task of the Treasury is  to centralize  the  revenues 
and  expenditures  of  the  central  authority  and  to  ensure  that  cash  deficits  are 
covered.  Despite  the  scale  of  the  total  settlements  it  makes,  the  Treasury  has 
virtually no  cash  outside the Postal Cheque Office;  the bulk of the revenue of the 
local  authorities  is  centralized with the Belgian  Municipal  Credit Institute.  Apart 
from  its  role  as  executive  agent,  in the broad sense,  of the budget,  the Treasury 
has  money-creating  powers  as  it issues  notes  and coin. 
The  Treasury  settles  almost  all  its  payments  through  the  Postal  Cheque  Office, 
which places  at the disposal of the Treasury the deposits that it receives and plays 
a  role  of  major  importance  in  the  Belgian  payments  mechanism.  Corporate  and 
individual  balances  with  the  Postal  Cheque  Office  have  represented  on  average, 
over  the  past few  years,  rather more  than 10% of the money  supply. 
Relations between public finance and liquidity 
11.  Transfers  from  private accounts  to public accounts  through postal cheques do 
not affect  bank liquidity. However, bank liquidity is  severely depleted at the main 
tax  due-dates  in January and July, when large  sums  are  transferred  to  the public 
authorities by debiting bank accounts. 
The  central  government's  budget  policy,  in  Belgium  as  elsewhere,  has  a  direct 
influence  on the volume  and  the pattern of liquidity in the economy.  The budget 
deficit  plays  a key  role  not only because  of its  volume  but also  through  the way 
in which it is  financed:  recourse  to the central bank and the money market, issues 
of medium  and long-term loans, resort to foreign  markets or drawing on reserves. 
In recent years,  the Treasury's  net borrowing  requirement has  fluctuated between 
Bfrs.  23,000  and  Bfrs.  34,000  million,  the  proportion financed  by  money  market 
institutions (see  Table  22) having also  varied. 
The  Government  has  a  line  of  credit  available  at the Banque Nationale  to cover 
its  cash  deficits.  This  arrangement  is  at present governed by  an  agreement  dated 
30 March  1968,  concluded  between  the  Belgian  State  and  the Banque  Nationale 
after endorsement by the Bank's Regency Council in accordance with its "organic" 
law. This agreement fixes  the ceiling of these advances at Bfrs.  16,000,1 stipulating 
that  the  credit  drawn,  as  shown  in  the  recorded  item  "public  securities"  of the 
Bank's balance sheet, may not exceed on average, over a period of three years, two-
thrids  of  the  ceiling,  which  is  itself reviewed  every  three years.  A  credit line  of 
Bfrs.  533  million was  allocated at the same  time for the Luxembourg Government. 
1 The  rule  is  that if special  circumstances  warrant  this  (notably  should  there  be heavy  withdrawals  from  the  Postal 
Cheque  Office  or  from  the  banks),  the  Banque  Nationale  will  place  a  supplementary  margin  at the  disposal  of  the 
Treasury. 
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The other forms  of Banque  Nationale  credit  to  the  Government  are  the consoli-
dated  interest-free  claims  on  the  State  inherited from  the  war,  the  investment of 
an amount corresponding to the Bank's capital,  reserves and depreciation accounts, 
its pension fund  holdings  and  its  holding  (limited  to Bfrs.  700  million)  of notes 
and  coin  issued  by  the  Treasury. 
On 31  December  1970,  these  various  sources  of finance  were  shown  as  follows 
in  the  Banque  Nationale's  balance  sheet:  Bfrs.  13,300  million  under  (Belgian) 
"Public securities", Bfrs.  34,000 million under "Consolidated claim on the Govern-
ment",  Bfrs.  3,700  million  under  "Public  long-term  securities",  Bfrs.  3,100  mil-
lion  under  "Securities  of  the  Staff  Pensions  Fund"  and  Bfrs.  300  million  under 
"Treasury  notes  and  coin". 
In fact  the Government also  has  other ways of  raising central bank finance  includ-
ing  in  particular  the  sale  of foreign  exchange  borrowed by  the  Treasury  to  the 
Bank,  and the purchase of new Treasury certificates by  the Securities  Stabilization 
Fund, to the extent that the purchase is financed by drawing on the Fund's advance 
account  at the Bank.  At the end of  1970,  the Treasury's  short and medium-term 
foreign  exchange borrowings stood at Bfrs.  40,400 million.1 
The  banking sector has  access  to virtually  the  entire range  of Government  stock, 
either through the money market, through sales  mainly for placing with the public, 
or through  the  capital  market.  Since  1962,  the banks  have  no longer  been com-
pelled  to invest  in Government securities,  save  temporarily  (from  1963  to  1972) 
in connection  with the maintenance  of  the cover  ratio.2  However,  the  re-employ-
ment  ratio,  introduced for  a  year in 1969, in effect  compelled  the banks  to hold 
a  certain  amount  of  Treasury  paper.  Moreover,  by  an  agreement  between  the 
Minister  of  Finance  and  the  banks,  the  latter have  undertaken  to  convert  into 
Belgian  franc  bonds  issued  by  the  Belgian  public  sector  half  the  increase  in. the 
March-November  period  of  1971  (in  relation  to  the  average  for  February of the 
same  year) of their resuorces in Belgian francs  deriving from  "non-banks". 
The  Government  stock  offered  to  individuals  and  firms  other  than  the  banking 
sector  in  the  broad  definition  is  stock  maturing  in  more  than  one  year;  some 
of the securities  are  drawn by lot or have  multiple due-dates.  The rate of  interest 
is  fixed  by  the  Minister  of  Finance,  by  agreement  with  the  banks  placing  the 
stock,  as  appropriate.  There  is  no limit  to  the  size  of the issues,  but the period 
during which  stock  may  be  taken  up must  always  be announced  in advance.  The 
issues  are  placed with the public  generally  through the banks, but of late this  has 
also been done through public credit institutions and private savings banks.3 
I  At the same  date  the long-term foreign exchange  debt was  Bfrs.  9,900  million. 
2  However,  the  Banking  Law requires  banks  incorporated  as  limited  companies,  as  partnerships  limited by  shares 
or  as  associations  of persons  with  limited  liability  to  place  their  statutory  reserves  in securities  issued  or  guaranteed 
by  the  Government,  the  provinces  or the municipalities. 
3  See  inventory  and  classification  of  public-sector  medium  and  long-term  fixed-income  securities  (Information  and 
Documentation  Bulletin  of  the  Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique,  March  1970). 
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THE INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
General observations on the instruments and their importance 
12.  The  instruments  of  monetary  policy  available  to  the  Belgian  authorities  are 
of  two  categories:  those  affecting  the  lending  capacity  of  the  banks  and  those 
concerned  with  the  direct  curtailment  of  credit.  The  banks'  lending  capacity  is 
limited  through  refinance  policy,  the  monetary  reserve  ratio,  open  market policy 
and limitation of the external debt position. 
In the  last  ten years,  much  progress  has  been  made  in liberalizing  the  domestic 
market  and  its  relations  with  for~ign  markets.  This  process,  partly  deliberate, 
partly self-impelled, has  necessitated a strengthening of monetary policy so  that its 
action  can  be at  once  prompter,  firmer  and  more  selective.  Thus  credit  restraint 
arrangements  and  a  monetary  reserve  ratio  have  been  in  use  since  1964  and  a 
ceiling  on central bank refinancing  was  introduced in 1969. 
Section I  - Refinancing policy 1 
Para.  I:  General 
13.  Under  Article  17  of its  Statute,  the Banque  Nationale  may  discount  bills  or 
other paper which serve  to finance  trade  and may  make  current-account  advances 
against pledged Government securities (or securities  ranking as  such). 
The  terms  on  which  these  facilities  are  made  available  are  determined either  by 
the  Statute  in  which  case  they  are  invariable,  or  by  the  Bank  itself,  in which 
case  they  may  be  varied.  Apart  from  the  rules  contained  in the  Statute,  credit 
thus  made  available  by  the  Banque  Nationale  is  provided at is  discretion. 
The  banks  mobilize  their  credits  mainly  with  the  Banque  Nationale,  the  Redis-
count and Guarantee  Institute  and  other public  credit institutions. 
The relative  scale  of rediscounting with the Banque Nationale, the Rediscount and 
Guarantee  Institute  and  other  agencies  varies  widely  but  direct  resort  to  the 
Banque Nationale  is  in any  case  on a  relatively  modest scale,  although  the Redis-
count  and  Guarantee  Institute  relies  heavily  on  the  central  bank for  refinancing 
(see  Table  11). 
!  For the  exact  meaning  of this  term,  refer  to  Part  I,  point 71. 
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Discounting  is  main  and  often  virtually  all  the  credit  provided  by  the  Banque 
Nationale to the economy:  its advances, being temporary and exceptional, normally 
reach  only  very  small  amounts (see Table  12). 
Para.  II:  The  Refinance 
Para.  Il-l:  Discount  credit 
14.  Under  Article  17  of its Statute;  the Banque  Nationale  has  power to discount 
bills  of exchange  and  other securities  covering  commercial  operations.  Under Ar-
ticle  19,  such  commercial  paper  must be  within  120  days  of  maturity  and  bear 
three signatures  known  to  be  sound;  however,  one  signature may  be replaced  by 
a pledge (of Government securities or goods).  Under Article  19(2) of the Statute, 
certain  bills  may  be accepted  for  rediscount  bearing  only  two  signatures,  on the 
basis  of  regulations  adopted  by  the  Banque  Nationale  and  approved  by  the  Mi-
nister  of  Finance.  Other discounting  terms,  including  the  period of drawing  the 
tenor  and  status  of the bills  presented,  and  the  nature of  the  merchandise  they 
cover,  are  determined  solely  by  the Banque  Nationale,  which  can  use  them  with 
flexibility. 
The Banque Nationale charges different discount rates for  different types of paper. 
The rates  vary  according  to  the  status  of the  securities  or the  use  to  which  the 
funds  concerned  are  to  be  put.  Variable rules  as  regards  eligibility may  give  pre-
ference  to certain industries or products,  for structural reasons,  in connection with 
the  general  economic  trend,  or merely  for  practical  reasons.  Certain  types  of se-
curity  may  be excluded,  and  securities  representing  hire  purchase  sales  or loans 
are  barred.  The  rate  for  accepted  drafts  domiciled  with  a  bank  is  the  "official 
discount  rate"  or Bank  rate;  since  31  July  1969,  there  has  been  only  one  other 
rate  (see  Table  14). 
An  important  example  of  preferential  rediscounting  is  the  "certification"  (visa) 
procedure applied, on certain conditions, to bills drawn in connection with foreign 
trade operations  of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic  Union:  certification is  a for-
mal  commitment  by  the  Banque  Nationale  to  discount  the  item  as  soon  as  it 
is within 120 days of maturity, provided it still offers the same guarantees as regards 
solvency.  Until 31  July 1969, the rate charged for certified paper was preferential 
in respect  of  export bills. For bills  drawn in respect of exports to the other EEC 
countries,  the  earlier  certification  procedure  was  replaced  on  1  June  1970  by 
another certifying merely  that the item complies  with  the Banque Nationale's  ge-
neral  eligibility  requirements,  without  any  commitment  on  the part of  the Bank 
to  rediscount  it.  The Bank  has  since  taken  powers  to  substitute  the  second  of 
these  certification  procedures  for  the first  in respect  of bills  drawn in connection 
with  exports  to  countries  other  than  EEC  countries  and  imports  from  any 
country. 
The introduction of  the procedure of certification without rediscount commitment 
aims  at substantially easing the impact,  on holders of bills,  of the Bank's need to 
limit  its  certification  (with  rediscount  commitment)  in  order  to  retain  sufficient 
control over the scale of the assistance  the banks obtain from it:  the total amount 
of paper representing foreign  transactions is  increasing with trade itself, and much 
more  rapidly  than  the  normal  facilities  for  recourse  to  the  lender  of last  resort 
available  to the banks  taken as  a whole. 
The Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute purchases  certified  paper  at rates  which 
are,  for acceptances  not exceeding  120  days, lower than Bank rate. 
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Para.  II-2:  Advances  against  securities 
15.  The Banque Nationale  grants  current-account advances  on securities  to banks, 
public  agencies,  various  private  institutions  and  individuals. 
Article  17  of the Statute of  the Banque Nationale stipulates as  acceptable  security 
for advances, short, medium or long-term stock issued or guaranteed by the Belgian 
or  Luxembourg  Governments,  by  the  Belgian  Municipal  Credit  Institute  or  by 
international financial institutions created under agreements  to which Belgium  is  a 
party,  or  issued  by  agencies  whose  liabilities  are  guaranteed  by  the  Belgian  or 
Luxembourg  Governments,  together  with bonds  issued  by  the  provinces  and  the 
municipalities,  provided  they  are  quoted  on  the  stock  exchange,  and  publicly-
issued  preference  shares  of  the  Belgian  State  Railways. 
Advances  to  banks  are  intended  to  help  them  cope  with cash  needs:  the  banks 
use  them  failing  assistance  from  the  market,  mainly  to  cover  debt  positions  on 
their  clearing  account. 
Credits are  extended to manufacturers,  dealers  and individuals, to enable  them to 
cope  with  exceptional  and  temporary  cash  needs,  and  to  individuals  in cases  of 
hardship. 
The rates  differ  with the nature of  the security put up.  In addition to the rates, 
the Bank  publishes  (see  Table  14) the  maximum  percentage of the pledge  which 
may be granted as  an advance. This percentage or ratio also varies with the nature 
of the security lodged;  the ceiling is  95 %. 
Normally  the  credit facility  is  made  available for  an  indefinite  period,  but it may 
be used for  only short periods at a time. For individuals, the period of availability 
may  not exceed eighteen months to start with, but may  renewed. 
The Banque Nationale also has authority to grant short-term loans  against  pledges 
of the  same  securities  as  for  advances,  and  to  make  advances  against  deposits  of 
gold  or  silver.  These  transactions  are,  however,  unusual. 
Para.  II-3:  Rediscount and  certification  ceilings 
16.  In 1969,  the  Banque  Nationale  introduced a  new  system  of  certification  and 
rediscount ceilings for  the banks. In contrast with the previous system, which was 
mainly  concerned  with  solvency  requirements,  the  aim  of  the  new  system  is  to 
adapt  bank  liquidity  as  required  by  the  objectives  of monetary  policy;  the  im-
mediate aim  was  to bring to a halt the exceptionally rapid expansion of the Bank's 
commercial  portfolio. 
The ceiling for each bank is fixed in relation to the average figure, over the previous 
twelve  months,  for its  deposits  in Belgian  francs,  bonds,  medium-term  notes  and 
own  funds.  The ceilings  are  fixed  as  a  proportion  of  the banks'  resources  chiefly 
because  seasonal  or accidental  reductions  in  deposits  are  among  the main  factors 
liable to force the banks "into the Bank". When it is  reached, a bank can no longer 
submit  bills  for  discounting  or certification  by  the Banque  Nationale. 
The  ceiling  applies  both  to  total bills  rediscounted  and  total bills  certified.  This 
takes  account  of the wide  range  of  specialization  among  the banks in internal or 
external financing. 
The  following  are  set  against  the  ceiling  for  each  bank,  thus  reducing  available 
margins: 
1 )  The  total of certified  bills  still having  less  than  two years  to  run before ma-
turity.  In this  way,  since  the  certification  system  is  a  formal  commitment  by 
the Banque Nationale  to  rediscount,  the bill is  protected  since  the holder  ap-
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plying for  rediscount is  in no danger of being hampered by exhaustion of the 
margin  available  to  the  bank concerned; 
2)  The  total  of  uncertified  paper rediscounted  at  the Ban  que  Nationale; 
3)  The  total of uncertified paper rediscountable at the Banque  Nationale and mo-
bilized in the ex-bank  market run by the Rediscount  and Guarantee Institute. 
By  charging  certified  bills  to  the  ceiling  of the bank  granting  the credit,  the 
authorities  ensure  that,  once  they  are  mobilized,  the  purchasers  are  not  pre-
vented  from  rediscounting  the  paper  because  the bank  concerned  has  mean-
while exchausted its  available  margin. 
The  rediscounting  and  certification  ceiling  was  introduced  by  the  fixing  of  the 
ceiling, on 1 May  1969, at the rate of 16 %, a  rate high enough to avoid  posing 
cash problems  for  the banks. 
A  subsequent reduction,  staggered  over  a  period  of time  to enable  the banks to 
adjust  their  operations  gradually,  was  effected  to curb  sales  of  commercial  paper 
to  the lender of last  resort designed  to  offset  bank cash  losses  due to deficits  on 
certain classes of external payments. While the influx of funds from mid-September 
1969 onwards was  mainly  due  to  other factors,  the simultaneous  lowering of the 
ceilings  forestalled any  undue increase in bank liquidity (see Table  18). In March 
1970,  the Bank lowered the ceiling  to  9·5 %  and  to  9 %  respectively at the end 
of  June  and  September,  while  excluding  from  the  ceiling  certified  export  credit 
bills 1  with more  than one  year  and  at most  two years  to run.  Finally,  in March 
1971, it cut the  rate  to  8 %  for  the  end of May  1971, including  two  monthly 
reductions of 1·3  %  in the interim. 
The  Banque  Nationale  reserves  the  right  to  change  the  ceiling  of  any  bank  as 
appropriate  (solvency  problems,  failure  to  comply  with  credit  restriction  rules, 
etc.).  In all  cases,  it remains  free  to assess  the amount and status of the paper to 
be  rediscounted  or  certified.  In  this  connection,  it  should  be  recalled  that  the 
Bank never undertakes in advance to discount (save in respect of the certification) 
or certify bills. 
Para.  III:  Efficacy  of refinancing  policy and of action  on interest rates 
Basic data and relations between interest rate and Bank rate 
17.  Variations  in  bank  liquidity  and  the  relatively  high  proportion of notes  and 
coin  in circulation  compared  with the total money  supply ( 45·6 %  at the end of 
1970) often compel  the banks to  resort  to the central bank and consequently  are 
an  incentive  to  them  to  ensure  that  the loans  they  make  are  a  fully  mobilizable 
as  possible.  Commercial  paper  plays  a  key  role  in  the credit  system  in Belgium. 
At  the year-ends  1966-1970  commercial  bills  outstanding corresponded  to  about 
42 %  of the amount drawn against credits originally granted by the banks to firms 
and  individuals  and  abroad;  at  the same  time,  rediscounting  by  the Banque  Na-
tionale  and  other  authorized  institutions  represented,  on  average,  9·4 %  of  this 
figure  and  22·6 %  of the total of commercial paper. Table  11  shows the total for 
all  securities  refinanced,  broken  down by  main  rediscounting  agency. 
Until the end of  1961, the key  interest rates were more or less  closely linked to 
Bank rate. As  long as  there was no real compulsory reserve  system  and the scope 
1 Paper  representing  export  credit  of  at  least  Bfrs.  3  million  for  not  more  than  two  years,  financed  by  a  discount 
pool  fed  by  banks  and  public  credit  institutions  . 
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for  open market operations was  still limited,  this link was of  some  importance  in 
ensuring  the  efficacy  of  rediscounting  policy.  The  reform  of  the  Securities  Stabi-
lization Fund and of  the  money  market (in 1959 and  1962 respectively),  and the 
institution of  a compulsory reserve  system  in  1961, have  led  to a looser  relation-
ship  with  Bank  rate,  particularly  in  respect  of  money  market  rates,  and  have 
brought  interest  rate  trends  into  a  closer  relationship  with  actual  market  condi-
tions.1  There  is  no  direct  relationship  between bank rate  and  medium  and long-
term capital  market rates. 
At present, Bank rate directly, though informally, influences two types of rate: 
As  the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute obtain finance  mainly by borrowing 
on the  money  market,  but must  always  contemplate  the possibility of having 
to  rediscount  as  the  central  bank,  its  charges  lie  normally  between  the -
usually low-call  money  rate  and the  Bank rate for  the  same  type  of  paper. 
The interest rates  charged by  the banks for  loans  to  firms  and individuals  are 
often  fixed  contractually  by  reference  to  Bank  rate  or  the  rediscount  rate 
charged by the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute:  the banks, too, must bear 
in  mind  the  possibility  of  resort  to  these  institutions.  For  investment  loans, 
however,  the  banks  generally  align  their  rates  on  those  of  the  National  In-
dustrial Credit Company,  which  are  geared  to  those  paid by the Company for 
the funds  it borrows  on the  capital  market. 
However, independently of Bank rate,  the Banque Nationale can  influence  several 
other rates,  either through its  role  as  Government adviser or  through  its powers 
with regard  to  money-market  instruments,  or again  because  of its membership  of 
the boards of public financial  institutions and supervisory or coordination agencies. 
At present, for example,  the Governor of the Banque Nationale is chairman of the 
Council  of  Public  Credit  Institutions and-de  iure-of  the  Central  Office  for 
Small  Savings. 
Moreover,  since  1962,  the  maximum  interest rates  paid by  the banks  on  Belgian-
franc  time  deposits,  previously  tied to Bank rate,  have  been fixed  by  joint  agree-
ment between  the Banque Nationale  and the  Belgian  Bankers' Association,  in the 
light  of  market  conditions,  the  balance  of  payments  and  the  business  situation. 
The Banque  Nationale  is  thus in a position  to influence  financial  savings  and mo-
vements  of  funds.  Since  September  1969,  however,  this  arrangement  no  longer 
affects  the rates  for deposits  of Bfrs.  5  million and over, which can  now be fixed 
freely  by  the banks;  at  the  end of  1970, these  "heavy  time  deposits"  accounted 
for  51  %  of  the banks'  total Belgian-franc  time  deposits. 
Conditions of efficacy of discounting policy 
18.  Bank  rate  changes  have  been  very  frequent  in recent  years:  in  1969  there' 
were  no  fewer  than  seven.  This  greater  frequency  is  a  measure  of the  growing 
influence  in  Belgium  exerted by foreign  market  rates. 
In  conclusion,  discounting  policy  in  Belgium  is  an  important  monetary  policy 
instrument,  mainly  because  of the  scale  of  discount  credit  granted  by  the  banks 
and the total sums involved in their recourse 2  to the Banque Nationale's rediscount 
facilities.  The efficacy  of the instrument largely  depends  on the elasticity  of credit 
1 See  graph  No  17  comparing  Bank  rate  and  money  and capital  market rates. 
z Mainly  indirect. 
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demand  in relation to its cost;  an  elasticity  which, of course,  tends  to weaken in 
an  inflationary  situation.  Capital  movements  to  and  from  abroad  can  also  limit 
interest  rate  policy.  Consequently,  the  efficacy  of  discount  policy  depends  to  a 
great  extent on  the  simultaneous  use  of  other instruments  of monetary  and  eco-
nomic  policy. 
Section II - Ratios and  minimum reserve policy 
General concept and history 
19.  Under  the Banking Law,  the Banking Commission  may,  through  a regulation 
approved by  the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic Affairs,  deter-
mine  from  time  to  time  what  proportions  must  be  maintained,  for  the  various 
categories  of  banks: 
a)  between their liquid and mobilizable assets  or certain parts of these assets, on 
the one hand and their sight and short-term liabilities, on the other. 
b)  between their  capital  and  reserves,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  total either  of 
deposits  of or all  their sight  and short-term liabilities,  on the  other. 
For the first  category a),  the rules  must be made in consultation with the Banque 
Nationale;  the  latter may,  of its own accord,  submit to the  Banking Commission 
reasoned proposal for adoption or amendment of such rules, where the Bank deems 
this necessary  for  monetary  reasons.  In this  connection there are  special  rules  for 
the  monetary  reserve  ratio  (see  below  I). 
The rules  on bank ratios apply  to the  '~banks" 1  as  defined by law (see Chapter I, 
Section  I, paragraph  II).  Infringements  are  treated  as  penal  offences.  There  are 
general  supervisory  rules  to  ensure  compliance,  providing  for  auditing  by  char-
tered  accountants. 
In 1946, for  the first  time, three bank ratios were  introduced:  a cash  ratio (coef-
ficient  de  tresorerie),  a solvency  ratio (coefficient  de  solvabilite), and a cover  ratio 
(coefficient de couverture). The cash ratio and the cover ratio were discontinued in 
1962;  the  solvency ratio was  replaced in 1965 by an "own funds" ratio (coefficient 
de fonds  propres). A monetary reserve ratio has  been introduced in 1961  and was 
in force  in  1964 and  1965. Only this  ratio now has  monetary policy  implications. 
A re-employment ratio was  instituted in 1969 for  a period of one year. 
Para.  I:  Monetary  reserve  ratio 
20.  Under  a  regulation  issued  by  the  Banking  Commission  in  1961,2  this  Com-
mission may impose a monetary reserve ratio, thereby acting directly on the money 
supply  by  restricting  banks'  lending  capacity. 
The same  regulation specified  that the Banking Commission may impose  this  ratio 
1  Since  Royal  Decree  No  11  of  18  April  1967  (Article  13)  (Moniteur  beige,  20  April),  the  Central  Office  for  Small 
Savings,  the  agency  supervising  private savings  banks,  has  the)  power,  in respect of private  savings  banks similar  to 
that enjoyed  by  the  Banking  Commission,  to  lay  down  the  same  ratios  through  a  regulation  issued by  Royal Decree. 
2  Regulation  o£  21  December  1961,  Moniteur  beige,  30  December  1961. 
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only  on  a  proposal  by  the  Banque  Nationale  motivated  by  the  requirements  of 
monetary  policy  and  credit control.  The monetary  reserve  ratio  applies  for  three-
month periods,  renewable  by  the  same  procedure. 
The  monetary  reserve  takes  the  form  of  Belgain-franc  balances  on  special  sight 
deposit  with  the  Banque  Nationale;  however,  the  Banking  Commission  may,  on 
the basis  of a reasoned proposal  from  the Banque Nationale, fix  what proportion 
of  the reserve may  or must, according  to circumstances,  consist of current-account 
balances  denominated in Belgian  francs  held with the Securities  Stabilization Fund 
or public  securities  of a  special  type  deposited with the central bank.  The rules 
make no provision for  remuneration of the reserve, but do not forbid  this. 
For  the  purposes  of  applying  the  ratio,  the  volume  of  money  and  near-money · 
liabilished on the last working day  of each  month:  this is  the basis for calculating 
the  monetary  reserve  for  the  monthly  period  beginning  on the  15th of  the  fol-
lowing  month. These  liabilities  consist  of Belgian-franc  commitments  not covered 
by  real  pledges,  for  a  contractual  period  not exceeding  two  years  and,  whatever 
their  origin,  having  the  nature  of  deposits,  current-account  liabilities,  loans  or 
securities  payable  at  short  term.  There  are  three categories: 
Liabilities  payable  on  demand  or  for  a  contractual  period  not exceeding  one 
month  (short-term  liabilities); 
Liabilities  for a contractual period of more  than one month but less  than two 
years; 
Liabilities  in  respect  of  deposit  books  opened  on  the  withdrawal  conditions 
approved  by  the  Banking  Commission. 
For the purposes  of  applying  the monetary reserve  ratio,  these  categories  may  be 
taken  together  or  separately;  and  they  may  be  so  taken  either  for  their  full 
amount, or for  the  increase  in relation to a reference figure,  or again  by  a combi-
nation  of  this  latter figure  and  the  increase  noted. 
The ratio may  not exceed  20 %  for liabilities  on demand and not  exceeding  one 
month, and 7 %  for liabilities at more than one month and for deposit books. 
Only  that part of  the  monetary  reserve  exceeding  Bfrs.  20  million  must  actually 
be constituted; this figure  may be increased by the Banking Commission when one 
at  least  of  the  ratios  is  fixed  at  a  level  higher  than  two-fifths  of  the  maximum 
rates. 
The obligation  takes  affect  on the date  fixed  by  the Banking Commission. 
The  monetary  reserve  ratio  was  applied  by  a  Banking  Commission  Decree  of  1 
July  1964,1  later  extended  until  15  July  1965.  It was  fixed  at  1% of  overall 
money  and near-money  liabilities  of  the  banks.  The reserve  was  made  up in the 
form  of  a  special  deposit  with  the  Banque  Nationale.  The rules  came  into  force 
on  17  August  through a  transitional  system  under wich  the  ratio  was halved for 
the first  two weeks. 
The  introduction  of  a  monetary  reserve  ratio  system  was  designed  to  strengthen 
anti-inflationary  action  taken  by  the Banque  Nationale  through  the  raising  of its 
interest  rates,  the  tightening  of  its  criteria  regarding  eligibility  for  discount  and 
its  recommendations to banks to moderate  the  expansion of their lending to firms 
and  individuals. 
The monetary authorities fixed  the reserve ratio at the low level of 1 %  of monev 
and  near-money  liabilities  of banks  because  their  aim  was  to achieve  the  desired 
'  Moniteur  beige,  11  July  1%4. 
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effect  mainly  through  recommendations  concerning  the  rate  of  growth  of  credit, 
adjusted  according  to  the nature  and  the  recipients  of the loans  granted;  for  the 
rest,  the aim  was  merely to establish the arrangement so  that the authorities could 
use  it  according  to  events,  particularly  should it be  necessary  to  enforce  credit 
restriction (see point 33 ).  The specific effect of the experiment on banking liquidity 
has  therefore  not so  far  been  substantial  and  it is  consequently  not yet  possible 
to measure  the impact of the ratio on the administration of liquidity by the banks. 
At all events, care has to be taken to ensure that the banks do not limit the effect 
of the  ratio by  reducing  relatively  the financing  of the  Treasury. 
Para.  II:  Own  funds  ratio 
21.  In a  regulation  of  5  October  1965 1  the Banking  Commission  instructed  the 
banks  to comply  with a  minimum  own  funds  ratio  to  replace  the  solvency  ratio 
(see  below). 
The own funds  ratio  is  the relationship between the  total of a bank's own funds 
and the arithmetic average  of the liabilities to be covered over twelve consecutive 
months;  the liability  to be  covered is  the total, at the end of the month, of liabi-
lities,  whether  at  term  or notice,  or  not,  denominated  in  Belgian  francs  or  in 
foreign  currencies,  and  consisting in deposits,  balances,  on current accounts,  loans 
or securities  payable  at  short-term. 
The  own  funds  ratio  of  each  bank  is  established  according  to  the  classification 
ratio  (fixed  annually)  of  that  bank,  that  is  to  say  the  relationship  between  the 
liabilities  to  be  covered  and  the  loans  granted,  each  category  of  the  latter being 
weighted  in  a  different  way.  The  minimum  own  funds  ratio  is  5 %, plus  one 
percentage point per higher classification ratio category, with a maximum of 15 %. 
The banks  must  comply  with the  own  funds  ratio  from  the  end of  the seventh 
month following  the date  of closure  of  the  preceding financial  year. 
When it established the own funds  ratio, the Banking Commission aimed at affirm-
ing  the obligation  to ensure  an  amount in capital and in reserves properly related 
to the objective  requirements created by  the  structure of each bank, the principle 
requirement being  the  degree  of  risk linked with  the credits. 
The own funds  ratio is  not used for  monetary policy  purposes. 
Para.  III:  Previous  ratios 
22.  In  1946  the  Banking  Commission  introduced  three  new  bank ratios:  a  cash 
ratio,  a  solvency  ratio  and  a  cover  ratio.  The  rates  differed  for  large  banks, 
medium-sized banks  and regional or specialized  banks.  A  re-employment ratio was 
introduced in  1969 for  a period of one year. 
1) Cash  ratio 
The cash  ratio,  the aim  of which is  to  safeguard  the liquidity  of the banks,  is  a 
minimum  relationship between  cash  in hand liabilities  payable  on demand  and at 
short-term. It was fixed  at 4 %  (for the large banks). It was discontinued in 1962 
when  preference  was  given  to an  arrangement  under which  the banks  would vo-
luntarily ensure maintenance of cash in hand as  appropriate 'to  the nature of their 
1 Moniteur  beige,  26  October  1965. 
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main  operations;  moreover,  the  monetary  reserve  ratio  henceforth  served  as  an 
instrument  enabling  the  authorities  to  influence  the  volume  of liquidity  held  by 
the  banking  sector. 
2) Solvency  ratio 
The solvency  ratio  was  a  m1mmum  ratio  fixed  at 5% (for  the large  banks) be-
tween own funds and funds borrowed or deposited. It  was replaced in 1965 by the 
own funds  ratio,  a  more  elaborate  system  taking  account  of the  risks  associated 
with  lending  (see  above). 
3) Cover  ratio 
To avoid  the  large-scale  monetization of public securities  in the aftermath of the 
war  (such  securities  accounted for  a  particularly  high proportion of bank assets), 
the banks were required to maintain a  minimum relationship between the volume 
of their Treasury certificates with terms up to one year, plus cash in hand and the 
total of liabilities demandable within two years.  The ratio was  fixed,  for the large 
banks,  at  65 %. 
In a  period of bank deposit  growth,  the main disadvantage of this  system, which 
was  adjusted in 1949, was  that it automatically  generated flows  of funds  into the 
Treasury.  It was  reformed  in  1957:  short-term  debt  lodged with the  banks  was 
converted into A certificates (maturing in one year) and B certificates (maturing in 
four  months)  of  a  special  Government  loan  of  a  fixed  amount;  should  their  de-
mand liabilities expand, the banks would supplement their partial cover by subscrib-
ing  to  certificates  of the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund instead  of Treasury certifi-
cates. 
The need to liberalize the Banks' lending operations and the fact that the Securities 
Stabilization Fund had built up what was felt to constitute an adequate "strategic 
reserve" led to the discontinuation, in 1962, of the obligation to hold cover in the 
form of public stock. The requirement was phased out over one year. 
On 31  December 1962, the A certificates held by the banks were converted - the 
sum  involved  was  Bfrs.  19,800  million-into  a  "special  conversion  loan"  reim-
bursable  in twenty years  from  31  December  1972  onwards;  since  19 57, B certifi-
cates (four month certificates) cashed on maturity by the banks have been renewed 
by  subscription from  the Securities  Stabilization Fund, which can  retransfer them 
to  the banks  by  auction. 
4)  Re-employment  ratio 
By  a decree of 20  May  1969,1  in force  until 31  May  1970, the Banking Commis-
sion  instructed  the  banks  to increase  gradually  the ratio  between their  easily  ne-
gotiable  Belgain franc  assets  (cash,  rediscountable  trade bills,  Belgian Government 
stock and securities) and their Belgian-franc liabilities maturing within two years. 
For  the  application  of  the  "minimum  re-employment  ratio",  the  banks  are  clas-
sified: 
- Initially,  in  relation  with  their  "reference  ratio",  which  is  the  relationship 
between  the  arithmetic  average  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  affected  by  the 
t  Moniteur  beige,  7  June  1969. 
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obligation,  as  recorded  at the  end of  February,  March  and  April  1969; 
- Next, from  month to month, in relationship with their "normative" re-employ-
ment  ratio. 
For  each  of  these  categories  there  is  a compulsory  monthly increase:  the  rate  is 
the number of points or fractions  thereof which, each month (beginning at the end 
of June 1969), is  added to the reference ratio to form the "normative" re-employ-
ment ratio. 
The following  table gives  the figures: 
Category  Reference  ratio  or  "normative"  Monthly rate of 
re-employment  ratio  increase 
I  below  20%  5 
II  from  20%  to  less  than  35%  3 
III  from  35%  to  less  than  45%  1 
IV  from  45%  to  less  than  55%  0·3 
v  from  55%  to  less  than  60%  0·1 
VI  60%  or  more  0 
The main objectives of the re-employment ratio were, on the one hand, to prevent 
the effect  of  the ceiling  on rediscount  and  certification facilities  with the  Banque 
Nationale being neutralized by a reduction of the Bank' investments in the Belgian 
public  sector  and,  secondly,  to  reverse  the  tendency  for  the proportion of  assets 
not easily  negotiable  to increase  as  compared  with liabilities maturing within two 
years. 
The re-employment ratio regulations have been allowed to lapse, a change in money 
market condtions  having made  them  unnecessary. 
Section III · Control of the money market  and  transactions with 
foreign money markets 
Para.  I:  Open  market  policy 
Para.  I-1:  The  money  market 
Concept and organization; participating institutions 
23.  The money  market  may  be  defined  as  the  market for  dealings  between  mo-
netary  institutions, other public  and  private financial  intermediaries,  the Treasury 
and the Securities Stabilization Fund in call money commercial bills and certificates 
of the  Treasury and of  the  Securities  Stabilization Fund. 
The  institutions  organizing  and  supervising  the  money  market  are  the Securities 
Stabilization  Fund,  the  Banque  Nationale  and  the  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  In-
stitute. 
The intermediaries dealing on the  money  market are,  in addition  to  all  the public 
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and  private  monetary  institutions,  the  other  public  credit  institutions,1  private 
non-banking  credit  institutions  and  institutional investors;2  some  international or-
ganizations  and a number of semi-public commercial institutions operate in certain 
sectors of  the market. 
The  money  market  has  three  compartments:  the  very  short-term  money  market, 
the  market in public certificates maturing in one year at most,  and the market in 
bank  and  commercial  acceptances. 
A.  The  very short-term  money market 
24.  The very short-term money market is in fact  concerned only with call money. 
By  a  protocol  concluded  between  the  participants  on  16  November  1959,  the 
clearing  house  (chambre  de  compensation)  market  and  the  non-clearing  market 
were  merged  into  a  single  market,  on  which  transactions  have  since  been  nego-
tiated  more  freely  and,  more  important,  under  a  guarantee.  Indeed,  in  order  to 
prevent differences  in  status  and financial  strength of borrowing institutions ham-
pering  the  establishment  of homogeneoqs  rates,  all  borrowing operations  must be 
secured either by general guarantee of the Government applicable  to  the liabilities 
of  certain  institutions  or by  a pledge  of Government stock with  the  Banque  Na-
tionale. 
Transactions  are  arranged bilaterally in  the  course  of the day  and  the settlements 
have  to  be  made  through  the  clearing  house.  Transactions  with  could  not  be 
completed  during  day  (either  because  the provisional  closing  of clearing  arrange-
ments  prompted new  bids  and  applications)  are  made  at a  single  rate  quoted at 
a special sitting in the light of supply and demand. 
The guaranteed call money  market was  reorganized by  a new protocol on 30  April 
1969 designed to ensure that the working of the market was in line with its main 
objective,  which  is,  in  Belgium,  to  facilitate  the financial  administration  of orga-
nizations  which  may  have  to  cope  with  wide  discrepancies  between  their  daily 
revenues  and  expenditure  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  channel 
funds  towards  the financing  of  external  trade  and ensure  control of  the prices  of 
public  stock,  through  the  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute  and  the Securities 
Stabilization  Fund  respectively.  Accordingly,  participation  in  the  guaranteed  call 
money  market  was  reserved  to  financial  establishments  of  the  public  or  private 
sector which  accept deposits  of funds  at sight,  in savings  or deposit books,  or at 
maturities not exceeding  three months,  since  these  are the only organizations  that 
have  temporary  cash  surpluses  or  deficits  the  volume  and  size  of which  cannot 
easily  be  foreseen. 
The participants undertook to comply  with directives  the Minister of Finance, the 
Banking  Commission  and  the  Central Office  for  Small  Savings  had issued  shortly 
before  in  order  to  limit  recourse  to  the  guaranteed  call  money  market  to  the 
covering  of  immediate  cash  needs,  to the exclusion of  any  systematic  support of 
lending or investing  activity.  These  instructions  require that averaged out for  the 
calendar quarter, the participants lending to the market should at least match their 
borrowing from it. The call money  rate is  therefore not a reliable indication of the 
relationship  between free  supply  and  demand. 
1 National  Industrial Credit Corporation,  Central  Office  for  Mortgage  Credit,  National  Fund  for  Credit  to Trade  and 
Industry,  National  Institute  for  Agricultural  Credit. 
2 General  Savings  and  Pensions  Fund,  private  savings  banks,  pension  funds  and  life assurance  companies. 
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The above  undertaking of the participants is  reinforced by the possibility of sanc-
tions, since the Banque Nationale which has  been made responsible for  supervising 
enforcement  has  the  power to  suspend  lending  to  any  participant  not complying 
with  the  rules. 
The clause  requiring participants to limit their borrowing from  the market applies 
neither to the Rediscount and  Guarantee Institute, which, by its nature, is in fact 
the prime borrower on the market, nor to the Securities Stabilization Fund, which 
must have power, as part of its control duties, to influence, for an indefinite period, 
both  supply  and  demand. 
In  1970,  of  the  Bfrs.  8,600  million  average  daily  call  money  dealings,  the bank 
lent  Bfrs.  3,800  million  and  the  Securities  Stabilization Fund Bfrs.  1,600 million, 
and  the  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute  borrowed  Bfrs.  6,700  million 
(Table  16). 
B.  The  market  in  public  certificates 
25.  The  market  in public  certificates  (and  securities  treated  as  such)  is  confined 
to the banks, the private savings banks, financial establishments of the public sector, 
certain  semi-public  utilities  (Telephones  and  Telegraphs,  Belgian  State  Railways), 
and  to  the Securities  Stabilization Fund. 
The  certificates  issued  on  this  market  are  divided  into  the  following  categories: 
1)  Very  short-term  cash  certificates (one, two  and  three months),  subscribed  and 
sold immediately by the Banque Nationale to the extent that it feels  the market 
situation warrants this, at rates fixed by itself, to the banks, the private savings 
banks,  public credit institutions and  to public  utilities. 
2)  Six,  nine and twelve month cash certificates sold by tender on the same market 
as  that of  the  very  short-term  certificates.  The  Minister  of  Finance  and  the 
Banque Nationale also  decide  on the  acceptance  of applications.  The allotment 
is  made  at a single  rate which is  that of the highest rate accepted. 
3)  Tranche  B four-month  cash  certificates,  representing  the  conversion  of  about 
a  third  of  the  public  debt,  previously  compulsorily  lodged  with  the  banks; 
these certificates  are  held  by  the  banks  and  the  Securities  Stabilization Fund, 
which  subscribes  to  B  certificates  held  by  the  banks  and  reaching  maturity. 
The Fund may  sell  the latter  to  the banks by  tender,  at the  same  rate as  its 
own certificates. 
4)  The  certificates  of  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund,  also  maturing  at  four 
months.  These  certificates  are  issued  by weekly  tender at a single  rate,  which 
is  the rate of the highest bid accepted  by  the Fund.  The proceeds of the sale 
of the certificates provide a facility which may,  according to need, be sterilized 
in  an  account  at the  Banque  Nationale  or readmitted  to circulation. 
5)  The certificates maturing at maximum one year which the Road Fund 1 has been 
authorized  to  issue  since  1967.  The  timing  and  terms  of  issue  of these  loans 
are  fixed  by  agreement  between  the  Minister  for  Public  Works  and  Finance 
and the Banque Nationale. The Securities Stabilization Fund subscribe to  these 
certificates  for  subsequent  placing  on  the  market  as  part of its  open  market 
policy.  So  far,  however,  no  such  certificates  have  been issued,  the Road Fund 
having used the money market by the other channel created at the same  time, 
1 Public  authority  set  up  for  the construction  of  motorways  and  the  improvement  of  national  roads. 
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namely the acceptance of bills of exchange with a term not exceeding 120 days 
drawn  by  contractors  and  discountable  at  the  Banque  Nationale  according  to 
the latter's own rules. 
As  regards  the relative  scale  of transactions,  most very  short-term certificates  and 
six,  nine  and twelve-month certificates have been  taken up in recent years  mainly 
by  public  credit  organizations,  especially  the General Savings  and Pensions  Fund. 
The certificates  of  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund have  been  subscribed  mainly 
by  the banks. 
Alongside  the  public-certificates  market  proper,  other  cash  certificates  are  issued 
accordit1.g  to special agreements between the Ministry of Finance, on the one hand, 
and the banks and semi-public organizations on the other. This "special certificates" 
technique  is  very  popular,  so  that as  much- and  even more-is  placed in this 
way  as  in the form  of ordinary cash certificates.  This paper is  placed mainly  with 
the semi-public institutions (see  Table 8). 
C.  The market in  bank and  commercial acceptances 
26.  Bank  and  commercial  acceptances  may  be  divided  into  three  categories:  ac-
ceptances  certified  by the Banque  Nationale,  non-rediscountable  bank acceptances 
and  domestic commercial  acceptances. 
1)  Acceptances  certified by  the  Banque Nationale:  these  are  bank or commercial 
acceptances  representing  imports  or exports,  on which  the  Banque  Nationale 
has  placed  its  "visa"  or certification  as  explained  in Chapter II, Section  I, 
para.  II.  The  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute  buys  this  paper  at  rates 
below  Bank  rate  for  acceptances  not exceeding  120  days;  it also  sells  them. 
A  market,  on  which  the  Institute plays  a  key  role,  has  therefore  developed 
in  these  acceptances.  In  1970,  the  Institute  discounted  Bfrs.  79,200  million 
worth of certified acceptances,  the bulk of which was  resold on the market or 
rediscounted  at  the  Banque Nationale. 
2)  Non-rediscountable  bank  acceptances:  most  of  these  concern  external  trade 
operations,  mainly  imports.  The  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute  acts  as 
broker here,  as  it does  for  the  third category below,  and subsidiarily,  to even 
out time-lags  between supply and demand, as  purchaser and/or seller.  In 1970, 
it negotiated Bfrs.  19,700 million worth of  paper in this way . 
.3)  International  commercial  acceptances:  as  for  certified  acceptances,  the  paper 
dealt in is  normally  eligible  for  discount  at the  Banque  Nationale;  in practice 
it is  so  only  by  imputation  at the  time  of  the  transaction,  against  the  redis-
count  and  certification  ceiling  of  the  selling  bank  (if this  is  not  done,  the 
dealing  terms  are  the same  as  those for  non-rediscountable  bank acceptances). 
In  1970,  the  Institute  negotiated  Bfrs.  20,400  million  worth of  acceptances; 
the  rate  at which  it buys  them is  below Bank  rate. 
The  Rediscount  and  Guarantee  Institute  purchases  these  three  types  of  security 
only  from  banks  and  sells  them  only  to banks,  public  credit  institutions,  private 
savings  funds,  mortgage  companies,  foreign  public credit institutions, international 
organizations  and,  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  insurance  companies.  Access  to  the 
market  is  curtailed  in  this  way  because  the  Institute was  set up mainly  to  help 
the banks and not to provide investment opportunities which would compete with 
the banks' collection  of  deposits. 
At the end of 1970, the total of bank and commercial acceptances outstanding was 
Bfrs.  160,900  million  (of  which  Bfrs.  31,700  million  were  certified  acceptances). 
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The total  was  broken  down  as  follows  between  the  various  groups  of holders: 
Bfrs.  6,600 million with the Banque Nationale, Bfrs. 9,300 million with the Redis-
count  and  Guarantee  Institute,  Bfrs.  122,000  million  with  the  banks  and  Bfrs. 
23,000 million with the other financial  intermediaries. 
The Rediscount and Guarantee  Institute, which also  deals  in medium-term paper/ 
obtains funds by borrowing call money, by selling bills on the ex-bank market and 
by  rediscounting  at  the  Banque  Nationale  paper  maturing in  not more  than  120 
days.2  Recourse  to  the  money  market enables  the Institute to  buy  bills  at lower 
rates  of interest  than  those  of the  Banque  Nationale.  Table  22  throws  light  on 
how the bills negotiated by the Institute are financed;  it shows that the Institute's 
use of the money market varies  widely and that, in line with liquidity changes on 
the market,  rediscounting at the central bank is  often on a large  scale. 
Para.  I-2:  Open  market  operations 
27.  Open market  transactions  in public securities and funds  are  the  responsibility 
of the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund.  However,  the Banque  Nationale  also  has  an 
important role to play on this  market because  of its technical  responsibilities  with 
regard  to  several  categories  of public certificates  and  through its  institutional and 
operational links  with the  Securities  Stabilization Fund. 
The  Fund  was  set  up in  1945  to  control  the  market  in  medium  and  long-term 
Government stock;3  the Banque Nationale agreed  to stand aside  from  this control, 
though it retains  its  legal  rights 4  in this  field. 
In 1959,5  the range of action of the Securities Stabilization Fund was  extended to 
the  market  in short-term  public  securities  and  to  the  market  in  very  short-term 
funds.  It operates on the latter market towards  the close of business  to offset  net 
supply  and  demand  and  so  prevent  sharp  fluctuations  in rates;  in  addition,  the 
Rediscount and Guarantee Institute, whose chief  role is  that of a borrower, seeks 
to  adapt  its  requirements  to market conditions. 
To  finance  its  operations,  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund has  at  its  disposal  a 
capital  stock  of  Bfrs.  2,800  million,  very  short-term loans  from  the  market,  the 
proceeds  of issues  of  its  own  certificates  (at  four  months)  and  a  credit  line  (at 
present, Bfrs.  4,000 million) with the Banque Nationale, normally secured on tran-
che  B  cash  certificates;  the  latter credit  is  independent  of  the  margin granted to 
the  Government  (see  Chapter I, Section  II, para.  III) and ranks  ahead  of it for 
repayment. 
Table  13,  which  traces  the  movement  of  the  main  items in  the  Securities  Stabi-
lization  Fund's  balance  sheet  shows  that its portfolio  is  mainly  accounted  for  by 
medium and long-term  securities but that, occasionally,  it includes  a small amount 
of short-term paper apart from  the certificates B.  At the end of each  month in the 
years  from  1967  to  1970  inclusive,  the  Fund  had  virtually  no  credit  balance  at 
the Ban que Nationale, while its cash certificates portfolio (without the B certificates) 
and  its  very  short-term  lending ranged  up to maxima  of Bfrs.  6,300  million  and 
'  Paper maturing  in not more than  ten years  covering  industrial investment or exports of capital  goods. 
2  The  Institute is  also  entitled  to issue  medium-term  notes  or cash  certificates  maturing  in not more thao  five  years. 
This  has  however  not been  done  since  1942. 
3  Decree  Law  of  18  May  1945,  Art.  2  (Moniteur  beige,  30  May  1945). 
4  Royal  Decree of 24  August  1939,  Art.  11(3)  (Moniteun  beige,  26  August  1939). 
5  Law  of  19  June  1959,  Art.  8  (Moniteur  beige,  20  June  1959);  Protocol  of  1~ November  1959,  covering  partici· 
pation in the  guaranteed  call  money  marl<et. 
374 Money  market  and  foreign  money  markets 
Bfrs. 3,500 million respectively. During the same period, the outstanding certificates 
issued  by  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund reached  a  maximum  of Bfrs.  12,300 
million,  very  short-term  borrowing  Bfrs.  5,100  million,  and  advances  from  the 
Banque  Nationale  Bfrs.  3,500  million.  Where  the  accounts  show  simultaneous 
lending  and  borrowing  on  the  very  short-term  market  it  is  because  the  Fund 
engages  in transactions with institutions not enjoying access  to the official market. 
The  Fund does  not intervene on the acceptances  market,  which  is  controlled  by 
Bank rate policy and the discount and sales  policy  pursued by  the Rediscount and 
Guarantee  Institute,  which,  in  close  association  with  the  central  bank,  sponsors 
the  ex-bank  market. 
The money  market  has  three  separate  sectors,  but there  are  many  links  between 
them.  Dealers on the call  money  market may,  after closure, either buy very short-
term Treasury certificates, or use  the refinancing facilities  of the Banque Nationale. 
Normally,  call  money  will  be borrowed only  if  the  rate falls  short  of  Bank  rate 
or of  the  rate  of  advances  by  the central bank.  The  Rediscount  and  Guarantee 
Institute,  through  its  own  transactions,  ensures  liaison  between  the  acceptance 
market,  the  call  money  market  and  central bank policy,  since  it obtains  finance 
by borrowing  at  call,  by selling bills  on the  "outside"  market  and by  using  the 
Banque  Nationale's  rediscount  facility.  These  functional  bonds  are  strengthened 
by  institutional  links  between  the  Banque  Nationale,  the  Securities  Stabilization 
Fund and the Institute. 
Objectives of the operations 
28.  In  addition  to  its  original  function  as  institution  controlling  the  market  in 
fixed-interest  securities,  the  Fund  has  gradually  been  assigned  other  tasks,  now 
enabling  it to operate throughout  the public  stock  market  and on the very short-
term  money  market.  It contributes  to  the  success  of  loans  raised  by  the  public 
authorities and helps  to ease  or eliminate any  temporary strain engendered by cash 
operations  on the  money  market.  Thus,  the  large  number  of  factors  guiding  the 
work of the  Fund act in a  complex  pattern of interdependence,  sometimes  over-
lapping,  sometimes  clashing.  At all  events,  the  practical  objective  of  the  Fund is 
to speed up or slow  down trend changes  and to offset to some extent seasonal or 
fortuitous  variations. 
In general,  the  scope  for  an effective  open market policy -be it in the short or 
in  the long-term-is  very  limited. 
In respect of the short-term, the difficulty is due to the lack of any genuine market. 
There are neither market sponsors nor brokers specializing in dealings in short-term 
public  stock.  Direct  dealing  between  interested parties  is  feasible  but apparently 
very  rare:  one  reason  for  this  may  be  that  the  institutions  concerned  can  adjust 
their  holdings  of  short-term  public  securities  to  liquidity  needs  merely  by  ap-
propriate timing of subscription and redemption dates, since the range of maturities 
is wide  and a good deal of latitude is  given  to subscribers with regard to the date 
of actual delivery  of certificates  subscribed  and their real  lifetimes. 
With regard  to the long-term,  the constraints deriving from  the obligation on the 
Securities Stabilization Fund to control the public stock market so  as  to facilititate 
the  covering  of  Treasury  needs  often  hamper  the  achievement  of  open  market 
policy  objectives.  In  Belgium  budgetary  spending  consistently  exceeds  revenue 
with the result that the Treasury is  continually having to resort to the money and 
capital  markets. 
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Para.  II:  Operations  bearing  on  international capital  flows 
Reasons and setting for these operations 
29.  The  impact  of  international  trends  on  national  monetary  policy  has  grown 
stronger  in  recent  years,  partly  because  of  the  tendency  for banking  operations 
to move more strongly into the international area:  the banks have stepped up their 
transactions  on  external  money  markets  considerably,  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
growth,  between  the  end  of  1964  and  the  end  of  1970,  of  the  following  two 
items as  percentages of aggregate  bank assets:  during this period, foreign currency 
liabilities  to  foreign  correspondents  rose  from  14·1  %  to  25·7 %  and  foreign 
currency  claims  on  these  correspondents  rose  from  8 %  to  18·2 %. 
The  result  is  that  the  liquidity  of  the  domestic  money  market  is  coming  to  be 
influenced more and more by external factors, and to the same extent the effective-
ness  of  the  instruments  available  to the  monetary  authorities  is  being  weakened. 
For example,  the remuneration of certain financial  assets in Belgium  is  aligned  on 
rates  prevailing on the international market. 
In Belgium  the  control of capital  movements  is  mainly  the  responsibility  of the 
Belgo-Luxembourg  Foreign  Exchange  Institute  (IBLC).  As  part  of its  action  to 
control bank liquidity  and credit, the Banque Nationale must watch that banks do 
not  obtain  large  sums  abroad.  To  achieve  this  purpose,  it may  have  to  impose 
limits  on the net external debtor  position of the banks. 
Para.  II-1:  The  two-tier  exchange  market 
30.  In 1955, the Institute established a free market for capital representing purely 
financial  transfers  abroad.  This  was  in  addition  to the payment  arrangements  on 
the official  foreign  exchange  market,  the "controlled" market, on which payments 
for  exports of goods  and services  were  to be made. 
However,  the  IBLC  did  not  forbid  payments  for  imports  of  goods  and  services 
through  the  purchase  of  foreign  exchange  on  the  free  market  or  the  inflow  of 
purely financial  capital  through  the  controlled  market. 
The  fact  that  a  choice  existed  between  the  two  markets,  in  respect  of  certain 
categories  of payments  and the right  to  sell  free  claims  on the controlled market, 
prevented the fluctuating rates on the free  market from falling below  those of the 
controlled market, which  are  fixed  within the limits of the margins  authorized by 
the  International Monetary  Fund. On the  other hand,  the free  rates could  move 
upwards  under  the  pressure  of  undue  demand  for  foreign  exchange  needed  to 
finance  the  export  of  capital. 
From the monetary policy point of view, exchange control could act therefore only 
as  a curb on deflation, in so far as  rising exchange rates on the free markets helped 
to discourage  capital  outflows.  However that may  be it is  important to note that 
the  rise  in rates  on  the  free  market  has  never  served  monetary  policy  aims;  it 
has  merely  been  the consequence  of the working of a  system  the  sole  purpose of 
which  is  to protect  exchange  reserves. 
On 10 May  1971, the  IBLC separated the controlled market from  the free  market 
completely.  Imports  of  goods  and  services  must  now  be  paid  for  through  the 
controlled  market in the same  way  as  exports;  moreover,  purely  financial  capital 
can  now  enter  the BLEU only  through  the free  market.  These  changes  serve  to 
switch any  surplus  supply  of foreign  exchange  to negotiation  on the free  market 
at rates falling short of those on the controlled market, while, in other circumstan-
376 Money  market  and  foreign  money  markets 
ces,  as  before  10  May  1971,  an  excessive  demand  for  foreign  exchange  is  chan-
nelled to the free  market at rates higher than those on the controlled market. 
Like the old system,  the new system has  no immediate monetary policy objectives. 
Nonetheless, it helps  to curb inflation where the supply of foreign exchange is too 
heavy;  where  demand  for  foreign  currencies  is  excessive,  the  effects  of  the  new 
system  are  the  same  as  those  of the old. 
The existence  of  a  free  foreign  exchange  market  since  1955  has  enabled  BLEU 
residents  and  non-residents  to  make  transfers  of Belgian  francs  and  foreign  cur-
rencies  into and  out of the  BLEU  without restrictions. 
Para.  II-2:  Control  of remuneration  of deposits  and  investments  made  on  the 
money  market by  non-residents 
31.  When  the  IBLC  separated  completely  the  two foreign  exchange  markets,  it 
instructed  the  banks  at  the  same  time  to  discontinue  all  interest  payments  on 
Belgian  franc  sight  deposits  owned  by  non-residents  and  held  on  "convertible" 
accounts.1  The  purpose  of  this  rule  was  to stem  the  inflow  of foreign  currencies 
into  Belgium.  The  Institute  also  forbade  the banks  to  open  deposit  accounts  in 
"convertible"  francs  for  non-residents. 
Para.  II-3:  Control  of the  external  position  of banks 
32.  In 1968 and in the first quarter of 1969, a number of Belgian and Luxembourg 
banks had appreciably increased their "controlled" foreign currency balances which 
should normally be held down to  the amounts necessary for the financing  of trans-
actions  in respect of which the banks are empowered to operate on the controlled 
foreign  exchange  market. 
At the beginning of April 1969, the Belgo-Luxembourg Foreign Exchange Institute 
called on the banks to make the necessary arrangements to bring their spot position 
in controlled foreign exchange, increased by their Belgian or Luxembourg franc  ad-
vances  to non-residents  on  "convertible"  accounts,  below  a ceiling  related  to the 
volume of their  normal  foreign  exchange business  for  customers. 
In exceptional cases,  the Banque Nationale  acted on behalf of banks requesting its 
assistance  in order to  be able  to comply  with the  Institute's instructions;  it pur-
chased  dollars  spot for  resale  forward  at  the same  rate. 
These  arrangements  were  later  amplified  and strengthened. 
Early in  1971, a situation the opposite of that obtaining at the beginning of  1969 
arose:  the banks,  borrowing  heavily  abroad  and  selling  the  foreign  exchange  to 
the central bank,  were making  excessive  additions  to domestic liquidity. 
In March  1971,  the  Banque  Nationale  therefore  called  on the  banks  to  exercise 
the greatest  restraint in those of their external operations in foreign  exchange and 
Belgian  francs  which  lead  to  the  creation  or  aggravation  of  an  external  debtor 
position in their books.  It warned the  banks that if it found  that some  establish-
ments were not following  its recommendations, it would be forced  to envisage off-
setting  the  increase  in  their  resources  by  a  severe  cut  in  their  rediscount  and 
certification  ceiling. 
In May  1971, several banks advised the Bangue Nationale of circumstances making 
it difficult  for  them  to  comply  with the limits set on their net external indebted-
1  Belgain-franc accounts  opened for  non-residents  to record  transactions  in foreign currencies on the controlled market. 
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ness,  because  their increased  debts  were  due  to  the  constitution of Belgian-franc 
deposits  by  non-residents  and  not  to  their  own  foreign  exchange  borrowings. 
Reluctant  to  penalize  banks  receiving  foreign  funds  they  had not  solicted,  the 
Banque Nationale arranged  that the banks in default should make special interest-
free  deposits  with the Bank  itself.  The accounts  are  not blocked:  if the position 
of  the  bank concerned  recovers,  it can  withdraw  the funds  deposited,  in appro-
priate  amounts. 
Section IV  - Direct  action on lending 
Para.  I:  Quantitative  control 
· Legal previsions and general characteristics of qualitative control of credit 
33.  The Banque Nationale determines policy on the direct control of credit; policy 
is  implemented,  with regard  to  the banks,  by  the Banque Nationale,  and,  for  the 
other types of financial  intermediary, though the appropriate trustee authorities. 
Credit  restraint can be quantitative or selective, general or specific.  It has  no ex-
plicit  legal  bases,  but  derives  from  the  responsibilities  for  preserving  monetary 
balance  assured by the Banque Nationale,  the Government and the specific  trustee 
agencies.  The rules  are  therefore  enforceable  through the powers  these  authorities 
possess;  for example,  the directives of the Banque Nationale  are  supported by its 
position  as  lender of  last  resort. 
On several  occasions  since  1964,  the  Banque  Nationale  has  adopted  measures  to 
curb credit to firms  and individuals, either overall or through quotas, where other 
monetary  policy  measures  had  failed  of  their  purpose,  that  of  slowing  down 
inflation. 
So  far  as  the  banks  are concerned,  the  credit restraint take the form  of a quanti-
tative restriction,  for  a given period, and  in relation  to  a base  date or period, of 
the expansion  of credit drawn from each establishment; it is  usually supplemented 
by recommendations encouraging the banks to be selective in the use of this reduced 
lending potential, preferring certain types  of borrower to others. 
Certain type:>  of credit may  escape general limitation. For example, the instructions 
issued  on  30  April  1969  by the Banque Nationale  concern  only  lending  to firms 
and  individuals,  excluding  cash  lending  abroad  in  foreign  currency  and  discount 
credit  to  the Road  Fund. Subsequently,  export credit bills  and  certain investment 
credits  were  also  exempted. 
So  far, where the credit limitation rules have been waived  for certain institutions, 
this has  been  done  for  practical reasons  only:  for  example, banks recently  set up 
are  allocated  quotas  adapted  to  their  special  situation.  In  any  case,  there  is  an 
absolute  minimum  amount for  outstanding credit. 
Recent  application of restriction 
34.  The Banque Nationale introduced arrangements to restrain credit of last resort 
by a directive  of 30 April 1969. The purpose of this was  to curtail the expansion 
of credit drawn and, hence, credit granted during the last eight months of 1969. 
It had become  evident that  the increase  in domestic expenditure and in outflows 
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of funds was being facilitated by an expansion in lending to firms  and individuals. 
The  total bank credit drawn and subject to the policy  of restraint had increased 
by 18·7 %  in 1967  and by a  further  19-4% in 1968. 
The  directive  covered  the  utilization  (total  figures)  of  all  acceptance,  discount, 
promissory  note  and cash  credit granted at origin by  each  bank, except cash  ad-
vances  extended  abroad  in  foreign  exchange  and  discount  credit  to  the  Road 
Fund. To  avoid  specially  favourable  treatment  of certain  types  of  financing,  and 
consequently  privileged  treatment  for  banks  specializing  in  these  fields,  no other 
type of credit was  excluded from  the quota arrangement. 
On  the  basis  of  the  average  outstanding  credit  in  1968,  the  amount  of  credit 
subject  to  a  restriction for  each  bank was  confined  originally  to the index rating 
of 118  on 30  June and 30  September  1969  and to the index rating of  122-5  on 
31  December  1969, with the  proviso  that  the increase  could  in  any  event reach 
Bfrs.  40 million  on the first  two of these dates and Bfrs.  50 million on the third. 
As  a  result  of  persistent outflows  of private capital,  the original limits were sub-
sequently tightened:  the index for the end of September was reduced on 18 August 
from  118 to 116 and the index for the end of December was reduced on 17  De-
cember from  122·5  to  119-5. At the same  time, the restrictive arrangements were 
extended for  the first  six  months  of  1970. 
In March  1970,  the  Banque  Nationale abolished  the limits  which had previously 
been fixed  for  the end of March  and  the end of  June  1970;  they  had ceased  to 
be effective because the change in "leads and lags" and the repatriation of balances 
held abroad before the revaluation of the German mark had enabled a large num-
ber of firms  to cut down their borrowing from the banks. The Banque Nationale 
set a new ceiling on the expansion of credit, fixed for  the end os  September 1970, 
but no longer applying  to the credit granted through "Creditexport"; to encourage 
export  on  a  large  scale,  export  credits  were  excluded  from  the  restraint.  The 
general rule authorized an increase of the restricted credit by 6 %  of the end-1969 
position  in the first  nine months  of  1970. The permitted growth rate  was  8 %, 
after taking account of the effects of special arrangements made, as  usual, for small 
and  new  banks,  and  of the  general  adjustment made  in  May  1970  in  favour  of 
banks which, for  special  reasons,  had difficulty  in complying  with the norm fixed 
for  the  end of  September. 
In  September  1970,  the  Banque  Nationale  prolonged  the  credit  restraint  and 
relaxed  it at  the  same  time,  setting  the  authorized  increase  for  the  end  of  the 
year  at  6 %  of  the  norm fixed  for  the  end  of  September;  it also  advised  the 
banks  to  avoid  increasing  the  amounts  outstanding  (at  30  September)  of  those 
funds  lent  to  finance-instalment  sales  of  services  and  consumer  goods,  personal 
instalment  loans  (save  those  for  housing)  and loans  to finance  companies,  and to 
channel  the  resources  released  in  this  way  and  through  the  relaxation  of  the 
nesttaint as  a  matter of priority to the financing  of industrial, agricultural or small 
commercial in;vestment,  to  the manufacture of goods  for export and to the imple-
mentation of other programmes particularly to growth or enhanced productivity. 
In  the  following  December,  the  credit  limitation  arrangements  were  again  pro-
longed,  the permitted increase  by the end of March 1971 being fixed  at 8% over 
the  norm  for  the  end of September  1970, but a  new category  of credit  was ex-
cluded from  the  scope  of the rules,  i.e.  the drawings  made on investment credits 
to  residents  opened before 9  December and reported to the Risk Office  not later 
than  15  December.  The banks were  recommended  to keep the increase in consu-
mer  credit  to  5 %  over  the  position  at  the  end of  September-a  ban  on  any 
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increase  had  been  imposed  three  months  previously - and  to  ensure  that  the1r 
lending was not used  to encourage speculation on price increases. 
On 24 March  1971, at a time when the pressure from  the supply side had abated 
a little, but cost inflation continued and the effects of the introduction of the VAT 
were being felt,  the  Banque Nationale renewed  the credit limitation arrangements 
until 30 September 1971, setting the authorized increase  at 4·5 %  for the end of 
June  and  6%  for  the  end of September, over  the norm fixed  previously  for  31 
March;  it maintained the exemption of cash  advances abroad in foreign  exchange, 
discount  credits  to  the  Road Fund,  export  credits  and investment credits  to  resi-
dents (opened before 24 March and reported not later than the end of that month). 
In this  way,  it was  forecast  that  total credit (credit  subject  to restraint plus  the 
export credit bills and investment credit excluded from the restraint) could increase, 
apart from seasonal variations, at an annual rate of  15 %. While leaving, as  usual, 
the distribution of lending  within the quota  to  the  discretion of  the banks  them-
selves,  the  Banque  Nationale  recommended  that they should  increase  the volume 
of  consumer  credit outstanding  at  the  end  of  September  1970 by only  9 %  by 
end-June  and 12% by  end-September  1971  and repeated its invitation  that  they 
should guard against  the use of their loans  for speculation on price increases. 
In its  instructions, the Banque  Nationale  stated that if quotas  were exceeded,  the 
certification  and  rediscount ceilings  of the banks  affected would be cut by at least 
the absolute amount by which the limitation was exceeded. 
Table 23  shows  the trend of actual utilization of bank credit subject to limitation, 
in  relation with the limits  set. 
Directives  similar  to  that issued  by  the  Banque Nationale were  made  by  the Mi-
nister of Finance  and the Central Office for  Small Savings to the other main classes 
of financial  intermediary, namely  the public  credit institutions,  the private savings 
banks  and  the life  assurance companies;  these  rules,  concerning the actual amount 
of credit allocated (whether used or not), were adapted to the ways in which these 
institutions  work.  For  all  these  financial  intermediaries  new  credit  in  1969  and 
1970  fell  below  the  authorized  maxima. 
Para.  II:  Selective  control  of credit 
35.  Action on the volume  of credit aims  at providing the appropriate response  to 
phenomena  characterizing  the  economy  as  a  whole.  However,  these  phenomena 
or their causes,  may  sometimes  be located in a  particular sector:  one  of these  is 
the  building  industry,  where  business  fluctuates  relatively  independently of other 
areas  of  the  economy;  private  consumers,  expenditure  is  another.  Although  this 
circumstance  warrants  selective  action  by  the  monetary  authorities,  in Belgium  it 
is  not as  elaborate  as  the comprehensive measures. 
Apart from selective admission to discount and exemption from credit restraint, the 
selective  action on credit is  brought to bear through recommendations  accompany-
ing the credit restraint rules. On 3 November 1969, such recommendations included 
for  the  first  time  selective  quota  control  of credit,  the  banks  being  called  upon 
to  keep  the  total  credit  extended,  directly  or  through  specialized  companies,  to 
finance  the  purchase  and  construction  of  buildings  other  than  industrial,  agricul-
tural  and  small  business  buildings,  together  with instalment sales  credit and  per-
sonal  loans,  within  the  overall  limits  of  the  respective  positions  at  the  end  of 
October  1969. 
With regard  to instalment credit (hire-purchase sales  and personal loans),  the bulk 
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.  of which  is  consumer  credit,  the  Government  also  has  statutory powers  to  fix  a 
minimum  down-payment,  a  maximum  period  for  repayment  of  the  loan,  and 
maximum  rates  of  interest;  these  powers  have  very  often  been  used,  but they 
involve  no  quota  restriction. 
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Notes and coin 
End of period  Treasury  Notes ofthe  Held by the 
notes  Ban  que  Total notes  Treasury 
&  coin  Nationale  &  coin  and the 
(2)  de Belgique  (3)  local 
(3)  authorities 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1960  December  5.2  124.1  126.8  7.3 (') 
1961  December  5.5  129.1  132.2  10.0 
1962  December  5.8  138.5  141.7  10.6 
1963  June (e)  5.9  146.2  149.6  12.8 
New series  (6) 
June  5.9  146.2  149.6  12.8 
December  6.1  150.5  153.7  12.1 
1964  December  6.4  160.3  163.7  10.8 
1965  December  6.6  170.3  173.4  11.8 
1966  December  6.9  175.3  178.7  14.9 
1967  December  6.5  177.5  180.1  17.4 
1968  December  6.6  183.2  185.4  20.8 
1969  December  7.0  183.0  185.2  25.6 
1970  December  7.5  188.2  190.7  25.2 
TABLE  1 
Money  supply 
Sight deposits 
Held by firms and individuals  (1) 
Deposits at sight 
Current  With the  and up to one 
accounts  Postal  month with banks 
with the  Cheque  and semi-public 
BNB  (3)  Office  (3)  establishments (3) 
(5)  (6)  (7) 
0.7  26.9  58.7 (') 
0.6  27.9  66.7 
0.5  30.4  71.3 
0.4  32.2  78.2 
0.4  32.2  76.0 
0.5  32.9  78.6 
0.6  35.9  86.4 
0.4  37.6  95.4 
0.5  41.5  104.1 
0.5  39.0  113.5 
0.8  46.2  123.3 
0.4  43.9  131.2 
0.4  49.6  152.6 
(in  B/rs.  '000 million)  -
Total 
Percentage 
of notes 
money  and coin 
supply  in total 
Total sight  money 
Total  deposits  supply 
(8)  (9)= (4)+(8) (10)= (3)+(9) (11)= (3)+(10 
86.3  93.6  220.4  57.5 
95.2  105.2  237.4  55.7 
102.2  112.8  254.5  55.7 
110.8  123.6  273.2  54.8 
108.6  121.4  271.0  55.2 
112.0  124.1  277.8  55.3 
122.9  133.7  297.4  55.0 
133.4  145.2  318.6  54.4 
146.1  161.0  339.7  52.6 
153.0  170.4  350.5  51.4 
170.3  191.1  376.5  49.2 
175.5  201.1  386.3  47.9 
202.6  227.8  418.5  45.6 
(1) ·Including semi-public administrative organizations, 
(2)  Excluding the balances of the Banque Nationale. 
(3)  Less holdings of money-creating credit institutions. 
(4)  The deposits of Congolese residents with Belgian banks should not be included in the money supply.  Statistical difficulties however, hamper the application of this principle.  For example, until the end 
of July 1960, deposits up to one month of Congolese residents (non-banks)  with Belgian banks were included in the money supply; they were excluded from it, up to a ceiling ofBfrs. 100 million in August 
and up to an extra Bfrs.400million in September, but these amounts were subsequently partly re-included, to the amount of Bfrso  100 mHlion in December 1960  and a further  Bfrs.lOOmillion in January, 
a  further Bfrs.  100rmillion inlSeptember and further Bfrs.  100 million in October  1961.  The result is  that changes  in  the figures  in column  7  of the  present table during the period from July  1960 
to October 1961  are to some extent purely a  matter of accounting. 
(0)  The figure for sight deposits owned by the Treasury and the subordinate public authorities at the end of December 1960 is abnormally low because of disruption caused by strikes.  Had there been no 
strikes, the figure would certainly have been somewhere between Bfrs.  8,000 and 9,000  million. 
(6)  For an explanation of the discrepancies between the new and the old series, the reader should refer to Section 2 of the article "Chapitre XII, Gerances et dettes dans l'economie beige" and "Chapitre 
XIII, Organismes monetaires de Ia partie statistique" in the Information and Documentation Bulletin  (BNB):  XLIInd year, Volume I, No  I, January 1967. 
(e)  Estimation. 
Source:  Information  and Documentation Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique  (Table XIII-4). TABLE  2 
Sources  of  changes  in  money  and  near-money  holdings  of  monetary  institutions 
(in  Bfrs.  '000  million) 
Refinancing outside  Money-market 
monetary institutions  financing  Realization of public  External  (increase: -) (2)  of public  securities  Credits  Total  transactions  authorities  to non·  money  (current)  Lending  mone·  Periods  Money  Near·  supply  balance +  to firma  tary  Bank  Miscel·  supply  money  and near·  capital  and in-
Other  Purchases  Through  financial  bonds  laneous  money  transactions  dividuals  of eommer- of credits  Central  on the  the  interme- of firms and  (')  cial claims  to firms  &  Govern- public  market by  Securities  diaries  au  tho- individuals)  on abroad  individuals  ment  rities (3)  monetary  Stabiliza-
institutions  tion Fund 
(1)  (2)  (1)+(2)=(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  ------
1960  +  4.4  +  6.1  +10.5  -1.6  +  6.0  +0.5  -1.0  +  6.5  +2.2  +0.1  +1.9  -0.1  -0.7  -3.3  1961  +16.7  +  9.1  +25.8  +  7.8  +  9.9  -1.1  -1.7  +  3.6  +2.0  +1.5  +0.4  +2.5  -1.1  +2.0  1962  +17.1  +  4.3  +21.4  +  4.7  +11.5  --0.2  +0.1  +  0.8  +2.2  +0.5  +0.7  +2.4  -2.4  +1.1  1963  +25.6  +  8.2  +33.8  -1.4  +16.4  --0.1  +1.3  +23.4  --0.2  -1.6  -0.1  +1.4  -0.4  --4.9  1964  +19.6  +  6.1  +25.7  +  7.0  +11.0 
-i:2 
-1.6  +12.4  +1.7  -2.2  -1.0  +0.2  ...  -1.8  1965  +21.1  +11.6  +32.7  +13.2  +15.9  -1.6  +  4.9  +4.5  -1.1  -2.0  +1.3  --0:6 
-1.2  1966  +21.2  +12.8  +34.0  -4.0  +20.2  +1.1  +2.2  +11.8  +3.2  -1.1  -0.6  +2.4  --0.6  1967  +11.0  +21.6  +32.6  +17.1  +26.1  -2.7  -4.0  +  1.4  -0.1  -2.0  -0.9  +1.5  -1.6  -2.2  1968  +26.1  +18.2  +44.3  -8.1  +25.6  +0.8 
+3:5 
+23.7  +3.1  -2.1  +0.7  +4.0  -3.0  --0.4  1969  +  9.8  +29.4  +39.2  +12.6  +11.1  -2.8  +20.1  +2.7  -2.1  -0.7  +4.9  --4.4  --5.7  1970  +32.2  +13.1  +45.3  +13.5  +25.0  -4.8  -2.5  +  4.5  +8.6  -1.2  -1.2  +8.4  -4.6  --0.4 
1969  1st  quarter  -4.4  +10.2  +  5.8  - 0.7  +  7.7  -1.0  --0.9  +  6.5  -2.8  -1.8  -1.8  --0.6  -0.7  +1.9  2nd quarter  +21.7  +  3.4  +25.1  +  4.2  +  6.9  -0.4  +2.1  +13.1  +3.3  +0.3  +1.3  +1.9  -1.7  -5.9  3rd quarter  -19.9  +  9.4  -10.5  -2.9  -4.2  +0.9  +1.6  -4.6  +1.3  -0.7  +0.9  +3.6  -1.3  -5.1  4th quarter  +12.4  +  6.4  +18.8  +12.0  +  0.7  -2.3  +0.7  +  5.1  +0.9  +0.1  -1.1  ...  --0.7  +3.4 
1970  1st  quarter  +  3.8  +  4.3  +  8.1  +  1.8  +  3.0  -1.3  -1.6  +  5.6  +0.9  --0.6  -1.2  +1.0  -1.4  +1.9  2nd quarter  +20.7  +  2.8  +23.5  +  4.5  +  7.6  ....  +1.8  +  8.7  +1.3  --0.8  -2.3  --0.8  -1.0  +4.5  3rd  quarter  -11.5  +  7.4  -4.1  +  3.9  +  0.3  "-2.6  --0.6  -9.9  +2.8  --0.2  +2.6  +3.7  -0.8  -3.3  4th quarter  +19.2  -1.4  +17.8  +  3.3  +14.1  -0.9  -2.1  +  0.1  +3.6  --0.4  --0.3  +4.5  -1.4  -3.5 
!.- - '-
(1)  Variation in the used outstanding-amount of discount,  advances and acceptances credit (except securities used for  mobilization of commercial claims on abroad), originally granted by monetary insti-
tutions• 
(2)  This is  net re-financillg:  Credits  granted at their ~origin by monetary  organizations and refinanced by them with non-monetary organizations minus credits granted at their origin by the latter and re-
financed  byjthem with monetary_ organizations.  -
(3)  Including pension funds. 
~  Source:  Information and Documentation Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique  (Table Xlll-3). 
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Belgian  francs 
Cash  Non-monetary 
holdings  (2)  fixed-income  Shares  (4) 
assets  (3) 
1965  +20.1  +  60.7  +2.6 
1966  +18.1  +  61.0  +3.6 
1967  +  8.5  +  86.6  +4.6 
1968  +22.7  +  80.6  +8.7. 
1969  +  4.9  +  89.2 (p)  +6.8 
1970 (p)  +32.7  +100.9  +2.0 
---
TABLE  3 
Principal  financial  assets  (!) 
Less: 
Securities 
held by  Total 
non-residents 
-(+0.5)  +  82.9 
-(-0.2)  +  82.9 
. -(  +2.8)  +  96.9 
-(-0.5)  +112.5 
-(-1.1)  +102.0 (p) 
-(+1.3)  +134.3 
(Changes  in  B/rs.  '000 million) 
Foreign  currencies 
Grand Total 
Deposits at 
Belgian  banks  Securities  (5)  Total 
-0.7  +  1.6  +  0.9  +  83.8 
+1.3  +  6.1  +  7.4  +  90.3 
+2.7  +  4.8  +  7.5  +104.4 
+0.4  +12.6  +13.0  +125.5 
+5.9  +15.0  +20.9  +122.9(p) 
-3.4  +14.9  +11.5  +145.8 
(1)  Held by individuals and  enterprises  (other  than financial  intermediaries), including public operating organizations and certain financial intermediaries which could not be excluded in 1970: life 
assurance  companies,  employers'  liability insurance  companies and pension funds. 
(2)  The cash holdings of the sectors described in footnote  (1)  h;lVe  been calculated by adding together the total amount of notes and coin and the sight deposits held by individuals and enterprises. 
(3)  Deposits on ordinary  or savings banks, other deposits at not more than one year; financial  assets at  medium and  long terms. 
(4)  Belgian companies' public share issues: amounts paid in cash on issue or on calls for  further  funds. 
(5)  Net purchases by residents of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.  . 
(P)  Provisional figures. 
Source:  Banque  Nationale de Belgique_,  anntial  reports. .  \.» 
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TABLE  4 
Money  supply  and  short-term  non-monetary  financial  assets  held  by  individuals  and  firms  (1),  and  their  proportion  of  GNP 
Money  supply 
End of 
period 
Notes  Sight 
and coin  deposits 
-
1964  163.7  133.7 
1965  173.4  145.2 
1966  178.7  161.0 
1967  180.1  170.4 
1968  185.4  191.1 
1969  185.2  201.1 
1970  190.7  227.8 
(1)  Other than financial intermediaries. 
(2)  Old series; 
(3)  New series. 
(p)  Provisional figures. 
(e)  Estimate  . 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
Total 
297.4 
318.6 
339.7 
350.5 
376.5 
386.3 
418.5 
Deposits 
Total  in foreign 
as  %of  currencies 
GNP  with Belgian 
Banks 
38.2  5.2 
37.5  4.4 
37.2  5.7 
35.8  8.4 
36.3  8.8 
33.8  14.7 
33.3 (e)  11.4 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Non-monetary short-term financial  assets  Total liquidity 
of  the economy 
Deposits  Deposits 
on  ordinary  at not more  Total 
or savings  than ·one  Total  as % of  Absolute  %of GNP 
figures  books  year  GNP 
169.7  43.8  218.7  28.1  516.1  66.3 
189.3  52.7  246.4  29.0  565.0  66.5 
~  61.7  (2)  l275.  3  (2)  ~  30.1  ~  615.0 (2)  t  67.3  207.9 
63.5  (3)  277.1  (3)  30.3  616.8  (3)  67.5 
231.5  71.2  311.1  31.8  661.6  67.6 
258.8  76.9  344.5  33.2  721.0  69.5 
270.1  104.4  389.2  34.0  775.5  67.8 
277.5  127.9 (p)  416.8(p)  33.2 (e)  835.3 (e)  66.5 (e) TABLE 5 
Velocity  of turnover of certain  components of the liquiJity of the  economy 
Ratios of withdrawals 
~n-, cnu'"""""'-''- on ordinary savings 
Monthly averages  Sight deposits  Bal!1nces  on  Postal  or deposit  books  at banks  Cheque  Accounts  (Caisse General d'Epar-
gne  et  de  Retraite) 
1960  2.06  3.04  Unknown 
1961  2.18  2.96  Unknown 
1962  2.23  2.89  0.24 
1963  2.23  2.85  0.25 
1~64  2.46  3.08  0.28 
1965  2.48  3.30  0.26 
1966  2.67  3.47  0.29 
1967  2.72  3.71  0.31 
1968  2.74  3.83  0.32 
1969  3.03  4.07  0.35 
1970  3.33  4.13  0.39 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
388 A.  Bank liquidity  (1) 
1.  Notes  of the Banque  Natio-
nale de  Belgique 
2.  Current  accounts  with  the 
Banque Nationale de Belgique 
3.  Balances  at the Postal 
Cheque  Office 
4.  Net lending of  call money in 
Bfrs. 
5.  Commercial paper rediscount-
able  at  the  Ban  que  Natio-
nale  (2) 
6.  Treasury certificates maturing 
within  not  more  than  one 
year,  in  Bfrs. 
7.  Certificates  of  the  Securities 
Stabilization Fund 
8.  Net cash position in foreign 
exchange  (not including par-
ticipations) 
9.  Less advances against securi-
ties of the Banque Nationale 
de Belgique 
Total 
B.  Indicators  of  the  potential  out-
goings  of  the  banks 
1.  Bfrs. sight liabilities (3) 
2.  Bfrs.liabilities maturing with-
in not more than one year (4) 
3.  Bfrs. liabilities maturing with-
in not more than one year and 
available  balances  of  trade 
credit lines opened 
c.  Liquidity  ratio:  Total  of  A  as 
percentage 
1.  of Bl. 
2.  of  B  2. 
3.  of  B  3. 
TABLE  6 
Bank  liqu;dity 
30.9.  31.12. 
1969  1969 
4.6  4.8 
0.1  1.0 
0.7  5.7 
3.9  4.9 
14.0  12.0 
10.3  7.8 
3.8  5.4 
3.8  4.0 
-0.2  -
41.0  45.6 
119.0  127.4 
275.9  293.0 
447.7  468.2 
34.5  35.8 
14.9  15.6 
9.2  9.7 
31.3. 
1970 
5.1 
1.0 
2.8 
4.1 
16.3 
12.5 
4.2 
4.5 
-
50.5 
129.0 
311.6 
501.6 
39.1 
16.2 
10.1 
(Bfrs. '000 million 
30.6.  30.9.  31.12. 
1970  1970  1970 
5.2  4.7  5.0 
0.1  0.1  1.2 
0.7  0.6  3.1 
1.2  3.4  2.2 
15.7  20.6  16.8 
16.0  16.1  10.1 
6.2  8.2  6.4 
6.0  2.8  3.4 
- -0.1  -
51.1  56.4  48.2 
137.3  132.1  143.9 
324.1  330.2  340.8 
518.7  531.8  553.8 
37.2  42.7  33.5 
15.8  17.1  14.1 
9.9  10.6  8,7 
(l)IIWhile the re-employment ratio was applicable (i.e. from 30 June 1969 to 31  May 1970) it may have made some of the 
assets treated here as part of bank liquidity non  ... realizable, but its exact impact on bank liquidity is difficult, and indeed 
impossible to asses: for one thing, the numerator of the ratio, which included Government stock and all commercial paper 
definable in theory as rediscountable securities was defined somewhat differently from liquidity as given here; secondly, 
a  decline in liabilities, which is one of the contingencies against which the banks hold easily realizable assets, would have 
had the effect of reducing the proportion of these assets which was blocked by the ratio. 
(2)  Taking into account rediscount and certification ceilings. 
(3)  Bankers, headquarters, branches and subsidiaries: loro sight balances minus the corresponding items of the Belgian 
franc assets: nostro sight balances (the reason why these asset items are deducted here rather than added to liquidity is 
that they probably largely correspond to the balances which the banks carrying out transactions among themselves must 
necessarily, because of  delays, postal among other things, hold with each other and which accordingly cannot be used and 
are not likely to have to be repaid) deposits and current accounts - at sight; financial companies - at sight. 
(4)  Creditors covered by real collateral, minus the Banque Nationale's advances against securities (since these advance 
are deducted from liquidity, they would affect the ratio twice over if they were included here); bankers, headquarters, 
bra,nches and subsidiaries, minus the corresponding items of  Belgian franc assets (for the reason for this deduction see note 
(3)  above, same items); other securities payable at short term; deposits and current accounts; at sight, at one month at 
most and at more than one month; deposit books; other deposits accepted on deposit books or bank books; financial com-
panies - at sight, at one month at most and more than one month. 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
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TABLE  7 
Factors  stemming  from  Central  bank  operations  and  influencing  bank  liquidity 
(Annual  variations  in  B[rs.  '000 million) 
Headings  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
1  Exchange reserves  (1)  +12.2  - 3.1  +10.9  +12.4  +  5.6  +  0.8  +12.0  -20.2  +  9.6  +19.3 
2  Net claims on the public authorities  +  0.6  - 1.3  +  4.1  +  0.7  -0.6  +  0.8  - 6.8  +12.5  +  0.2  -2.5 
3  Claims on firms  and individuals (2)  - 1.7  +  5.0  - 0.8  -2.3  +  5.3  +  3.2  - 1.7  +12.5  -7.4  -11.6 
4  Miscellaneous  - 3.1  +  6.4  - 1.5  - 1.4  - 0.8  +  0.1  - 0.3  - 0.6  - 2.4  -10.0 
Total  +  8.0  +  7.0  +12.7  +  9.4  +  9.5  +  4.9  +  3.2  +  4.2  - -4.8 
{Decrease: + 
Notes in circulation  - 5.0  - 9.2  -11.8  - 9.6  - 9.5  -5.0  - 1.8  -5.2  +  0.7  +  5.1 
Increase:  -
5 
Balance blocked under the  {Decrease: + 
monetary reserve ratio  - - - - 1.2  +  1.2  - - - - -
Increase:  -
6 
Cash  position  of banks  +  3.0  -2.2  +  0.9  - 1.4  +  1.2  - 0.1  +  1.4  - 1.0  +  0.7  +  0.3 
--··--
(1)  Excluding commercial acceptances in Bfrs.  on exports, Bfrs. 400 million deriving from the DM revaluation in 1969  and Bfrs. 3,500 million from the allocation of Special Drawing Rights by the IMF 
in 1970. 
(2)  Including acceptances in Bfrs.  arising from  exports. 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. ....., 
\,() 
....... 
TABLE  8 
Short-term  Treasury  debt  in  Bfrs.:  structure  of short-term  claims  on  the Treasury 
Certificates 
placed with 
the Banque 
End of  Nationale 
period  (agreements  Tranche 
of  14/9/48  B  1 
and 30 /3/68)  mon-
th  -
1960  6.0  9.1  0.3 
1961  6.5  9.1  0.9 
1962  5.1  9.1  0.2 
1963  9.3  7.7  0.1 
1964  9.8  9.1  0.4 
1965  9.0  9.1  0.2 
1966  9.6  9.1  0.1 
1967  2.7  9.1  1.4 
1968  14.7  9.1  -
1969  15.5  9.1  0.1 
1970  13.3  9,1  0.4 
(1)  Not including swap certificates  (banks - SNCI). 
(2)  Not including the "Schools Pact", 
(3)  Not including certificates deposited with the IMF  . 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
At very  short term 
2  3  4 
mon- mon- mon-
ths  ths  ths 
------
0.3  0.6  0.3 
0.6  1.1  2.3 
0.3  1.9  -
0.3  0.8  -
0.5  1.6  -
0.4  2.1  -
1.1  3.2  -
0.6  7.4  -
0.5  5.1  -
1.9  5.7  -
1.2  14.0  -
Cash  certificates 
Sold  by tender  Special  Special 
certificates  certificates 
6  9  12  in  the hands  in the hands 
Total  mon- mon- mon- Total  of  the Belgian  of  semi-public 
ths  ths  ths  banks  (1)  institutions  (1) 
--------
1.5  0.5  2.1  1.1  3.7  0.1  14.1 
4.9  1.3  1.2  2.7  5.2  - 13.5 
2.4  1.7  1.9  3.6  7.2  - 11.0 
1.2  1.1  2.8  2.7  6.6  1.6  10.2 
2.5  1.0  0.9  0.7  2.6  2.5  6.4 
2.7  0.8  2.3  1.4  4.5  5.1  10.7 
4.4  1.1  0.7  0.7  2.5  6.0  7.2 
9.4  2.7  1.1  0.4  4.2  3.4  16.7 
5.6  4.9  0.7  0.3  5.9  - 13.6 
7.7  0.7  0.3  0.2  1.2  2.8  16.3 
15.6  1.8  0.2  1.7  3.7  4.0  18.3 
Balances 
of  indi-
vi  duals 
on  Postal 
Cheque 
Accounts 
(2) 
30.2 
30.6 
34.2 
38.3 
44.7 
44.9 
48.0 
44.2 
52.0 
50.2 
54.7 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Other 
1.8 
2.9 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
3.4 
1.6 
1.5 
1.7 
1.6 
Total 
(3) 
66. 
72. 
69. 
75. 
77. 
87. 
90. 
91. 
102. 
104. 
120. 
-
3 
8 
4 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3 ""  \0 
N 
TABLE 9 
Long  and  medium  Bfrs.  issues  of the  public sector  (I) 
(in  Bfrs.  '000  million) 
I  Securities not accessible to all  Securities accessible to all investors (2)  investors (4)  Total net  Total 
long and  Net  (including  interventions 
Issues in large tranchea  medium-term  of the  interventions 
issues  of the 
(more than  Securities  Securities  Net tap  Total  Gross issues  Redemptions  Net issues  one year)  Stabilization  Stabilization  Gross issues  Redemptions  Net issues  issues  net issues  (1)  Fund (5)  Fund)  (3) 
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)-(2)  (4)  (5)=(3)+(4)  (6)  (7)  (8)=(6)-(7)  {9)=(5)+(8)  (10)  (1~)=(9)+(10) 
1959  31.9  10.9  21.0  7.6  28.6  6.9  3.0  3.9  32.5  -0.6  31.9 
1960  35.9  20.7  15.2  8.8  24.0  7.5  2.3  5.2  29.2  -1.9  27.3 
1961  (')  27.5  15.6  11.9  9.1  21.0  4.2  2.6  1.6  22.6  -0.3  22.3 
Total  1962  36.2  22.3  13.9  13.1  27.0  13.5  4.0  9.5  36.5  -0.9  35.6 
of Bfrs.  1963  27.6  18.5  9.1  6  7  15.8  7.1  5.5  1.6  17.4  -0.6  16.8 
issues  1964 (')  38.4  26.3  12.1  5.7  17.8  13.2  7.3  5.9  23.7  +1.6  25.3 
of the  1965  46.2  22.5  23.7  8.8  32.5  12.8  6.3  6.5  39.0  +0.5  39.5 
Belgian  1966  46.4  28.4  18.0  9.8  27.8  13.4  5.1  8.3  36.1  -0.1  36.0 
public  1967  65.1  35.5  29.6  15.8  45•4  15.8  8.5  7.3  52.7  +0.5  53.2 
sector  1968 (')  66.0  29.5  36.5  21.9  58.4  15.6  9.0  6.6  65.0  -2.1  62.9 
1969  83.3  56.5  26.8  17.9  44.7  23.2  9.8  13.4  58.1  +0.1  58.2 
1970  71.6 (v)  +0.9 
(1)  Issues in large tranches the period of subscription of which overlaps two years are divided between the two years according to the amounts actually subscribed to in each yearw  Until 1965, tap issues of 
short-term deposit receipts (one year at most) of the semi-public credit institutions and of the Belgian Municipal Credit Institute were included in the. totals for net tap issues, since they could not be isolated. 
Since 1966, the figures in Column 4  have covered only net long and medium-term issues (more than one year); the total for net issues at one year at most for the years 1966,  1967 and 1968  ("Public Fi-
nancial Intermediaries": nil,  Bfrs.  300 million and Bfrs.  1,700  million respectively;  "Local Authorities, E3 Inter-Municipal Road Fund and Municipal Credit Institute" Bfrs.  600 million, Bfrs.  1,600 mil-
lion and Bfrs.  1,200 million respectively)  is therefore no longer included in this table. 
N.B. Net movement in Central Government short-term debt in Bfrs.:  1961: Bfrs.  2,700  million;  1962: Bfrs.  2,300 million; 1963: Bfrs. 8,800 million;  1964: Bfrs.  2,500 million; 1965: Bfrs.  7,400 million; 
1966: Bfrs. 4,500 million; Bfrs.  5,600 million; 1968: Bfrs.  16,900 million; 1969: Bfrs. 400 million; and 1970: Bfrs.  15,200 million. 
(2)  The following are classified  as securities available to all investors:  those issued by public subscription, those quoted on the stock exchange or schedules for quotation on the stock exchange, those nor-
mally dealt in outside the Stock  exchange, together with bonds and deposit receipts issued on tap by the Belgian Municipal Credit Institute, the National Corporation for Credit to Industry, the National 
Agricultural Credit Institute, the Central Office for Mortgage Credit,  the National Fund for  Credit to Trade and Industry and the savings bonds issued by the General Savings and Pensions Fund. 
(3)  The securities bought back on the stock exchange by the fund for the Amortization of the Public Debt are included in Column 2  ("Redemptions")  not at  the time  of the repurchases but at the time of 
cancellation. 
(4)  Normally in large !ranches, but including tap issues of semi-public housing institutions. 
(5)  Variations (portfolio increase =' (-), reduction  =  ( +) of the portfolio of quoted securities of the (Securities Stabilization Fund expressed at face  value). 
(6)  In 1961, the last tranche of EAM securities was released.  This operation entailed the transfer of Bfrs.  1,400 million from the category of  securities not accessible to all investors to that of securities ac-
cessible to all investors. 
(7)  The figures  relating to the Veterans' Endowment Fund include, in gross issues, Bfrs.  2,844 million of consolidation (interest and redemption not reimbursed on maturity) and Bfrs.  1,561  million of re-
demption for the years  1961  to  1963. 
(8)  Not including Bfrs.  3,800  million of ONPTI securities cancelled following the transfer by the General Savings and Pensions Fund of  the administration "Pensions for tbe Self-Employed" to the ONASTI. 
Source:  Information and Documentation Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique  (Tables XVI-I  and XVI-4). TABLE  10 
Medium  and  Long-term  securities  held  by  financial  intermediaries 
(in  Bfr•·  '000  milium) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
Central  Government (direct +indirect debt)  138.6  145.4  182.1  187.3  189.1  198.1  200.4  212.5  231.8  245.9  257.8 
Provinces,  towns,  municipalities  5.6  5.6  5.7  6.4  6.7  8.1  10.2  12.4  16.5  20.0  25.5 
Independent  funds  +  administrative  semi-public  cor-
porations  13.7  14.2  14.8  15.7  17.7  18.6  19.4  20.2  20.8  21.6  22.0 
Semi-public utilities  15.7  15.9  16.8  18.0  18.0  19.7  20.9  23.0  27.0  29.8  35.6 
Semi-public credit institutions  43.6  48.0  53.5  59.3  61.8  68.0  73.6  81.1  92.9  97.6  110.0 
Public social security institutions  5.3  6.0  7.9  9.2  10.4  11.5  12.6  13.7  14.0  19.0  22.0 
Total  222.5  235.1  280.8  295.9  303.7  324.0  337.1  362.9  403.0  433.9  472.9 
Debentures (Belgian  companies)  14.1  14.3  14.8  16.6  17.0  19.1  21.0  21.2  22.5  23.2  26.5 
Foreign bonds  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.5  3.5  3.6  4.1  3.8  4.4  4.9  5.2 
Total  240.0  252.8  298.9  316.0  324.2  346.7  362.2  387.9  429.9  462.0  504.6 
~ ·----·-~··-
~  Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
\JJ TABLE  11 
Rediscounting  by  deposit  banks 
Annual  averages  at  the  end of each  quarter 
Other  Other 
Ban  que  Rediscount  public  national 
Nationale  and  rediscounters 
de Bel- Guarantee  credit ins- (including  titutions  gique  Institute  (3)  the Belgian 
banks) 
1964  1.4  14.1  4.4  3.8 
1965  0.7  14.8  5.3  3.8 
1966  1.2  18.4  5.2  4.0 
1967  1.2  20.3  5.3  3.9 
1968  2.2  26.7  6.1  4.4 
1969  8.3  29.5  6.2  5.0 
1970  0.5  20.6  7.9  7.0 
(1}  Including Bfrs.  800  million in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
(2)  Including Bfrs.  1,100 million in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
(3)  Including their share in the financing of the Creditexport pools. 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
TABLE  12 
Abroad 
1.2 
1.4 
1.2 
2.8 
3.7 
2.8 (1) 
2. 3 (2) 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Pro  memoriam 
rediscounting 
of the 
Rediscount 
Total  and 
Guarantee 
Institute 
with Banque 
Nationale 
24.9  4.2 
26.0  5.1 
30.0  8.7 
33.5  6.7 
43.1  10.6 
51.8  16.1 
38.3  4.7 
Rediscount  portfolio and  advances  against  securities  of the  Banque  nationale de Belgique 
(in  B[rs.  '000 million} 
Rediscount 
End of year  Advances against  securities  with the Banque Nationale (1) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
51 
74 
3,022 
1,655 
625 
34 
338 
345 
572 
47 
189 
(1} This is rediscounting by the semi-public institutions and the commercial banks. 
Sourc.:  Iianque  Nationale de Belgique. 
394 
5,333 
3,682 
9,188 
7,143 
5,290 
10,538 
13,642 
11,699 
24,737 
16,048 
4,122 TABLE  13 
Main  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  Securities  stabilization  fund 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Portfolio 
I 
End of period  Tranche B  Credit balance  Certificates  Borrowings  Overdraft with  Securities  Other cash  Loans  of very  of  the 
quoted  cash  certificates  short-term  with the Banque  Securities  of  money  the Banque 
certificates  money  Nationale  Stabilization  at very short  Nationale 
de  Belgique  Fund  term  de  Belgique 
Face value 
1960  6,661  1,403  1,200  15  6  5,812  ...  .  .. 
1961  6,892  1,086  ...  3,069  3,201  10,996  .  ..  .  .. 
1962  7,759  2,226  .  .  .  50  ...  6,440  ...  589 
1963  8,383  2,711  ...  .  ..  .  ..  6,549  877  600 
1964  6,827  4,099  .  .  .  .  ..  .  ..  7,357  ...  389 
1965  6,299  2,728  .  .  .  ...  50  5,884  .  ..  .  .. 
1966  6,426  3,269  .  .  .  ...  .  ..  4,524  1,563  320 
1967  5,943  3,560  ...  141  .  ..  6,348  .  ..  .  .. 
1968  7,959  5,124  .  ..  432  .  ..  8,892  1,256  ... 
1969  7,833  4,654  ...  .  ..  .  ..  8,377  631  .  .. 
1970  January  7,873  4,314  .  ..  878  .  ..  9,465  .  ..  ... 
February  7,008  4,274  .. .  3,507  .  ..  11,099  ...  .  .. 
March  7,102  4,344  .  .  .  ...  .  ..  7,699  221  .  .. 
April  7,481  4,564  .  ..  287  ...  8,814  .  ..  .  .. 
May  7,273  4,214  .  .  .  2,931  .  ..  10,873  . . .  ... 
June  7,220  5,144  2,800  ...  .  ..  10,093  1,452  .  .. 
July  6,757  4,214  400  2,228  ...  10,103  .  ...  ... 
August  7,242  4,214  .. .  2,684  .  ..  10,394  .. .  ... 
September  7,319  4,214  1,000  230  1,670  10,902  ...  .  .. 
October  7,181  4,618  .. .  3,033  .  ..  11,282  .  ..  ... 
November  6,939  4,248  .  ..  3,351  448  11,387  .  ..  ... 
December  6,932  4,214  .. .  1,071  .  ..  8,737  ...  .  .. 
\jJ  -
~  Source:  Annual reports  of the Securities Stabilization Fund. '-"' 
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TABLE  14 
Bank  rate  and  other  Interest  rates  of the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique 
Discount 
Acceptances  domiciled  with  banks,  warehouse 
receipts 
Acceptances  certified  beforehand  by the Ban-
que Nationale de  Belgique 
imports 
exports  (EEC countries) 
(other countries) 
Acceptances  without  domicile  at a  bank 
Non-accepted  bills  with  domicile  at  a  bank 
Non-accepted bills without domicile at a  bank, 
promissory notes 
Advances  in current  account  and loans  on 
Cash  certificates  and  certificates  of  the  Se-
curities Stabilization Fund with a  currency not 
exceeding  130  days  (limit  95%) 
Cash certificates with a  currency exceeding 130 
days but not exceeding 366 days (limit 95 %) (1) 
Other public  securities  (limit 80%) 
-
(1)  366 days maturity before 20 December 1967. 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
1.1.  6.2. 
1969  1969 
---
4.50  4.50 
- -
4.50  4.50 
4.50  4.50 
4.00  4.00 
5.25  5.25 
5.75  5.75 
6.25  6.25 
5.50  5.75 
5.75  6.00 
6.25  6.25 
I 
Rates in force  since: 
6.3.  10.4.  29.5.  31.7.  18.9. 
1969  1969  1969  1969  1969 
------------
5.00  5.50  6.00  7.00  7.50 
Bills accepted by and payable 
at a  bank, warrants and ac-
- - - - - ceptances  duly  certified  as 
representing  foreign  trade 
5.00  5.50  6.00  7.00  7.50  transactions 
5.00  5.50  6.00  7.00  7.50 
4.50  5.00  5.50  7.00  7.50 
5.75  6.25  6.75  9.00  9.50 t  Other  bills  and  promissory 
6.25  6.75  7.25  9.00  9.50  notes 
7.00  7.50  8.00  9.00  9.50 
6.50  7.00  7.50  8.50  9.00 
6.75  7.25  7.75  8.75  9.25 
7.00  7.50  8.00  9.00  9.50 
1.6.  22.10.  10.12.  25.3. 
1970  1970  1970  1971 
---------
7.50  7.00  6.50  6,00 
9.50  9.00  8.50  7.50 
9.00  8.50  8.00  7.00 
9.25  8.75  8.25  7.25 
9.50  9.00  8.50  7.50 TABLE 15 
Monetary  reserve:  Ratio  and  amounts 
(in  B/rs.  '000  milium) 
Ratio  Amounts  Ratio  Amounts 
1 964  July  - - 1965  January  1%  1.3 
August  1%  1.1  February  1%  1.3 
September  1%  1.2  March  1%  1.3 
October  1%  1.2  April  1%  1.4 
November  101  /0  1.2  May  1%  1.4 
December  1%  1.3  June  1%  1.4 
July  - -
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
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TABLE  16 
Call  money  market * 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Capital lent by  Capital borrowed by 
Total 
Daily averages  (1)  Rediscount and  (8)=(1)+(2)+(3) Withdrawals 
Deposit banks  Securities Sta·  Other  Deposit banks  Securities Sta·  Guarantee  Other  or  of capital 
bilization I!'und  institutions  (2)  bilization Fund  Institute  institutions (3)  (4)+(5)+(6)+(7) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (9) 
1960  2,415  1,107  1,664  1,025  10  3,104  1,047  5,186  37 
1961  2,487  1,811  1,671  1,817  1  3,162  989  5  969  23 
1962  1,518  943  1, 703  1,517  1  1,375  1,~~~  4:164  307 
1963  1,585  202  1  842  1,600  122  1,126  3,629  49 
1964  1,879  6  2:743  1,310  480  1,690  1,148  4,628  11 
1965  1,  767  722  2  546  1,417  5  2,356  1,257  5,035  83 
1966  1,905  264  2:658  1,222  805  1,696  1,104  4,827  ... 
1967  1,984  1,148  3,299  1,  731  282  3,418  1,000  6  431  ... 
1968  2,135  1,448  2,974  2,346  19  3,089  1,~g~  6;557  ... 
1969  3,829  59  3,351  1,280  1,841  3,455  7,239  ... 
1970  3,757  1,631  3,198  1,350  58  6, 737  441  8,586  ...  ... 
4,015  1,075  427  8,249  1970  1st  quarter  934  3,300  28  6,719  ... 
2nd quarter  3,958  1,776  3,089  1,342  15  7,0S9  377  8,823  ... 
3rd quarter  3,681  1,500  3,131  1,351  188  6,328  445  8,312  ... 
4th quarter  3'385  2,~g~  3,266  1  625  6,816  512  8,953  ... 
1971  1st  quarter  4  050  3,397  1:456  282  5,849  384  7,971  /" .. 
1969  August  2:349  15  3,611  1,051  2,923  1, 795  206  5,975  ... 
September  5,592  ...  ~·~gg 
564  5,595  1,818  415  8,392  ... 
October  6,697  524  4,680  5,561  284  1,049  ... 
November  3,985  2  3:439  970  2,413  3,573  470  7,426  ... 
December  4, 711  90  3,481  1,042  404  6,448  388  8,282  ... 
1970  January  5,382  168  3,669  908  74  7  828  409  9,219  ... 
February  2,676  424  3,  91  1,241  s;424  226  6,891  ... 
March  3,856  2  163  2,488  1,091  7  6,781  628  8,507  ... 
April  4,017  1'247  2,687  1,125  ...  6,514  312  7,951  .  .. 
May  3,069  2'2 9  3,867  1,980  6,925  329  9,235  ... 
June  4,817  1:764  2,690  901  48  ~·~r 
489  9,271  ... 
July  3,514  1,062  3,253  1  240  5~8  820  7,829  ... 
August  2,958  2,313  3,407  1:554  7:018  106  8,678  ... 
September  4,600  1,112  2,720  1,258  31  6, 738  407  8,434  ... 
October  2,738  2,992  2,776  2084  ...  5,703  719  8,506  ... 
November  3,349  1,941  3,479  1:484  ...  6,981  296  8,761  ... 
December  4,068  1,961  3,556  1,302  ...  7,767  516  9,585  .  .. 
-- -- - ------- -----------------
(*)  From  17  November 1959  to 30 April  1969,  most of the dealings in ca1I  money were governed by  the "Protocol drawn  up with a  view to participation in the guaranteed call money market".  Since 1 
May 1969,  a  new  "Protocol governing the guaranteed  call money market"  was  signed  between the Securities Stabili?.ation Fund, the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute and the public and private sector 
financial institutions accepting sight deposits, bank  book deposits or savings deposits on notice not exceeding 3 months.  The table also includes dealings outside these Protocols. 
(1)  Until 31  December 1964, the averages are calculated on the basis of the number of working days in the period. From 1965 onwards, the averages have been established on the basis of the total number 
of days in the period; this method of calculation is  the same as that used  by  the Rediscount and  Guarantee Fund in the presentation of its data. 
(2)  This column includes the General Savings and Pensions  Fund, the National Industrial Credit Corporation, the Belgian Municipal Credit Institute, the Belgian State Railways (until 30 April 1969)  and• 
since August  1960,  miscellaneous  "ex-Protocol"  lenders. 
(3)  This column includes the National Del Credere Office, the National Fund for Credit to Trade and  Industry,  the National Industrial Credit Corporation, the Belgian  Municipal Credit Institute, and 
the Belgian State Railways  (until 30 April  1969). 
Source:  Information and Documentation Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique  (Table XVIII-I). VJ 
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TABLE  17 
Discount  and other rates  on  the money  and  capital  markets 
per  cent 
1  I  T  I  I  r  .I  I  -
Bank  rate:  acceptances  domiciled  with  banks 
Government  loans  maturing  in  more  than  5  years  {issued  before  1  December  1962)  - ----- Government  loans  maturing  in  more  than  5  years  {issued  after  1  December  1962)  .........  Certificates  of  the  Securities  Stabilization  Fund  {4  months) 
-·-·- Call  money 
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1968  1970 TABLE  18 
Net  short-term  external  liabilities  of the banks 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Short-term  Short-term  Net short-term external 
End of  year  external liabilities  external claims  liabilities of the banks 
A  B  C=A-B  -
1960  17.7  9.9  7.8 
1961  30.0  12.6  17.4 
1962  29.0  15.3  13.7 
1963  46.2  19.2  27.0 
1964  58.2  25.5  32.7 
1965  64.5  29.2  35.3 
1966  89.5  45.3  44.2 
1967  104.8  53.3  51.5 
1968  128.5  74.5  54.0 
1969  169.6  108.7  60.9  . 
1970  248.2  149.4  98.8 
So•rce:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
400 TABLE  19 
Rediscount and  certification  ceilings  of the  banks  with  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique 
Ceilings  Outstanding amount 
imputed 
Available 
as per cent  amounts  Non- margin 
of funds  (general  Bills  certified 
covered (1)  rule and  certified  bills re-
Situation  (general  flat-rate  (3)  discounted 
at end of month  rule only)  rule)  (5) 
(Bfrs.  '000 million) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(2)-(3)-(4) 
1969  May  16  54.5  31.1  8.9  14.5 
June  16  56.5  32.3  7.1  17.1 
July  16  56.5  33.6  8.6  14.3 
August  14  48.9  32.1  9.8  7.0 
September  14  50.0  32.6  6.6  10.8 
October  131/s  47.7  33.4  4.9  9.4 
November  131/a  (2)  47.7  (2)  32.0  4.0  11.7 
December  12  44.0  29.7  4.2  10.1 
1970  January  111/s  41.5  28.5 (4)  3.1  (4)  9.9 
February  102/s  40.0  28.7 (4)  1.  7  (4)  9.6 
March  10  37.6  27.2  1.1  9.3 
April  10  37.7  28.0  2.8  6.9 
May  10  38.6  28.4 (4)  2.8 (")  7.4 
June  91/2  36.8  26.0  2.2  8.6 
July  91/2  38.1  23.5  3.5  11.1 
August  91/z  39.0  21.3  4.6  13.1 
September  9  37.1  20.5  4.3  12.3 
October  9  37.1  20.4  (4)  5.8 (4)  10.9 
November  9  38.0  21.0  6.3  10.7 
December  9  38.0  20.7  6.2  11.1 
1971  January  9  38.0  20.2 (4)  6.4 (")  11.4 
February  9  39.0  19.3 (4)  4.5 (4)  15.2 
March  82/s  37.5  19.4  5.1  13.0 
N.B.  For interpretation of this tahle, particularly Column (5), see Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, XLVI, 
Volume I, N°  I, January  1971, p. V. 
(1)  The funds covered C'JoUiist of own fund;, loan'i issued as bands and depo3it certificates and Bfrs. deposits received on 
sight, time and deposit book accounts, not including bank creditor accounts. 
(2)  On I December 1969, the ceilings fixed according to the general rule were lowered to 12f% of  the funds covered.  On 
this date, the ceilings (general rule and flat-rate rule) totalled Bfrs.  46,500 million. 
(3)  Whether rediscounted or not, with less than two years to maturity (maximum of  one year to maturity for export credit 
bills, since 31  March 1970). 
(4)  Minus hills reaching maturity on the last day of the month, but which, because this day was a  Saturday or a holiday, 
were not  collected until the beginning of the subsequent month. 
(5)  Including certified bills rediscounted and bills rediscountable at the Banque Nationale mobilized on the ex-bank mar-
ket operated hy the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute. 
Source:  Bulletin of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, Table XVIII-3. 
401 TABLE  20 
Rates  charged  by  the  Rediscount  and  guarantee  institute  on  purchases 
of certified  acceptances 
Term 
60  days maximum 
61  to 120  days 
121  to  365  days 
366  to 545  days 
546  to  730  days 
(31  December 1970) 
Certified  bills 
5.80 
6.00 
6.50 
7.00 
7.25 
(1) Interest is  calculated by six-monthly periods. 
Source:  Rediscount and Guarantee  Institute. 
TABLE  21 
Outstanding  amount  of  bills  negotiated  by· the  Rediscount  and  guarantee  instit1;1te 
and  how  financed 
(Daily averages) 
(in Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Financing  (1) 
Amount 
outstanding 
Bills sold or placed  Rediscount at the 
Call  money  Banque. Nationale  on the market  de  Belgique 
1960  10,054  3,172  6,254  421 
1961  11,171  3,301  7,289  384 
1962  10,068  1,428  7,705  762 
1963  12,257  1,217  8,415  2,452 
1964  13,397  1,895  9,399  1,9~3 
1965  13,514  2,583  8,486  2,367 
1966  17,978  1,921  10,476  5,499 
1967  20,677  3,663  12,917  3,996 
1968  27,982  3,300  17,761  6,813 
1969  32,947  3,554  14,967  14,254 
1970.  24,986  6,738  13,595  4,583 
(1)  A very small proportion of  the amount outstanding is financed from the Institute's own resources.  The financing does 
not take account of paper placed with bill-brokers on the market. 
Source:  Reports of the Rediscount and Guarantee Institute. 
402 TABLE 22 
Financing  the  government's  net  borrowing  requirement 
1963  1964  1965 
1. Government 
recourse to the 
Belgian  mar-
ket: 
a)  monetary 
institutions  +11.0  +11.5  +11.8 
b)  other  -0.2  +  2.4  +15.1 
Total  +10.8  +13.9  +26.9 
2. Government 
recourse to for-
eign markets  +12.5  +  1.1  - 4.8 
Grand Total  +23.3  +15.0  +22.1 
(1)  After elimination of Bfrs.  700  million  (DM revaluation). 
Source:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
1966 
+  6.9 
+  5.3 
+12.2 
+  4.9 
+17.1 
TABLE  23 
1967 
+  3.9 
+21.6 
+25.5 
- 2.5 
+23.0 
Bank  credit  subiect  to  limitation  (I) 
1968 
+27.4 
+10.4 
+37.8 
- 3.7 
+34.1 
Amounts used 
Situation  Maxima 
at end  of period  fixed  Export  Other 
credits bills 
1966  - 4.8  162.3 
1967  - 6.8  191.5 
1968  1st  quarter  - 6.9  198.1 
2nd quarter  - 7.1  207.-
3rd quarter  - 7.2  208.-
4th quarter  - 7.2  226.5 
1969  1st  quarter  - 7.4  234.1 
2nd quarter  257.5  7.9  243.2 
3rd quarter  253.6 (2)  8.5  237.4 
4th quarter  260.9 (3)  9.3  234.1 
1970  1st  quarter  - (4)  (10. 6)  235.9 
2nd quarter  - (5)  (12 .1)  245.1 
3rd quarter  253.9 (6)  (13, 2)  246.0 
4th quarter  270.6 (6)  (13. 3)  262.2 
1971  1st  quarter  245.0 (7) 
2nd quarter  257.8 (8) 
3rd quarter  262.0 (8) 
(in  B[rs.  '000 million) 
1969  1970 
+15.0  +16.0 
+  8.0  +18.2 
+23.0  +34.2 
+5.1(1)  -10.4 
+28.1  +23.8 
(in  Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Total 
167.1 
198.3 
205.0 
214.1 
215.2 
233.7 
241.5 
251.1 
245.9 
243.4 
235.9 
245.1 
246.0 
262.2 
(1)  In 1969, the credits limited were those to firms and individuals, plus those to non-residents other than in the form of 
foreign exchange advances.  The external lending subject to limitation is mainly that connected with deferred payment 
facilities for exports which, like lending to firms and individual in the strict dense, strengthens the cash situation of  these 
firms and individuals.  In 1970, outstanding export credits were exempted from limitation. 
(2)  Mter the reduction made in August 1969. 
(3)  Mter the reduction made in Sept<mber 1969. 
(4)  The limit of Bfrs. 263,200 million set in Septtmber 1969 was discontinu<d in Marth 1970. 
(0) The limit of Bfrs. 271,400 million set in Sept<mber 1969 was discontinu<d in Mar<h 1970. 
(6)  The limit set no longer  covers export  credits lending. 
(7)  The limit set no longer covers export credits, nor investment credit opened to residmts before 9 December 1970 and 
reported to the Risk Office not later than 15  December 1970. 
(8)  The limit set no longer covers export credits, nor investment credit opened to residents before 24 March 1971  andre-
ported to the Risk Office not later than 31  March 1971. 
SOU1'ct:  Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
403 Part seven 
THE MONETARY  POLICY 
IN LUXEMBOURG CHAPTER  ONE 
BASIC FACTS  OF  MONETARY POLICY 
Section .  I  .  Institutional framework and structural. aspects 
Para.  I:  Institutional  framework 
Legal  basis 
1.  The monetary system in Luxembourg is  governed by  the special  protocol relat-
ing  to  the  system  of  monetary  association  with Belgium.  This  protocol is  an es-
sential  part  of  the  convention  establishing  an  Economic  Union between  Belgium 
and  Luxembourg  (BLED). 
Owing to its rather special protocol, Belgium bank notes and coins are legal tender 
in the Grand Duchy;  they  constitute  the main part of the fiduciary  circulation in 
Luxembourg. The real Luxembourg issue of notes and coins cannot exceed, relative 
to  the  maximum  issue  of  small  coinage  authorized  by  Belgian  law,  a  limit  cor-
responding  to a relationship with the Belgium  and Luxembourg population, rising 
to  an  absolute  sum  of  150  million  francs.  It represents,  according  to  the  best 
estimations,  only  6 %  of fiduciary  circulation. 
National Bank of Belgium 
2. Due  to  these  arrangements,  Luxembourg  does  not  have  a  central  bank.  The 
National  Bank  of  Belgium  which  issues  Belgian  bank  notes,  is  also  the  issuing 
authority  for  the majority  of  notes  which  circulate  in  Luxembourg.  The Bank is 
permitted under Article  17  of its  statutes to  provide  short-term financing  against 
Luxembourg government security, but it is  not permitted to discount either these 
security or Luxembourg  trade bills.  It is  accepted  that  a change  in Belgian  Bank 
rate  may  have  an impact  on  the structure of  Luxembourg  rates,  in providing  an 
incentive  to  the  Luxembourg  banks  to  bring  their  own  interest  rates  into  line 
and  to  adjust their activity on the Belgian  monetary market accordingly.  Also due 
to the fact  that the official  exchange reserves  of the Economic Union (BLEU)  are 
held  by  the  National  Bank of Belgium,  Luxembourg  surplus  foreign  exchange  is 
automatically  converted  into  Belgian  currency. 
Links between the State of Luxembourg and the National Bank of Belgium 
3.  There being  no central bank in the accepted  sense  of the term, such  monetary 
policy  measures  as  can  be implemented  without  a  central bank  are  handled  by 
the  Government. 
This does  not, of course,  affect the residual legislative powers or the requirements 
of  the Economic Union Treaty. It follows  that no complete  monetary  policy  can 
be  pursued by  the  Luxembourg  authorities.  With the exception  of  the  methods 
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of creating  money  through  refinancing,  the  other instruments  of monetary  policy 
are available  to  the Luxembourg  Government. In all  cases,  only  the  Luxembourg 
authorities can  take the initiative in the adoption of monetary policy measures. 
The Bank Control Commissioner 
4.  The  Government  has  delegated  exercise  '~Jf  these  powers  to  a  Bank  Control 
Commissioner  appointed  under  a  Luxembourg  decree  of  17  October  1945.  The 
Commissioner,  who is  supervised by the  Government, ensures  enforcement of  the 
laws,  decrees  and regulations  relating  to  financial  establishments  and  their  trans-
actions.  Originally the implementing measures  adopted by  the Commissioner were 
mainly  concerned with the protection of depositors,  and  they set out rules  in this 
connection.  In the same  context,  the Commissioner made recommendations  to the 
banking sector concerning the maintenance of a minimum cash  and liquidity ratio; 
in addition to this task he has, however, also the right to request the establishments 
supervised  to  supply  all  information necessary  for  the conduct of general financial 
policy. 
In connection  with  this  last  objective  the  Luxembourg  decree  of  19  June  1965 
entrusted to  the Bank Control Commissioner  the  power to  make  agreements  with 
the establishment supervised,  subject  to  ministerial  approval, on rules  designed  to 
ensure  the orderly development of credit and the implementation of bank liquidity 
policy  of the banking  system. 
The State Savings Bank 
5.  While the Bank Control Commissioner is  therefore the central entity concerned 
with  the  implementation  of  monetary  policy,  the  State  Savings  Bank,  a  public 
institution incorporated under a law  dated  12  February  1856, must also  be men-
tioned.  Thanks  to  resources, it has  considerable  influence  on  the  distribution  of 
credit. In .  can  play a role of  some importance in implementing monetary policy, in 
that  most. of  the banks  match  their interest rates  with many  of  the  lending  and 
borrowing  rates  set  by  the  Savings  Bank.  It should  be noted  that  the  Bank  is 
subject  to  supervision  by  the  Bank  Control  Commissioner. 
The General State Fund 
6.  The  General  State  Fund,  which  is  a  department  of  the  State  Savings  Bank, 
issues Luxembourg currency in accordance the rules of the Economic Union Treaty. 
There is  one other institution having  monetary powers:  the International Bank in 
Luxembourg,  a  limited company  incorporated under Luxembourg  law.  It has  the 
right to issue  a fixed  amount of currency,  which is  relatively small in comparison 
with the overall issue. 
Para.  II:  Structural  aspects 
Para.  II-1:  Structure  of financial  intermediaries 
Classification of financial intermediaries 
7.  In the strict definition  the banking sector, all of which is  subject  to  the super-
vision  of  the  Bank  Control  Commissioner,  comprises  the  banking  and  savings 
establishments. There is no differentiation between deposit banks, banques d'affaires 
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(investment banks)  or long-term credit banks, and even the savings  establishments 
are  allowed  to  engage  in all  banking  transactions.  Thus  the banking and  savings 
establishments  are  covered  by  a  single  definition:  they  are  enterprises  habitually 
accepting  sight  or  short-term  deposits  with  a  view  to using  them,  on their own 
account,  for  credit or investment transactions. The rural  savings banks, which are 
cooperative  societies,  do  not operate  outside  the farm  sector,  however. It should 
also  be  noted that  the State  Savings  Bank is  more  active  in the field  of  medium 
and long-term real estate credit than most of the other banking establishments. 
Although it is  true that the banking system  is  not marked by  distinctions  arising 
from the application of the yardstick of deposits at call and deposits in near-money, 
the Luxembourg Parliament has on the other hand introduced the concept of credit 
establishment,  defined  as  follows:  "any  individual  or  corporation  other  than  a 
banking  establishment  that habitually  engages,  whether as  a primary or as  a sub-
sidiary activity, in the lending of capital, or of purchasing power". 
In the  wide  sense  of  the  term  the credit  establishments,  i.e.  firms  specializing  in 
consumer credit, also  belong to  the banking system,  and the decisions  of the Bank 
Control Commissioner are  enforceable on them also. 
Most  of the banks  are  companies  incorporated under  Luxembourg  law,  although 
some of them are  subsidiaries of  foreign  banks. There are  also  a few  branches of 
foreign bank in Luxembourg.  The State Savings Bank constitutes the public bank-
ing sector;  it carries out all  banking operations. 
In recent years  the number of banks has increased  sharply and a large number of 
business  links  have  been  created  beyond  the  Luxembourg  market,  the  result  of 
which has been a heavy inflow of international capital. 
The  Bank  Control  Commissioner  maintains  a  register  of  banking  and  savings 
establishments  entitled to  operate in the country pursuant  to  the Law  of  2  June 
1962, which  lays  down rules  for  the access  to  and pursuit  of  certain professions 
and  rules  for  the establishment and administration of firms. 
The Treasury 
8.  The Treasury also acts as  a financial intermediary; it creates cash in Luxembourg 
currency  the  amount of  which  is  decided  pursuant  to  the  rules  of the Monetary 
Association Protocol. It is  also the depository of the funds placed on postal cheque 
account,  the surplus of which is  transferred to the General State Fund. The latter 
pays over the assets in Belgian currency to the State Savings Bank. 
The lack  of a central bank is  bound to  raise  special  problems in connection with 
banking liquidity  and the liquidity of  the economy.  Those  in charge of monetary 
policy have been forced  to work out procedures preventing the banks, should the 
need  arise,  from  tying up their funds  to  an  excessive  extent, since refinancing op-
portunities  are  uncertain.  Access  to  the  Belgian  monetary  market  is  of  definite 
value here,  since  it enables  the Luxembourg  banks  to  make  certain rediscountable 
-or at least mobilizable-investments there. 
Para.  II-2:  Banking  system  and  financial  market 
Issue of securities and their holdings by the banks 
9.  The banking and savings establishments are free to acquire on their own account 
Luxembourg  and  foreign  securities,  and several banks are  very  active  in the field 
of issues of international securities. At present ways and means are being considered 
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whereby  the  banking  and  savings  establishments  could incorporate,  under certain 
conditions,  Luxembourg  government  stock  in their liquid investments. 
Financial market regulation 
10.  There is  no institution empowered to regulate the Luxembourg capital market, 
which  is  very  narrow and upon which the institutional investors draw. The Treas-
ury  has  intervened  from  time  to  time  by buying  back  Government stock on the 
stock  exchange,  where  the  terms  of issue  of  the  loans  allowed  it to do  so,  thus 
regularizing  the  market  by  this  procedure  where  necessary. 
Para.  II-.3:  Importance  of financial  transactions  with abroad 
Relation between exports and GNP 
11.  Net  trade  with  abroad  is  an  important  source  of  money  creation,  since  the 
value  of  exports  of  goods  and  services  accounts  for  some  three-quarters  of  the 
gross national product. Of late, this  ratio has  tended to increase, and this explains 
the  high  liquidity  of  the  banking  sector. 
Degree of freedom of capital movements 
12.  Capital  movements  are  relatively  unrestricted:  capital  moves  freely  in  both 
directions unhampered by exchange control. Nor are there administrative obstacles, 
except that foreign firms  and  resident establishments wishing to float  public issues 
on the Luxembourg market must apply for authorization to the Bank Control Com-
missioner. The purpose of this rule  is  to protect the saver. 
Section II - Liquidity 
Para.  I:  The  liquidity  of the  economy 
Content 
13.  The liquidity of the economy  is  made  up  of its legal  means  of  payment  and 
its financial  assets in near-money which represent claims against the banking sector. 
Money  balances  are  composed  of  notes  and  coin,  not  including  notes  and  coin 
held  by  banking  and  savings  establishments,  and  sight  deposits.  The latter  item 
is  sub-divided  into  sight  deposits  with  the  banking  sector  and  deposits  with the 
Postal Cheque Office. Notes and coin in circulation are made up not only of Luxem-
bourg currency but above  all  of Belgian currency, which is legal tender throughout 
Luxembourg. 
The  near-money  assets  of  the  economy  are  savings  deposits,  time  deposits  and 
foreign  exchange  deposits  of  residents. 
Primary liquidity has apparently grown less  rapidly than the gross national product, 
the ratio of the one to the other having fallen from  45·5 %  at the end of 1963  to 
41·6 %  at the end of 1968. However, available data are  not always  reliable, since 
they include the Lfrs.  sight deposits of non-residents. Any valid inferences must he 
based on  the assumption  that the proportion of foreign  funds  is  low and  remains 
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unchanged. Nor is  the amount of Belgian money circulating in Luxembourg known. 
For lack of reliable information,  an estimate has  to be made based on the relation-
ship  of  the  Belgian  gross  national  product  to  the  Luxembourg  gross  national 
product.  On this  basis  it may  be  assumed  that the  share  in primary  liquidity  of 
notes and coin in circulation is about 42 %  and that this ratio is  tending to fall. 
The liquidity of the economy is  largely dependent on net transactions with abroad: 
this  also  explains  why the liquidity  of the banking sector is  so  high. A last point 
is  that  the  economy  has  large  semiliquid  holdings  which  the  banks  can  easily 
transform  into  money  balances. 
Para.  II:  Bank  liquidity 
Content 
14.  The liquidity  of  the  banking  system  includes  cash  and  potential liquidity or, 
simply,  liquidity.  According  to  the  rules  laid  down  by  the  Bank  Control  Com-
missioner, cash includes assets in hand and balances with the Postal Cheque Office, 
the State Savings  Bank and  the  National Bank of Belgium.  It will be noted that 
cash  liquidity is  neither  compulsory,  nor  even  mainly,  made up  of balances  with 
the  Belgian  Central  Bank. 
A  special  feature  of  cash  liquidity  consists  then  in  the  fact  that large  sight  de-
posits  made  by  the  banking  and  savings  establishments  with  the  State  Savings 
Bank  are  regarded  as  primary  liquidity,  although  this  establishment  is  itself  part 
of the banking system and is  subject  to the supervision of the Bank Control Com-
missioner. 
Potential liquidity is  made up  of  bank balances, short-dated securities,  rediscount-
able  securities  and  mobilizable  public  securities.  The  bank  balances  are  mainly 
placings  with Belgian  banks. 
Sources 
15.  Broadly  speaking,  bank liquidity  is  the outcome of  the  play  of forces  which 
are  to  a  considerable  extent  independent:  changes  in  liquidity  are  largely  the 
result of changes in the volume and pattern of the financial assets which the banks 
create  in  response  to  demand  from  the  other sectors  of  the  economy  and  from 
abroad.  These changes  are effected,  in respect of liquidity,  through movements of 
notes and coin, of foreign exchange and of sight deposits through the postal cheque 
accounts  of  the  banks  and  the  accounts  linking  the  Luxembourg  banking  sector 
with  the  Belgian  banks.  Thus,  the  liquidity  of  the  banking .  system,  while  being 
relatively  high  and  normally  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  banking 
control authorities usually varies in relation with considerations alien to the require-
ments  of  monetary  policy.  The  need  for  intervention  by  the  public  authorities 
has  only  recently  become  clear.  Since  the expansion of credit has  to be contained 
within certain limits action has  just begun with a view to controlling the distribu-
tion  of credit. It is,  however,  unlikely  that the  authorities  will use  other instru-
ments  having  a direct impact on banking liquidity. 
Treasury  transactions  do  not  a  priori  affect  the  overall  liquidity  of  the  banking 
system,  since  the  State  Savings  Bank,  as  depository of Treasury liquidity,  is  part 
of  the  banking  system. 
The  liquidity  of  the  banking  system  is  measured  by  the  arithmetic  relationship 
between the bank assets  regarded as  liquid  and its sight- and short-term liabilities. 
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The  banking  sector  may  acquire  rediscountable  or mobilizable  commercial  bills, 
bank  acceptances  and  Belgian  Government  stock,  which  in  fact  constitute  a 
substantial  part  of its  potential liquidity. 
Other  components  of  bank  liquidity  may  be  taken  into  consideration  when  the 
banks  are  viewed  in isolation.  These  are  largely  liquidity  components  relating  to 
technical  operations  that do  not affect  the  overall liquidity of the  system:  this is 
the case  for example with interbank investments or the sale of claims  among local 
banks. 
Para.  III:  Liquidity  and  public  finance 
Treasury ~geznent 
16.  Treasury liquidity is  invested in  the banking sector.  The General State Fund, 
which  centralizes  the  moneys  received,  is  part of  the  State  Savings  Bank,  which 
has  the  rank  of  state accountant.  Hovever,  payments  may  also  be made  through 
the postal cheque service, with which the General Fund has an  account. The latter 
keeps  separate  accounts  from  the  State  Savings  Bank  and  deposits  the  available 
Treasury moneys  with it.  These  moneys  may  also  be placed  with other banks, in 
bonds or certificates  issued by the Central Government  or the Luxembourg Com-
munes or in foreign Government bonds  and  securities guaranteed by foreign Gov-
ernments. 
Treasury manageznent effects on liquidity 
17.  The flow  of  liquidity  between the  public  sector  and  the  banking  sector does 
not necessarily  modify  bank liquidity,  as  it does  where  public  liquidity is  admi-
nistered by a Central Bank. Only when Treasury funds  leave  the banking sector is 
there  any  change  in bank  liquidity  (operations  involving  postal  cheque  accounts, 
foreign  countries,  movements  of cash). 
The Treasury is  the  depository of funds  deriving from  the  economy,  through  the 
Postal Cheque Office service. Net transactions on postal cheque account thus modify 
bank liquidity. 
The  financing  of  Treasury  commitments  is  a  third  method  of  modifying  bank 
liquidity.  The Treasury has  a credit line with the State Savings Bank and another 
with  the  International  Bank  in  Luxembourg,  this  being  the  counterpart  to  the 
International Bank's right of issue.  The bank sector can  also  acquire claims on the 
public sector (loan certificates, Treasury certificates). These are short- and medium-
term  public  paper,  freely  assignable  between  the  banks  and  issued  on  the  basis 
of agreements negotiated between the banking sector and the Central Government, 
with facilities  for extension. It is  unlikely that the contribution of the bank sector 
to  the  financing  of  the  Government's  borrowing  requirement  hampers  credit 
policy. 
Lastly, under tl1e  Convention of 12 April1968, the Luxembourg Government has, 
in  the same way as  the Belgian  Government, a credit line with the National Bank 
of Belgium  of  an  amount  proportionate  to  the respective  populations  of the  two 
countries.  This  facility  is  available  for  temporary  deficiencies  only,  not exceeding 
120 days,  at Belgian bank rate,  against  the lodgment by  the Luxembourg Govern-
ment  of  a  Luxembourg Treasury  Bond denominated  in Belgian  francs. 
The Treasury influences  the liquidity of the economy through the issue of Luxem-
bourg  notes  and  coin,  the amount  of  which  is  fixed  contractually  under  the mo-
netary  association  protocol. 
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The  authorities  can  modify  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  through  the  issue  of 
medium- and  long-term  public  stock.  The  resulting change  in liquidity is  unlikely 
to be  lasting,  however. 
Insofar  as  the Treasury uses  the moneys placed on Postal Cheque Account,  it can 
step up the liquidity of the economy.  Again, the fact  that the State General Fund 
places  the available  Treasury funds with the State Savings Bank enables  the latter 
to use such funds  to make loans  within the framework of its own liquidity policy. 
Lastly,  the money-market loans raised by the Treasury to finance  the budget deficit 
have  so  far  been  relatively  small. 
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THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Section I  - Refinancing policy 1 
General background 
18.  The  concept  of  refinancing  policy  must  be  understood in the  context  of  the 
Luxembourg  monetary  system. 
The absence  of  a  central  bank raises  fundamental  problems.  The refinance  policy 
of  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  is  not  automatically  applicable  to  the  Luxem-
bourg  banking  system.  In  this  connection  is  should  be  noted  that  the  banking 
sector is  subject solely to the supervision of the Luxembourg banks' Control Com-
missioner. 
Under  the  special  Monetary  Association  Protocol  "the Belgian  Government  shall 
make all contacts and negotiate all agreements with the National Bank of Belgium 
necessary  to facilitate  for  the  Luxembourg Government and  the Luxembourg eco-
nomy access  to  any  credit that can  be granted by  the National Bank of Belgium, 
especially  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  and  maintenance  in  Luxembourg  of 
an  office  of  the National Bank with a  discount counter". 
In fact  the liquidity of the banking system has so  far posed few  problems;  on the 
contrary,  the  bank  sector  normally  offers  fairly  substantial  sums  on  the  Belgian 
money  market.  Part of the claims  which it thus acquires  from  the Rediscount and 
Guarantee  Institute  can  be  rediscounted with the same  institution.  These  are,  of 
course, credits granted by the Luxembourg banking system indirectly to the Belgian 
economy, some of which are backed by a right of rediscount. This is not refinancing 
in the strict sense  of  the  word. 
Rediscounting by the NBB 
19.  In addition  to this  special  form  of  refinancing  there  is  a  right  of  mobilizing 
claims on the Luxembourg Government with the National Bank of Belgium. Under 
Article  17  of its ,  Statute,  the  Belgian  Central  Bank  may  "discount,  purchase  and 
assign  short- or medium-term paper issued  or guaranteed by  the Belgian  Govern-
ment or by the Luxembourg Government or issued by institutions whose liabilities 
are  guaranteed  by  the  Belgian  Government  or by  the  Luxembourg  Government, 
... make current-account advances and short-term loans against pledges:  a) of public 
short-, medium- or long-term securities, issued or guaranteed by ... the Luxembourg 
Government ... b) of  like  securities  issued  by  institutions  the  liabilities  of  which 
are guaranteed by  the ...  Luxembourg Government  ... ". 
'  For  the  exact  meaning  of  this  term,  refer  to  Part  I,  point  7L 
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lnftuence on the levels of interest rate 
20.  In fact, the scope for refinancing is very limited and the Luxembourg monetary 
authorities  can,  at  the present  time  at  any  rate,  exert hardly  any  influence  at all 
on bank liquidity through this instrument. The terms governing rediscounting with 
the National Bank of Belgium,  including  bank rate,  have  very  little monetary im-
pact on the Luxembourg economy,  except to the  extent that they can in principle 
provide  an  incentive  to  the  Luxembourg  banking  system  to  offer,  through  the 
Belgian Rediscount  and Guarantee Institute, a  greater or lesser volume of Luxem-
bourg funds  on the Belgian  money  market. 
On the other hand,  the Bank Control Commissioner can pursue a form of interest 
rate policy  designed  to  influence  the distribution of credit to the economy.  Under 
Article 8 of the Luxembourg decree  of  19  June 1965  concerning bank and credit 
transactions  and  securities  issues  the  Control  Commissioner  has  power  to  adopt, 
by agreement with the establishments subject to his jurisdiction,  rules  the purpose 
of  which is  the order development of credit and the pursuit of  a liquidity policy 
for  the  banking  system.  When 90 %  of  the  bank  and  credit  establishments  sign 
the  agreement  it becomes  compulsory  for  all  the  banking  sector. 
This measure is now being negotiated, but as  it has  no.  precedent its effectiveness 
cannot  be  predicted.  · 
Section II - The  control  of bank liquidity 
21.  A refinance policy presupposes the existence of a central bank, both for assign-
ments of claims  and  secured advances, whereas the control of bank liquidity could 
be carried  out by  a  non-bank  acting  as  depository  for  compulsory  reserves.  Such 
an  institution does  not exist  in Luxembourg,  however,  and,  in general,  no  direct 
method of controlling the volume  of bank liquidity  is  used.  Public securities held 
by  the banks do not constitute evidence  of a measure  of monetary  policy  but are 
issued  under  an  agreement  with  the  banking  system  to  finance  Treasury  expen-
diture.  Moreover  they  are  freely  assignable  as  between the local banks. 
There is a  cash  ratio  and  a liquidity  ratio  which,  under  a  recommendation  from 
the  Bank  Control  Commissioner,  should  be  maintained  at  6%  and  30%  res-
pectively  of certain categories  of liabilities.  However,  these  ratios  are  laid  down 
with the  aim  of  ensuring  the technical  solvency  of  the banks.  As  the rates  have 
so  far  remained  constant  they  have  not  changed  the  relative  liquidity  of  the 
banking sector and have  therefore not had an effect  as  an instrument of monetary 
policy.  Moreover,  the components of bank liquidity are at present largely made up 
of short-term claims on the Luxembourg economy and on the Belgian economy. 
Section III - Supervision  of the money market and  of the links with 
international money markets 
22.  It is  virtually  impossible  to  study  the  Luxembourg  money  market  separately 
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from  the  Belgian  market.  Since  the  Belgian  franc  is  legal  tender  and  acceptable 
in unlimited  amounts in Luxembourg,  transactions  take place  unhampered within 
the Economic Union, and the Luxembourg banking system has access to the Belgian 
money  market, upon which it has  traditionally been a lender. 
The Luxembourg monetary  authorities do  not use  open market policy to influence 
bank liquidity through the money market. Generally,  the banks place part of their 
resources  on  the  Belgian  market  and  they  repatriate  these  funds  in  accordance 
with needs,  thus  themselves contracting or expanding liquidity. 
Article 17 of the Statute of the National Bank of Belgium establishes the principle 
of  open  market  operations,  which  could  apparently  be  applied  to  Luxembourg 
public  stock.  However,  open market operations  by  the Belgian  monetary  authori-
ties  are  effected  through the Securities  Stabilization Fund, which operates only  in 
Belgium. 
Section IV • Direct control of the distribution of credit 
23.  Among  the  different  ways  in  which  bank  liquidity  is  controlled,  only  two 
require  the  intervention of a  central  bank:  refinancing  and the sterilization-to 
whatever  extent-of bank liquidity  through  open  market  operations.  The  third 
method  of intervention  does  not necessitate  the assistance  of  a  central  bank;  a 
non-bank  could  centralize the compulsory  reserves  of  the  banking  sector.  Never-
theless,  the  Luxembourg  authorities  have  not so  far  used  this  device;  they  have 
preferred direct  methods  of  controlling  the  distribution of credit, either  through 
quantitative regulations or through selective control or qualitative control. 
In view  of  the  special  organization  of  the  Luxembourg monetary  system  in  the 
framework  of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union,  the Bank Control Commis-
sioner  has  certain monetary powers. He centralizes  information on the pattern of 
the resources  and investments  of the banking sector and he monitors the trend of 
credit. This process has revealed a need to curb consumer credit and to take certain 
measures  at the  same  time  to  check  credit in  general. 
For  this  reason  a  control  system  is  envisaged  combining  quota  restrictions  and 
the reduction of the period for which consumer credit tnay be granted, with quali-
tative  control of credit in general  through  adjustments  in interest rates.  To pre-
vent  this  qualitative  restriction  having  too  general  an  impact,  certain  exceptions 
are  provided for  in  the field  of subsidised housing  and productive investment. 
It is  to be noted that these  control measures  will require the agreement of 90 % 
of the  banks  and  will  be  subject  to  ministerial  approval. If 90 %  of  the banks 
give  their approval the rules  will become compulsory for  the entire sector. 
These control measures would remain in force  for an initial period of six months, 
or one  year  at  the outside. 
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1-' 
00 
Notes and coin (2) 
Luxembourg  Belgian notes 
notes and coin  and coin  (1)  Total 
1963  297  5,9H  5,928 
1964  317  6,491  6,358 
1965  319  6,653  6,530 
1966  345  6,678  6,551 
1967  380  6,582  6,440 
1968  423  6,778  6,674 
1969  476  7,115  6,922 
1970  433  7,319  7,123 
---------------------· -------
(1)  Estimate based on the ratio of the Luxembourg G.N.P.  to  the Belgiau G.N.P. 
(2)  Minus cash in hand with banks  and savings  banks. 
TABLE 1 
Primary  liquidity 
(in  Lfrs.  million) 
Deposit  money 
Share of  notes 
Primary  and  coin 
Sight  Postal  cheque  liquidity  as  a  percentage 
deposits  (2)  deposits  (2)  Total  of primary liquidity 
5,295  1,288  6,583  12,511  47 
6,314  1,213  7,527  13,885  45 
6,182  1,321  7,503  14,033  46 
6,380  1,268  7,648  14,199  46 
7,098  1,242  8,340  14,780  43 
7,860  1,367  9,227  15,901  42 
9,309  1,235  10,544  17,466  39 
10,522  1,275  11,798  18,921  37 .f::,.  ...... 
\0 
Notes  and  coins  Deposit money  Total  (1)  (2) 
--------
1963  5,928  6,583  12,511 
1964  6,358  7,527  13,885 
1965  6,530  7,503  14,033 
1966  6,551  7,648  14,199 
1967  6,440  8,340  14,780 
1968  6,674  9,227  15,901 
1H69  6,922  10,544  17,46G 
1H70  7,123  11,  7H8  18,H21 
(1)  Estimate based on the ratio of the Luxembourg G.N.P.  to the Belgian G.N.P. 
(2)  Minus cash in hand with banks and savings  banks. 
TABLE 2 
Liquidity  of  the  economy 
Time  deposits 
Savings  deposits  (francs  and 
foreign 
currencies) 
9,271  7,179 
10,476  7,910 
11,398  9,272 
12,153  11,999 
13,286  14,304 
14,263  17,546 
15,335  30,165 
16,467  41,875 
(3)  Minu~ 80%  of foreign  currency deposits, which is the estimated share of non  .. residents' deposits  . 
(in  Lfrs.  million) 
Sight  deposits  Total  Liquidity  of the  in foreign  (3)  economy  currencies 
-----
1,823  15,659  28,170 
2,680  18,020  31,905 
4' 10\l  20' 180  34,213 
4,013  22,124  36,323 
5,361  24,625  39,405 
6,302  27,719  43,620 
13,543  34,672  52,1:18 
13,116  43,346  62,267 TABLE 3 
Liquidity  of  the  economy  and  Gross  National  Product 
(in  L[rs.  million) 
Primary  Secondary 
GNP  Primary  liquidity as  a  Secondary  liquidity as  a 
liquidity  percentage  liquidity  percentage 
of  GNP  of  GNP 
1963  27,496  12,511  45.5  15,659  56.9 
1964  31,596  13,885  43.9  18,020  57.0 
1965  33,117  14,033  42.4  20,180  60.9 
1966  34,665  14,199  41.0  22,124  63.8 
1967  36,052  14,780 
I 
41.0  24,625  68.3 
1968  38,251  15,901  41.6  27,719  72.5 
1969  44,538  17,466  39.2  34,672  77.8 
1970  49,770  18,921  38.0  43,346  87.1 
420 Notes 
and coin 
1963  400 
1964  522 
1965  524 
1966  562 
1967  671 
1968  914 
1969  935 
1970  947 
it  (1)  See point 14  in the text  •  ..... 
Cash 
Deposit 
money 
1,200 
1,291 
1,721 
1,981 
2,733 
3,218 
4,711 
5,427 
Total 
1,600 
1,813 
2,245 
2,543 
3,404 
4,132 
5,646 
6,374 
TABLE  4 
Bank  liquidity 
Short-term  Banks 
security (1)  (1) 
337  9,609 
292  11,219 
320  13,475 
462  17,571 
474  24,183 
816  38,925 
1,050  70,498 
1,447  105,316 
(in  Lfrs,  million) 
Potential liquidity 
Total Bank 
Rediscountable  Mobilizable  pub- liquidity 
commercial  bills  lie  securities  Total 
3,231  1,200  14,377  15,977 
4,539  3  16,053  17,866 
4,179  1,781  19,755  22,000 
4,863  2,712  25,608  28,151 
4,377  4,356  33,390  36,794 
3,947  5,282  48,970  53,102 
5,830  5,175  82,553  88,199 
6,068  4,588  117,419  123,793 ANALYSIS  OF CONTENTS PREFACE 
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